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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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

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The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between December 25 and January 25, inclusive.

105,770

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FOREWORD

The MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN of the Office of Naval Intelligence has now been published for over nine years. It has a circulation of slightly under 800 copies, reaching all commands, afloat and ashore, except very minor ones, and, in addition, the State Department and the more important commands of the Army.

The attention of the service is invited to the fact that the BULLETIN is the only medium of wide circulation which the service has for general information of a confidential or near-confidential nature. As such, it has vast opportunities for the expansion of its usefulness. At present, the great majority of the material for the BULLETIN is received from a comparatively very small number of sources, and this material is usually in the form of intelligence reports. But it is felt that the BULLETIN, to make the most of its opportunities, should draw from the service at large and should be the vehicle of expression of those confidential matters of most interest to the service at large.

Accordingly, the Office of Naval Intelligence desires and requests that officers submit to the BULLETIN, for publication in the Special-Article section, articles of general interest on naval subjects which are of too confidential a nature for a public periodical, such as the Proceedings of the Naval Institute. These articles might be such as comments on existing naval practices or activities, suggestions for improving same; ideas concerning naval activity abroad or in cooperation with other branches of the Government, etc.

But, furthermore, the Office of Naval Intelligence believes that the BULLETIN should be something more than a technical periodical—it should be, as well, an instrument of education in those broad spheres in which our Navy should be increasingly interested as a representative of a world Power whose interests are continually expanding. Hence this office also desires confidential articles from officers of the services on such subjects as our foreign relations; foreign trade and shipping; observations on the political, economic, and social activities of foreign peoples, reports of travel abroad, etc., particularly, of course, as these subjects bear upon the mission of our Navy and Government in war and peace. A few hypothetical subjects, chosen at random, might be mentioned as: The clash of foreign interests in China, or in South America; Sea control of the oil routes of the world; Singapore versus Pearl Harbor; The political position of the United States in Panama; Communism in the Far East; A visit to the Dutch East Indies. etc.

Suggestions or comments from the service regarding these missions which the BULLETIN desires to fill will be welcomed.

Special articles for the BULLETIN should be sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, marked " For the BULLETIN," in original and at least one copy. There are no other stipulations in regard to submission of such. Credit will be given in the BULLETIN to the author of an article, but it is understood, of course, that no remuneration can be made.

CONFIDENTIAL

O. N. I. MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

VOL. X FEBRUARY, 1928 No. 8

ARGENTINA

B. POLITICA

1. Editorial on President Coolidge's message to Congress.

The Argentine press has devoted leading editorials to President Coolidge's recent message to Congress. They particularly take offense to what they consider a suggested comparison between the Governments of China and Nicaragua and a similarity of methods of treatment in regard to the landing of armed forces. In speaking of financing and loans, it states that the bankers are not philanthropists, but business men, and they do not consider loans to Central American Republics as acts of philanthropy.

Where mention was made of our armed forces as assisting in restoring peace, they state that they can not see the " assistance " part of it, as they maintain that we were operating against an organized force which had the right to rebel.

Several articles have been published citing influential Nicaraguans' upholding of the action of the United States in Nicaragua, and these have been adversely commented on by the press, stating that Nicaragua might as well be a part of the United States and that it is inconceivable that presidential candidates in Nicaragua would have to seek the approval of their candidacy from a Secretary of State.

The press, in general, frequently comments adversely on our Nicaraguan action and policy. *La Prensa* in particular was informed of conditions by a member of the Geographical Society, who was familiar with Latin American conditions and the methods in which insurrections started and were carried on in Central American countries and who gave them a very good argument as to why the United States found it necessary to intervene, but this apparently has made no impression.

NOTE.—In connection with the above, it is to be noted that Mr. Hughes, the chief of our delegation at the Pan American Conference, declared at the conference that it was the desire of our Government to withdraw from Nicaragua just as soon as such a move is possible. It must be remembered that our forces are in Nicaragua at the request of both the Conservative and Liberal factions.—ED.

CHILE

A. ECONOMIC

1. Economic estimate.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

Economic penetration of foreign interests.—Chile, like most new countries, early realized the need of foreign capital and the assistance of business and professional men from other countries. To obtain these, attractive profits and treatment were accorded foreign capital and enterprises up to a few years ago—until about the beginning of ex-President Alessandri's administration. The lower classes then began to make themselves felt, and the tendency from then on has been toward subjecting foreign and national business enterprises to the same treatment. This is reflected in many new laws. Also, a greater feeling of nationalism has been growing and manifesting itself during the past 10 years. The national wealth of Chile is estimated at about $5,000,000,000; and foreign investments at $1,192,000,000. Allowing for inaccuracies, this indicates that from 20 to 25 per cent of the capital wealth of the country is owned, directly or indirectly, by foreigners. As the United States owns nearly one-half of the foreign investments, this means that she owns 10 per cent of the capital wealth of Chile—and is rapidly acquiring more.

Foreign investments are estimated as follows:

United States	$526,000,000
British	351,000,000
German	100,000,000
Spanish	80,000,000
Italian	$60,000,000
French	45,000,000
All others	30,000,000

The United States stands out without a foreign competitor in the field of mining. The amount invested is $276,000,000, principally in three larger copper companies and one iron mine. British mining investments are estimated at $4,000,000.

The nitrate interests are next in importance. The British have $75,000,000, United States $30,400,000 and Germany $20,000,000 invested in this industry.

Foreign railroad investments are almost entirely in the hands of British and American interests, with $75,000,000 and $10,000,000, respectively. The railroads owned by Americans are those serving their mining and nitrate interests.

Economic penetration of foreign countries by Chileans.—Bolivia is practically the only country in which Chile has investments. The majority of the large tin and silver mining companies were incorporated under Chilean law and organized and financed by Chileans. Important capital-share interests are still held by Chileans.

Bearing of the economic situation on international relations.—Although Chile owes her present economic importance largely to foreign capital and energy, and is practically dependent upon foreign capital to increase her economic capacity, she maintains an independent foreign policy which is based strictly upon expediency. At the present time Chilean policies are guided more by British influence than any other Power.

Foreign commercial and economic influences affect internal affairs to some extent as regards discrimination against foreign investments.

General conclusions.—The financial barometer of the country is the nitrate industry on which the Government depends for a large portion of its revenues. For Chile to maintain her standing there should exist a fair certainty that the nitrate trade will revive and Chile's monopoly of this product be permanently maintained; or to so diversify her economic production and economize in her governmental expenses as to make her prosperity and solvency independent of the future of the nitrate trade.

In case of war of any magnitude, she would need foreign financial help. Chile is self-sufficient as to food with the exception of sugar.

NOTE.—The public opinion of Chile is not, generally speaking, any too favorable to the United States. To a large extent this is due to the results of the arbitration award of the United States in the Tacna-Arica dispute between Chile and Peru, which award was not accepted by Chile after she and Peru had agreed upon the United States as an arbitrator. Chile has recently been upset by political turmoil and her economic stability threatened by the lessening of world demand for her nitrates, due to the increase of the air fixation process of obtaining nitrogen.

Our investments in Chile are larger than in any other South American country (but closely followed by those in Argentina) and are, in all Latin America, only exceeded by those in Cuba and Mexico. Our capital invested in Chile has increased 3,000 per cent since 1915. Our total investments south of the Rio Grande, including the West Indies, are well above $5,000,000,000, an increase of about 300 per cent in 16 years.—ED.

DENMARK

A. AERONAUTICAL

1. Aviation exhibit and aviation factories.

The International Aviation Show held in Copenhagen, recently was a disappointment from the technical point of view as very few new types of aircraft were exhibited. Several countries, including Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Holland, and Italy, showed merely photographs, models, and in the cases of Germany and Czechoslovakia a few examples of well-known engines. France had by far the largest exhibit, occupying almost half the "Forum" where the exposition was held. The French airplanes, however, were far from new, consisting of a Farman single-engined "Jabiru," a Morane 137 training monoplane, and a Loire-Gourdou-Leseurre type 32 pursuit monoplane. Outside of the building in front of the main entrance was placed the Loire Olivier *LeO H 19* flying boat flown across Africa by Lieutenant Bernard. It may also be mentioned that several other French seaplanes were moored off the naval air station.

The one novelty on the French stand was the 18-cylinder W-type inverted high-speed Farman engine developing 700 horsepower at 3,200 revolutions per minute. The Farman reduction gear has a ratio of 2.46 to 1. The total weight (dry) is 927 pounds. The cylinder dimensions are distinctly small, being 4.33 by 4.93 inches, the power being obtained by using a fairly high compression ratio (6 to 1) and a high rate of revolution.

The British section was confined to three firms: The Bristol, Armstrong-Siddeley, and Henry Hughes. The Bristol Co. showed their new type 101 two-seater fighter with Jupiter VI engine. This airplane has a steel wing structure, the spars being built up of rolled strips riveted together. The fuselage and tail plane are of wood. Owing to the special form of the top fuselage fairing, the field of fire aft is very good. The pilot's vision is also excellent due to the 30° forward stagger of the wings. Both the pilot's seat and rudder bar are adjustable. The Oleo rubber landing gear has a stroke of 8 inches.

The Armstrong-Siddeley Co. showed four different types of engines, and Henry Hughes a complete series of his aircraft instruments.

On the Swedish stand was an R-42 L Junkers bomber with three 310 horsepower Junkers engines. This airplane is practically identical with the G-24 commercial type except for the detachable center section of the fuselage which contains the cockpits and bomb compartment.

In addition to the two gun cockpits on top of the fuselage there is a gun turret which can be lowered below the body by means of a Bowden wire control. When in the lowered position it can be rotated by the gunner's left hand in an effort to keep the gun trained on the objective with his right. Leaving aside the effect of the air blast, it is doubtful whether the turret can be rotated quickly enough to be of much use.

The crew consists of five—two pilots, two gunners, and a bomber. Racks are arranged for four 220-pound, six 110-pound, and twelve 55-pound bombs, a total of 2,204 pounds.

Among the equipment noticed was a Bristol gas starter, Horn electric tachometers, Goerz altimeters, Zeiger air-speed indicator, and Weymann fuel gauges. The fuel capacity of 340 gallons gives a range of about 620 miles and a duration of 6.5 hours at cruising speed. The total fuel consumption for the three engines at full throttle is 463 pounds per hour and at cruising speed 352.51 pounds per hour. The consumption of oil is 5 per cent that of fuel.

The Danish Army showed a type O observation biplane and the Danish Navy showed a Danecock pursuit airplane and a Brandenburg observation seaplane.

NAVAL AIRCRAFT FACTORY

The naval aircraft factory forms a small section of the large naval dockyard which employs 1,000 men. The aviation section has only about 100 workmen.

The present activities of the aircraft factory are concentrated on Hawker Danecock purusit airplanes, of which three have been built and four are now being completed following the purchase of three in England. These airplanes are practically identical with British service Hawker "Woodcocks" except that the "Jaguar" is substituted for the "Jupiter" engine. One of the Danish-built "Danecocks" has a supercharged engine giving, it is stated, a ceiling of 31,160 feet; even an unsupercharged model has a ceiling of 28,870 feet. The speed at ground level is only 148 miles per hour.

The workmanship of the Danecock is extremely good, being quite up to the British standard. Much of the raw material, including spruce and the wires used for the fuselage bracing, is bought in England.

Denmark is leaning heavily on the British industry as it is also obtaining delivery of a large flying boat, the *Nanock* (three Jaguar engines), built by the Supermarine Co. at Southampton. Owing to the pressure of work on the Schneider cup contenders, the delivery of the *Nanock* is behind schedule, but the Supermarine Co. are paying a penalty for the delay.

Shortly after the war, the naval aircraft factory started building 25 Brandenburg monoplane seaplanes with a Danish-built copy of the 175-horsepower Benz.

I saw some duralumin floats of these seaplanes under repair. Despite the coating of tar varnish inside and out, and also on the outside two coats of shellac and a coat of white paint, the metal which dated from 1921 had very nearly perished. These floats are typical Heinkel designs, having a flat bottom forward and a V bottom aft of the step.

Some of the Brandenburgs are used for training, in which case wooden floats are employed instead of metal on account of expense. Recently a few Avro Lynx seaplanes have been bought for training.

Other aeronautical activities of the factory included the construction of a couple of Farman "Jabiru" commercial airplanes (four 180-horsepower Hispano-Suiza) for the Danish air lines. These airplanes are conceded to be unsatisfactory not only on account of their design but also because of the difficulty of keeping the four engines in tune.

Not far from the aircraft factory is the naval air station where the engines used in the Brandenburg seaplanes were made and where repairs are now undertaken. At the station are three test beds, one for water-cooled, one for rotary air-cooled, and one for radial air-cooled engines.

MILITARY AIRCRAFT FACTORY

The army maintains a small aircraft factory on the outskirts of Copenhagen. It is now occupied with building 11 O type biplanes used for training or observation, depending upon whether a 160-horsepower Mercedes or a 230-horsepower B. M. W. IV is used, these engines being interchangeable by unfastening four bolts.

The O airplane is very similar in size to the Fokker CI but has a number of features incorporated in the CV, such as the pivoted tail skid and adjustable stabilizer. The wing covering follows Fokker practice. On the upper surface plywood is used from the nose to the front spar and on the lower surface from the nose to the rear spar, the rest of the covering being of fabric. A German N. K. F. honeycomb radiator equipped with shutters is placed under the fuselage. The landing gear incorporates an axle floating between the two fore and aft landing gear struts on each side and connected to horizontal rods running between the bases of the struts by a number of rubber loops. Additional shock absorbing is furnished by an Oleo arrangement running up from the axle to the junction of the side struts. The wings of the O airplane are constructed by the army technical corps in a separate shop near Copenhagen. The military aircraft factory, however, is equipped for engine repairs.

FRANCE

A. NAVAL

1. New building program.

On December 20 the Chamber of Deputies reconvened after the brief recess and immediately took under consideration the draft bill authorizing the laying down, between July 1, 1927, and June 30, 1928, of the units included in the second part of the naval program, and fixing the yearly appropriations to be inscribed for this purpose on the budgets from 1927 to 1932. This bill had been formulated and examined, and its passage was assured prior to the adjournment of Parliament last summer; but the circumstances connected with that adjournment, together with the fact that the Chamber has concentrated entirely on the budget since its reconvening in the autumn, prevented earlier consideration of this bill.

That section of the Journal Officiel of December 21, 1927, reporting the debate may be briefly summarized as follows:

In dealing with the difficulties with which French naval construction had had to contend after eight years of enforced idleness, reference was made to the tremendous intensive development of German naval construction within the tonnage limits of the treaty of Versailles.

No allusion was made to our recently announced naval program, and in speaking of the naval conference at Geneva there was merely a temperately phrased and brief rehearsal of the reasons preventing the French acceptance of the invitation to attend, as set forth in their notes to us of February 15 and April 2, 1927, one remark to the effect that, as was to be expected, the conference ended in a breakdown, and the expression of the hope that the conference and the very reasons of its failure will make her American and English friends realize the obligations imposed upon France by the length of her lines of communication and her colonial empire. The Socialist spokesman, in opposing the bill, restated the consistently maintained position of his party that as the cardinal rôle of the French Navy should be one of defense, construction should be concentrated primarily on submarines and secondarily on small tonnage units. While admitting that the treaty of Washington established the maximum tonnage of cruisers, he contended that no reason exists for building up to this maximum. In conclusion, he observed that if either France or Italy effected a large concentration of troops near the frontier, the other would consider itself threatened and, therefore, on sea, he urged that France's neighbors be given a proof of her pacific intentions by way of a cessation of the concentration in the Mediterranean of the bulk of France's active naval force.

This latter view, as might be expected at the present time, did not find much support and the bill was passed without any further discussion of moment.

The following day in the Senate the budget debate was interrupted and after a very rapid discussion in which no opposition was manifested, and during which the Minister of Marine declared that the general morale of the navy is distinctly improving, and that, specifically, the number of candidates for the naval schools and of enlistments and reenlistments is increasing, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 271 to 21.

The bill consists of only three articles.

Article 1 authorizes the laying down, between July 1, 1927, and July 30, 1928, of:

1 cruiser	tons	10,000
6 destroyer leaders	tons each	2,500
5 first-line submarines	do	1,600
1 submarine mine-layer	tons	750
2 scout ships for distant operations	tons each	2,500

The original intention had been to build 3 large destroyers, or destroyer leaders, of some 2,700 tons, and 4 smaller destroyers of some 1,500 tons, but this has been abandoned, and the 6 vessels now to be laid down will still be within the class of destroyer leaders. These 6 units will probably very closely resemble the *Tigre* (2,360 tons) type in tonnage though with a superior armament of 5.5-inch guns (*Tigre* mounts 5.1-inch guns) and with a speed of 37 knots. The French feel that when the present destroyer leaders are constructed they will have a splendidly effective flotilla and will be superior to any other navy in this arm; in this connection, it may be noted that during the debate in the Chamber the president of the naval commission stated that a section of these destroyer leaders could join issue with an Italian light cruiser of 5,000 tons.

This same speaker indicated that the five first-line submarines would be similar to the *Redoubtable* and the *Pascal*, though they will probably be nearer the tonnage of the latter inasmuch as their authorized size is 1,600 tons.

NOTE.—In addition to the above program, there is authorized, under a previous law, the laying down of eight 600-ton coastal submarines during 1927 and 1928. France is now building 14 submarines of 1,600 tons, 1 of 3,000 tons, 3 of 780 tons, and 8 of 750 tons. Attention is invited to the following article as an aid in appreciating the scope of the French postwar building activities.—ED.

2. *Résumé of naval policy and organization.*

(*a*) NAVAL POLICY

French naval policy is based upon the fact that, although France does not possess a relatively powerful force of capital ships, at the same time, with her light forces and submarines backed by a powerful air force, she hopes to make it impossible for large surface ships to dominate the Western Mediterranean. Therefore it will be possible for France to keep open her lines of communication between southern France, Corsica, and northern Africa for the purpose of transporting troops and supplies.

To this end, the French program of naval development appears to be along the following lines:

(1) Replacement of obsolete light forces and submarines with modern ships.

(2) Increasing the numbers of light forces and submarines.

(3) Execution of a restricted program of coast defense.

(4) Increasing the development of naval aviation.

(5) Modernizing the few remaining battleships.

France has a heavy building program for light forces, as indicated in the table attached. The 1922 and 1923 blocks of the program have been completed, the 1924 block is nearly completed, and the 1925 block is well advanced.

French postwar building program

Type	Building, 1924 and 1925 programs	Authorized and appropriated for 1926 program	Authorized and appropriated for 1927 program	Built, 1922 and 1923 programs	Projected		Total
					1928 program	1929 program	
	Number of units	*Number of units*	*Number of units*	*Number of units*	*Number of units*	*Number of units*	
(CV) Aircraft carriers, first line				1			1
(CL) Light cruisers, first line	3	1	1	3	1		9
(DD) Destroyers, first line	10	4		12	4	2	36
(DL) Destroyer leaders	3	3	6	6	3	3	24
(CM) Mine layers, first line	1				1		2
(SC) Cruiser-submarines		1			1		2
(SS) Submarines, first line	9	5	5	9	6	5	39
(OSS) Submarines, second line		8	4	12	4	4	32
(SM) Mine-laying submarines, first line	2	1	1		1	1	6
(AO) Oil tankers	1	2			2		5
(AS) Submarine tenders		1					1
Cadet school ships		1					1
Gun boats			2				2
River gun boats	1						1
Aircraft transports	1						1

(*b*) ORGANIZATION

The present French Government is a Republic based upon the representative system. The President of the Republic is the head of the State. It is a position of great dignity, but little power, similar to that of the King of England. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who selects his ministers to form the cabinet. The Prime Minister is president of the council (cabinet) and actually the head of the Government. The cabinet collectively is responsible for the general policy of the Government and in practice is the executive power. No one person (neither the President of the Republic nor the Prime Minister) is authorized to give orders to the head of an executive department, who is subject only to the orders passed by the council of ministers or cabinet as a whole. Any order of the President of the Republic, to be legal, must be countersigned by a minister. This assures legislative control, since ministers comprise the cabinet, which is responsible to Parliament.

Distinct from the cabinet, but comprised of some of the cabinet members, is the Council of National Defense (Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale), which body is charged with the organization of the entire nation for war and is composed as follows: The Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of Public Works, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, the Minister for the Colonies, the vice president of the army war board (Conseil Supérieur de Guerre), the vice president of the navy war board (Conseil Supérieur de la Marine).

The head of an executive department and member of the council (cabinet), such as the Minister de la Marine, is responsible for his own department to the cabinet. The naval command includes the naval and aeronautical forces of the high seas, the naval forces, air and land, of the coast defense, and the service schools destined for recruiting and training of military personnel.

Naval administration may be classified under the three following subdivisions:

(1) The central administration in Paris.

(2) The administration of the naval regions, ports, and establishments at home and abroad.

(3) The administration of the high seas forces.

The Minister of Marine (Secretary of the Navy) is the supreme head of the navy. He may be either a naval officer or civilian. He need not necessarily be either a senator or deputy, though while holding office he becomes "ex officio" a member of both houses and takes part in their debates on any subject of naval interest.

The minister has a personal staff, which comprises the cabinet militaire under the chef de cabinet, who is a naval officer, at present a vice admiral. He is in charge of the secretariat and the various smaller civil departments.

The council of administration is instituted under the presidency of the Minister of Marine to consider broad questions of administrative policy. It is composed of the following: The chief of the general staff, the chef du cabinet militaire (who is also the directeur du personnel de l'administration centrale), director of military personnel, the director of air service, the director of naval construction, the director of naval ordnance, the director of the "intendance maritime" (pay and subsistence), the medical director, and the accountant general.

The superior council of the navy is a consultative organization specially charged with furnishing data on questions pertaining to war at sea and the defense of the littoral. The composition of the council is as follows: The Secretary of the Navy, president; the vice-admiral, chief of the general staff, vice president; two vice admirals designated to exercise in time of war to the command of the North and Mediterranean forces; the vice admiral commander in chief of the Mediterranean squadron; two vice admirals chosen by the Secretary of the Navy.

For consultation the flag officer commanding the naval war college and the two assistant chiefs of the navy general staff are members of the council. The chief of the general staff of the army and one other member of the superior council of the army designated by the Secretary of War have a deliberate voice in the council with the right of vote only on questions of interest to the war department.

The members of the council are designated at the end of each year by special decree.

The general staff is organized along similar lines to that of the general staff of the army.

The guiding principle which has prompted the various organic decrees of the superior council of war and the general staff of the army, and which has been fully confirmed by the experience of war, is that the general officer designated for commander in chief of the French forces in time of war should be placed in time of peace at the head of the general staff of the army.

Applying this principle to the navy results in the designation in time of peace of the chief of the general staff (vice admiral), who in time of war becomes commander in chief of the naval forces of France and who assumes the general direction of naval operations in conformity with instructions from the Minister of Marine, following the orders of the government.

This flag officer is responsible for all that concerns preparation for naval warfare to include forces afloat, naval aviation, and coast defense.

Under the vice admiral, chief of the general staff, are placed the directors and chiefs of central administrative bureaus for all that concerns coast defense, mobilization, and armament of the fleet and the naval air service. He keeps closely in touch with flag officers afloat and with the directors of the matériel and personnel services.

He personally directs the work of the general staff.

A ministerial order of February 29, 1920, reorganized the staff on the basis that the directing staff must be clearly separated from the executive services. The nomenclature of the sections of the staff was changed and is now the same as that in force in the Ministry of War.

To each " bureau " constituted by the order a certain number of officers from the matériel and personnel sections are attached for " service courant," their missions being to assure liaison between the staff and the executive services. They are clearly separated from those officers whose duties are the preparation of war plans. The ministerial view was that the particular nature of the material used by the navy necessitated constant liaison between the preparatory department, i. e., the matériel and personnel sections, and the utilizing department, i. e., the staff. To insure that officers were not overwhelmed with current work, this clear distinction was drawn in each bureau. The distinction was carried further by the appointment of a second assistant chief of staff. The first assistant chief of staff is responsible for current work, the second assistant chief of staff directs the study of questions undertaken by the bureaus in accordance with the orders of the chief of staff.

The staff is constituted with the following bureaus: Organization (mobilization, personnel, matériel), intelligence, operations, ports and bases (also transports and communications), personnel, aeronautics, pay, medical, construction, ordnance, accounting, public works, hydrographic.

(*c*) PERSONNEL

The regular establishment is comprised as follows:

Commissioned officers	3,125
Warrant officers	264
Midshipmen at sea	68
Enlisted personnel	52,500
Total	[1] 55,957

There is no marine corps. All duties performed by our marines (afloat) are performed in the French Navy by bluejackets.

The French Naval Reserve Force is comprised as follows:

Approximate number of naval officers	3,450
Approximate number of merchant marine officers	5,980
Approximate number of men	169,838
Total	179,268

Of the above enlisted total, about 53 per cent belong to the first reserve (active) and 47 per cent to the second reserve (inactive).

The French Naval Reserve Force is composed of men who have completed their military service and who are automatically transferred to the reserve until reaching the age of 50 years. The first reserve includes those within 10 years' period after completion of military service and second reserve from end of this period up to 50 years of service.

(*d*) EFFICIENCY AND MORALE

There is a decided improvement in the efficiency and morale of the French Navy over the conditions existing at the end of 1925.

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[1] Includes 227 officers and 3,472 men for aviation.

H. M. S. QUEEN ELIZABETH

A stable government and a strong Minister of the Marine have been able to impress the people that with over 50 per cent of the present French Army composed of colonial troops, and with France dependent to a large extent on her colonies for raw products, a strong navy is a natural necessity.

In the past two years the navy budgets have been voted practically as submitted. New construction in ships and in aviation which was far behind in 1925 is now practically in step with the program.

Propaganda in the press concerning the aspirations of Italy in the Mediterranean has aided materially to stimulate interest.

Then such other items as (1) pride in the new units going into commission, (2) foreign cruises, (3) the establishment of a regular system of promotion for officers, (4) establishment of trade schools for men, (5) increase in salaries and allowances for officers and men, have had a large effect in improving the morale of the personnel and the efficiency of the navy as a whole.

Steps have been taken, too, within the last two years to stamp out the communist cliques which existed. Investigation showed that these cliques were made up of men drafted from the industrial centers where communism was ripe, and the annual quotas for the navy are now being drafted from centers free of communist organization. In addition, each man is personally investigated as to his affiliation with communist organizations.

The status of enlistments for 1927 is as follows:

Reenlisted men (3 years)	13,000
Voluntary enlistments (3 years)	14,000
Conscripts maritimes (obligatory military service in the navy; 3 years)	8,500
Military conscripts (drafted from the army; period of service 18 months)	14,500
Insular force (colonial)	2,500
	52,500

NOTE.—See the "Bulletin" of September last for a report on the detailed organization of the French naval forces, the high command, and the supreme council.—ED.

GREAT BRITAIN

A. NAVAL

1. H. M. S. "Queen Elizabeth."

The *Queen Elizabeth* recently completed an extensive refitting which included the installation of bulges, modification of the fire-control top, and the construction of a single funnel in place of the two previously fitted. The illustration shows a broadside view of the ship after refitting. Attention is invited to the absence of extensive antennae support and flag hoist facilities on the foremast.

2. *Notes on H. M. S. "Nelson."*

Hull.—From the gangway landing abaft No. 3 turret the two rows of blanked explosion ports were plainly visible above the water line. Going forward on the forecastle, three breakwaters were noted, the forward one being estimated about 5 feet in height, and the second, of less height, abreast the forward end of No. 1 16-inch turret, and the after one abreast the after part of the high 16-inch gun turret. In the way of the high breakwater forward, abaft it and inboard, are two oblong steel lockers of approximately the height of the breakwater and square in section, estimated about 8 feet long, said to be for the stowage of boatswains' gear. The main deck was said to be planked with Oregon pine, the width of the planking being estimated about 6 inches. Discussion as to the use of Oregon pine in lieu of teak developed the information that it was done to save weight, but so much complaint had been received about the deck that in all probability it would soon be replaced with teak, weight under the treaty displacement being available.

Ground tackle.—The vessel carries three main anchors of about 9 tons each, two on the starboard side with cables of wrought iron, said by one informant to be 3⅛-inch wire size and by another to be 3¼-inch wire size, Kentner patent shackles being used. The three anchors are hoisted by three vertical capstans, two in the same athwartship line, and one some distance forward of this line. Aft on either side, two electrohydraulic winches were noted, abreast the turrets, for handling lines, the electric motors being below deck.

Anchor machinery.—Immediately below the forecastle was a large anchor-windlass machinery room. In this space there were three separate electrohydraulic engines for driving the vertical capstans above, through worm gears. The contract requirement was to hoist an anchor at the rate of 5 fathoms per minute, and this requirement was made without difficulty on the *Nelson's* trials, the maximum speed being given as one shot of 12 fathoms in 1.56 minutes. While each unit is capable of being operated independently, it was noted that the two capstans in the same athwartship line operated through a shaft having a jaw clutch in the middle between the two worms, indicating that either motor could be used on either main capstan. Discussion as to the electrohydraulic type of installation indicates that this is a new type so far as capital ships are concerned, that there are no special advantages in weight over the steam windlasses formerly provided, and that the governing reason for its adoption on the *Nelson* was the elimination of long leads of steam piping in the vicinity of magazines. So far as could be learned no difficulties have been experienced thus far with anchor handling arrangements as to capacity or operation.

Officers' and crew's living spaces.—The flag quarters are in the extreme after part of the second deck, the day cabin being the extreme after compartment, with the mess room next forward. The day cabin aft was noted to have square, sliding windows, the cabin having the usual furniture and furnishings, with a fireplace provided with an electric heater against the middle of the forward bulkhead of the compartment. The admiral's stateroom and bath were on the port side. The commanding officer's quarters are on the starboard side forward of the flag quarters; the chief of staff's quarters in a corresponding location on the port side. The wardroom country is located on the port side, abreast the 6-inch gun mounts on the main deck. Entering from aft one compartment is given up to a smoking and lounging room, with the usual furniture and furnishings and fireplace fitted with an electric stove. Forward of this compartment is the wardroom mess room, which has a seating capacity for 53 officers at one sitting, with the possibility of extending this by the use of small tables to provide for a maximum of about 65 officers at one sitting. The gun room is also located on the port side, on the main deck. The officers' quarters generally are located aft and on three decks. A portion of the second deck starboard side, forward of the officers' country, is partitioned off by lockers and curtains hung from brass railings from the beams above, installed by the ship's force, to form very comfortable and commodious chief petty officer, petty officer, and engine-room artificer quarters. The lockers are manufactured of aluminum in at least three types, i. e., for chief petty officer, seaman branch and artificer branch, and are left bright and polished. The second deck is covered with linoleum left in the natural color. All berthing for chief petty officers, petty officers, and crew is in hammocks, with convenient hammock stowage. Stowage for sea bags in living spaces is not provided, it being understood that they are stowed below. Standard suit cases are a part of the outfit, and suitable stowage below is provided. The messing arrangements for chief petty officer, petty officers, and crew are provided by mess tables and benches. The tables and benches were noted to be of somewhat heavier and more permanent construction than in our service, and a certain proportion of the benches are provided with frame backs, with the rails across the top of the back upholstered. Generally speaking, the impression was gained that much greater comfort is provided for the crew than has heretofore been customary; also excellent recreation-room facilities.

Commissary spaces.—The officers' and crew's galleys are located forward of the officers' country, on the main deck, and are equipped with oil-burning ranges and aluminum equipment with Monel metal cutting table tops. Oil-burning bake ovens are understood to be provided. The deck of the crews' galley was finished off in white, smooth, square tile. The butcher's shop is adjacent to the crew's galley. The general mess system is employed for the crew. There were stated to be general mess issuing rooms on the second and third decks, served from the galleys by dumb-waiters. One of these rooms was seen equipped with steam-heated warming ovens for keeping the food hot.

Heating and ventilation.—Artificial ventilation is supplied to the living spaces below deck, in combination with thermotanks for heating. This heating, however, is supplemented by portable electric heaters which are plugged into the ship's lighting circuit. The cabins and wardrooms are also fitted with electric fireplaces.

Communication.—Interior communication is provided by telephones, loud speakers (stated to be 100 on board), and by a limited number of voice tubes. So-called electric megaphones replace voice tubes so far as possible. Owing to the great number of telephone calls received on the bridge, it was said that it was necessary to have a man on telephone watch on the bridge.

Machinery spaces; steering engine rooms.—In discussing the *Nelson* design the comment was made that perhaps the most remarkable features of the ship were the economy of the engines and the fact that the fuel consumption, roughly three-fourths of a pound of fuel per horsepower per hour, remained nearly constant over the lower range of speed up to about 50 per cent of the maximum.

Shops.—The foundries and blacksmith shops were noted to be located in the inclosure on the main deck, just abaft the bridge structure. The carpenter's shop, a very large space, with power tools, which included saw table, lathe, and universal tool, was located on the second deck forward, abaft the anchor windlass room. Lumber stowage was on deck on the port side in the vicinity of the carpenter shop.

Bridge structure.—The navigating bridge level of the bridge structure was visited, the compartments on lower levels being closed and not seen. The names on these compartments, however, showed the usual spaces, such as the chart room, the captain's sea cabin, the navigator's sea cabin, the admiral's sea cabin, and chart room, etc. On the navigating bridge, in addition to the usual navigation instruments, Evershed bearing instruments were noted. The flag bridge is above the navigating bridge.

Fire control.—It was stated that the primary 6-inch control stations were in the foremast structure, and the 6-inch director towers were pointed out and may be seen on photographs on the platform with and adjacent to the main battery primary control station. The main battery and 6-inch secondary control stations may be seen on the photographs abaft the mainmast. Observation and conversation locates the antiaircraft director and control station on the top platform of the foremast structure, above the main and 6-inch stations. The two round towers amidships, near the funnel, are range-finder towers, and the two small ones under the searchlights are apparently searchlight control towers. The turret range finders have a base of 41 feet, and the casings extend out on either side of the rear of the turret, with noticeably large cross section, evidently permitting a small amount of train of the range finders independent of the turret.

Catapults.—The quarterdeck space aft is very limited and would appear to just permit the installation of the catapult understood to be contemplated. There was no evidence that this installation was to be made in the immediate future, and informant said that he did not know when, if ever, it would be installed.

Complements.—The following flag and ship's officer complements for the *Nelson* are noted from the November "Navy List":

The commander in chief's staff (officers)	27
Ship's commissioned officers, including commanding officer	39
Ship's warrant officers	22
Midshipmen and cadets	32

It was learned on the *Nelson* that the admiral includes in his mess the chief of staff, the flag captain, and the flag lieutenant.

The ship's complement has been published as 1,361, officers and men.

NOTE.—Photographs of the "Nelson" are to be found in the "Bulletin" of June last.—Ed.

3. *H. M. S. "Glorious" and "Courageous."*

(*a*) *H. M. S. "Courageous."*

The conversion of this vessel to an aircraft carrier has been much delayed—the present estimated date of completion being March, 1928, with the probability that final completion will be somewhat longer delayed. Outside bulges are installed on both the *Courageous* and *Glorious* extending well above the water line. The flying deck has been installed complete with island on the starboard side. No armament is carried in the island. With regard to the location of the island, its center was estimated to be about two-fifths of the length of the ship from the bow. The distance from the stem to the forward edge of the flying deck is approximately equal to the distance between the forward edge of the flying deck and the forward end of the island structure. The uptakes from the boilers are evidently carried outboard, then horizontally a distance of 40 to 50 feet to the stacks; the flying deck is left bare, i. e., without wood decking, this being British naval practice with regard to flying-off decks. The flying deck was said to be clear of obstructions, other than the island. Two hydraulic elevators are said to be installed, one was noted at the extreme after end of the flying deck with platform estimated about 30 feet square. It was stated that there was another elevator near the island, probably of larger dimensions.

The main battery is composed of 4.7-inch guns located on sponsons, six on each side in broadside, with two guns aft and two forward. Platforms are built out about one deck level below the flying deck at approximately the corners of the flying deck, which contained what is believed to be the fire control. Searchlights are carried above the navigating bridge on the island structure. The radio antennae are carried on steel masts three in number on each side, these masts being fitted to hinge outboard. Safety booms are fitted for the after half of the flying deck, extending outboard at angles of about 45° with the horizontal, with three or four fore-and-aft wire ropes at equal spacing carried, thereby said to be able to catch a plane that might tend to run over the side. The boats are carried in recesses in the sides. The deck abreast the island structure was said to be about 85 feet in the clear. The island structure extends somewhat outside the deck line of the flying deck and seemed some 16 or 18 feet wide. In general, the island has been kept as small as possible and located as far forward as practicable.

So far as improvements in the island on *Courageous*, as compared to earlier designs, the tripod mast and overhead structure of the *Eagle* and *Hermes* is conspicuously absent, the top of the bridge portion being below the level of the tops of the stacks. Vision aft from the bridge is obtained by an extension of the bridge on either side beyond the line of the smokestack structure.

(*b*) *H. M. S.* "*Glorious.*"

This vessel is also in dock and is much behind the *Courageous* so far as progress of work is concerned. The estimated date of completion was given as February or March, 1929. The bulges have been completed, but the flying deck and supporting structure was only about half completed. The uptakes for this vessel were noted in the boiler shop and from shape would indicate that the same design of island will be used. The island structure is not installed on the *Glorious*. The two vessels will be alike in general arrangement, although work on the *Glorious* has been so delayed that trials of the *Courageous* can be taken advantage of, if a change should prove necessary.

NOTE.—These ships were originally built as light battle cruisers designed for operations in the Baltic during the war. They have been undergoing conversion for four years. They displace about 18,500 tons and are credited with a speed of about 31 knots.—ED.

4. *Visit to H. M. S. "Berwick."*

The following are the general characteristics of the *Berwick:*

Laid down: September, 1924.
Completed: Financial year 1927–28.
Length: 590 feet.
Breadth: 68 feet, 4 inches.
Mean draft at standard displacement: 16 feet, 3 inches.
Standard displacement: 10,000 tons.
Estimated horsepower on full power trial: 80,000.
Corresponding speed at standard displacement: 31½ knots.
Total fuel oil capacity: 3,400 tons.
Armament: Eight 8-inch, 50-caliber; four 4-inch, 45-caliber, antiaircraft; four 3-pounders; four 2-pounder pompoms; eight 21-inch torpedo tubes (2 quadruple).
Estimated total cost, as revised 1927, including guns: £1,853,149.

General arrangement.—All five vessels of this group are fitted as flagships, the flag quarters being the extreme after portion of the second deck; the day cabin is the after compartment comfortably fitted out. The mess room is the next forward compartment; stateroom and bath on starboard side forward of mess room. The commanding officer occupies the flag quarters in the *Berwick*, the commander the commanding officer's quarters, etc. The commanding officer's quarters consist of a cabin, stateroom, and bath, on the port side opposite the corresponding quarters of the flag officer. The wardroom is located on the starboard side, forward of the quarters just described. The wardroom consists of a smoking and lounge room with comfortable chairs, table, electric fireplace, etc., in one compartment with the mess room forward of the smoking room. A seating capacity is provided for 22 in the wardroom, although it is not clear that this is the maximum. A very favorable impression was gained of both this arrangement of the wardroom in two compartments as well as the general tone of comfort that prevailed in regard to furnishings of both spaces. All furniture is of wood, indirect lighting from clusters of lamps suspended by chains, artificial ventilation with punka louvres for distribution of air in any direction desired, and electric heating is provided.

The gun room is an open compartment next to officers quarters; midshipmen are berthed in hammocks and are furnished with chests of drawers of wood for stowage of effects. Mess tables are set up for meals and for schoolroom instruction. Comfortable crews' quarters are provided, the berthing and messing being by compartments—chief petty officers in one compartment made up by separating off a portion of the deck space by lockers and dropping curtains from brass rails attached to the deck beams to the top of the lockers, seamen branch in another compartment, etc. Aluminum lockers for personal effects are used throughout, made in three sizes, left bright, and polished. Aluminum lockers are also installed on the side of the ship over every alternate mess table for the stowage of the mess gear, condiments, etc.

The impression of the living spaces both of officers and crew was one of roominess, convenience, and comfort to which the high overhead contributed to a great extent.

Torpedoes.—Two quadruple torpedo tube mounts are installed on main deck amidships, the four tubes in the same plane. The tubes are trained by hand, only one trainer required. No unusual features were noted. No torpedoes were on board. The torpedo workshop is located in the amidships deck structure and stowage therein is provided for eight torpedoes. It is understood that difficulties have been experienced in launching the torpedoes successfully (about 50 torpedoes having been fired) due to the 30-foot drop (approximately) involved. At present the subject is being studied to determine whether the difficulty can be overcome by stengthening the torpedoes, or whether it will be necessary to relocate the tubes on a lower level. The latter solution appears the probable one.

The torpedo control platform is on the bridge structure just abaft and about 2 feet below the level of the bridge. A 12-foot range finder with the torpedo director's firing gear and order transmitters are located on each side of this platform.

Eight-inch gun mounts.—An opportunity was afforded to enter an 8-inch gun house. The time permitted for inspection was brief and little or no explanation was volunteered.

Access is provided through small hatch under overhang on each side. The gun house is of good size, but appears congested; gun pits are deep and of large diameter, tapering to less diameter at the bottom; guns well separated with trunnions well forward close up to the port openings. The guns have a short length from trunnions to breach and are heavily counterbalanced on top. The guns are 50 calibers in length and are capable of a high angle of elevation. Breech mechanism side-swinging outboard and capable of operation both hydraulically and by hand. The gas check system appeared to be of the De Bange type. The usual air blasts for gas ejecting are provided functioning automatically on breach opening and in addition, water washout by orifices so arranged that one impinges on the mushroom head and the other two are directed into the powder chamber. This washout is hand controlled by a valve well to the rear of the gun breech. A loading tray of rugged construction is attached to the breech of the gun. Elevating and training power is oil hydraulic (variable speed type). The rammer is telescopic and also hydraulically operated. Flame proof powder hoist comes up between and abreast gun breeches. Shell hoists come up in rear and outboard and shallow metal shell troughs are installed leading outboard to the breech opposite loading tray. Turret officer's booths are located on each side forward and outboard. Booths could not be seen into, but it was stated that only the starboard one was at the time fitted out with periscope and other equipment. No exterior sprinkling apparatus was noticed in the turret. It was stated that blowers were provided for ventilation only, no provision being made for putting the turret under air pressure.

A 22-foot range finder extends across the rear of the turret and projects beyond on either side, the projecting casing being of large cross section and permitting a small amount of train of the range finder independent of the turret. A door in the rear of the turret provides access for the range finder crew. This door can also be used as an exit for the gun crews, but, owing to congestion, it would be difficult to reach quickly in an emergency. Four blanked ports about 6 inches square noted in the rear mount plate were assumed to be for pressure relieving.

Ammunition supply.—In regard to ammunition supply one shell hoist, pusher type, is located on each side outboard, direct hoist from handling room with revolving scuttle, axis vertical at bottom, and flame proof (not seen) at top. The powder is brought up in two single-stage hoists adjacent from powder handling room, stated to have flame-proof scuttles at top and bottom and flame-proof carriage. This hoist was spoken of as a pusher type with a reciprocating motion, one car ascending while the other is descending.

The shell handling room was visited. A circular shell rack, carrying about 30 shells, is installed about 30 inches from the deck, each shell stowed upright in a separate carrier. The shell rack can be rotated by hand to bring an individual shell opposite the scuttle at the bottom of the hoist. Two independent shell carriers, or trolleys, rolling on a circular track, are also provided inboard of the large shell rack by which individual shells can be picked up from any part of the rack and delivered to the hoist scuttle. The vertical revolving scuttle at the base of the shell hoist is of circular section with four 90° flash-tight compartments, so designed that only one compartment at a time is opened to the hoist and another to the handling room. A shell hoist, circular in section, is also provided on each side of the handling room by which shells are delivered from the room below to the ready rack. These hoists enter the handling room adjacent to the hoist scuttle.

The gun trials were stated to have been successful. The mounts have not yet been accepted due to alterations found necessary and which were in progress. Workmen were noticed engaged on the upper end of the powder hoist. In reply to a question it was stated that they had been on the lookout for difficulty with the roller paths but so far no trouble had been experienced.

Fire control.—The primary 8-inch control station is located in the upper platform of the bridge structure. The director tower and range finder could be seen in this location. The secondary 8-inch control station and the 4-inch antiaircraft control station are located on the platform aft forward of the mainmast. Directors are provided in this station. These stations can be seen in photographs. A transmitting room was stated to be located below decks.

Bridges.—The navigating bridge, or conning platform, is uncovered and located well forward, with a clear view, provided with magnetic compass and gyro repeater and the usual bridge instruments, though no steering wheel is installed here. The ship is steered, as is usual in the British service, from the house below, a large speaking tube being provided for communication with the bridge. No peloruses are provided on the bridge wings, but a clear view through an arc of about 330° can be had from the compass in the middle of the platform. It was observed and commented on that voice tubes had been replaced wherever possible by electric megaphones to guard against danger of gases entering the ship. There is a steering station below in central station and in steering engine room. It was noticed that mechanical semaphore (signal) apparatus is still employed.

Protection.—Armor grating hatches were noted in the engine-room hatch about 6 inches in depth. The protection over the steering engine was noted to be approximately 1½ inches in thickness, this being the thickness of the armored hatch cover, noted in passing through. Protection is inside the explosion chambers generally as follows: In way of magazines 4-inch armored longitudinal bulkheads with 2½-inch thwartship bulkheads, and 2½ inch deck forming the top of the box protection, with 1⅜-inch protective deck over engines and 1½ inches over steering engine.

Machinery and boilers.—Eight Yarrow boilers are installed in two water-tight compartments, four boilers to each compartment; two forward boilers utilize the forward stack, after two boilers of the forward boiler room and forward two boilers of the after boiler room utilize the middle stack, and after two boilers of the after boiler room utilize the after stack; 250 pounds steam pressure and 150° F. superheat are carried. The machinery, Parsons geared turbines, is contained in two water-tight compartments, the forward turbines operating the outboard shafts. High temperatures in the engine rooms are complained of, 120° F. having been mentioned in the comparatively cold English climate; the commanding officer mentioned that in his opinion the vessel could not be operated successfully in tropical climates without a material change in engine-room ventilation. It was noted that the ventilation for the forward engine room was supplied at the after end and exhausted at the forward end.

Shops.—The shops seemed complete, well arranged, and well located. They are centralized in adjacent compartments on the same deck and abaft the engine-room spaces. The machine shop is in a central compartment and the equipment included two 6-inch lathes, one 8-inch lathe, one unusual shaper, one large sized drill press, grinding machines, etc. On the starboard side outboard of the machine shop were three smaller shops—woodworking shop aft, electrical shop center, and ordnance shop forward. On the port side, outboard of machine shop in corresponding spaces, are the engineer's ready storeroom and the engineer's workshop (work benches and vises).

Steering engine.—The steering engine is electrohydraulic, manufactured and installed by Brown Bros., Edinburgh. The electric motors and Janny pumps are in duplicate, one set located in the same compartment as the hydraulic cylinders and one set in the next forward water-tight compartment. Telemotor control in duplicate is provided from the bridge and other steering stations. The commanding officer and chief engineer spoke of the gear as having given excellent and quiet service and only troublesome when dynamos failed. No auxiliary source of power, such as storage batteries, is provided, nor is any auxiliary method of steering except hand operation of the pumps provided. Inquiry was made as to the reliability of the telemotor control and the reply was made that there had been no difficulty experienced; also, that there was no appreciable lag in response of the rudder to the wheel. A step-by-step electric indicator is used to show the degrees of rudder position. The hydraulic rams straddle the rudder cross head.

Windlass.—The anchor windlass was steam driven, actuating three vertical capstans by shafting and worm gearing; one capstan could be unpinned to permit hand operation on deck.

Anchors.—The anchors were said to be 103 hundredweight each and arrangements are provided to carry three main anchors. It has been learned that only two anchors will be carried.

Ventilation and heating.—Artificial ventilation, with thermotanks for heating, is supplied to the living spaces; the heating of officers' quarters was said to be by electric heaters only. All ventilation ducts are made of aluminum and are fitted with valves at bulkheads and decks for protection against gas.

Deck.—The main deck is planked with Oregon pine, said to have been used in lieu of teak on account of weight. Opinion was expressed that it would not be satisfactory.

Catapult.—The catapult foundation has been installed between the after funnel and the after control station. The inside of the cylindrical foundation will be used for aircraft storage and workshop. Informant stated that the catapult would probably not be installed until after the vessel returns for her first refit, some two years hence, and that present plans contemplate the installation of a powder (cordite) catapult. One plane is to be carried. The cylindrical foundation for the airplane derrick on starboard side was noted, but derrick has not been installed. The foundation is installed aft of the catapult and outboard.

Complement.—The total crew's complement was said to be 660, exclusive of aviation detail; the officer complement, also exclusive of aviation, 45. Approximately 80 marines are carried in the complement and these marines man one turret. This guard includes a band of 13 pieces.

Completion of vessel.—It is understood the *Berwick* is being delayed due to alterations in turrets and proposed changes contemplated in torpedo tube location, or torpedo strengthening, and that the vessel will not be ready to proceed to China prior to March, 1928. Comment was also made to the effect that steam leakage in high-pressure packing had been experienced and would require remedying. The smoke pipes on the *Berwick* and sister ships are to be lengthened 14 or 15 feet. This extension was found necessary as smoke and gases interfered with the after fire-control stations to such an extent as to render them uninhabitable, and, also, under certain conditions, entered the quarters aft. This work was observed to be in progress on the *Cornwall* moored near by. It was also stated that the probable order of completion so far as could be foreseen at present would be *Cumberland*, *Cornwall*, *Berwick*, *Suffolk*, and *Kent*.

***NOTE.—Photographs of the "Berwick" were given in the October "Bulletin." In adidtion to the five vessels of this class, Great Britain is building eight other 10,000-ton cruisers and one 8,400-ton ship.*—ED.**

5. *Visit to H. M. S. "Adventure."*

The *Adventure* is a flush-deck mine-laying cruiser laid down at the Devonport dockyard November, 1922, and completed in 1927. The general dimensions are as follows:

Length: 500 feet.
Breadth: 59 feet.
Mean draft at standard displacement: 14 feet 5 inches.
Standard displacement: 6,740 tons.
Estimated horsepower on full-power trial: 40,000.
Corresponding speed at standard displacement: 27.75 knots.
Total oil fuel capacity: 1,550.
Main armament, not including mines: Four 4.7-inch antiaircraft and four 3-pounder guns.

Mines.—The second deck is the mine deck; the outboard portions on each side are open from a section in the vicinity of the foremast where there is a transverse water-tight bulkhead to a water-tight bulkhead about 15 feet from the stern. This latter bulkhead has wide doors than can be dogged closed when portable sections of track are removed. Two mine tracks are installed on each side (four rails, channel section), carrying two rows of mines for laying. The type of mine provided was stated to be the British Navy standard electric contact mine type No. 2, no material improvements having been made since the close of the war. The mine was spoken of as a 500-pound mine, carrying 200 pounds of explosive. The tracks have a capacity of 340 mines of this type, 82 on each of the four tracks and 12 additional on the transverse track at the forward end of the mine compartment. The forward ends of the tracks are connected by a transverse track with turntables. The further statement was made that emergency stowage in war time could be provided for "over 400 mines." The mines, in lots of 40, are propelled along the tracks by small trucks, which are in turn pulled by wire ropes led over guide sheeves along the length of the tracks to the laying platforms at the stern, where the wire ropes take a 180° change of direction and are led to the electrohydraulic winches (Janney pumps) located amidships abaft the machinery space inclosure. One electrohydraulic winch is provided for each mine track. Movement in a fore and afte direction, when the mines are secured, is prevented by lashings to eyebolts in tracks spaced about every 10 feet, approximately. About 25 dummy mines were on the starboard tracks at time of visit.

Mine laying.—Mines can be laid at all speeds of ship. Two outboard tracks are normally used, an operator on each dropping platform. Normal spacing of mines in laying was said to be 150 feet. It was stated that the mines could be laid with intervals of 2½ seconds. The statement was also made that the ship's allowance of mines could be laid in 20 minutes. Mechanical telegraphs provide communication with the bridge, the dial of which with double pointers was noted to have signals as follows: "Make ready, start laying, cease laying, am ready, am laying, have ceased." The dropping platform for the two inboard tracks is so arranged that the mines from the two inboard tracks are controlled by one operator. The mines are mechanically released. When outboard tracks are laying the inboard tracks are standing by, and vice versa, to prevent a break in the field.

Machinery.—The machinery of the *Adventure* has been previously described in the Bulletin of last May. The Diesel engines, two eight-cylinder Vickers (Ltd.) operating at 343 revolutions per minute, are located one on each side of the forward engine room, direct connected to the alternators located just abaft the Diesel engines. The operating platform is at the after end of the compartment elevated about three feet above the floor plates of the engine room, thus providing a good general view of the forward engine room. Excitation for the alternators is provided by small Diesel engine sets located outboard of the main Diesels. The after engine room contains the two sets of Parsons turbines in the forward end of the engine room, and the motors abaft the turbines, operating the propeller shaft through a common pinion, with clutches at each end. About 10 minutes is required to shift from one drive to the other, the procedure being to stop and to shift one shaft at a time. About 500 tons of Diesel engine oil is carried. Diesel engine fuel consumption said to be one-half ton per hour at 12 knots—maximum speed with Diesels 14 knots.

Boiler fuel oil.—Said to carry 1,000 tons approximately, burning 2½ tons per hour, but the corresponding speed for this consumption was not stated.

Steering engine.—Electrohydraulic supplied by McTaggart Scott (Ltd.); the four rams straddle the rudder crosshead, one motor and pump being in the same compartment with the rams and the duplicate installation in the next compartment forward with watertight bulkhead between. Telemotor control of the pumps from the bridge. Operation of steering engine and control said to be very satisfactory. Arrangement seemed compact and sufficiently roomy, about 2 foot 6 inch clearing being estimated between the tops of the rams and the deck beams above.

Windlass.—Three vertical capstans on deck are operated by steam engine located on the second deck; one capstan can be unclutched from the engine for hand operation above.

Armament.—The main battery consists of four 4.7-inch .50-caliber guns, mounted singly in antiaircraft mountings, three aft and one on the forecastle. The 4.7-inch guns were stated to be the same type as the antiaircraft guns in the *Rodney* and *Nelson*. No torpedo battery is carried.

Fire control.—Director fire system is provided for the 4.7-inch battery, with the director tower and control station located in the foremast. No details of the system could be obtained. The transmitting station is below deck and was stated to be nothing more than a switchboard room. Two 12-foot range finders are provided, one located on the upper bridge and one on the foremast fire-control platform.

6. *Visit to H. M. S. "Amazon," destroyer.*

Details of "Amazon."—

Length: 311 feet 9 inches.
Breadth: 31 feet 6 inches.
Mean draft at standard displacement: 9 feet 1 inch.
Standard displacement: 1,330 tons.
Corresponding speed at standard displacement: 37 knots.
Total fuel-oil capacity: 433 tons.
Armament: Four 4.7-inch guns and two 2-pounder pompoms, exclusive of machine guns and torpedoes.

It will be noted that the *Amazon* is greater in its general dimensions and some 120 tons heavier than the *Ambuscade* reported upon in the December BULLETIN. It was estimated from the brief visit made to the vessel that it is built of heavier scantlings and that the same effort, as compared to the *Ambuscade*, has not been made to reduce weight wherever possible. It has also been noted from the December 7 issue of the "Shipping World," in the annual report of John I. Thornycroft & Co. (Ltd.), that claim is made that the *Amazon* went through her acceptance trials with results that were highly satisfactory; further, that the trials were far more severe than any previously imposed and that they were exceeded by an ample margin; also, it is stated that the vessel is the most economical destroyer in the British Navy.

The visitors were conducted over the *Amazon* by the commander of the flotilla and opinion was expressed indicating that there was a school of thought against destroyers of the size of the *Amazon* due to its cost, complexity, etc. The impression was gained, however, that greater consideration has been given both in the *Amazon* and *Ambuscade* to the comfort of officers and crew than has heretofore been the case.

The general arrangement of the vessel is approximately the same as described for the *Ambuscade*. The boiler pressure for the *Amazon* was stated to be 260 pounds, with superheat to give a steam temperature of 700° F. The boiler rooms and machinery spaces were not visited, but it is understood that the arrangement is approximately the same as for the *Ambuscade*.

With regard to armament, only six spare torpedoes are carried. Opinion was expressed that there should be more tubes with correspondingly more spares, or at least that 12 torpedoes should be carried for the present six tubes. The 4.7-inch guns appeared to be capable of a considerable angle of elevation, but when inquiry was made as to whether they could be used as antiaircraft guns the reply was made that they were not high-angle fire. The guns appeared to be capable of an angle of elevation of at least 30°. Only four depth charges were noted in the stern racks, and when inquiry was made in regard to this small number the reply was made that this number could readily be supplemented. These bombs carry 250 pounds of explosives. Two depth charge mortars, estimated to be about 8-inch bore, as in the *Ambuscade*, were noted in each quarter. Two center-line triple torpedo tubes were mounted on the main deck and two antiaircraft pompoms on structure amidships.

Vickers's fire-control instruments were noted on the guns; also gun director on platform above navigation bridge. The range finder was installed on a high mount abaft the gun director. Hydraulic depth charge release apparatus and torpedo director mounts were noted on both sides of the range-finder platform on the bridge.

With regard to the operation of machinery, the impression was gained from conversation with the flotilla commander and engineer officer of the ship that the *Amazon* had experienced very little trouble with her machinery plant in comparison to the *Ambuscade;* the latter vessel was said to be still undergoing certain final machinery trials. A feature of both vessels, but omitted, is that access to the navigating bridge is provided within the bridge structure.

NOTE.—These are the first destroyers built by Britain since the war. The 1927–28 estimates call for eight more.

JAPAN

A. NAVAL

1. *Launching or completion of ships.*

Destroyer *No. 41* was launched at the Ishikawajima Dockyards, Tokyo, December 26, 1927.

Destroyer *No. 42* was launched at the Fujinagata Dockyards, Osaka, December 27, 1927.

Submarine *I–24* was launched at the Kawasaki Dockyards, Kobe, on December 12, 1927.

Submarine *I–54* was completed and commissioned at the Sasebo Navy Yard on December 15, 1927.

NOTE.—Destroyers "41" and "42" are of 1,790 tons. Japan is building or has authorized 24 boats of this class. "I–24" is a mine-laying submarine of 1,150 tons. There are 6 in this class—3 completed and 3 building. "I–54" is of 1,650 tons—6 boats in the class.—ED.

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2. *Grand maneuvers.*

The grand maneuvers were held between the dates of October 11 and October 24, 1927, inclusive. The maneuvers were divided into the first period from October 11 to October 19, and the second period from October 20 to October 24. The blue force (defending) comprised the combined first and second active fleets, and the red force (attacking) comprised the third fleet which was specially organized for the maneuvers.

The first period was devoted to joint exercises between the army and navy, to test the local defenses of parts and important centers, and to separate tactical exercises of the blue and red forces. The second period was devoted to a major fleet operation with the blue and red fleets opposing each other.

The conduct of the maneuvers was planned to cover particularly the following points:

(1) Mobilization of shore establishments in conjunction with the fleet mobilization.

(2) Major operations of the fleet in scouting, screening, and day and night actions with aircraft and submarines.

(3) Test of the defenses of Sasebo, Kure, and Yokosuka, especially against airplane and gas attack.

(4) The operation of the advanced bases at O-mami-shima and the Bonin Islands.

(5) The establishment of temporary air bases at Tomeye in the Goto Islands, at Saiki and Oita.

(6) The usefulness of the new aviation station located on the island of Hachijo-jima.

(7) Mining and mine sweeping.

(8) Operation of the new aircraft carrier *Akagi.*

(9) Operation in the fleet of the new cruisers of the *Furutaka* and *Aoba* classes and new fleet submarines.

(10) Communications, especially between surface vessels, and aircraft, and submarines.

(11) Call of reserve officers to active duty. (Total of 3 flag officers and 36 other officers.)

Statement of chief umpire.—Admiral Suzuki, Chief of the Naval General Staff, who acted as chief umpire on board the *Mutsu,* made the following statement to the press on October 10, just prior to the opening of the maneuvers:

> The present grand maneuvers differ from former ones in two respects. First, the red or attacking fleet in this case is superior to the blue or defending fleet, and secondly the time and place of the fleet actions is not specified in advance as heretofore but will develop in the course of the maneuvers. In the grand maneuvers of 1924 the fleet action took place south of the Bonin Islands, and likewise in this case it will take place somewhere in the Pacific.
>
> The red fleet will approach from the direction of the South Sea Islands and will attempt by radio and air planes to locate the blue fleet. The blue fleet will base on the western part of Honshu and will attempt to ascertain the formation, course and speed of the blue fleet. The most important features of the present maneuvers is the tactics employed by each fleet in searching for the others position.

FIRST PERIOD, OCTOBER 11 TO 19, INCLUSIVE

Maneuvers ordered started October 11 at 0800 by signal from Admiral Suzuki in *Mutsu*. All navy yards and stations placed on mobilization status.

First fleet (blue) at Tokuyama.

Second fleet (blue) at Tokuyama.

Third fleet (red) at Ariake Bay.

Temporary air bases established at Oita (near Beppu), at Saiki and at Tomeya in the Goto Islands.

YOKOSUKA AREA–FIRST PERIOD, OCTOBER 11 TO 19, INCLUSIVE

October 11, 12, and 13

Fifth submarine division and third destroyer division operated at Tateyama near entrance to Tokyo Bay.

Live mines were planted at the entrance of Yokosuka harbor.

October 14.—Night air attack on Yokosuka

Attacking force: 15 planes from Kasumigaura; dirigible *N 3*.

Defending force: 30 planes from Oppama; antiaircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries.

Operations: Started 1800; naval station and town of Yokosuka were darkened. Searchlights used. Planes dropped flares and simulated a bomb and gas attack. Defending forces used gas masks. Operations ended at 2200.

October 17.—An attempt to mine entrance to Tokyo Bay

Attacking force: Third destroyer division; mine layers *Enoshima*, *Ninoshima*, *Kurozaki;* planes from Oppama.

Defending force: Fifth submarine division, plus planes from Oppama and *Otomari* (an ice-breaker, simulating large cruiser).

Oct. 18.—Day air attack on Yokosuka

Attacking forces: Planes from Oppama.

Defending forces: Planes from Oppama, antiaircraft batteries of ships and shore stations.

Operations: Started at 1400. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack. Special preparations were made to counteract gas. Operations ended at 1510.

KURE AREA—FIRST PERIOD, OCTOBER 11 TO 19

October 11

(1) Oil tanks and coal depot camouflaged. City placed under martial law. Antisubmarine nets laid.

(2) At 0800 a mine force under Rear Admiral Tachi consisting of sixth mine sweeper division, plus *Bisan Maru* and *Kikusui Maru* left for operations in the Bungo Channel.

Planes from Hiro left to establish temporary base at Saiki.

October 12

Vice Admiral Taniguchi (commander in chief of Kure area) left to inspect the defenses of Tokuyama.

October 14

(1) Day air attack on Kure.

Attacking forces: Six planes from Saiki.

Defending forces: Antiaircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries.

Operations: Started at 0910. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack from altitude of 1,000 feet. Gas masks used. Fire fighting and hospital forces exercised. Bombs assumed to have hit railroad station, reservoir, radio station in town of Yakuyama, back of Kure, and oil tanks at Hitonose and Akitsuki. Ended at 0940.

(2) Night mine-sweeping operation against Kure combined with submarine attack.

Attacking forces: (Rear Admiral Tachi) Sixth mine sweeper division; mine layers *Washizaki*, *Kurokami*, *Bisan Maru*, *Kikusui Maru;* submarine tender *Karasaki;* one division of submarines.

Defending forces: Local defenses.

Operations: Started about 1800; ended 2100.

October 15

(1) Naval hospital exercise at receiving 160 injured from incoming vessel.

(2) Night air attack on Kure.

Attacking forces: Six planes from Saiki.

Defending forces: Antiaircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries.

Operations: Started 1830. Naval station and town of Kure darkened. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack operation. Ended 2030.

October 16 and 17

Mine force described above under October 11 (2), moved to Bungo Channel and operating with air forces from Saiki and Oita, mined the Bungo Channel.

October 18 and 19

Battalions from Kure naval barracks embarked and carried out a landing near Nigata, west of Hiro.

SASEBO AREA—FIRST PERIOD, OCTOBER 11 TO 19

October 12

Night operations of naval forces against Sasebo, in conjunction with a land attack following an assumed landing.

Attacking forces: Detachment from red fleet at Ariake Bay and one battalion from Sasebo naval barracks.

Defending forces: Local defense forces, including shore batteries.

Operations: Started at 1900; ended about midnight.

October 13

(1) Day air attack on Sasebo.

Attacking forces: Seaplanes from temporary air base in Goto Islands.

Defending forces: Antiaircraft batteries of ships and shore batteries on Mount Tajima.

Operations: Started at 0900. Planes simulated bomb and gas attack; ended at 1030.

(2) Similar air attack was carried out on the night of October 13. Naval station and town of Sasebo were darkened. Planes used flares. Shore defenses searchlights. Defense was especially organized to counteract effect of gas attack.

October 14

Battalions from Sasebo naval barracks were exercised in heavy marching order and field maneuvers.

October 15

(1) Two battalions were embarked and made a landing at Matsubara in Omura Bay. Planes from Goto Islands covered the landing which was opposed by one battalion from Sasebo.

(2) Night air attack of October 13 repeated, starting at 1920.

October 16

Battalions which had landed at Matsubara attacked Omura with four planes from Goto islands. Operations started at 0530.

October 17

At 1250 day air attack and at 2100 night air attack by planes from Goto Islands.

October 18

(1) At 0640 day air attack by planes from Goto Islands, opposed by planes from Omura. Attack ended at 0712.

(2) The training ship *Shikishima* entered port theoretically damaged and emergency dry docking carried out.

October 19

Day air attack of October 18 repeated. First period closed at 0900.

JOINT ARMY-NAVY MANEUVERS AT SHIKOKU—FIRST PERIOD, OCTOBER 11 TO 13

The area of operations for this maneuver covered the northern coast of the island of Shikoku between Takuma and Matsuyama, and the contiguous waters of the Inland Sea. A convoy of troops embarked at Takuma and proceeded westward under escort through the Inland Sea. A landing was effected at Matsuyama, opposed by troops of the eleventh army division.

Attacking forces (green): *Tatsuta* (flag first destroyer squadron), twenty-fifth destroyer division, twenty-sixth destroyer division; *Yura* (flag first submarine squadron), twenty-fourth submarine division; *Notoro* (airplane tender); *Mamiya* (temporary airplane tender); *Tsurumi; Bizan Maru* (chartered steamer); *Kikusui Maru* (chartered steamer); motor lighters for landing troops; detachment of troops from eleventh army division.

Defending forces (black): Twenty-eighth destroyer division; twenty-seventh destroyer division; *Jingei* (submarine tender); twenty-sixth submarine division; planes from Saiki; land forces from eleventh army division (3 battalions mountain artillery, 1 battalion engineers, 1 cavalry squadron, 1 radio company).

Operations—October 11

Started 0800. Black land forces were concentrated near Matsuyama. Of the black forces afloat, the *Jingei* and twenty-sixth submarine division were at Mitsugahama, the twenty-seventh destroyer division was at Kamekawa, and the twenty-eighth destroyer division at Asaki-wan. The green naval forces concentrated in Awa-shima. Green troops were embarked at Takuma.

October 12

Green convoy got under way, destination Gunchu, near Matsuyama. Convoy was attacked by submarines in Kurushima Channel.

October 13

0120 convoy was attacked by black destroyers and aircraft. The landing was made under smoke screen between 0230 and daylight of the 13th at Gunchu.

The maneuver was officially ended at 0740. The operations were witnessed by Admiral Suzuki, chief of naval general staff, and General Uyehara, member of the military council.

OPERATIONS OF BLUE FLEET—FIRST PERIOD, OCTOBER 11 TO 19

At the opening of the maneuver, October 11, the first and second fleets (blue) were concentrated at Tokuyama.

October 11 to 13

The first destroyer squadron and first submarine squadron with the aircraft tender *Notoro* and special service vessels were operating in the joint army-navy maneuvers off Shikoku. The *Hosho* was at Tokuyama making practice flights and air reconnaissance. The second submarine squadron was operating in the Sea of Izo and the Bungo Channel.

October 14

Blue fleet left Tokuyama and proceeded through the Bungo Channel for tactical exercises.

October 15

First destroyer squadron made a night attack on the blue main fleet.

October 16 to 18

Tactical exercises.

October 19

Blue fleet returned to Tokuyama.

OPERATIONS OF RED FLEET—FIRST PERIOD, OCTOBER 11 TO 19

At the opening of the maneuvers, October 11, the third fleet (red) was concentrated at Ariake Bay.

October 12

Detachment of red fleet participated in attack on Sasebo.

October 13

Red fleet left Ariake Bay for tactical exercises.

October 14

Exercised in night torpedo attack.

October 15

Returned to Ariake Bay.

October 16

At 0430 red destroyers and submarines operating with 15 planes from the Akagi made an attack on the red fleet at anchor in Ariake Bay. Operations ended at 0700.

October 17 and 18

At Ariake Bay fueling.

October 19

Red fleet left Ariake Bay in following order to take up position to the south for maneuvers of second period: 0600, fourth submarine squadron with *Muroto* and *Sunosaki* (oilers); 0945, third destroyer squadron; 1800, main body of red fleet, with remaining cruisers, destroyers, submarines and special service ships.

FORCES AT O-MAMI-OSHIMA—FIRST AND SECOND PERIODS, OCTOBER 11 TO 24

During the first and second periods (October 11 to 24), the following vessels were operating at O-mami-Oshima, based on Konia: Seventeenth destroyer division, mine layer *Katsuriki*, submarine tender *Komabashi*, aircraft tender *Wakamiya*.

During both periods these vessels carried out exercises in mine laying, mine sweeping and air reconnaissance.

Casualties

October 12: Submarine *Ro–62*, coming to surface touched another submarine. Periscope damaged.

October 15: Destroyer *Yomogi* stripped a turbine and returned to Kure.

October 16: Plane from *Akagi* had forced landing at sea. Plane and both pilots lost.

October 18: During air attack on Sasebo plane *No. 131* from Omura had forced landing in sea due to engine trouble. No fatalities.

October 23: Dirigible *N–3* completely wrecked and burned in heavy gale.

October 23: Plane *No. 78* operating from Hachijojima made forced landing at sea. Plane lost, pilots rescued.

SECOND PERIOD, OCTOBER 20 TO 24, INCLUSIVE

The maneuver of the second period (October 20 to 24) was participated in by the entire blue and red fleets.

Red fleet left Ariake Bay at 1800 October 19 and proceeded to its initial position. Assuming that—

(1) Red was in initial position at 0600 October 22 (zero hour was at 0800 October 22), (2) and that red fleet speed proceeding to initial position was 12 knots, then red covered 720 miles in going

from Ariake Bay to its initial position. The circle C–1 is struck from Ariake Bay as a center with a radius of 720 miles. Red was, therefore, somewhere on C–1 when the maneuver started at 0800 October 22.

The blue fleet left Tokuyama October 20 and stood out to sea through the Bungo Channel. Blue probably established a scouting line from the end of Kyushu, scouting bearing east, distance about 400 miles. Planes from Omura, Sasebo, Saiki, and Oita could cover the western end of this scouting line and planes from Hachijojima the eastern end.

Blue mine forces mined the Bungo Channel and the Straits of Shimonoseki, Naruto, and Tomagashima (entrance to the Inland Sea).

October 22

Zero hour 0800; maneuver started by order of the Emperor in the *Mutsu.* Both forces started scouting and screening operations with cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. Very heavy weather. Dirigible *N–3* lost.

October 23

First contact at 1800. Both forces attempted night attacks by destroyers, submarines, and aircraft on main bodies.

October 24

The fleet action started at 0600, and at 0745 the maneuver was officially ended by signal from the *Mutsu.*

Upon completion of the maneuvers the blue fleet proceeded to Yokosuka with the Emperor on board the *Mutsu*, and arrived there at 1400, October 25. Assuming—

(1) That the blue fleet left position of the close of the maneuvers at 1000, October 24, then it steamed for 28 hours to Yokosuka.

(2) That fleet speed was 12 knots (weather was heavy), then the fleet covered 336 miles going from scene of final fleet action to Yokosuka. The circle C–2 on which fleet action therefore occurred is struck from Yokosuka as a center with radius of 336 miles.

The fleet action started at daylight 0600, October 24. Red had therefore steamed 46 hours from its initial position. Assuming that red fleet made good 12 knots per hour, their advance from initial position to point of fleet action was 552 miles. Press reports stated that the fleet action took place about 200 miles south of the Kii Peninsula. Assuming this to be approximately correct, then the initial position of red is deduced to have been about latitude 20° 50′ north, longitude 137° 30′ east, on Circle C–1, and the fleet action took place about latitude 30° 25′ north, latitude 136° 35′ east, on circle C–2. The distance between these two positions is 552 miles.

ANALYSIS OF THE MANEUVERS

The current naval budget carried an appropriation of 5,000,000 yen for the conduct of these maneuvers. Consequently no expense was spared in the mobilization of forces ashore and afloat and in the exercise at such emergency drills as quick dry docking of ships, protection of civilian population against gas attacks, and receiving of large numbers of wounded in naval hospitals. As is characteristic with the Japanese, it was evident that the plans for the maneuvers were worked out in the most minute detail.

Thorough provisions to meet a local attack on their naval bases and large historical centers were shown in the operations during the first period of the maneuvers. Their peace-time organization, unlike ours, provides a considerable active defense force, especially of destroyers and submarines based permanently on their naval bases. These units are not a part of the active fleets.

The fear of air attack, especially with gas, was evidenced by extent of the operations of planes against Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo during the first period, and the elaborate preparations practiced to nullify, as far as possible, the effect of gas.

As in previous grand maneuvers, the extent of the actual operations of the opposing fleets against each other was very limited, extending actually over a period of 48 hours from 0800 of October 22 to 0800 of October 24. There has been no evidence either in present or past maneuvers that they have exercised in scouting operations over large areas, with the subsequent difficulties in concentration of forces for attack. They inevitably in their maneuvers have planned ahead of time exactly when and where each phase of the operation will occur. In spite of the statement of Admiral Suzuki (chief of the general staff) before the maneuvers that this procedure for the first time would not be followed, the limited time involved and limited area of operations during the fleet maneuvers of the second period indicated that no extensive scouting operations were involved.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

I. RELATIONS OF NAVAL OFFICERS TO CONSULAR OFFICERS.

The following is extracted from the consular regulations of the United States as being of interest to the service:

Commanders of squadrons.

When a naval squadron of the United States visits a foreign port where there is a consular officer it is the duty of the commander of the squadron to send a boat ashore, with an officer on board, who shall call upon the consular officer, notify him of the arrival of the squadron, and tender him a passage to the flagship at such time as he may select. It is the duty of the consular officer to accept the invitation and visit the flagship as early as convenient, which must be within a period not exceeding 24 hours, and to tender his official services to the commander.—E. O., September 6, 1923.

Commanders of ships of war.

When a ship of war of the United States visits a foreign port where there is a consular officer it is the duty of the commander thereof, if not a flag officer, to pay the first visit in person to a consul general, and to tender him passage to his ship. If the commander be a flag officer, or if the consular officer be of lower grade than a consul general, it is the duty of the commander to send a boat ashore, with an officer on board, to visit the consular officer and tender him a passage to the ship at such time as he may select. It is the duty of the consular officer to accept the invitation to visit the commander or return his visit, as circumstances may require, within a period not exceeding 24 hours, and to tender to him his official services.—E. O., September 6, 1923.

Social attention to naval officers.

Though consular officers are expected to use their official position to advance the interests of the Navy, it may be remarked that their salaries are not established on a scale to require social attentions to the officers which call for the expenditure of money, unless they see fit to give them. The fact that such attentions have been given, or are supposed to be required, will not justify a consul in asking increased compensation.

When naval force may be asked.

The Navy Department is an independent branch of the service, not subject to the orders of the Department of State, and its officers have fixed duties prescribed for them; consuls will therefore be careful to ask for the presence of a naval force at their ports only when public exigencies absolutely require it and will then give the officers in command the reasons in full for the request and leave with them the responsibility of action. If the request is addressed to the Department of State the reasons should likewise be fully stated for its information.

II. IMPORTANT TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF EUROPEAN POWERS.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

The British policy regarding treaties.

A long period of peace, both internal and external, is necessary for Britain to recuperate from the effects of the World War and come back to the position which she once held in world affairs. Consequently a great effort is being made to reduce the danger spots in the Empire to a minimum, and to maintain friendly international relations.

At present her problems are mainly economic. Many of the treaties signed by her since the close of the World War have been treaties of commerce and navigation designed to create or maintain good relations with other nations. Britain never enters into international contracts lightly nor without due preparation and thorough consideration of the probable effects. For this reason as well as because of the Empire's almost irrefutable claims to world supremacy in many lines, such treaties of a political or military nature as she signs are as a rule of considerable importance.

A strong body of British opinion favors her old and successful policy of nonintervention abroad (except in matters in which she as a nation is vitally interested) and the avoidance of all warlike alliances, open or secret, that might entangle the Empire in another nation's quarrels. There has also been evident, especially since the adoption of the League of Nations' policy of registering all treaties, a tendency on the part of the British Empire to adjust its relations with other States by means of informal agreements.

Before the World War, Great Britain had striven to maintain the balance of power in Europe, to adjust the strength of the States in the common interest of preventing any of them from obtaining undue prominence. In spite of the substitution of the idea of a League of Nations for that of a balance of power, the British can not disregard the possible grouping of nations should the league one day prove to be divided against itself, nor can the British forget that there are certain nations not members of the league.

Since 1914 certain great international events have forced the British to agree officially to some treaties and to terminate or repudiate others. Among these may be mentioned the peace treaties between the Allied and Central Powers at the close of the World War; the Washington agreement; the Anglo-Japanese alliance: the abandonment of the protocol for the settlement of international disputes; and the signature of the treaty of Locarno.

One of the most important British treaties of recent times was that signed at London on December 6, 1921, giving the Irish Free State the same status as the self-governing dominions. This treaty marked a milepost in British affairs as showing the tendency to grant to each of her colonies and protectorates the greatest measure of self-government compatible with Empire integrity. Recent treaties signed with Iraq and Afghanistan reveal British policy regarding buffer nations—the small States which lie directly across her trade routes, with all of which she is endeavoring at present to maintain as friendly relations as possible. The recent visits of the King of Iraq and the King of Egypt to London were for the purpose of friendly conversations regarding difficulties real or potential between their respective States and the British Government. A new treaty with Iraq is said to have been concluded during this visit of the King. The King of Afghanistan is also scheduled to visit London during the coming winter, and as this mountain State lies directly across the path from Russia to India there is little doubt that every effort will be made by the British to impress the King favorably.

It is safe to assume that Great Britain will sign comparatively few political and military treaties in the years that lie directly ahead and will expend her energies in making friendly alliances by other means.

Germany's policy since the war.

Because of her important pivotal position the destinies of all the Central European States are closely linked with that of Germany—what affects her affects them. The Locarno treaties of mutual guaranty, initiated by Germany, can therefore be said to have as much influence upon the future of Europe in general, and of Central Europe in particular, as has the Versailles treaty of peace concluded between Germany and the principal allied and associated powers.

Provisions of the Versailles treaty seemed destined to remain in force only until such time as a hating and hated Germany could recover her military and economic strength sufficiently to enable her to wage war again, this time with the double purpose of conquest and revenge. But after failure of her first attempt to reestablish a monarchy, she was gradually forced by the sting of political ostracism, and by her deplorable economic condition, to adopt a policy of conciliation, realizing that only through such a policy was it possible to bring about a political and economic recovery. Of great influence also was the knowledge that complete rehabilitation and contentment of her nationals could come only after evacuation of the Rhineland; with desire for Austro-German union an additional contributory factor.

This policy culminated in the Locarno treaties, which sought by common agreement means to preserve the respective signatory nations from the scourge of war, and to provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes of every nature which might arise between them.

Basic facts concerning these treaties are as follows:

Name of treaty and purpose	Duration	Date signed	Signatory powers	Ratifications exchanged
Versailles treaty (conclusion of peace).	Perpetual	June 28, 1919	Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and 22 other powers.[1]	Jan. 10, 1920.
Locarno treaties:				
Security pact	Indefinite	Dec. 1, 1925	Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia.	Sept. 14, 1926.
Treaties of arbitration	do	do	Belgium, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia.	Do.

[1] United States never ratified; made separate treaty of peace Nov. 11, 1921.

Further application of Germany's conciliatory policy is seen in her compliance in general with the terms of the Versailles treaty—reducing her army, abolishing universal military service, surrendering warships, dismantling fortifications, and performing other acts which reduced her military strength.

Additional treaties of arbitration and conciliation have been concluded with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy, that with the latter probably being most important since it holds promise for peace in a number of possible trying situations. A treaty of friendship and neutrality with Russia quieted Moscow's fear of complete isolation as a result of Locarno, at the same time retaining for Germany the advantages of friendship both with her Slav neighbor on the east and the allies on the west. There have also been various agreements supplementing or modifying the Versailles treaty, most important of these being the London protocol, signed August 30, 1924, by which the Dawes plan was put into effect. In addition, the recent Franco-German commercial treaty, signed after long negotiation, promises to have a very beneficial and far-reaching effect upon both political and economic relations of the two countries.

In her attitude toward Poland alone Germany has failed to apply her policy of conciliation, and German-Polish relations are fraught with disturbing possibilities. Germany is determined not to accept the Danzig Corridor and the Upper Silesian settlement, while Poland is equally determined to keep her gains of Versailles and later. Border difficulties constantly occur, and it is only recently that negotiations between the two countries were resumed after a trade deadlock of long duration.

The treaty-making policy of France.

All French alliances, understandings, conversations, and military contracts entered into since the war have embraced the idea that security must be maintained as a paramount consideration.

Within the last 60 years France has been twice invaded by Germany; once she was conquered, and the second time she was victorious, but in both cases with unfortunate and painful results. There is not a country that has suffered, and still suffers, more profoundly from war than France. Security from German aggression, then, has dominated her policy in all international relationships.

The following tabulation indicates some of the more important alliances entered into by France in order to obtain security:

Name of treaty and purpose	Duration	Date signed	Signatory powers	Ratified
Franco-Belgian (defensive alliance).	Indefinite	Unknown	France, Belgium	Sept. 14, 1920.
Franco-Czechoslovakian alliance.	No fixed term	Jan. 25, 1924	France, Czechoslovakia	Mar. 4, 1924.
Franco-Polish alliance	do	Feb. 19, 1921	France, Poland	June 27, 1922.
Franco-Rumanian alliance	10 years	June 10, 1926	France, Rumania	Nov. 8, 1926.
Franco-Yugoslavian alliance	5 years	Nov. 11, 1927	France	Not yet.
			Yugoslavia	Nov. 27, 1927.

France began to negotiate this series of alliances in 1920 with the apparent intention of encircling Germany with a confederation of enemies. This policy of alliances conduced to the estrangement of Great Britain, convinced as she already was that a prostrate Germany was a disaster for British trade. At the same time Great Britain objected to making a military convention for the defense of France against Germany, and refused to aid France in forceful measures intended to make Germany pay. France felt the need of Great Britain's support, and to obtain or keep it she has shown a willingness to concede much along every line except in the matter of her security from German attack. Thus France's foreign policy was at every step dominated by anxiety over the war which every Frenchman believed Germany was preparing, and by the desire to propitiate or enlist the support of other nations which are in a position to help when the critical moment arrives.

This was the situation up to the signing of the Locarno agreements and Germany's entry into the League of Nations. These events have brought France and Great Britain closer together, and if they have not diminished the old prevalent fear and suspicion of Germany, they have at least given rise to the belief, slowly augmenting, that Germany is now less free to prepare her revenge than she was, and that in case she decided upon war France would not be left alone to meet the attack. In the security pact of the Locarno treaty France secures the guarantee of the present Rhineland frontiers.

By the signing of a treaty of friendship and mutual defense with Yugoslavia on last armistice day, France completed the system of mutual-defense treaties originated seven years ago. These treaties also involve the balance of power in the Balkans. The Yugoslav treaty had been pending for several years but was actually signed following the visit of an Italian naval squadron under Prince Udine, a close relative of the Italian King, to the International Zone of Tangier. Italy countered the Franco-Yugoslav treaty 11 days later by concluding a second treaty with Albania.

The foreign policy of Soviet Russia.

Soviet Russia's foreign policy, like the domestic policy, is based on the premise of communism as the dominating power of the world. The inexorable pressure of present realities, however, has compelled the Russians to minimize their enunciations with regard to the dissemination of Communist doctrines, and, though their intentions remain unchanged, they have begun to realize that their ultimate objective must be approached indirectly. The British Empire, as the chief opponent to the extension of Bolshevist influence, has aroused an even greater vindictiveness than the old animosity of Czarist times. And Soviet leaders have not been slow to direct and increase the already existing enmity of the Russians for Great Britain, encouraging the development of nationalism—a principle diametrically opposed to Communist tenets—at home and in certain " backward areas " as a means of magnifying Russian influence and prestige and at the same time striking a blow at Russia's traditional enemy, the British.

To offset the alleged British anti-Russian program, Soviet diplomats have been engaged in creating a network of international arrangements with individual States. So far, five nonaggression and neutrality pacts have been signed by the Soviet Government (with Turkey, Germany, Afghanistan, Lithuania, and Persia), and three others have been drafted (with Finland, Latvia, and Poland). Russia's policy in promoting a pro-Russian bloc is recognized as detrimental to league solidarity in general and to the policies of those nations which sponsor the league, particularly Great Britain.

The following important treaties have been signed by Soviet Russia in an attempt to achieve a pro-Russian bloc:

Name of treaty and purpose	Duration	Signed	Signatory powers	Ratified
Russo-Turkish nonaggression and neutrality pact	3 years plus 1	Dec. 17, 1925	Russia Turkey	Jan. 5, 1926 Feb. [illegible], 1926
Russo-German nonaggression and neutrality pact	5 years	Apr. 24, 1926	Russia Germany	June 29, 1926 June 10, 1926
Russo-Afghan nonaggression and neutrality pact	3 years plus 1	Aug. 31, 1926	Russia Afghanistan	Apr. — 1927 Do.
Russo-Lithuanian nonaggression and neutrality pact	5 years plus 1 at intervals	Sept. 28, 1926	Russia Lithuania	Nov. 5, 1926 Do.
Russo-Persian nonaggression and neutrality pact	3 years	Oct. 1, 1927	Russia Persia	Nov. 2, 1927 Oct. 31, 1927

Two treaties, which endeavor to prevent Russian expansion westward and which because they receive the sanction of certain of the great Powers, are important to Soviet Russia:

Name of treaty and purpose	Duration	Signed	Signatory powers	Ratified
Polish-Rumanian guaranty treaty	5 years	Mar. 26, 1926	Poland Rumania	Nov. 26, 1926 Do.
Treaty of Paris awarding Bessarabia to Rumania	Indefinite	Oct. 28, 1920	Great Britain France Italy Japan Rumania	Apr. 14, 1922 Apr. 24, 1924 Mar. 7, 1927 No. May 19, 1922

Italy and the Balkans.

With the announced policy of Mussolini for the enlargement of the rôle of Italy there has been and must continue to be a reaching out into the international realm for the accomplishment of this objective. The most important step, and one which Italy is consistently insistent upon, is the redistribution of mandates under the European colonial system. Consequent upon her failure to obtain concessions promised to her by the pact of London, there remains for Italy an unsettled question which will be satisfied only when she has gained a colonial empire commensurate with that of England or France. These aggressive intentions, and the development of Fascism, which prompts them, is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in the development of international relations since the World War, and one which may serve to create a new balance of power in Europe.

In the pursuance of her enlarged policy Italy has turned to strengthen her influence in the Balkans, where her most immediate interests lie, and here she at once runs counter to the orientations of France. The rivalry of Italy and France for control in the Balkans and the Mediterranean area, and the open resistance of France to Italy's aggressive policy, involves in turn practically every European nation, and may be considered the governing factor which has determined the following treaties and accords:

Name of treaty and purpose	Duration	Date signed	Signatory powers	Ratified
Little entente (alliance for maintenance of treaty of Trianon).	5 years; renewed in 1926 for 3 years.	In 1921 and 1922.	Yugoslavia-Rumania.	Yes.
			Rumania-Czechoslovakia.	Do.
			Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia.	Do.
Treaty of Tirana (treaty of friendship exercising a protectorate over Albania).	20 years	Nov. 27, 1926	Italy	Dec. 3, 1927.
			Albania	Yes.
Yugoslav-French treaty (treaty of defensive alliance).	5 years	Nov. 11, 1927	Yugoslavia	Nov. 27, 1927.
			France	Not yet.
Second treaty of Tirana (defensive alliance).	20 years	Nov. 22, 1927	Albania	Dec. 3, 1927.
			Italy	Nov. 20, 1927.
Italian-Hungarian treaty (treaty of friendship, conciliation, and arbitration).	10 years from date of ratification.	Apr. 5, 1927	do	May 21, 1927.
			Hungary	Aug. 8, 1927.
Italian-Roumanian treaty (treaty of amity).	5 years	Sept. 12, 1926	Italy, Roumania	Not ratified.
Paris convention (accord recognizing Roumanian sovereignty to Bessarabia).	Indefinite	Oct. 28, 1920	Italy	Mar. 9, 1927.
			France	Apr. 30, 1924.
			Japan	No.
			Great Britain	1922.
			Roumania	Yes.
Italian-German treaty (treaty of conciliation and arbitration).	10 years	Dec. 29, 1926	Italy	Yes.
			Germany	Yes.
Italian-Spanish treaty (treaty of friendship and neutrality).	do	Aug. —, 1926	Italy, Spain	Unknown.

Recent indications which show the general trend of Italian policy, and which bring into the foreground the Balkan and Mediterranean issues, have been the visit of the Italian fleet to the International Zone of Tangier, and the signing of the second treaty of Tirana, a treaty of defensive alliance, as a counterpoise to the Yugoslav-French treaty, also a treaty of defensive alliance.

NOTE.—For further aspects of the treaty-making policies of European States, attention is invited to the two following articles.

III. EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER.

There has been a growing apprehension in Germany because of the movement of European politics away from the League of Nations idea back to the old balance-of-power grouping. In this connection there was an article contributed to the *Tageliche Rundschau* recently by Freiherr von Rheinbaben, a member of the Reichstag for the People's Party and a personal friend of the Foreign Minister, Doctor Stresemann.

After characterizing the present disarmament meeting at Geneva as an apparently "hopeless recommencement," Von Rheinbaben continues:

> It is accompanied by an ever plainer return of European diplomacy to the highly dangerous system of pre-war alliances, the military obligations of which have only partially become known and published. What a difference between the resounding speeches for peace of the September assemblies and actual practical developments in European politics!

Von Rheinbaben fears Germany "can do but little to abjure the surely impending danger of renewed warlike developments in Europe. Up to the present she has tried her utmost both in Locarno and elsewhere to keep this danger at least away from her own soil." He writes—

> Even greater than the demand to evacuate the Rhineland, than the revision of the Dawes plan and the strengthening of Germany's interest in the East, is the need for keeping Germany out of an impending conflict. Not an entirely simple policy in face of the great store of dishonesty and hypocrisy in the relationship of a number of European countries to each other and especially in the most important field of the work of the League of Nations disarmament!

Von Rheinbaben does not agree, he writes, with some other political observers in Germany who judge the Franco-Italian tension to be the greatest danger for the peace of Europe. It is true that the dangerous diplomatic game of alliances and the struggle for power in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans resembles in many ways the occurrences of the last 20 years before the World War. At the same time one should perceive that Britain, not the least on account of her position in the Locarno adjustment, has again become to a large degree the arbitrator of war and peace in Europe. The real danger is in the northeast. In complete reversal of the historical conditions of several centuries, Von Rheinbaben says, Poland imagines that, between a weak Russia and a defeated Germany, she can make herself the dominating factor in eastern Europe. Most skillfully she has "diplomatically" gone as apprentice to France. Poland appears at the moment to stand as the prop of the "Spirit of Geneva," of civilization and of right, while her small Lithuanian opponent, who, it is true, acts politically as awkwardly as possible, is made to seem the disturber of the peace, after Vilna has been taken from her in the midst of peace times and after far-reaching preparations have been made to end her existence as a State.

Germany is not herself a prime factor in the threatening conflict but she knows that any violence offered to Lithuania by Poland will threaten seriously her "island of East Prussia." Germany issued in agreement with Russia an appropriate public warning, and she will urge peace at the council meeting at Geneva.

The peace of Europe was never buttressed, Von Rheinbaben writes in conclusion, by the one-sided English-French compromise which was in fashion from 1919 to 1925. The peace of the future and the realization of essentially better conditions for Europe will depend primarily on whether an agreement regarding the form and preservation of peace will be reached as among equals by Germany, England, and France.

NOTE.—The questions raised by the author of the above article touch upon the fundamental sore spots of Europe to-day.

He speaks first of the balance of power grouping and the system of pre-war alliances. The latter of these is the result of the instinctive movement toward the former. The underlying motive of the balance of power is security, and fear forces the European nations into alliances to maintain that balance. And the object of the balance is to prevent any power or group of powers from gaining such strength, either singly or in combination, as to be able to control the course of Europe. And in this system, England occupies a peculiar position. She is often in but not of Europe and her geographical situation places her in an ideal position for acting as the final arbiter of Europe. British statesmen have for centuries realized this advantageous position of their country and have made the most of it. In the early part of the nineteenth century Britain was allied with Prussia against France. She later partook in the Crimean war against Russia. The policy of Gladstone and Disraeli vacillated between enmity for or friendship with Turkey in order to effect a compromise between Gladstone's hatred for the Turk and Disraeli's insistence that Russia must not control the straits. With the use of Germany and her alliance with Austria and her supposed alliance with Russia, British policy made a complete reorientation in favor of France. After having been an ally of Russia during the war and having promised the straits to Russia during that period of friendship, Britain is now very probably determined that Russia shall have nothing of the kind.

After the conclusion of the war, Britain very soon returned to her position of political detachment. This was because the scales had again shifted, this time in favor of France, and this shift was augmented by the system of alliances which France proceeded to build up. This system included Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia and gave France a great preponderance of power as opposed to Germany, Austria, and Hungary. The effect of this shift was strikingly shown during the French occupation of the Ruhr when Great Britain (the war having been ended only four years) so opposed France that the latter accused her of actual friendliness for Germany. This dangerous position of Europe was largely overcome by the Locarno pact, which, in the form of a solemn political instrument, defined the position which, in effect, Britain has occupied in Europe for, as was said, centuries. By this instrument Britain binds herself to preserve the present boundaries between France and Germany and agrees to align herself with Germany, should France unprovokingly attack Germany or with France, should Germany so attack. Thus to-day, in western Europe, we find Britain playing her historic and profitable and, for geographic reasons, necessary rôle. And this rôle is necessary for Britain because she can not *permit either power to gain such relative ascendancy as would overshadow her on the North Sea or the English Channel. And it is of interest to note that in playing her postwar game in Europe, Britain can act only for herself as the Dominions have made it clear that they will not be bound, without their express consent, to the European commitments of England.*

In the Mediterranean Britain occupies a position of absolute control, but it is, of course, to her advantage to establish a balance of power in this area if possible, for by this means the danger to her is lessened, and the necessity of maintaining such a strong naval force in this sea is decreased. That is to say Britain feels that she must control this sea, and if necessary she would center such a force therein as to be superior to all other naval powers combined. But if she can divide the principal naval powers of the Mediterranean into two camps and she remain aloof from both, or aid first one and then the other, she obviously is in a better position than if the entire Mediterranean were united against her. But in any case the objective is the protection of her vital Mediterranean route, and if the other principal naval powers in that sea are divided (as they are at present), her game is the same as it is in the struggle between France and Germany and she plays it as effectively.

Britain has consistently refused to guarantee any boundaries in eastern Europe because they are not of a primary concern to her. This is shown by her refusal to subscribe to the French-German-Polish pact and to the Geneva protocol. And throughout Britain has been slow, very slow, to commit or bind herself to any definite and permanent line of action and, furthermore, has repeatedly refused to bind herself by any postwar alliance. The nationalistic postwar development of Europe, working through time, will, when the occasion arises, show her where her alliance interests lie. Until then Britain is content to wait.

The subject of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute was treated in the December issue of the "Bulletin." The writer of the above article speaks from the German nationalistic point of view, but the "Polish Corridor" rankles in the breast of every German. And although Germany has bound herself to settle this travesty upon geography, history, economics, and politics by peaceful means, one may be assured that she will not rest until the continuity of the Reich is reestablished by a territorial reunion with East Prussia.

The author concludes by speaking of peace as among equals. This is the essence of the demand which Germany (through her very able and sincere foreign minister, Herr Stresemann) is continually making upon the league. The demand envisages three things—equalization of armaments, abolition of forces of occupation, and redistribution of mandates.

The German position in regard to these is at least logical and is based upon the acknowledged position of equality which Germany again occupies in the European family of nations because of her admission to the league and to the highest body of that league, the council.

The covenant of the league calls upon the members thereof to effect disarmament; Germany claims that she is the only one which is disarmed. The allied occupation of German territory can, by the treaty of Versailles, continue until 1935 unless Germany meets her obligations under that treaty. Germany claims that she has met those obligations and the continued presence of foreign troops on her soil is an insult in view of her position of equality and of the guarantees contained in the Locarno pacts; this occupation is what the Germans feel most deeply. In the latter part of January, Herr Stresemann in the Reichstag denounced, with the hearty support of all Germany, this continued occupation. The next day, the French Foreign Minister, M. Briand, announced the withdrawal of 10,000 more French troops from Germany. This brings the French forces of occupation to about 50,000. It is very likely that the entire force of occupation will be withdrawn considerably before 1935. The question of mandates is largely one of pride and economics and Germany has made known her intention to press when the time is propitious for a redistribution of mandates. In this she will probably be supported by Italy, who feels that she was deprived of her just share of this form of control over backward areas.—Ed.

IV. TREATY NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.

The recently concluded negotiations with France in regard to a treaty of arbitration and outlawry of war, together with the Pan American Conference at Havana, constitute the most outstanding contemporaneous activities of our Government in its foreign relations.

The treaty between the United States and France was signed in Washington on February 6, just 150 years after our first treaty with that power. And it is of interest to note that the treaty of February 6, 1778, negotiated by Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, was not only our first treaty with France but the first which the United States made with any foreign power. The assistance which it rendered to the United States in the form of French intervention in our behalf during our Revolution was largely instrumental in our attaining independence. It might be further noted that this instrument contained the only secret clause ever inserted in a treaty of the United States.

Let us now trace the significant development of the treaty signed on February 6, 1928.

In 1908 Mr. Elihu Root, as Secretary of State, concluded with France an arbitration treaty. In this treaty matters affecting "vital interest" and "national honor" were to be exempt from compulsory arbitration. This treaty expired in February of this year.

In April, 1927, the French Foreign Minister, M. Briand, said: "France is willing publicly to subscribe with the United States to an engagement tending to outlaw war between the two nations." This statement was made in the course of a public address and was doubtless intended as a "feeler." In June M. Briand made a formal suggestion to the United States "That they condemn recourse to war and renounce it, respectively, as an instrument of their national policy toward each other." This was received sympathetically by our Government, but the latter desired to investigate the implications and commitments of this suggestion.

On December 28 the Secretary of State, in a note to the French Government, welcomed the proposals of M. Briand, but earnestly suggested that its principle of "renouncing war as an instrument of national policy" be extended so as to gain the adherence of all of the principal powers of the world. This was not favorably received in Paris for reasons to be mentioned later.

On January 5 Mr. Briand replied, agreeing "in principle" to Mr. Kellogg's note of December 28, but throwing in a word which altered matters substantially. This word was "aggressive" and would accordingly only renounce aggressive war as an instrument of national policy. Washington felt that this entirely nullified the original Briand proposal. Shortly after this note it was intimated from Paris that Great Britain and France having both examined the Kellogg proposals, that they were both in accord in their attitude toward the subject.

On January 11 Mr. Kellogg in a new note to the French Government, stated that the United States was unable to agree to any such modification as suggested in the note of January 5. Mr. Kellogg made it plain, first, that the United States desired a multilateral treaty with France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Italy; and, second, that all wars, and not merely aggressive ones, should be renounced. The Secretary of State thus simply reverted to the basis of the original Briand proposal, with an extension of its scope.

On January 20 M. Briand replied, saying that France could not commit herself to a general pact to outlaw war because of her previous commitments, to be mentioned later. He stated that the extension from a bilateral to a multilateral basis completely altered his original proposal. He furthermore remarked, with some wisdom, that the United States would probably find the other proposed adherents to the pact agreeing with France. This note had the effect of concluding the discussions regarding "outlawry of war."

The treaty signed on February 6 was released to the public by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and it is, in effect, simply an extension of the Root treaty of 1908. Instead of "outlawing" war as originally suggested, the preamble merely states that it is the desire of France and the United States to settle their differences by submitting same to an impartial tribunal and that the parties condemn (but not renounce) war as an instrument of national policy between them. So much for the proceedings of the negotiations relating to outlawry of war.

The 1928 treaty differs from its predecessor in one respect, however. The Root treaty excluded from the necessity of arbitration matters affecting vital interests and national honor. These phrases, admittedly, could have a very wide application. The present treaty excludes, for the United States, questions of domestic concern, questions affecting the Monroe doctrine, and questions involving third parties. On France's part there are excluded questions involving the commitments of France under the League of Nations. The treaty resurrects the old Hague tribunal, established in 1907. The Root treaty also mentioned this body as being the arbitrator in case of dispute, but in the 20 years of life of the Root treaty the arbitration provisions of the treaty were not once invoked. The present treaty supersedes the Bryan "cooling-off" treaties of 1914 as well as the Root agreements, and is doubtless intended to serve as a model for future arbitration treaties.

Let us now briefly examine the causes of the failure to outlaw war. These are very important, especially from the French angle, because they explain so well the difficulties lying in such an undertaking and the differences between the American and the European points of view.

The United States could not accept the "aggressor" reservation because it has found no suitable answer to that practical and necessary question, How is an aggressor to be defined? The general European point of view is that an aggressor is one who engages in war without first submitting his case to arbitration. But suppose he submits his case and still goes to war? Or could not a nation by its provocative tactics so goad another state into war that the latter, while technically the aggressor would, in fact, be quite otherwise? And who would arbitrate, or suppose arbitrators can not be agreed upon? These are questions which the United States would like to have answered before it can readily pick out an aggressor.

The underlying fact in the French side of the negotiations was the League of Nations and France's system of European treaties and alliances. For these reasons she desired to limit the outlawry treaty to the United States, or, if such a treaty were to be extended to others, to limit its application to an aggressive war. Aside from her commitments under Articles X and XVI of the covenant. France is bound by the Locarno treaties and by alliances which tie her to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Rumania. Being so committed and feeling that her peace and security are intimately bound up with the league, France did not feel that she could in any way, even for America, weaken or endanger those safeguards which she has erected for herself on the Continent. For under the provisions of the covenant of the league or her treaties of alliance, France sees occasions when she quite well might be called upon to engage in war, and for this reason she felt that she could not sign any multilateral treaty renouncing war among certain powers who are themselves within the league, which recognizes war as its ultimate sanction.

V. FOREIGN PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

Immigration and colonization.

Fear of European aggression has long been a matter of apprehension to Latin America. During the wars for independence many Spanish-Americans feared that certain European powers might intervene to restore to the dominion of Spain her revolted colonies in America. Fears of this intervention of other European powers which would have destroyed the autonomy of Spanish-American nations were entertained in Argentina during the reign of the Dictator, Rosas, whose ambitions involved him in difficulties with France and England; in Peru at the time of the dispute with Spain in 1863 over unsettled claims of Spanish citizens against the Peruvian Government because of alleged injuries during the revolutionary period; and in Mexico and Venezuela when European nations threatened permanently to occupy their territory. Later, the colonizing and commercial enterprise of Germany gave rise to serious alarm in certain sections of South America—notably in southern Brazil—where the majority of Germans emigrating to South America were concentrated. During the World War this situation was regarded as an actual menace by the Brazilian Government, as in some localities German influence predominated, and it was feared that the early German successes might serve to revive the former sentiment of the State of Rio Grande do Sul for separation from the rest of Brazil in order to form an independent republic. At the present time, Italy's efforts to relieve her population problem include a project for planting throughout Latin America colonizing units which will retain with the homeland at least a strong social and cultural tie.

From the time of their independence, the Latin American countries have permitted and encouraged the entrance of immigrants of practically all nationalities who came to establish themselves permanently and to aid in the occupation and development of the vast tracts of unsettled wilderness; but the policy, in general, has been to scatter the newcomers throughout the country, separate colonies not being considered desirable. The tendency of the immigrants to concentrate in regions where there were already large numbers of their own nationality has been particularly discouraged.

Italian immigrants have always been welcome, especially in Argentina where there are some 2,000,000 distributed throughout the agricultural districts. In fact, the rapid development of Argentina has been generally credited to the industry and productiveness of the early Italian settlers, but no political significance has been attached to their presence. Recent Italian emigration regulations promulgated by Premier Mussolini, however, have met with the strongest opposition from the Argentine and Uruguayan Governments in particular and a storm of protest from the other Latin-American countries in general. It would appear doubtful, therefore, if Italy's plan for the retention in unitary colonies of her emigrants to Latin America could meet with success.

Of further significance in the relations of the Latin American States with other nations has been the Monroe doctrine, promulgated at a juncture when the United States was apprehensive of the encroachments of Russia upon the western coast of North America, and when—in common with the rising States of Latin America—she viewed the association of European powers known as the "Holy Alliance" as a menace against the independence and integrity of American nations. The declarations of President Monroe in his message to Congress in December, 1823, aimed against European colonization or interposition in America, were received with approbation by South America. The Monroe doctrine still insures the peace and stability of the Americas by forestalling causes of intervention or the permanent acquisition of territory in America by a foreign power.

In regard to the Asiatics, Latin American countries, with the exception of Brazil, do not desire Japanese immigration. Brazil's policy is to welcome foreigners who come as permanent settlers with the intention of becoming Brazilian citizens and mingling with the racial cosmos of the country. Public opinion regarding the desirability of the Japanese in large numbers has been greatly divided, there being a strong sentiment that the Japanese could not fulfill these conditions. Recently, however, this sentiment appears to have become somewhat modified, and it is reported that negotiations are under way for the entrance of considerable numbers of Japanese into the sparsely populated regions of the Amazon Valley for industrial purposes.

Commercial.

German commercial interests in and efforts toward penetration of Latin America appear to be outstanding at the present time, particularly in Colombia.

Due to the activities of the Sociedad Colombiana-Alemana de Transportes Aereos, otherwise known as the "Scadta," Colombia is reported to be the first nation in the world to have all of its principal centers of commerce connected by airplane. In 1919 the "Scadta" was formed as an anonymous company under Colombian law in the city of Barranquilla, for the purpose of establishing aerial communication with the interior of Colombia, employing planes of German manufacture. The initial capital, which was small, was subscribed principally by German financial agencies with only a small amount of stock sold in Colombia. As Colombia is notoriously deficient in rail or road communications, the Magdalena River being the only practical shipping route, local conditions were favorable for the establishment of aerial transportation. By 1921 the capitalization was increased, the company receiving some slight support from the Colombian Government, and a definite service was established between Barranquilla-Girardot, Girardot-Neiva, Barranquilla-Cartgena. By 1924 the organization was developed to the point of perfect maintenance and repair, with all projected lines nearing completion. The cartographic section was in a position to execute any mission in aerial photography and the preparation of maps from aero photographs: the company giving a striking proof of this efficiency when engaged by the Swiss boundary commission charged with the settlement of the boundary controversy between Colombia and Venezuela to map certain inaccessible regions of the territory in dispute.

In furthering its campaign to extend the original Colombian River line into an inter-Caribbean air net embracing all important Central American and Antillean ports, the "Scadta" signed a contract with the Colombian War Department, certain military features of which are of direct interest to the United States in connection with the defenses of the Panama Canal. The company, furthermore, obtained a direct subsidy of $60,000 from the Colombian Government to purchase new superhydroplanes: the subsidy feature, of course, making a change in relationship between the company and the Colombian Government from an independent commercial enterprise to a semigovernmental organization.

Plans of the "Scadta" organization to extend its service from Colombia to the Central American countries—such service necessitating landing in the Canal Zone and the possible establishment of an air base—have been halted, pending the decision of the United States in this regard. In the meantime an intensive propaganda campaign inspired by the "Scadta" has been launched in the Colombian press, designed to stir up anti-Americanism and exert pressure upon the Colombian Government to assist in obtaining the desired permission to land in the Canal Zone.

In regard to trade a determined and growing effort is being made by Germany to capture the Colombian market, representatives of that nationality cutting prices to such an extent as to make business entirely unprofitable for competitors of other nations. Furthermore, they have a particularly favorable field of action in Colombia, where they can and do foster the already existing pro-German and anti-American prejudices.

Cultural.

French culture and intellect, in general, are most admired in Latin America, where it is commonly entertained that France and her people have more intellectual sympathy for Latin Americans than almost any other people. Racial ties with Spain are close, of course, but the protracted struggle for independence and the long delay of the motherland in recognizing the independent status of her former colonies has hindered the development of commercial relations between Spain and the nations of Spanish America. In recent years, however, Spain has made many efforts, with some degree of success, to cultivate their sympathy and good will.

NOTE.—It might be said, that while the weapon of penetration of the old diplomacy was military force, that of the new is economic pressure. And the latter has proven just as effective and much harder to combat than the former. Economic penetration—silent, augumentative, often times intangible but always with an eventual pressure which may be even more effective than armed force—is more difficult to limit or even to measure than the latter. At present the investments in Latin America of the United States and Great Britain are practically equal, being about $5,200,000,000 each, while those of all other nations combined amount to a total of about $2,200,000,000.—Ed.

VI. REPORT OF TRIP TO MUKDEN, HARBIN, AND DAIREN

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

Peking-Mukden Railway.

This railway maintains a regular service and the trains are run on schedule time. The passenger equipment is very old for the reason that no foreign firm will extend credit with which to make needed replacements. A few British railway engineers and fiscal officers who remain to look after British investors' interests in the line make a brave show of technical supervision without which even the present decrepit conditions could not be maintained. The cars are filthy compared with American standards; the sleeping and dining accommodations are uncomfortable and unhygienic; and the service is slovenly. It may, however, be said to the credit of Chang Tso-lin that he has reserved one train per day on which military free riders are forbidden, thus assuring for paying passengers a place in which all their senses do not revolt against the disgusting habits of Chinese soldiers. In most ways the Peking-Mukden must be considered a third-class railway. Its hasty degeneration to the conditions of other Chinese-run railways is prevented partially due to its distance from the war zone and more to the persistency of British engineers and officialdom in trying to prevent loss to the British bondholders.

Mukden.

The atmosphere at Mukden has undergone a noticeable change since Chang-Tso-lin has shifted his residence to Peking. Only second-rate individuals remain in official positions. The affairs of the government of the three eastern Provinces are largely directed from Peking, a method of handling so important an area that is generally regarded as unsatisfactory. All Chinese, Japanese, and other foreigners consulted expressed the need of a good official to coordinate the affairs of the three eastern Provinces in Mukden. General Wu Chun-sheng, Governor of Hailungkiang, temporarily occupies this post, but he lacks the power and vision for such an important post. Chang Hauch-liang was most frequently mentioned as the best available man, in view of the prestige he enjoys as son of the marshal. Mr. Matsuoka, vice president of the South Manchurian Railway, unhesitatingly expressed it to be the Japanese wish that Chang-Tso-lin himself return to Mukden. Very significantly he said, "We do not like to assume the responsibility for Chang-Tso-lin in China proper."

Coming from the widespread pessimism among business men and officials in China proper, which increases progressively as one goes south, one is immediately struck with the optimism among business men, foreign and Chinese, in Mukden. As to the prosperous conditions in Manchuria I heard no dissenting voice. The atmosphere is infectious with high business adventure comparable to our own West. Even the Chinese masses on the streets look well nourished. Animals have replaced human transport and the numerous cart animals are noticeably well fed. There is no unemployment in Manchuria. The senseless inflation of the fengpine is well known and causes immense difficulties to trade. Everybody condemns the fengpine, but business thrives and men are prosperous in spite of this stupid device for financing Chang-Tso-lin's military venture south of the wall. The wealth of Manchuria lies in rich and sufficient land and this fundamental soundness will permit much stupidity in government without incurring hardship.

From the more sensational business point of view Mukden is the Mukden Arsenal or, more properly, arsenals. Into the building and maintenance of these huge plants much of the Chinese wealth in Manchuria is poured, and from them relatively small output finds its way to the northern armies. The Mukden arsenals are an expensive luxury for Chang-Tso-lin. Upon them feed richly many foreign firms and numerous Chinese officials. The wasteful and cumbersome system of distributing wealth in China known as squeeze finds its supreme development here. The story of the arsenals is a disgusting commentary on Chinese character. Whereas the amounts of squeeze here are stupendous and concentrated in a relatively small group, the system employed is general throughout China and alone is sufficient an evil to prevent China for years from taking her place among strong nations. Here is a huge governmental industrial plant in which the principles of squeeze are employed by all heads of departments in the same sordid way that an avaricious No. 1 boy exacts toll in a domestic establishment.

Yang Yu-ting, director of the arsenal, genuinely tries to reduce sqeeze within reasonable limits, but it is recognized as folly for him to attempt to eliminate the system so well grounded in Chinese nature. Directorships are farmed out among political favorites and likewise transferred as directors become too notoriously avaricious or as they accumulate what might be considered their share. The biggest paying job is director of construction, who, I am reliably informed, cleared $300,000 in one year after making the customary distributions to his associated beneficiaries.

Useless new buildings are being constructed in order to collect the squeeze while suitable existing ones are abandoned. Likewise old and expensive machinery plants lie idle as new ones replace them. Once the squeeze is paid on buildings and machinery the interest lies only in newer projects on which squeeze is yet to be had. A fine German electric furnace steel plant was constructed, the squeeze duly paid, and a German expert employed, but the steel contractors have thus far prevented its full operation. Raw materials are bought and paid for but only a fraction is actually delivered. The demand for falsification of invoice prices is a general practice.

The only interest is in new plants, which alone are producing limited outputs and affording squeeze. Mukden arsenals are a tragic monument to the most unwholesome qualities of Chinese character. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Chang-Tso-lin, or rather the Chinese people, pay three prices for all the munitions used in the senseless internecine wars.

The Chinese officials in Mukden try to belittle the part played by foreigners in the technical operation of the producing parts of the arsenal. My investigations showed that every vital activity of the arsenals was supervised by foreigners, including Japanese, Russians, Germans, Swedes, Americans. Naturally all the machinery is imported from abroad.

South Manchurian Railway.

The contrast between Chinese railways and the Japanese-operated South Manchuria has been remarked by every traveler. In all respects the South Manchuria Railway demonstrates the superiority of the Japanese to the Chinese in organizational, technical, and political skill. In a word, the South Manchurian physically compares favorably to America's best railways and furnishes almost perfect service. Certain administrative faults and lack of economies do exist in the operation of the railway and in the administration of the zone; but nevertheless the railway operates excellently and the zone is firmly governed. This can not be said of any Chinese institution of like nature. Past events and present-day security for development in and near the railway zone prove almost conclusively that the freedom from normal Chinese chaos in Manchuria has been insured by the Japanese control.

Harbin.

Conditions have greatly changed in Harbin since 1923. Red Russians have replaced White Russians on the directorate of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The complete civil administration of the railway zone, including the city of Harbin, has been restored to Chinese bands and is being administered by a civil official. The gross revenues of the railway, formerly deposited in a Russian bank, have now been divided between the Dalbank and Chinese banks. The parity between Chinese and Russian employees on the railway is being approached. The president informed me that this parity is almost reached in the administrative and operating departments, but that in the technical department the replacing of Russians by Chinese must be deferred, due to the limited number of Chinese with the requisite linguistic and technical qualifications. Soviet Russia's influence in the Chinese Eastern Railway is everywhere diminishing before aggressive Chinese tactics. The local Chinese officials, invigorated by the virile and foreign atmosphere of the north, are taking every advantage of a weak Russia and a Japanese policy which temporarily enjoys Moscow's discomfiture.

Harbin is growing rapidly, especially in Chinese population. It is estimated that the net increase in population in all Manchuria caused by the influx of immigrants from Chihli and Shantung will reach 800,000. Of these perhaps a fourth reach Harbin and are distributed on lands to the east and west along the Chinese Eastern Railway by the semigovernmental banks and guilds. Some of these are absorbed as laborers in Harbin. With the immigrants still arriving in winter, one might expect there would be much suffering before they can be placed on land to produce their first crops. I found no evidence that the immigrants were not being fed and housed. This in China is quite unusual. Since both Government and individuals seem willing to advance funds to maintain these immigrants and encourage their coming, it shows a foresight unique in China. The productivity of north Manchuria will tremendously increase. The increase in the value of land owned by semiprivate banks and private large holders will fully repay present small expenditures, and in the background is the feeling that this colonization is China's strongest weapon against Japan's encroachment.

Business in Harbin is thriving and the prospects for the future are bright. There are predictions that Harbin will become one of the foremost cities in China. One senses an atmosphere of boosting in Harbin which is impressive and foreign to China. With richest virgin land being populated with a rapidity perhaps not paralleled even in our West, the optimism for the future of Harbin is well founded.

If China proper leaves one hopeless in viewing the future, if the local conditions in the arsenal atmosphere of Mukden disgust one with Chinese lack of ability and integrity, Harbin is the one spot where one may revive a degree of confidence in China's strength The Chinese ability to trade successfully has been traditionally recognized; their ability to create political conditions permitting a reasonable opportunity for the individual's talents has been markedly inferior. In north Manchuria to-day, and in south Manchuria to a slightly lesser degree, the Chinese can farm and trade with a freedom unknown elsewhere in China. Officialdom undeniably benefits from the farm and factory; capitalism is the motivating force back of all development, just as it is in the United States; but officials and capitalists, self-seeking as they are, have a conception which is as unique in China as it is simple and which may be expressed as an appreciation of a well-nourished laying goose instead of a dead one. Officials are permitting commerce and industry an unusual degree of freedom from the customary restrictions and obstructions. The result is that in Manchuria one sees the Chinese in rich fields and in a favorable atmosphere to express their most pronounced natural abilities. It is here rather than in the blatant, theory-ridden, and imitative south where Chinese nationalism flourishes most. The Chinese of Manchuria are engaging in natural pursuits, are well fed, confident; they do not have imperialism (they are imperialists to the core), but they resent any material advantage that Russia or Japan may enjoy in Manchuria, and they will go to considerable lengths to diminish that advantage. If the southerners are patriotic academicians who in frantic movements would eliminate even the foreigners who feed them, the Manchurian Chinese tend to develop into healthy nationalists who will retain the old-fashioned Chinese sense of sufficiency and a practical sense to benefit even from foreigners and then eliminate them by gradual substitution. The Manchurian Chinese entertain a very marked appreciation for western organization and science; they seem to understand that it is more in keeping with Chinese nature to absorb even foreign-created wealth than it is to destroy it and go through the dubious processes of creating it themselves. They proceeded more slowly with the recovery of rights on the Chinese Eastern than was necessary, but the intact railway is gradually passing into their hands. Military pressure will have to be employed before Russia's stake in the Chinese Eastern is ever recovered.

The reasons for the strength of the Chinese in Manchuria are complex. International accidents alone do not explain the situation. It is true Manchuria came to China as an incident in the conquest of China herself; Russian influence dwindled with a World War and a revolution; and international intervention prevented Japan from reaping the benefits. The rigorous climate excludes all but strong men and adventurous; the opportunities certainly favor men with vision. However, I believe that one must look for the principal causes of Chinese vigor in Manchuria in foreign influences. Russia built a railway and a small empire along the path of the Chinese Eastern. Japan took over a part of it and continues Russia's plan, probably better than Russia could have done. The Chinese were responsible for none of the grandiose scheme except the original disgraceful alienation of her soil and sovereignty. But the Chinese grew up alongside of an organization superior to any they had ever known and began to reap untold material advantages from law, order, and modern communications. The advantages were not all material. Many Chinese absorbed some of the spirit of foreign civilizations and some considered it worth while to imitate them within limits. Russia's hold on the Chinese Eastern Railway is becoming unsteady, but Russia's civilizing influence will long persist in Manchuria. There is little originality in much of the Chinese development in the area of Russian and Japanese influence. The encouraging thing for China is that some Chinese by their acts, if not by their admissions, are manifesting an appreciation of methods more in keeping with the world requirements than they have been able to create for themselves.

One of the most capable appearing Chinese officials I have encountered is Chang Huang-hsiang, governor of the Chinese Eastern Railway railway zone. In 1923, as commander of the military forces in the zone, he executed the demands for the transfer of the land office records from the railway to the Chinese authorities. This demand was only partially successful, but since then he has steadily pushed his claims for the recovery of Chinese sovereignty in the zone with marked success. Regardless of the political views held, all observers agree that Governor Chang is an intelligent and determined executive, who thinks of national interests. Of considerable personal wealth, he does not have to indulge in the petty and disgraceful forms of squeeze. Many irritations and costly administrative exactions do exist, particularly directed against Russians, but on the whole the zone is well and positively governed. Bandits continue to infest the eastern line, but this condition has always existed. It is an interesting fact that both White and Red Russians prefer life under Chinese jurisdiction to residence in Russia. Harbin is a safer place to live than ever before. The streets have been greatly improved since the Chinese took over its administration.

I could hear no fear expressed of radical activities in Manchuria. An excellent secret service, superintended by White Russians having a personal as well as professional interest in keeping down communistic activities, is operative everywhere. I was shown Russian-made plans for preventing a possible invasion by Soviet forces, but these were more academic than real. The higher Chinese authorities were fully conscious of Russian inability to take aggressive measures in Manchuria because of Russia's fear of attack from the west, her internal weakness, and the avoidance of any steps in the Far East which would arouse Japan's countermeasures. As Mr. Matsucka expressed it, "The Russians would never submit to the Chinese aggression on the Chinese Eastern Railway if they were not afraid of Japan's reaction to forceful resistance."

The crossover at Anganchi.

When questioned as to the real reasons for the objection to permission being granted for the Taonan-Anganchi Railway to cross the Chinese Eastern Railway at Anganchi, the president of the Chinese Eastern Railway stated that it was purely a technical matter, which is now under consideration by the technical board. I appeared dissatisfied with the answer, whereupon the president admitted hesitatingly that certain other difficulties did exist. Not only, it appears, did the Russian directors object to the extensions of the Chinese railway (built with loans from the South Manchuria Railway) which would tap an area of north Manchuria formerly conceded to be in the Russian sphere of influence but there were " other reasons " which the "government" had to consider. This opened a subject, seemingly unimportant, which was very typical of the international conflict existing in all Manchurian questions.

Later I asked Mr. Matsucka about the matter, and he enthusiastically defended the propriety of this particular crossover and crossovers in general. One gathered that the South Manchuria Railway was eager to extend this railway over which it exercises credit control in the direction of Aigun. From various sources it was learned that some official Chinese object even to a Chinese railway built with Japanese money invading north Manchuria; others under Japanese influence or in Japanese pay favor the scheme; Russian officials wish to obstruct either Chinese or Japanese encroachments damaging to Chinese Eastern Railway interests; and some Chinese favor maintaining a fiction of Russian interest in order to hinder Japan's moving northward. Adding a little squeeze here and intimidation there one finds that a railway crossover assumes huge proportions. There is little doubt but that in Chinese and Russian eyes the Anganchi crossover would establish a precedent favoring future Japanese encroachments in north Manchuria.

Dairen.

The principal value of my visit to Dairen was derived from two conversations with Mr. Matsuoka, vice president of the South Manchuria Railway. The president was absent in Japan. I talked with the Japanese consuls in Mukden and Harbin, both of whom conversed freely of local conditions and of Chinese generalities, but imparted no important information. They left no doubt in my mind that the Chinese were unanimous in obstructing Japanese political and commercial development except in those cases of individual Chinese who personally benefited from association with the Japanese. The Japanese officers in these two places, whom also I visited, were most affable and hospitable, but told me nothing of value. Mr. Matsuoka, however, was very communicative. His long association with foreigners gives him a frankness of speech which seems natural.

He wasted little time on the conventional explanation of Japan's position and objectives in Manchuria, and quickly abandoned the altruistic smoke screen of Japan's Manchurian projects which is so unconvincingly employed by Japanese publicists. He admitted frankly that Japan's needs dictated economic exploitation of Manchuria, and "certain resources of the maritime Province," as well as a strategic zone on the mainland to protect her from Russia. The strategic aspects of Manchuria, he added, were never stressed in keeping with their importance. "We not only must protect Japan from Russia but protect China as well." I asked him, "Why

China?" and he replied, "Japan by way of China. For perfect security we should have outposts in Mongolia, but that is a little too far." When asked about the probability of another war with Russia, he stated that there were many Japanese who thought that a war would come within 5 or 10 years. He believed that the recrudescence of Russian strength would not come so soon, but that within a period of 20 years Japan should expect to have to face a Russia aggressive in the Far East. He believed that in the future great compromises had to be effected between Japan and Russia or a war was inevitable.

He categorically denied all knowledge of the rumored political negotiations resulting from the visit of Chinese Eastern Railway officials to Dairen in September. No one with whom I talked in Manchuria believed that any serious conversations, such as have been reported, took place. Gen. Chang Hsuang-hsiang said that he believed the "leaks" regarding the Russo-Japanese rapprochement were permitted with a view to intimidating the Chinese.

In discussing the general railway situation, Mr. Matsuoka assumed a very unconcerned attitude toward independent Chinese railway construction. His criticism of the Chinese was not their actual building of the contested lines, but rather their high-handed disregard of existing agreements. There is room in Manchuria for many more railroads, he said, and parallel lines are not harmful to the South Manchuria Railway, provided the area between lines allows normal exploitation. The South Manchuria Railway is fast approaching maximum capacity as at present constructed. Both on this score and because of the fact that facilities at Dairen were not limitless, he defended the construction of the Kirin-Kainei line and the harbor at Seishin. The Hulatao bugaboo did not disturb him. It is technically a difficult port for development. Even if the Chinese could manage to finance and construct it, which he seriously doubted, it would require 10 years to develop facilities for handling 3,000,000 tons a year. Dairen is now handling about 10,000,000 tons per year, and its tonnage is increasing at the rate of about 1,500,000 tons annually. He reiterated the idea of there being room for all in Manchuria. These confident statements are hardly consistent with known obstructions which the Japanese invariably put in the way of all Chinese attempts at independent railway and harbor exploitation.

The vice president made some interesting observations regarding creditor control over Chinese railway enterprises. By way of minimizing the extent of Japanese influence outside of the South Manchuria Railway lines, he mentioned the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway which was financed by the South Manchuria Railway. He said that on this line the South Manchuria Railway had a few technical and fiscal representatives but that their supervision was ineffective both in the operation of the railway and in the control of revenues. The Chinese circumvented all efforts to provide a surplus to apply to interest due on the bonds. Mr. Matsuoka admitted that the South Manchuria Railway expected its financial returns from these feeder lines only from the handling of freights fed into the Japanese-owned railways. He naturally did not add that a mounting indebtedness to the South Manchuria Railway was probably viewed with favor as constituting a fine argument for seizure in possible future political complications in the area.

As previously mentioned, Mr. Matsuoka expressed dissatisfaction with Chang Tso-lin's venture south of the wall. When I mentioned a possible advantage of having a "covering detachment" intervening between militant southern nationalism and Manchuria, suggesting that embarrassing arguments would be heard regarding Japan's position if nationalism broke against the Great Wall, he said that he was favorable to letting the Chinese do whatever they pleased south of the wall but that the Japanese would fight and not argue if their Manchurian interests were menaced.

I was surprised to hear from several independent sources that communist propagandists were very active in the general sullen atmosphere of discontent prevailing in Korea. This sole weapon temporarily remaining to Russia, subversive propaganda, is being vigorously employed through Korean communists residing in Siberia. An American professor who has just completed a three-months' investigation of social conditions in Korea told me that he everywhere encountered intense hatred of Japan and very definite evidences of Russian-inspired radical organizations. The situation he considered acute and the cause of great concern to Japanese officialdom. Mr. Matsuoka at first was inclined to deny the existence of unusual unrest in Korea but finally admitted that propagandists were causing considerable difficulty.

General conclusions.

Manchuria is an area which because of its natural wealth and peculiar geographical position will continue to create political problems of vast importance not only for the three nations primarily affected but for the statesmen of the world. Because of their material interest, in contradistinction to sentimental considerations, the Chinese in Manchuria have developed an intense desire for the recovery of alienated rights. This desire will be magnified as the Chinese colonization proceeds, as it does now at a stupendous rate. Genuine Chinese nationalism, based on very practical ideas, grows rapidly and is being fed by the enthusiasm with which the Russian position is being negatived, as well as by the deeply-rooted resentment of Japanese aggressions. Japanese policies were condemned by all Chinese officials and business men with whom I talked, with a boldness unusual among Chinese.

The gradual and temporary elimination of Russian influence in north Manchuria is probably looked upon with satisfaction by Japan. This, however, is not without its immediate disadvantage to both China and Japan since the bitterness of a two-party fight is intensified when not relieved by the usual Asiatic amelioration afforded by a three-sided situation. The Chinese-Japanese struggle is on in earnest. The kinetic energy of Japan is pitted against the potential energy and mass of the Chinese. Japan militarily can take over Manchuria with little difficulty, and will if the Chinese create a crisis of sufficient magnitude to justify military action. I believe all Japanese interests in Manchuria would welcome such a crisis, since, with the huge influx of Chinese settlers and increase in Chinese independent development, time works for China. Meanwhile it is clear that Japan by credit control over railway construction and otherwise pursues a policy of extending her sphere of influence into northern Manchuria.

The vigor of the Chinese in Manchuria and their rapidly mounting wealth is undeniably the result of the creation of an atmosphere by Russia and Japan in which Chinese commercial talents could best assert themselves. The Chinese invariably succeed where others govern. It might properly be added that they succeed only where others govern. There is no foundation for confidence as Russian influence in the Chinese eastern zone entirely disappears that traditional Chinese corrupt practices will not assert themselves, and that gradually conditions so well known in China proper will not be approached. The same would be true if unforeseen international developments force Japan to relinquish her position in south Manchuria.

Whereas the present situation in Manchuria has become an acute struggle between China and Japan, Russia is destined to reemerge as her strength returns, and any consideration of the Manchurian problem must envisage a three-nation strife for rich stakes in which the position of each can be defended with certain sound political and economic arguments and from which sentiment were better eliminated.

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The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between January 25 and February 25, inclusive.

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FOREWORD

The MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN of the Office of Naval Intelligence has now been published for over nine years. It has a circulation of slightly under 800 copies, reaching all commands, afloat and ashore, except very minor ones, and, in addition, the State Department and the more important commands of the Army.

The attention of the service is invited to the fact that the BULLETIN is the only medium of wide circulation which the service has for general information of a confidential or near-confidential nature. As such, it has vast opportunities for the expansion of its usefulness. At present, the great majority of the material for the BULLETIN is received from a comparatively very small number of sources, and this material is usually in the form of intelligence reports. But it is felt that the BULLETIN, to make the most of its opportunities, should draw from the service at large and should be the vehicle of expression of those confidential matters of most interest to the service at large.

Accordingly, the Office of Naval Intelligence desires and requests that officers submit to the BULLETIN, for publication in the Special-Article section, articles of general interest on naval subjects which are of too confidential a nature for public periodical, such as the Proceedings of the Naval Institute. These articles might be such as comments on existing naval practices or activities, suggestions for improving same; ideas concerning naval activity abroad or in cooperation with other branches of the Government, etc.

But, furthermore, the Office of Naval Intelligence believes that the BULLETIN should be something more than a technical periodical—it should be, as well, an instrument of education in those broad spheres in which our Navy should be increasingly interested as a representative of a world Power whose interests are continually expanding. Hence this office also desires confidential articles from officers of the services on such subjects as our foreign relations; foreign trade and shipping; observations on the political economic, and social activities of foreign peoples, reports of travel abroad, etc., particularly, of course, as the subjects bear upon the mission of our Navy and Government in war and peace. A few hypothetical subjects, chosen at random, might be mentioned as: The clash of foreign interests in China, or in South America; Sea control of the oil routes of the world; Singapore versus Pearl Harbor; The political position of the United States in Panama; Communism in the Far East; A visit to the Dutch East Indies, etc.

Suggestions or comments from the service regarding these missions which the BULLETIN desires to fill will be welcomed.

Special articles for the BULLETIN should be sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, marked "For the BULLETIN," in original and at least one copy. There are no other stipulations in regard to submission of such. Credit will be given in the BULLETIN to the author of an article, but it is understood, of course, that no remuneration can be made.

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GERMANY

A. NAVAL

1. Résumé of naval activities during 1927.

[*Source: German press*]

Of the 6 battleships of the *Deutschland* type and the 6 light cruisers allowed Germany by the Versailles Treaty, only 4 or 5 were in commission at the beginning of 1927. These were the battleships *Elsass* and *Hessen*, and the cruisers *Nymphe* (flagship of the Baltic forces) and *Berlin* of the Kiel Station, and the battleship *Schleswig-Holstein* (fleet flagship) and *Schlesien* (flagship of the commander in chief of the North Sea forces), and the cruiser *Amazone*, of the Wilhelmshaven Station. The cruisers *Emden* and *Hamburg* were at the disposition of the inspector of naval training at Kiel as school ships.

As soon as the regular annual conditioning was completed, foreign cruises of several months duration were planned for the fleet. They serve to give the crews training in technic and seamanship during long cruises and under conditions not offered by native waters. The aforesaid battleships and cruisers left Germany on March 29 on a cruise. The *Schlesien* did not participate in this cruise as she was only placed in commission on March 1 with the crew of the *Hannover* and was scheduled for construction and ordnance tests in native waters before joining the fleet as flagship of the commander-in-chief of the North Sea forces. The *Schlesien* crew were recompensed for their disappointment in not being able to participate in the general cruise by a cruise on board the *Hannover* which took them to the North Atlantic islands, stopping at Amsterdam on the way back.

This practice cruise was an entire success in every respect. When outward bound, the vessels called at Ferrol, Villa Garcia, and Ponte Vedra and then in groups at the West African islands, calling at the ports of Porto da Praia, Porto Grande, Sta. Cruz de Teneriffa, La Luzm Sta. Cruz de la Palma, Medeiro, Horta, and Ponta Delgada. The return cruise led via Sevilla and Lisbon.

The officers and men were received everywhere with great cordiality and press reports from the different ports of call all point to the splendid impression made by the German bluejackets. Those vessels which touched at Lisbon (including the fleet flagship with Vice Admiral Mommsen) were given a most brilliant reception, far exceeding all expectations, and on Whitsunday, the Portuguese President, General Carmona, visited the flagship in person. The press of both countries has attributed the return of German property in Portugal to this visit.

Upon the completion of the cruise, the ships underwent the necessary repairs incident to such an extensive undertaking and then performed the allotted military tasks during which they and the light forces were engaged for several weeks the beginning of August in the regular fleet, artillery, and torpedo firing practice.

In July the *Hessen* accompanied by *T 190* visited Danzig, the first time a German naval vessel has visited this port since the close of the war. The rousing welcome accorded these vessels was a proof of the unaltered sympathies and devotion of that place for Germany and things German.

The torpedo boat and mine sweeping detachments whose slight cruising radius prevented them from participating in the Atlantic cruise with the rest of the fleet, went through maneuvers in native waters in the spring. The summer cruises took the first torpedo boat half flotilla to various Scandinavian and Baltic ports, among them, Norkoepping, Arkoesund, Skagen, Stavanger, the Hardanger Fjord, Larvik, and Drammen. Four hundred men of the crew were enabled to visit Oslo through the curtesy and kindness of the Norwegian Railroad Co. while the vessels were in Drammen.

The second torpedo boat half flotilla remained in the Baltic and called at the ports of Koenigsberg, Riga, and Reval.

The summer practice cruise of the second torpedo boat flotilla was restricted to native waters of the Baltic, the vessels calling at Swinemuende, Kolberg, and Koenigsberg.

At the beginning of September the entire fleet was concentrated in the western Baltic for autumn maneuvers. The combined maneuvers with the army at Ruegen which were originally planned had to be abandoned owing to conflicting duties for the major portion of the military forces detailed for these maneuvers. The rest of the program which consisted of a review in the Bay of Swinemuende before the President, followed by the cruising and battle maneuvers under the command of the Chief of the Naval Establishment, took place according to schedule. This represented the climax of the fleet's activities, and the various detachments then returned to their different bases, the annual changes in personnel taking place at this time. This event which comes down to us from the days of general conscription is still a very important one, and last year especially so, as changes were made in the major part of the commanding officers. The commander-in-chief of the fleet, Vice Admiral Mommsen, was succeeded by Rear Admiral Oldekop, formerly chief of the Navy Department in the Ministry of Defense, and the commander-in-chief of the North Sea forces, Rear Admiral Prentzel, who succeeded Admiral Oldekop in Berlin, was in turn replaced by Rear Admiral Werth.

The cruiser *Berlin* was sent to the dockyard for overhaul and repair, as she was detailed to the training division on December 1 for an extensive training cruise with the 1927 cadets.

As long as we have no colonies, it will be impossible to have any of our vessels stationed permanently abroad. This deficiency is overcome in part by the custom dating from 1925 of sending the school cruisers on cruises around the world with the officer and paymaster "aspirants." A start was made in this direction with the cruiser *Berlin* which made a cruise around South America. The *Hamburg* left in the spring of 1926 for a round-the-world cruise, from west to east. At the time of this report, the vessel is in the Mediterranean on her return voyage, while the *Emden* is in the southern Atlantic, being expected back in Wilhelmshaven about the middle of March.

The cruiser *Berlin* left the beginning of December for Japan, via Spain, Italy, India, and the Sunda Archipelago. On the return voyage the cruiser will call at Australian ports for the first time since the war.

One activity of the navy which has aroused world-wide interest is the completion of the southern Atlantic research expedition in which the *Meteor* was engaged for 777 days. After overhaul and the necessary repairs, the *Meteor* will return to the regular forces as survey ship. She is making preparations for next year's survey work to replace the *Panther* which was finally put out of commission at the end of 1926 after 25 years of service.

The native survey work whose purpose is to keep the charts and handbooks of German coastal waters up-to-date was performed by two boats. It was impossible to keep the *Panther* in commission for this purpose owing to the lack of personnel. In fact it is impossible to man even the modest number of ships permitted us by the Treaty of Versailles. The resultant lack of special vessels has led to the regular vessels of the naval forces having to engage more extensively in nautical-scientific work. The foreign cruisers are actively engaged in this work. One example is the research work carried out by the *Emden* not long ago in Japanese waters, having sounded what is reputed to be the greatest depth yet found—about 6,450 fathoms.

The Esthonian wooden sailing schooner *Cecilie* which was chartered by the Navy Department in June for a period of four weeks, furnished valuable information through terrestrial magnetic observations in the Baltic. The results of this work under the direction of Doctor Hessel of the naval observatory in Wilhelmshaven will assuredly tend to disperse definitely the anxieties of

Baltic shipping in connection with the magnetic anomalies which are such a menace to shipping in those waters.

The tidal research work in the North Sea by means of high seas tide gauges was interrupted owing to the loss of the three sets of apparatus used for this purpose. It is hoped that important work along the lines of tidal research can be carried out next summer.

The economical measures of the Government which threatened to put a stop to the further development of the German nautical work have called forth a protest from German shipping circles which have stated in no unequivocal terms that they wish to see this work continued and carried on to the same extent and in the same admirable way as in the past. It is to be assumed that this action will be accorded the proper consideration.

The navy's share in the general budget remained as before at about 2.6 per cent. Even though the 1927 naval budget exceeded that of 1926 by about 25,000,000 marks, this was due principally to the expenses of the replacement vessels. The 1927 budget included the third installment for the small cruiser B, the second installment for the small cruisers C and D, for six large torpedo boats and one small torpedo boat, the first installment for the small cruiser E, and finally the installments for the completion of the torpedo boats *Seeadler*, *Greif*, *Albatros*, *Condor*, and *Falke*.

The following vessels were launched and commissioned in 1927:

(*a*) *Cruisers*.—Cruiser B (*Koenigsberg*) was launched in Wilhelmshaven on March 26, and cruiser C (*Karlsruhe*) was launched at the Deutsche Werke in Kiel on August 20. Both cruisers are sister ships of an improved *Emden* type. Owing to the maximum displacement of 6,000 tons for this class of ship which has been imposed on us by the treaty (the other navies have already attained 8,000 and 10,000 tons for cruisers), an attempt has been made through the most economical methods of construction (as regards weight) and through the adoption of oil fuel to give the ship a higher combat value than that of the *Emden*. Therefore, the cruisers will be equipped with nine 6-inch guns mounted in three triple turrets. The arrangement of these turrets—one in the forecastle, the other two aft, the center one being higher—enables all guns to fire on the broadside. Four 3-inch anti-aircraft guns and four triple torpedo tubes complete the armament. The machinery consists of four turbines with reduction gear, two working on a shaft as cruising and main turbines. There is also an oil motor cruising plant which can be coupled to the shaft of the main engine. At 14.5 knots, there will be a cruising radius of 5,500 miles. At about 65,000 shaft horsepower, it is expected that the type will attain a speed of at least 32 knots. Date of commissioning, about the end of the summer of 1928.

(*b*) *Torpedo boats.*—The large boats, *Greif*, *Seeadler*, *Albatros*, *Falke*, and *Condor* were put into commission one after the other. After having been put through various tests, they have now all been detailed to the fleet with the exception of the *Condor*. The torpedo boats *W–109* and *W–110* (*Iltis* and *Wolf*) were launched at Wilhelmshaven on October 12 and will be completed toward the end of this year. The fleet will then possess a flotilla of thoroughly modern destroyers.

There have been no serious accidents in the navy during the past year. Reconstruction work could be pursued without hindrance—both in point of material and training, as well as organization and appreciation of the necessity of naval defense. That the last-named point is the most urgent can be seen from the unfortunate opposition in the Government council toward the project of the replacement of the first of our obsolete battleships. It is to be hoped that this opposition will be overcome and that the work of replacing our old warship material can proceed without any further friction.

NOTE.—It is altogether likely that a "comeback" of the German Navy may be expected with as much certainty as may economic and political rejuvenation. The navy is and, for some years to come, will be bound and hampered by the provisions of the treaty of Versailles. These provisions, in brief, as they relate to the German Navy allow her 8 pre-war battleships—6 in commission and 2 in reserve. The age limit on these ships is 20 years, but after this age they may be replaced with ships of not more than 10,000 metric tons displacement. She is allowed 8 cruisers—6 active and 2 in reserve—with an age limit of 20 years and replacement ships are not to exceed 6,000 tons displacement nor mount a gun larger than 6 inches. She is allowed 32 destroyers and torpedo boats—24 active, 8 in reserve. Age limit is 15 years and replacements of destroyers must not exceed 800 tons and of torpedo boats 200 tons. No submarines, aircraft, or aircraft carriers are allowed. The personnel allowed must not exceed 1,500 officers and 13,500 men.

It appears that the German Navy is, during these years, conducting a twofold policy:

(a) Flag-showing cruises. The purpose of this activity is largely political and psychological. Germany desires her naval flag to be seen again in all parts of the world as an incentive and aid to German commerce; as an aid in overcoming the antipathy which German war-time actions aroused in many peoples; and in assisting the conduct of German postwar political policies.

(b) Germany is building up the nucleus of a new navy in matériel and personnel. She is spending so far comparatively little money but is apparently making the most of her money and ships allowed by the Versailles treaty. Her new cruisers embody many interesting innovations in design, and information is recently at hand that she will soon start the replacement of her old battleships by new 10,000-ton vessels. While the ships of the German Navy are largely obsolete and ineffective, still they are undoubtedly being utilized most effectively for training purposes. The morale is high. The number of officers is 940 and enlisted men 13,974.—Ed.

GREAT BRITAIN

A. NAVAL

1. Recognition lights.

Opportunity was recently offered to observe the recognition and night engagement lights of H.M.S. *Colombo* (light cruiser, 4,200 tons). The accompanying sketch indicates the arrangement of these lights.



The advantage of the British system appears to be in the great number of combinations which are possible.

JAPAN

A. NAVAL

1. Visit to submarine school, Kure.

The submarine school at Kure was recently visited.

There was seen during the inspection—

(1) One attack teacher, British type.

(2) Tilting platform for training diving rudder men.

(3) Battery and electrical classrooms, containing a battery of 132 cells, each about 4 feet by 2 feet 1 inch by 18 inches, and said to be of 3,000 ampere-hours capacity. Escorting officers said that the hard-rubber cells and all other parts were made in Japan; that the cells were very successful and that they were rarely bothered by broken ones, but that they had a lot of trouble with disintegration of the soft-rubber ventilating ducts leading from the top of each cell to the central exhaust (suction) tube running along the top of each row.

(4) A six-cylinder Diesel engine mounted for instruction purposes.

(5) Barracks, administrative buildings, and schoolrooms.

None of the submarines attached to the school for instruction purposes were seen, except *Ro-52*, out of commission and with engines (but no battery) in her, which is moored in front of the school.

This school has all the equipment necessary for a careful and complete education of personnel for submarine duty. The supply of models of such auxiliaries as radio gear, oscillator sets, etc., is not as extensive as in our submarine school at New London, but there is no deficiency in their equipment for instruction in such basic things as engines, batteries, and systems of attack, while the submarines on duty at the school supply the practical experience needed.

The students divide their time of instruction almost equally between class work at the school and actual operation aboard the submarines. Several groups of students, both officers and enlisted men, were seen in the lecture rooms and model rooms. They gave an excellent impression of zeal, attention, and personal cleanliness.

The school is under the command of a very capable officer, Capt. S. Omoto, who has been in submarine duty almost continually for 23 years and was in England during the World War. The instruction staff consists of 16 officers and some warrant and chief petty officers, and nine submarines are attached to the school.

NOTE.—The courses at this school include the "ordinary" course, "superior" course for commanding officers, "special" course for division commanders, "engineering" course, and "secondary" course, largely for petty officers. Total enrollment, 1926: Officers, 100; men, 494.—ED.

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2. *Engineering school, Maidzuru.*

Location: In Maidzuru Naval Station.

Purpose: To educate cadets for the corps of engineers, Japanese Navy. Also to provide opportunity for a few commissioned officers, special officers, and warrant officers to pursue engineering studies beyond their regular calls of duty.

Buildings: All of wood; substantial, but bare and unadorned.

Personnel: There are 24 officers, headed by a vice admiral, charged with administration and instruction. At present there are 139 cadets and 14 special and warrant-officer students.

Instruction courses:

(1) Cadet engineers.—Duration three years. It is proposed to increase this to three years eight months in the near future (proposed for 1928). Cadets enter this school between the ages of 16 and 20 and progress through it coincidentally with the progress of their line contemporaries at the naval academy at Etajima.

(2) Ordinary course for officers.—For lieutenants (junior grade) and ensigns. Duration of course six months to one year.

(3) Special course for officers.—For officers who have applied for permission to come here for the pursuit of some special technical subject. Duration, six months to one year.

(4) Course for warrant mechanicians.—Duration of course, one year.

Vessels attached: *Tama* (cruiser), *Adzuma* (armored cruiser), twenty-fifth destroyer division (*Nashi*, *Take*, *Momi*, *Kaya*), *Ro 31* (submarine).

Equipment: The equipment of the model rooms and the chemical laboratory is very simple and meager. There are full and cross-section models of valves, pistons, cylinders, etc., but many of these are of wood, and all are small. There are no large models of boilers, condensers, etc., available to the students, and the school has nothing to compare with the equipment of the model rooms of the engineering department at Annapolis.

Comment: Enlisted men of the engineering branch are not sent to this school but to the special school at Yokosuka.

RUSSIA

A. GENERAL

1. Summary of the situation in Russia.

In Berlin, where there are exceptional facilities for gaining information about Soviet Russia, the opinion prevails that Stalin has gained in power by his drastic treatment of the opposition; the Trotsky group is unlikely to exercise any more influence in Russian politics. There is a slender possibility that it may attempt an armed revolt against Stalin, but this would end in failure and Stalin would seize the opportunity for exterminating the opposition as was done in the case of the revolting "bourgeoisie."

The year 1927 has brought many disillusions to the communists. Their hope of winning China, and thereby dealing a crushing blow to the British Empire, has been completely shattered. The "Arcos" raid and the rupture of diplomatic relations with England have reluctantly convinced them that communist propaganda abroad is, for the present, a futile expenditure of money. Moreover, the split in the communist parties of other countries has shown them that the hopes of communists are darker than they have been at any time since the revolution.

These disillusions have been accompanied by practical disappointments. The rupture of relations with England brought financial shortage not far removed from bankruptcy. This has since been partly relieved by American credits. Faced with economic ruin, the soviet rulers have been compelled to scrap some of their revolutionary principles in order to maintain themselves in power. They have had to admit that capitalism has entrenched itself since the war and that the prospect of world revolution has disappeared. For this reason Stalin considers communist propaganda abroad to be thrown away. Even in Russia he is for adopting an economic policy which encourages the institution of capital. He has therefore given the peasant landholders (Kulaki) privileges which had always been denied them, even though they enjoyed them without sanction. Without the cooperation of these peasant capitalists, grain exports on a large scale would not be possible, and it is on the export of grain that Stalin's foreign trade program is based.

It is in this encouragement of the peasant capitalist that Stalin and the Trotsky group have fallen out. Trotsky and his friends still believe that a world revolution is imminent. They think it dangerous to communism to foster the peasant capitalist and put their faith in the industrial working class. They are in touch with the die-hard section of the Communist Party in Germany, which has split in two, just as it has in Russia. This die-hard section believes in the possibility of revolution in Germany, whereas, in fact, the whole movement is under perfect police control and any attempted rising would be crushed at the outset.

The fact is that Stalin and Trotsky represent revolutionary types who in history have always been in bitter opposition. Stalin is a realist with a strong instinct for maintaining his power regardless of every ideal theory. Trotsky is a doctrinaire fanatic who sees the world not as it is but as he would like to have it. The journalists who knew him abroad have always believed that he was a man of strong common sense, and that Stalin, who had never been abroad, was a typical Bolshevist fanatic. In point of fact, the truth is the direct opposite.

The best informed German opinion believes that there is a rapid evolution in progress toward sounder economic principles and cooperation with other nations; that the soviet leaders have realized that without foreign trade the Russian working population can not possibly attain a decent standard of living. Russia's participation in the Geneva conference is believed to be a sign of this change of policy.

Stalin's rule marks the end of militant communism and the beginning of Russia's longing for peace and quiet. This does not mean that capitalist institutions will be adopted openly; lip service to communist ideals will continue to be paid; the almost insane ravings of Bukharin, of the Third International, will not be muzzled; but the evolution will continue under the red flag, which the next generation may come to know as the Russian national flag long after Bolshevism has passed into history.

It is not suggested that Stalin's government has emerged from its difficulties. There is discontent and unrest among the peasants, who resent the shortage of the merchandise they require and the attempt to force them to buy things they do not want. These unwanted goods have been made under the orders of soviet officials unacquainted with the market, who fear that, if they scrap them and admit their mistake, they will lose their employment, and so they force them on the peasant. It is largely due to this that the peasants will not sell their corn.

The depreciation of the "tschervonetz" is also pressing heavily upon the soviet rulers, and foreign capital is urgently needed for setting the means of transport in working order.

2. *Deportation of the political opposition.*

[The following article was written by Mr. Max Scheffer, the correspondent in Moscow of the Berlin Tageblatt. Herr Scheffer is one of the best-informed foreign correspondents in Moscow, having been stationed there for several years and having, it is stated, very close contacts with both the Soviet and the German Governments.]

Thirty members of the "opposition" were recently informed by the political police ("Ogpu") that they would be sent to different remote parts of European and Asiatic Soviet Russia within three days. On the day following this very thing happened to the highest persons of the opposition, in fact if not in form. They were informed by the party to leave Moscow. First of all Trotsky, Muralov, Rakovski, Radek, and then also the "repentants" Kamenev and Zinoviev.

Astrakhan, it is said, was proposed to Rakovski, a place lying on the Caspian, which always stinks of fish and is a regular oven during the summer months. Trotsky was allotted a not very well-known spot in Siberia in the government of Viatka, 300 miles from the nearest railway station. For Radek a nest in the Siberian government of Tobolsk; for Serebriakov a position somewhere in the Semipalatinsk, which is to be looked for somewhere in middle Asia; Kamenev in Tobolsk; Zinoviev, on the other hand, on the heights of the Urals. In this way the names of the opposition, important heretofore, are scattered about in the lavish, expansive inhospitality of this gigantic Russia from Archangel to Astrakhan and from the Urals into the depths of Siberia and as far as Semipalatinsk.

That is, before the eyes of history, the unusual phenomenon that the Russian revolution has brought forth. It is a question of persons who have stirred up the revolution and then led it as few others have done before them. And now those who raised up the State from out of the revolution are being sent by the State into the wilderness. Among them there are, besides important economic laborers, many whom the young State considered representative enough to send abroad. There are two ambassadors, the 56-year-old Rakovski and Kamenev. (Rakovski was until recently the soviet ambassador at Paris; Kamenev in Rome.) Serebriakov was responsible for the first connection between soviet industry and America which he accomplished on a trip which attained a certain distinction. Among those banished is Sosnovski, a journalist of spirit and courage, who wrote "feuilletons" in the soviet press, the first criticism ever heard in Moscow of soviet life—which certainly has its horrors. Smirnov is among the banished—Minister of Posts up to his fall a few months ago—which was due to his "opposition" activity, and who in the last few weeks was an eager visitor to the Labor Bourse; he was formerly a metal worker. Then a sinister figure—Beloborodov, the Minister of the Interior of the Russian Union and, according to common talk, "the executioner of the Czar"; Smilga, once powerful in the highest economic council; Satev, editor of the Leningrad Pravda; then Radek; then Trotsky, the hero of all revolutionary heroes, the great man of the October battle and of Kronstadt, formerly Foreign Minister and later War Minister of the Soviet Union, dialectician and speaker as no other. At times he overshadowed Lenin.

About all these people one must say that, shortly after having lost their offices because of their exclusion from the party, they were in need of money if not actually in distress. Too many details are known for anyone to doubt that. To-day it is interesting for all of them that the present system no longer provides for the 17 kopeks pocket money which the Czar dispensed to exiles. The greatest number of those exiled are laborers, but, as one sees, there are also among them men of cosmopolitan intelligence and men with a talent for agitation and management. They are to go the way which they have already traveled under the Czar or would have, had they been caught. There are among them revolutionaries who have belonged to the party for practically 30 years, such as Smirnov. All these men must feel uneasy, nearly insane, to have prepared, led, and served the greatest and most penetrating of all revolutions without affecting their own persons in any other way than if they had fought against the revolution, or, still worse, with no other result than if the old régime had asserted itself. History has fabricated nothing more witty and nothing more horrible than the fate of these victorious revolutionaries for whom at the end of their efforts under both systems the silence of Siberia stands—under the hostile system which they overthrew and under the friendly one which they led to victory. Many a man must bitterly say to himself that for him the Soviet State makes up for what the Czarist State could not accomplish. Europe looks at this drama with unconcerned curiosity. It must appear to us that alongside of the "permanence of the revolution" in Russia, about which Trotsky and Stalin have so long fought, the "permanence of Siberia" also deserves a place as the epitome of certain irrevocable Russian methods used against political dissenters.

The "thirty" of the opposition who were handled with absolute lack of consideration are consoled by the fact that they know why they are faring so badly. They wander into banishment because of "counter-revolution." "Counter-revolution"—merely this accusation—has, with their approbation in countless cases in these last 10 years, been sufficient for administrative exile. But these members of the opposition will know exactly what is meant thereby. They themselves have seen their "administrative liquidation" coming months ago. Surely the opposition, a very small but brilliant group, when it began the fight "against the overwhelming system of Stalin" about a year and a half ago thought it almost impossible that this undertaking would end with their exclusion from the party—with their banishment. The world was of the same opinion. But the complete submission which the opposition was forced to make in October, 1926, must already have told them that it was a question of a hopeless fight. Subsequently it became obvious here that they had cause to worry about their freedom of action if they continued the fight which was destroying the party. Already in August Stalin was determined to make an end of it, but his plans miscarried. The opposition correctly regarded this time won as a respite. They then fought on with all means at their disposal. The coming party congress was bound to bring the decision—a congress of functionaries—but in case one collected 30,000 votes for the opposition program, then this group could not be ignored in deciding the fate of their leaders. But there were not many more than 7,000 persons who signed this program, and among them were 1,200 intellectuals.

One so often forgets in Europe that the opposition is very largely composed of the group of old revolutionaries, laborers, and others of the "has-beens." The exclusion followed with mechanical certainty. One had to acquaint the opposition with the fact that it had committed everything imaginable against the party which could be brought up during the few months between August and December in the way of disloyalty, insubordination, and contempt of tradition. It was said that they wanted to found a second party. This is absurd. For the men of the opposition it was a question, in any case, of breaking through the invisible walls which for years had separated them from the party—in any case, to make known their point of view and thereby in the course of events to win back the influence which was "organized away from them" by Stalin. From the beginning they have regarded their policy as one requiring a long time, under great personal risk, and with the prospect of a great defeat. They held fast to their ideals until to-day. They regarded all this as necessary in order to draw the masses completely to themselves. They were certain that such a moment would come, but before that time in the fight for their convictions they could above all show no weakness—tactics, therefore, to lose everything in order to gain everything and to stake everything thereon—very "revolutionary" tactics, but, as the exile to Siberia now goes to show, perhaps an error. It is evidently just as hazardous to resort to revolutionary tactics in the revolutionary Russia of to-day as it was in the old Russia.

It has been said that this high stake played by the opposition—this "Aut Caesar aut nihil" of Trotsky's—was to serve primarily to reconquer power, the loss of which he never got over. We can not see into each other's hearts, but it is certain that the opposition fought with much determination because it believed that the present policy of the party was doomed to nothing less than a catastrophe if it pursued the trend it was going. The opposition thought that in such an event, the peasants would become economically and politically overstrong and would one of these days overthrow the proletarian dictatorship. It demanded further "revolutionary guarantees, decided advocacy of the interests of the proletariat in the reconstruction of the soviet economy, and, in the event of a contrary course of events, it forecasted the end of the revolution. The opposition fought with conviction in order to avert this, and said, after the expulsion of its leaders from the party, that it would continue to fight. For the casual observer it will always remain an astounding paradox that in a proletarian state such a program could lead to banishment on the ground of counter-revolutionary activities.

The party majority, or, to express it in a shorter term, Stalin, asserts that the opposition had become incorrigible, intolerable, and that the party was crumbling away under its activities; that, in the interest of the whole, it had no longer been possible to endure the disagreement and methods of the opposition. Whether the system of dictatorship is not in itself too unyielding to admit of discussion is a useless question in this connection. But with this action, which must make a most distressing impression within the party, the majority admits to a great extent what it usually denies—that the opposition has as a fact gained influence, frequently intangible, and that it produced effects directly traceable to this influence, which were beginning to become dangerous to the ruling majority, or at least to its political freedom of movement. But it is actually impossible to-day to determine how far these conscious and unconscious effects go, and both camps are not certain in this respect. It is just this lack of clearness in surveying the situation which must have disquieted Stalin. One thing is certain—he did not desire a discussion. Intolerance, his opponents call it. Absolutism in his consciousness of power, which admits of no one beside him, is what it really is.

But Stalin can argue that the party is still in the midst of its growth; that it must first become fused into one organic whole out of a haphazard agglomerate. Since Lenin's death, scarcely four years ago, 800,000 new members have been admitted into the party, now totaling 1,200,000. What a shifting. These new elements, who never saw Trotsky in action, still have to be "taken hold of" by the functionaries—to be "thoroughly worked" in order to become a firm axis for the State. These functionaries of the party are mainly men not of the revolution, but of the after-revolution, themselves still raw material, optimistic, unschooled, and often ignorant. And Stalin believes that it would be disastrous to throw a discussion of the weightiest and most fundamentally significant problems into the midst of such a party, or, rather, group of rulers, still in process of development. One feels in this action of Stalin's against the idealogical flight of the "old ones" the dry but steely hard, and stoical realism with which this man, who is so far from dazzling, who never plays, and who is often repellent, built up the "monolithic party" and simultaneously made innumerable clever compromises between municipal and rural elements, between the workmen and the peasants, with which the opposition reproach him and which it wishes to dissolve by an energetic move. But it is not only anxiety for the welfare of the party that actuates Stalin, forcing all reins into his hand.

At the moment the export figures of Soviet economy are seriously receding, purchases of grain abroad are again becoming necessary, the attitude of the peasants, in spite of all attempts to win them over, is cool, and at the same time the interests of the workmen and of industry are clearly in opposition to each other. The collective agreements are either not coming to a conclusion at all or only with great difficulty. A great deal of the aggravation of the situation was forecast and probably even brought about (as in the workmen's question) by the opposition. Stalin feels that it is more imperative than ever to guarantee unity in the party and quiet in the country, and that he must confirm by his actions the danger of the opposition which he denies in words. It has been said that one of his reasons for having the opposition disappear so thoroughly is his intention to remove all obstacles in the way of negotiations with other countries which he is planning. But that is looking too far afield. Reasons closest at hand—quite tangible reasons—which were inexorable in his opinion, impelled him to act more quickly than was considered possible by his highly important opponents, who foresaw the dangers threatening him day after to-morrow, but not those threatening themselves to-morrow.

The banishment to Siberia of the opposition will further deepen the chasm between communist Russia and bougeois Europe. It throws a dazzling light on this world which is incomprehensible to us and which only few wish or attempt to understand. This country is in reality not so very different than it was under Catherine, who wrote splendid maxims to all prominent men in Europe, but who had a different régime in her own country. Perhaps she was obliged to. We Europeans of to-day, however, can not escape the impression that in painful convulsions such as are being manifested, or rather intimated, to us by the present Russia, a new world will be born. But, for all that, these spasms seem none the less horrible and dangerously foreign to us.

NOTE.—The banishment of Trotsky and the other prominent members of the opposition is probably the most significant action of the soviet since Lenin announced, in 1921, his "retreat toward capitalism" and his "new economic policy." The fundamental question splitting the groups of Stalin and the opposition is an old one—one which has always existed in Russia, which exists to some extent in every country, but which has been especially emphasized in Russia during the soviet régime. It is the conflict between the city workers, the "proletariat," and those who till the soil, the "peasants."

Long before the Russian revolution, Karl Marx, whose "Capital" is the handbook of communism, laid down the theory that those who labor for others (or the proletariat) should be those who rule. As capitalistic society proceeded in the course of its development, the number of the proletariat would increase, their subjugation to capitalism would become more complete, and the gulf between the capitalist and the laboring classes would become deeper and finally impossible of bridging. The solution of the problem, according to Marxism, was revolution, the nationalization of natural resources and the means of production, and the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the proletariat, be it remembered, being the laboring class—the industrial workers. Marx foresaw that such a revolution to be successful must occur in a highly industrialized state, where there was a preponderance of industrial workers. For this reason, he stated that Germany was the nation best fitted to stage and sustain such a revolution. And this is the paradox of the Russian revolution—that it was not industrial Germany but agricultural Russia which attempted the application of the social, economic, and political theories of Marx.

The reason for this is quite simple. The opportunity for the Russian revolution presented itself at the time of the crumbling of the Czarist régime, and the communists simply took advantage of it as being better than nothing. Having seized power, what did the communists find?

They found, first of all, a country essentially unsuited, from an economic point of view, for the application of their theories. Now, a country with a preponderant agricultural population, where those who live on the soil also own it, is always and essentially conservative and capitalistic. And this because private ownership of the soil is a tenet of capitalism, whereas public ownership of the land is a theory of communism. One of the first acts of the Soviet Government was the expropriation of all landed estates and the division of the land among the peasants, although ownership of the land was nominally *vested in the State. Having been given the land to till, the peasants took it over as actually being their own and have so held it. For this act of the soviet the peasants were exceedingly thankful. But, and here is the crux of the matter, they thus became capitalists and capitalistic minded. Having secured the soil, it was immaterial to them what the Government did, provided that they were left alone. (Let us note in passing that the peasants constitute about 80 per cent of the population.) Having installed itself in power by the aid of the city proletariat, the Soviet Government set about the task of converting the country to a communistic basis. This was supported by the proletariat but bitterly opposed by the peasants, who, when the Government asked for their crops in order to effect a communistic division, simply refused to grow any more crops than they required for their own personal consumption. Even the soviet could not withstand this attitude on the part of the stolid peasant. They threatened them, begged them, in cases forced them, but all to no avail. Famine and economic collapse were near at hand, and the Soviet Government was compelled to partially submit to the capitalism of the peasant.*

Now, Russia, being an agricultural State, must depend for her economic stability upon an export of grain, from which she can import manufactured commodities. This requires that the peasant be placated and satisfied in order that he may produce the grain. But the proletariat, who put the Government into power and who sustain it, demand that they be first considered. If the Government supports the proletariat and enforces their communistic doctrines and utilizes the products of the peasants' toil to enhance the city workingman, it means that the peasant will again curtail production, foreign credit will be lacking, imports for the city as well as for the peasant will decline, prices will increase, and the economic structure will totter. If, on the other hand, the Government favors the peasant, the proletariat will withdraw their political support and the political basis of the Government will be shaken. This, in essence, is the predicament of the soviet.

Out of this continually perplexing and never-answered question two parties have formed along the natural lines of the division. One, led by Stalin, the present chief of state, is inclined to favor the peasant in order to first establish a sound economic basis of existence. The other, recently led by Trotsky (the opposition), demands that the proletariat be satisfied in order to insure the political continuity of the communist state. To date Stalin is the victor. And it would seem that this struggle between Stalin and the opposition is but one step in the slow and painful evolution of Russia into a truly peasant nation. Stalin is, historically and economically, on sounder ground than Trotsky. For Russia is inherently a peasant and an agricultural State and when running counter to this basic fact the political theories of Trotsky are butting a stone wall, which, in the end, is absolutely unyielding.

As Herr Scheffer states, this conflict within Russia is as yet purely a domestic one which does not affect foreign countries or foreign relations. But, in a broad historical sense, it does affect the remainder of the world, because sooner or later, when the peasant rules in theory as well as in fact, the communistic basis of the Soviet Government will pass into limbo.

As a commentary on Herr Scheffer's observations, it is of interest to note an especially clever cartoon which recently appeared in the European press. It depicts a Siberian peasant standing beside his snow-covered hut somewhere in the desolate wastes of his land. Trotsky is approaching with his grip, while the peasant is laughing uproariously and saying, "You see, Comrade Trotsky, governments change, but Siberia—never!"—ED.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

I. NATIONALITY OF MR. HECTOR BYWATER.

Mr. Bywater is one of the foremost naval critics and writers. He has published several well-known books on naval subjects and is a naval correspondent for various American and English newspapers.

Because of his prominence, it is of interest to note that Mr. Bywater is now definitely established as a British subject and is so recognized by the British Government. For some time his citizenship has been in doubt owing to the fact that his father considered himself an American citizen.

II. ESTIMATE OF THE EUROPEAN SITUATION AS SEEN FROM BERLIN.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

If preparedness for war is the best guarantee of peace, then Europe is assured of a long period of the latter. There is scarcely a single European country that is not armed to the limit imposed by its means or by the existing treaties; indeed, some of them appear to be arming far beyond their means, while others are seeking ways of circumventing the treaties in order that they, too, may be able to assist in thus insuring the peace of Europe. All of them have been comforted and filled with a feeling of justification by the recent news from America indicating that the United States is getting ready to join the great family of "preparers."

This guarantee of peace is powerfully reinforced by another factor which can hardly be overestimated as a preserver of European concord—the precarious financial existence of the important majority of the European countries. The military essayists of Europe have evolved various pet theories about how "the coming war" (they no longer speak of "the war of the future") will be a war of gas, a war of airplanes, a war of industry, etc., according to their own personal bent. But their arguments appear like irrelevant vagaries when set alongside of the dictum of the German economist who wrote: "The next war will be a war of credits." In this fact—and nobody who studies Europe with any discernment can regard it as anything but a fact—lies the temporary salvation of Europe from a repetition of the World War.

Mussolini, to cite one example, may rant as much as he pleases about "carrying the Italian tricolor beyond the Brenner Pass, if necessary" and about restoring the quondam glory of the Roman Empire; to realize that he is not to be taken literally. One needs only to know that Italy is indebted to the amount of 85,000,000,000 lire. He will not carry the Roman eagles very far on a debt on which Italy will still be paying interest long after Mussolini has been forgotten.

The statesmen of Europe realize well enough that an armed encounter between almost any two European nations would inevitably result in a repetition of the World War. The earnest efforts of the great powers to prevent conflicts among the smaller countries prove that no reliance is placed in the possibility of localizing any new conflagration. In this respect the machinery afforded by the League of Nations has been put to some use.

Thus we have the strange spectacle of a Europe all ready to fight, but afraid to start. The war not only deepened hatreds but strained friendships. No country in Europe to-day can say with certainty that it has a friend in case of need. Peculiarly enough, this situation also acts to a certain degree as a preventive of war, for what country could be anxious to plunge into a war without some precise idea of how the alignment of the belligerents is going to be. Perhaps the greatest and most potent enigma of all is Soviet Russia. Take what attitude one may toward the Communist Union, it is something that must be reckoned with, and reckoned with seriously, for Russia is second to none in military preparedness and, what is still more significant, in zeal for military preparation. This zeal is inspired in part by the hope of spreading the communist doctrines but also largely by Russian nationalistic ambitions. Speculation is rife as to where Russia would stand in a future war. A good guess would be that she would join the country or countries which offered the most promising field for realizing whatever shifting ambitions are uppermost at the moment. At any rate, it is quite clear that the Russians are out to beat the capitalistic world at its own military game.

Speaking before the German Colonial Association on his trip around the world, Walter Bloom, a prominent German writer, expressed the opinion, gained from a lengthy stay in Russia, that no power, either internal or external, could overthrow the communist régime, which was almost as strongly rooted in Russia as any capitalistic government in any capitalistic state; if it fell, it would be due solely to sheer inability to maintain itself, to the utter failure of the Communist principles. In other words, there could be no overthrow, but there might be a collapse, which he predicted would occur in 10 years.

The summary treatment of the Bolshevik opposition or back-to-Lenin faction shows that the more moderate elements have gained control of the Bolshevik government. These elements, of course, furiously reject the charge that they are any less Bolshevistic than in the early days of Bolshevism, but their actions belie their words. Russia has taken a decidedly new course in both internal and foreign policy. Money circulates freely, licensed merchants and government-supervised manufacturers operate, and churches throw open their doors as wide as if the apostles of Bolshevism had never spoken or written a word against any of these things. American non-recognition of Soviet Russia does not, for example, prevent the Standard Oil Co.—in Bolshevik eyes the supreme emblem of capitalism—from successfully courting the favor of Russian oil to the great discomfiture of the English petroleum magnates. Intercourse between Russia and the outside world is becoming freer. The other countries are getting tired of waiting for the Bolshevik régime to fall, and the feeling is gaining ground on all sides that a country of Russia's size and importance can not continue to remain much longer an outcast from the circle of nations. The speed with which each country has assumed or is assuming a rational attitude toward Russia is directly proportional to its nearness to Russia. Those situated far away can afford to disdain any diplomatic contact, but those near to her have soon found cogent reasons for not being excessively cautious about getting on speaking terms with the Bolsheviks.

The end of the year 1927 finds Germany in the rôle of the enchained Titan of Europe, the chains being the peace treaty and the Dawes Plan. Some are beginning to take pity on this economic giant and demand that he be relieved of some of his shackles, but others, including perhaps the majority of the French, are haunted by the fear that any display of sympathy at this juncture would merely embolden him to take undue advantage of his freedom. From all sides one hears that Germany, in spite of her stupendous war burdens, is rapidly gaining commercial and industrial supremacy in Europe. What would happen if these burdens were removed? Thus far nobody has offered to assure France that, if this is done, Germany will remain in her orbit and not become an economic meteor.

And so they continue to hate each other with a deep, fervent hatred which appears pathetic to the foreigner. With many Germans, particularly the Nationalists, this hatred has come to be almost a religion, defined with the precision of a fatalistic Mohammedan formula. Some regard hatred of France and everything French as a test of patriotism. It should be said, however, in proof of the common sense which still enjoys a wide vogue in Germany that a very high percentage of Germans fail to stand this test. This percentage forms * * * to use the title of a pro-rapprochement magazine * * * "the other Germany" ("Das andere Deutschland"). From this viewpoint we find Germany divided into two camps: The one would "take up arms against a sea of troubles": the other would supinely submit to transient indignities at France's hands for the sake of accelerating reconciliation with her. It is amusing to note how many of the former group have of late been slinking over to the latter camp in the dark. The "policy of reality"—that is, the policy of facing the actual facts of the situation and dealing with them in a common-sense manner—appears to be now so firmly established in Germany that it will take more than the half-hearted opposition of the Nationalists to arrest its progress.

NOTE.—It is to be borne in mind that, while the sum total of the military forces of Europe is numerically greater than it was before the war, this is to a great extent due to the number of new States which the war created and which have in turn, raised their own armies. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are all products of the war, while such countries as Yugoslavia and Rumania had their original territories greatly increased at the expense of States whose military establishments are limited by the peace treaties.

It is mentioned above that the chains fettering Germany are found in the peace treaty and in the Dawes Plan. Those under the peace treaty include occupation of German territory, limitation of German armament, exclusion of Germany from mandates, the separation of Prussia and East Prussia by the Polish corridor, etc. These were mentioned more fully in the February BULLETIN *in an article on the "European Balance of Power."*

The restrictions imposed by the Dawes Plan have only recently been given wide prominence. It will be recalled that the Dawes Plan does not fix any total for the amount of reparations which Germany must pay. It puts her railways and certain other productive activities under a mortgage. The annual amounts to be paid to the reparations account were established in the Plan, they being on a gradually enlarging scale until the year 1928–29, when the maximum is reached and thereafter increased or decreased with the movements of various specified indices of prosperity. Two circumstances have called German attention particularly to the Dawes Plan. The first of these is the approach of the maximum year, and speculation is rife as to whether or not Germany will be able to meet and maintain her annuities which at present amount to 1,750 million marks and increase to about 2,500 million marks in 1928–29. Then, of late, Germany has had an unfavorable balance of trade which fur-

ther disturbs her outlook. The second circumstance is connected with the Agent General for Reparations. This officer, created by the Dawes Plan, is the transfer agent for all reparations; he is the creditors' representative in Germany. Last October he submitted to the German Government one of his semiannual statements concerning his observations of the economic situation of Germany. This inadvertently became public, and the criticisms contained therein of the financial policy of the Reich were so pronounced that the Government was severely shaken. This statement noted that the economic condition of the Reich was not a sound one, and it contained recommendations for the correcting of this condition, some of which recommendations touched upon what Germany believed were purely domestic affairs. This had the effect of not only causing some nervousness in Germany but of indicating how great the power of the Agent General (who is an American) really is. The Germans were thus made to feel that this was another example of the domination exercised over their country by foreigners. At another time the Agent General has recommended that the total amount of reparations which Germany must pay be definitely fixed. This meets with the approval of the Germans but is opposed by the French, who apparently do not yet wish Germany to know at what definite date she may expect to be free from the reparation burden.—ED.

III. LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

There follows a reprint of a lecture recently delivered at the Army War College by Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, retired.

The disarmament commission of the League met again in March, having adjourned last December after appointing a subcommittee on security and arbitration. Mr. Hugh Gibson, our ambassador at Brussels, is our delegate, while Rear Admirals Hilary P. Jones and A. T. Long are our naval advisors.

With your permission, I shall confine my remarks to-day to the naval aspects of the question of the limitation of armament. As regards land and air aspects, I know of none better qualified to speak than my colleagues on the Preparatory Commission, General Noland and Major Strong, respectively, and I should feel it very presumptuous of me to attempt to touch on those subjects.

Although it may be going over old ground for many of you, it seems to me desirable to begin with a general outline of the methods of reduction and limitation of naval armaments advocated by the different schools at the preparatory conference, held during the summer of 1926 and early spring of 1927.

The following five methods of effecting the reduction and limitation of naval armaments were considered by subcommission A of the

Preparatory Commission, and are included in the report of the subcommission to the Preparatory Commission for further consideration with a view to adopting an agenda for a final conference on reduction and limitation of armaments:

- Method 1. Total tonnage.
- Method 2. Total depreciated tonnage.
- Method 3. Limitation by classes—
  - Application A. Tonnage by classes.
  - Application B. Numbers of ships by classes.
  - Application C—
    - Total tonnage of capital ships.
    - Total tonnage of aircraft carriers,
    - Total tonnage of auxiliary surface vessels (cruisers and destroyers).
    - Total tonnage of submarines.
- Method 4. Naval material in reserve.
- Method 5. Personnel.

Methods 4 and 5 may be considered as subsidiary to each of methods 1, 2, and 3, but are not in themselves primary methods of reduction and limitation of naval armaments.

Method 1, reduction and limitation by total tonnage, was not acceptable to the delegations of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Argentina, and Chile in view of the manner of its application as advocated by the proponents of this method. The objections of the delegations mentioned are set forth in extenso in the report of subcommission A, but they may be epitomized in the statement made by the British delegate that the idea of the proponents is to put the total tonnage allocated to a particular country in a box, lock the box securely, and note on the outside only the amount of the total tonnage, but what is to come out of the box, either during the conference or after, will be unknown to all powers other than the particular power owning the box. However, the method of limitation by total tonnage may be reconciled with the other methods of limitation if each nation will state at the conference table how it is intended to use the total tonnage assigned to it and agree so to use that tonnage. But the nations advocating this method distinctly repudiated any idea of giving such information and insisted upon reserving to each country the right to use this total tonnage in any manner it may see fit, even to making changes during the life of the agreement as may be deemed desirable. However, this rigid attitude was somewhat modified later but still the method remained unacceptable. The resulting conditions would permit a certain degree of competition in building within the tonnage allowance, and further would tend to foster mistrust and suspicion.

Method 2, limitation by total depreciated tonnage, may be dismissed as not in reality a real method of reduction and limitation, but rather as an interesting and ingenious means of applying the age factor and of prescribing rules for replacements that are applicable to any basic method of reduction and limitation.

Method 3, limitation by classes, was accepted by the delegations of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Argentina, and Chile as the most logical and just method. Three applications of this method are set forth in the report of subcommission A. Application A, tonnage by classes, was submitted by the delegation of the United States and agreed to as the most acceptable by the delegations of the Argentine and Chile; application B, numbers of ships in classes, was submitted by the British delegation; application C, total tonnage of capital ships; total tonnage of aircraft carriers, total tonnage of auxiliary surface vessels, total tonnage of submarines, was submitted by the Japanese delegation. It will be noted that the last is the same in principle as that submitted by Mr. Hughes at the Washington Conference, and differs from application A only in the method of dealing with auxiliary surface vessels—that is, cruisers and destroyers—by lumping the tonnage of these two classes. This method is not considered as desirable as either application A or B in that in lumping the tonnage of cruisers and destroyers the possibility of competition in building in those classes may be envisaged. In other words, the same objections, but in less degree, exist as set forth in regard to method 1, limitation by total tonnage.

Each of the applications A and B has certain inherent weaknesses if applied by itself, but it is believed that a combination of these two applications is possible which, if properly applied, will produce a method that will bring about a positive reduction and limitation of armaments that will allay all suspicion or doubt during the life of any agreement.

I beg you to excuse what may seem an excessive use of the personal pronoun in the following remarks. My only excuse is that my various conversations were intimately connected with subsequent events and may have had some influence on the attitude of the administration and of our delegation.

During the summer of 1926, through a press representative, a suggestion was brought to us of the possibility of a three-power conference between Great Britain, Japan, and ourselves in case no progress were made by the preparatory conference then in session. Although this was later repudiated when it appeared in the press, it was received with a certain sympathy by our delegation at Geneva. During a long recess of the Preparatory Commission I made a trip to London on private business and while there paid calls on the First Lord of the Admiralty and on the First Sea Lord, then Admiral Beatty.

During our conversation the subject of the above suggestion was tentatively hinted at. Both of the Admiralty officials expressed the opinion that no conference would be possible without the participation of France and Italy. I suggested to them that their objections might be lessened somewhat by the inclusion in any agreement of an elastic clause covering the situation in which if any signatory were menaced in any category by the building program of a non-signatory Power, by which the menaced signatory would be permitted the right to meet such situation without undue formality of conference with the other signatories, the other signatories agreeing to discuss among themselves their own procedure in the circumstances. The suggestion seemed to be received sympathetically and the First Sea Lord told me he would have the possibility studied. At the time I came to the conclusion that it was not advisable to pursue further any suggestion of the three-Power conference at that time. Needless to say, when the suggestion was repudiated no further consideration was given to the subject during the continuance of the preparatory conference that summer by our representation in Geneva.

On the adjournment of the preparatory conference, in November, 1926, the British delegate at the conference informed me that he had received a telegram from a member of the Admiralty suggesting my going to London on my way back to the United States. As I had other plans, I objected to going to London unless it was considered of sufficient importance to warrant the disarrangement of my schedule; however, agreeing that if he should receive further word in Paris I naturally would give it consideration. He telegraphed the subject of our conversation to London, and, on our arrival in Paris received another telegram, somewhat urgent in tone, to the effect that, while it was not desired to interfere with my plans, it was considered very important that I visit London if possible. Under such circumstances, naturally, I canceled all engagements and went to London for a day.

The result of my visit was a positive assurance that there would be no question as between the Admiralty on the part of Great Britain and the United States in regard to practically any attitude the United States might take; that there could be no question between the two countries as to general policies, and that they would bring up no question as to our equality in naval armament. There was a further assurance that Great Britain recognized the principle of the 5:5, and that there would be no question raised as to our right to equality in all categories. As far as I could understand, the British attitude was frankly outlined, and on my part our attitude on all categories of vessels was fully outlined, even to the extent of explaining in detail why we required certain characteristics in all of our units. While I hesitate to give the specific authority, I can say that the assurance of accord on practically all points was given me from a source so authoritative that I had every reason to consider it the accepted attitude of the Government. Be it remembered that I had been especially requested to come to London, at great inconvenience to myself, specifically for a conference.

Immediately upon leaving the conference, I went to our embassy and dictated a memorandum giving in detail the subjects discussed and the general conclusions arrived at in order to submit them to the authorities at home. Certainly, we had every reason to believe that an equitable agreement for the limitation of naval armament as between the United States and Great Britain might be reached without undue difficulty. How far my confidence was shared by those in authority at home I. of course, can not say, but so far as I know there was no suggestion from any authoritative source that would lead me to believe that my understanding was not correct.

As you all know, the President issued his invitation in February (1927) to the other Powers signatory to the Washington treaty. The substance of that invitation and the various replies are known to you, so I will only call attention to the fact that Japan accepted without any suggestions further than to note with satisfaction that the question of ratios would be open to further discussion. In this, I think, the Japanese misinterpreted the President's words in his invitation, in that the President referred to the ratios established for France and Italy as open to discussion, not to the 5:3 for Japan. In their reply the British did suggest the possibility of discussing other matters not specifically touched on in the President's invitation.

On my return to Geneva early in March, 1927, to attend the second meeting of the Preparatory Conference, I again visited London and spent a week at our embassy. During that time I paid courtesy visits to the high officials of the Admiralty and was received most cordially everywhere. Mr. Bridgeman, the First Sea Lord, seemed much pleased at the President's invitation and assured me that had the President not done so his Government was prepared to issue an invitation to a conference. There was no hint from any source that led me to change the impressions formed during my last visit to London except, possibly, a talk I had with one of the admirals in the Admiralty. During our conversation this admiral suggested the compelling need of Great Britain for cruisers. My reply to him was as follows: "Admiral ——, there is one thing you must keep in mind always and never let it get away from you, because it will be a sine qua non of any agreement between us; that is, that the United States will not accept, by agreement, a position of inferiority to you or any nation on earth in any category of vessels.

Any conferees who accepted such a position of inferiority would deserve to be hung, drawn, and quartered. Certainly, if I were one of them I would never go back to America again. Please keep that before you all the time." Confidentially, I may tell you that that admiral was one of the British delegates at the conference.

It seems to me, therefore, that our position was frankly and fully made known to the British Government, and long before the conference opened it should have been very apparent to them practically what our proposals would be, and certainly they should have come as no surprise. Incidentally, during my visit to London in November, 1926, I received a further assurance from the authority above quoted that any suggestion as to modification or changes in the Washington treaty until the expiration of that treaty would be intolerable.

From London I went on to Geneva for the Preparatory Conference which continued in session until early in May, when I came home to attend the final discussions preparatory to the meeting of the three-power conference in June. During this time the General Board of the Navy had made very comprehensive studies of the whole subject and had prepared papers covering each class of vessel and arrived at conclusions as to our needs in each class. I would like to say now that those papers are epics and seem to be unanswerable in their arguments. The Secretary of State evidently studied every phase of the subject, for in all of the many conferences held between him and the naval members of the mission he showed an astonishing grasp of the fundamentals of our naval policy. The whole situation was explained to the President, and our delegation left for Geneva with the hearty backing of the administration in the attitude we took.

Our mission consisted of Mr. Gibson, our ambassador to Belgium, and myself as delegates, eight naval officers as advisers, a full staff of State Department representatives, and a secretarial force. There was at all times full cooperation between the naval and State Department representatives and practical agreement reached on all points before being presented for consideration by the British and Japanese.

The proposals made by each delegation are given in full in the printed report of proceedings, copies of which, doubtless, you have. The first British proposal came to me as a distinct surprise, particularly their proposal in regard to a modification of the Washington treaty with reference to capital ships and aircraft carriers. I confess I felt somewhat outraged because it seemed to me that a very large part of the whole understanding given to me by those that I considered speaking with authority had been largely repudiated. It further seemed to all of us that, not only in their first proposal but in all of our subsequent conferences, the British, while conceding our right to parity in principle, were determined to make parity in fact impossible.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that all three delegations may be credited with honest intent to achieve the following three objectives:

First. National security.

Second. Economy.

Third. Reducing as far as possible suspicion and unrest due to competition in armaments and thereby eliminating one of the causes of war.

It is most unfortunate that the methods proposed for achieving the desired results differed so widely that final agreement was impossible.

The following is a general outline of the various proposals which were adhered to more or less closely throughout the discussions:

The British proposals

The British proposals sought to give to the British Empire—

1. *Security* (through the accentuatoin of the cruiser class).—The effect of the British proposal would have been to authorize Great Britain to maintain a total cruiser tonnage of 600,000 tons, a figure twice as great as the maximum figure proposed by the United States. This figure was based upon their estimated necessity for a total of 75 cruisers, including 5 light mine layers and aircraft carriers. This figure was not materially departed from throughout the negotiations, although in various counterproposals the figure appeared to be decreased for limited periods of time in case the treaty provisions should not be effective beyond a fixed date, generally accepted as 1931, the date prescribed by the Washington treaty for a conference of all five powers.

During the discussions subsequent to the original proposal, they were able to reduce the original figure of 600,000 tons to 510,000 tons, provided the cruiser force were made up of fifteen 10,000-ton cruisers and 60 cruisers of 6,000 tons each. This latter proposal made in committee meetings was in furtherance of their plan to adopt and standardize a type of cruiser which would be too small for the mounting of 8-inch guns. They advocated the eventual abolishment of the 8-inch-gun cruiser.

2. *Economy.*—The British proposals sought to achieve economy through two main provisions. First, the extension of the life of individual vessels so that new construction to maintain a navy of predetermined size would come at less frequent intervals; and, second, by reducing the size of individual units while still retaining

predetermined numbers. An examination of the economic features of the British proposals, when applied to the United States, disclosed the fact that if we were to achieve economy by this road we would get economy with inefficiency, that the conditions under which the British Navy operated were different from our conditions, and that, therefore, the types suited to their use were not suited to our use.

3. *The establishment, by means of treaty, of a greater feeling of world confidence and the continuance of peace by the allaying of possible suspicions and the guarding against surprise or unexpected conditions arising through the development of armaments.*—The British sought to achieve this end by so arranging that the British Navy would be in a preponderant position—a position of such marked superiority that no other power, without an unduly great outlay of funds, would be able to achieve parity.

The Japanese proposals

The Japanese proposals sought to achieve—

1. *Security* (through the establishment of the principle of the status quo as a basis of naval strength).—The Japanese were in a situation favorable to themselves for putting forward this kind of proposal. The negotiations at Washington, which led up to the treaty for the limitation of naval armament, were based upon a 5–5–3 ratio of naval strength as between Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. A strict interpretation of the Japanese proposal made at the first plenary meeting would have resulted in a combined ratio of the three classes of vessels under discussion—cruisers, destroyers, and submarines—as follows:

United States	5.0
Great Britain	7.5
Japan	3.4

Attention is invited to the fact that this is a material increase in ratio of Japanese naval strength to the United States over that provided for in the Washington treaty, as far as the United States is concerned.

The Japanese delegation were sincerely desirous of limiting very greatly the amount of new construction of naval vessels, but at the same time desired to achieve what they estimated to be greater security through the adoption of some plan which would increase their relative naval strength above that provided for in the Washington treaty.

2. *Economy*.—As above indicated, the Japanese sincerely desired to negotiate a treaty which would provide for marked economy in naval expenditure, particularly for new construction. Their plan made it obvious that while economy was a guiding principle, security

took precedence as a principle. This sequence of the importance of principles was common to the proposals of all three powers.

3. *The establishment, by means of treaty, of a greater feeling of world confidence and the continuance of peace by the allaying of possible suspicions and the guarding against surprises or unexpected conditions arising through the development of armaments.*—On this no comment is necessary.

The American proposals

The American proposals sought to achieve—

1. *Security* (through the adoption of the principle that necessary naval strengths were largely relative in nature, that no power could be secure or maintain naval security except that its navy bore a certain relation in strength to the navies of other important powers.).—This theory was different from that propounded by the British. While they stated repeatedly that their needs were absolute and not related directly to the strength of other navies, yet in the negotiations at Geneva it was obvious that each time the question of relative naval strengths came up the British delegation were equally as firm in their adherence to the principle of relative naval strengths as were either the American or Japanese delegations, who openly avowed the principle.

The American delegation believed that each nation should be free, within a total tonnage limitation for the various classes of naval ships, to build those types made necessary for the efficient meeting of the conditions under which its navy would be obliged to operate. This contention was made necessary because of the vastly different conditions existing between the naval operating conditions of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States in the matter of bases, distances, and necessary commercial routes, as well as outlying possessions. In this respect the Japanese delegation were in entire accord with the American position.

2. *Economy.*—The American delegation believed that economy in naval expenditures could best be realized in the limitation of the number of tons of ships of the various classes that could be possessed by the negotiating powers. Tonnage is a much more definite measure of cost than numbers. It is also a more definite measure of naval strength. The proposals of the American delegation were directed toward a minimum tonnage in each class of vessel; and had a supplementary proposal that applied to all classes, to the effect that the United States would accept as low a total tonnage in any class as the other powers would agree to on the basis of the principles of the Washington treaty. This meant, for instance, that if Japan and Great Britain would agree to a tonnage less than the minimum for any class mentioned in the American proposals, the United States

would agree to such a reduced tonnage. There was no bottom to this proposal. The United States delegation was prepared to go to the limit.

3. *The establishment, by means of treaty, of a greater feeling of world confidence and the continuance of peace by the allaying of possible suspicions and the guarding against surprises or unexpected conditions arising through the development of armament.*—The United States' proposals seemed to meet with the maximum possible efficiency the requirement of stabilizing naval conditions and thereby removing cause for mistrust or alarm as between the nations in their naval development. Their proposals were all-inclusive and left no chance for misunderstandings.

Negotiations

During the negotiations the fact was developed that there would have been no great difficulty in negotiating a treaty concerning destroyers and submarines and other less important classes of naval vessels. Tentative agreements were arrived at regarding types and sizes and armament of these classes of vessels, but it was decided that an agreement of this kind, which could not be completed by a similar agreement regarding cruisers, would largely defeat the objects of the conference, so the American delegation pressed continually for an agreement regarding cruisers.

In the negotiations regarding cruisers it early became evident that the 8-inch gun was a pivotal question. The importance of the 8-inch gun came from the fact that it is a gun too large to be mounted quickly and efficiently on existing merchant ships, and from the further fact that merchant ships of the speedier types in time of war are readily convertible to auxiliary cruisers and, when so converted, can render exceedingly valuable war service. The United States and Japan, so far as availability of merchant vessels suitable for conversion to auxiliary cruisers is concerned, found themselves in a position of marked inferiority with relation to Great Britain. The ratio of merchant vessels of this type as between Great Britain and the United States was over four to one in favor of Great Britain, and as between Great Britain and Japan the ratio was still more markedly adverse to Japan.

In the matter of the 8-inch gun the Japanese delegation was in sympathy with the American position. The discussion concerning the 8-inch gun resulted finally in a proposal by the British delegation that cruisers be divided into two classes, that the larger class should be limited to about 15 cruisers and that the smaller class should be limited in size to 6,000 tons, this tonnage being estimated by them as too small for the mounting of 8-inch guns. The Japanese were able to confirm this opinion by their experience with the *Furutaka* class of light cruiser, which is of 7,100 tons displacement, carries 8-inch guns, and is considered by them an unsatisfactory type because the 8-inch gun is too heavy for a vessel of that size.

IV. DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE LEAGUE.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

There began at Geneva on February 20 a series of meetings which will bring into relief the progress made thus far by the League of Nations toward disarmament. This session of what is known as the Security Commission will on March 15 merge into the meeting of the League Preparatory Disarmament Commission and sessions will be continued until the Council of the League meets on March 15.

The United States takes no part in the meeting of the Security Commission but has a representative on the Disarmament Commission. It was the original plan to set a date at this meeting for a world disarmament conference, but in view of the large number of parliamentary elections this year many of the States, members of the League, believe that it would be better to postpone fixing the date.

It is more than eight years since the coming into force of the covenant of the League of Nations pledged those powers not forcibly disarmed by the peace treaties to the reduction of their armed forces to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement of international obligations. It is more than two years since the signatories of the final protocol of the Locarno conference expressed their conviction that the "coming into force of these treaties will hasten effectively the disarmament provided for in article 8 of the covenant of the League of Nations."

How far have these impressive declarations been translated into an actual reduction or even an actual limitation of armaments, and what are the present prospects of disarmament? Since 1921 the problem has been on the agenda of the main international gatherings and has often been debated in the press, but the haze which hangs over the complicated transactions of the League of Nations has made it very difficult for the average person whether soldier or civilian to decide whether there was being built up anything tangible.

It would be difficult to write on this question from a distinctively military viewpoint, as the basic issues raised by the subject are mainly economic and political. To understand the problem in its true perspective one must bear in mind the history of the past few years.

The peacemakers of Versailles asserted that disarmament was one of the main planks in their program of reconstruction. They dealt with the question both in general and in particular. They pledged themselves to a limitation and reduction of armaments under article 8 of the covenant, and they forced the defeated States to accept drastic limitations of their armed forces. Articles 1, 8, and 9 of the covenant envisaged a general reduction of armaments, the control of the private manufacture of war material, the exchange of full and frank information concerning armaments, and the establishment of a permanent advisory commission of military, naval, and air experts to assist the council.

The preamble of Part V of the treaty of Versailles reads:

> In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to observe strictly the military, naval, and air clauses which follow.

This was confirmed and elaborated by correspondence between M. Clemenceau, on behalf of the allied Powers, and the German delegation before the treaty was signed.

M. Clemenceau wrote as follows:

> The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments are not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to renew her possibility of military aggression. They are also the first steps toward that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventatives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

All members of the League are thus solemnly pledged to disarmament, and the extracts quoted form the treaty basis for all discussions on disarmament which have taken place under the auspices of the League.

The first Assembly of the League, in 1920, recommended that States should not exceed their existing level of armament expenditure until article 8 of the covenant became operative. At the same time the Assembly moved the council to appoint a temporary mixed commission of political, military, social, and economic experts to consider the question of the reduction of armaments, and a disarmament section was formed in the League secretariat.

Each successive assembly returned to the charge, and resolutions were passed recommending the limitation of expenditure and the exchange of information between the member States regarding armaments. This is now published in the League of Nations Armaments Year Book, which contains very complete information regarding the armed forces of each State.

The temporary mixed commission meanwhile attacked the broader problem, and in 1923 submitted a draft treaty of mutual assistance to the assembly. The drafting was mainly the work of Viscount Cecil of Great Britain and Colonel Requin, the French military representative on the permanent advisory commission. The real object of this treaty was to increase security and maintain the status quo; a joint and several undertaking was to be given by all parties to assist any of their number who became the object of a war of aggression; complementary agreements might be concluded for mutual defense. The draft treaty was warmly supported by France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia. It was decisively rejected by the British Empire and the ex-neutrals of northern Europe, on the ground that the proposals involved too great an extension of international obligations.

The fifth Assembly of the League in 1924 made a fresh start and attempted to solve the question by arbitration. The resulting discussions formed the basis of the Geneva Protocol. In effect, the Protocol required signatories to recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in all justiciable disputes; additional conciliation procedure was instituted for nonjusticiable disputes. Each signatory was to assist in sanctions ordered by the League, in accordance with the respective signatory's geographical situation and scale of armaments. Finally, the Protocol provided for a conference for the reduction of armaments.

The Protocol was supported by many continental States but proved unacceptable to the British Empire. After its nonratification the question of an agreement on international disarmament seemed to be put aside for some time to come.

At the meeting of the Assembly of the League in 1925, however, the French delegation brought forward a resolution requesting the Council of the League to call a disarmament conference at the earliest opportunity. This was adopted by the Assembly in spite of doubts of the British representative who considered that the political situation at the time was hardly favorable to a successful outcome for the deliberations of such a conference. The decisions arrived at in September, 1925, form the basis of the discussions which have since been in progress under the auspices of the League of Nations. The Council entrusted the preliminary work to a Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference on which the States, members of the Council, and certain other members of the League were represented. The United States of America and Germany (the latter at that time not a member of the League, though she has since become one) also accepted invitations, but the Soviet Government refused to send representatives.

The Preparatory Commission began its work by forming two subcommissions: Subcommission A, consisting of service representatives to discuss the military problems, and subcommission B to examine financial, economic, and political questions. These subcommissions sat at Geneva during the greater part of 1926 and examined the technical aspects of disarmament. Subcommission A produced an exhaustive report in which the pros and cons of almost every form of naval, military, and air limitation are discussed. The service representatives were able to obtain a very general measure of agreement as to the various technical measures by which armaments could be limited in practice. They failed entirely to agree as to the results which would ensue from the adoption of the various methods, opinions being divided, owing to the conflicting outlook and interests of the various States. Subcommission B produced a shorter report, containing valuable conclusions regarding defense expenditure, and some rather theoretical views dealing with other war resources. Two important decisions, however, resulted from the deliberations. The first was the summoning of a conference of experts on civil aviation, which was held at Brussels in March, 1927. The second was the appointment of a committee of financial experts on defense expenditure to draw up a model statement, which should enable the differences in budget systems in the various countries to be overcome, and also to consider whether any selected items of defense expenditure could be taken as key items. These financial experts met at Paris in February, 1927. They stated definitely that no key items could be selected which would be any real indication of expenditure, owing to the differences in accountancy in the various countries. They also drew up an interim model statement which contained so many items that it was generally recognized as impracticable.

The main hopes and fears of the various States were clearly shown in the discussion. When considering the British and French views many differences can be traced to the wide difference between Latin and Anglo-Saxon mentality. The British stand has been based on two main ideas: First, there is the problem of the limitation of those armaments which are actually limitable. There are many components of national strength, such as population, raw material, financial power, and economic and industrial resources, which obviously can not be limited. Secondly, attention should be concentrated upon armaments which are immediately available for aggression at the outbreak of war. The British hold that it is not possible to limit the ultimate war strength of any country—that is, that which the French describe as "war potential"—but believe that much will be accomplished if the immediate striking power of a State is reduced. The French view is quite different. They maintain, first, that armaments consist of the total resources of a State—human, economic, and moral—and that war in the future will be more and more a question of resources and not of standing armies, navies, and air forces. As it is impossible to limit all the resources which go to make up the ultimate war strength of a country, it is entirely unfair to select limitable factors such as trained reserves. They assert that certain countries with small economic resources require a vast reservoir of trained man power for their security; great industrial nations, owing to their potential strength, do not need such trained reserves. The French go even further and state that armaments in the future should only be permitted in inverse proportion to resources—the less the resources the greater the armaments. In fact, many nations must be given an armament handicap. Secondly, the French contend that the interdependence of armaments is an essential principle, and that limitation applied to one force must apply equally to all others. To this argument the British reply that it is impossible to decide exactly the comparative value of a battleship, a battalion, or an air squadron. The insistence on pursuing arguments regarding interdependence and equal treatment to their extreme logical conclusion has nearly wrecked the preparatory commission on various occasions. Further, the French and their continental allies demand greater security before any advance can be made in disarmament. The British, on the other hand, consider that a substantial measure of limitation and reduction of armaments is the best method of bringing about an increase in security. Again, France believes that no disarmament convention will give adequate guarantee of security unless it contains far-reaching powers of investigation and supervision. The British view, which has been strongly supported by Italy, Japan, and the United States of America, is that international good faith is the only sound basis for international agreements, and that no rigid system of control is workable or acceptable.

The States bordering on Russia declare that they can only accept a limitation of armaments if the Soviet Government adheres to any convention agreed to on the subject. Some States also feel that disarmament would be automatically achieved if armaments were stabilized at their present ratio while other States believe that the existing balance of armaments is inequitable, and that there must be a leveling up as well as down. The Italians, for instance, declare that they will accept a most drastic reduction of armaments, always provided that they are given an absolute equality with the strongest military power in Europe.

As a representative in the Preparatory Commission of the forcibly disarmed States, Germany had a good case for argument of which her representative took full advantage, particularly after Germany had assumed membership in the League. Each time he intervened in debate the German delegate put the case for his Government a little more clearly. Germany, he urged, had been disarmed under the treaty of Versailles. She is now waiting for the other signatory powers to carry out their promised reduction of armaments; if they failed to do so, Germany, while executing the treaty, would no longer feel morally bound by it.

We thus reach the eighth Assembly which met last autumn. Its main feature was a renewed attempt to link up disarmament with arbitration and security. But though the Geneva Protocol formed part of the background of the discussion there was a notable change in the line of approach. In the first place, a distinctive feature of the resolutions of the eighth Assembly was the attention paid to regional agreements of limited scope, or, in other words, to the possibilities of the separate treatment of the various danger zones on the Locarno model, as distinct from the more sweeping and ambitious program of the Protocol. In the second place, there was a certain change in the distribution of emphasis. Security appears prominently in the 1927 resolutions, but, as compared with the Protocol, more stress is laid on arbitration and less on the sanctions behind it. The 1927 resolutions mark a welcome advance toward a more realistic handling of the problem. One formidable stumbling block was removed by the decision of the Soviet Government to be represented at the disarmament conference and to take an active part in the work of the Preparatory Commission. The previous abstention of Russia had implications affecting not only the Russian Succession States but Europe as a whole. It was clearly recognized that this new and powerful force which had thus been set in motion might complicate the situation in some respects while simplifying it in others. Russia appeared on the scene and her appearance marked the opening of a new and—taking it all in all—perhaps a more hopeful chapter in the history of the disarmament question.

The Security and Arbitration Committee authorized by the last Assembly was formed by the Preparatory Disarmament Commission last December, and is composed of the delegates of 26 States, members of the League, with a representative of Soviet Russia as an observer. The program drawn up a few weeks ago at Prague under the direction of the chairman, Doctor Benes, the Czechoslovakian foreign minister, marks a fundamental change in the methods by which the problem of disarmament will henceforth be attacked. Instead of making new alliances between natural friends similar to the Little Entente, the security committee will at the meeting now in progress attempt to proceed on the lines of the Locarno agreement and seek to form compacts between friends and enemies such as the Little Entente and Hungary and Bulgaria and the other Balkan States. Such compacts are not to be guaranteed by any great power but will be so drawn that, should a dispute arise, its merits when brought before the League Council will be as clear-cut as the case of Belgium in 1914, so that the Council will be unable to make other than a unanimous decision.

The committee hopes to complete the initial stages of the work in time to report to the Council which meets on March 15. A second meeting will then be held prior to the June meeting of the Council to draft arbitration and security conventions which, if the Council approves, will be passed to the September Assembly. That body is then expected to vote resolutions calling upon the governments to conclude agreements preliminary to calling the world disarmament conference which, despite the tortuous paths followed, still remains the League's final aim.

In the last analysis it is clear that only a small measure of agreement has thus far been reached, and the difficulties incident to the making of further progress are easily visualized. Membership in the League of Nations has not changed national instincts, removed national interests, nor eliminated racial pride and traditions. Complete disarmament seems to necessitate a universally accepted arbitral body—something which does not now exist—and requires a willingness to give decisions on any and every matter that may be brought before that body, a responsibility that the League of Nations has avoided. Until willingness to give and to accept arbitral decisions is insured beyond possibility of breakdown, physical forces will probably prove to be national necessities, for the moral support of the League alone can not ensure national security. The precedent of the Washington Conference offers little hope of application of similar methods regarding general disarmament, for the circumstances of Geneva and Washington are not the same. The latter concerned the great naval powers only. The present problem is one for all the powers, great and small, naval, military, and air. With land forces in which mechanization is included in more varied and smaller units and in air power which is readily derived from civil sources, application of this form of restriction presents difficulties absent from the naval problem.

A cynical view of the results achieved was thus given by a prominent French journal following one of the most discouraging conferences:

> The battle for disarmament has temporarily ceased. Now each of us will dress his wounds, count his dead, and prepare for the next encounter. * * * Let us not blame any one in this affair. Each party plays his own game and egoism rules supreme. France and her European friends desire the status quo, stability and peace; Great Britain wishes to maintain her naval hegemony; Italy means to reserve for herself the possibility of future development. As for Germany, she is waiting for all these quarrels to end in a break, in order to claim the right to free herself from the military clauses of the treaty of Versailles.

Actually the situation when studied closely does not appear to be so discouraging as might seem at first sight. Something very definite has been accomplished. First, the examinations carried out by experts in the two subcommissions have resulted in publication of full data on the technical problems of disarmament. Secondly, the discussions in the Preparatory Commission have shown the political and economic difficulties which exist and made clear the attitude and interests of the various States. Thirdly, the presence of the Russian delegation and the indispensable collaboration of Russia in the work of the Preparatory Commission is an indisputable accomplishment, and an omen of future possibilities. The disarmament problem has been put under the microscope and can be examined in all its aspects. It is very far from solution and may in the last analysis prove impossible of solution under existing human conditions, but there is no need to despair. It is esential to remember that civilized States are only attempting the first stage on the road to disarmament and that no attempt of this nature has ever been made before.

From the economic standpoint it has been shown that the maintenance of great forces involves expenditure intolerable in the industrial struggle. Defeated, disarmed nations have decided advantages and successful, armed nations are handicapped as trade competitors. Reasonable world opinion has been given the opportunity to understand these facts. In any case, disarmament can only come as the result of international will convinced of the necessity. The League of Nations can not enforce disarmament in advance of world opinion. The more immediate task to which the league has set its hand is the dissection and reduction of the causes of international friction, the ripening of public opinion, and the development of an international desire to disarm.

NOTE.—The three most recent and interesting moves among the Powers in their endeavor to find some solution of the problem of armament have been: (*a*) *The work of the subcommittee on Security and Arbitration,* (*b*) *the proposal of our own Government to France to abolish war as an "instrument of national policy" among the Powers,* (*c*) *the disarmament proposal of the Russian delegation to the Preparatory Commission last December.*

(*a*) *The report of the security and arbitration body has not been made public yet, but in the next issue of the "Bulletin" it is hoped to include an article on the work and results of this committee.*

(*b*) *The proposal of our Government to France to abolish war as an instrument of national policy was spoken of at some length in the February "Bulletin" in the article "Treaty Negotiations with France." As explained in this article, it was the original desire of our Government to include such a proposal in the arbitration treaty recently negotiated with France and to extend the proposal to include the major powers. France desired to limit the proposal simply to herself and the United States or, if it was to be extended to other powers, to make it applicable only to "aggressive" wars. In this quandary, it was thought best to conclude the arbitration treaty* (*whose predecessor was soon to expire*) *and take up the subject of* *the abolishing of war as a separate topic of discussion. The arbitration treaty, by the way, was recently approved by the Senate without a record vote.*

After the signing of the treaty on February 6, the Secretary of State again took up with France negotiations regarding the abolishing of war. The latest note of the Secretary of State on this subject to France is as yet (at the time of going to press) unanswered, for France quite evidently desires to utilize the March session of the Council of the League to sound out the European powers and probably her own allies as to their attitude toward the proposals of Mr. Kellogg. If this matter is any further advanced by the time of the next issue of the "Bulletin," an article will be included therein upon the subject.

(*c*) *The proposal of the Russian Government last December was predicated upon simply abolishing all armament. A period of five years was allowed for this and at the end of that time, all navies were to be scrapped, all armies disbanded, and all war material destroyed except that necessary to sustain national police forces. The proposition quite obviously was immediately shelved by the Council of the League. But it had the merit, for Russia, of putting her in a better light, through cooperation, even though the sincerity of her proposal was almost universally doubted. It is of interest to note that certain European observers are seeing much in common between the Russian proposal to the League and the United States proposal to France. This Russian proposal is more or less of simply academic interest—its chief value being in that it brought forth the reaction and viewpoint in the council which only a proposal to abolish all armaments could.*—Ed.

V. JAPANESE-LANGUAGE SCHOOLS IN HAWAII.

Though the Supreme Court of the United States, on February 21, 1927, declared unconstitutional the foreign-language school laws of the Territory of Hawaii, it did not apparently silence the controversy nor allay the suspicions and antagonisms engendered by the long and bitter litigation that preceded the final decision.

The first attempt on the part of the Territory to regulate the foreign-language schools had its inception in the general hostility to everything un-American that prevaded the country during and immediately following the World War. The hostility to the German language schools on the mainland served to direct attention to the foreign-language schools in Hawaii. An examination of the textbooks used in the Japanese-language schools revealed that, while nothing actually derogatory to America was being taught, there was no effort being made to inculcate American patriotism. On the contrary, these textbooks contained stories of Japanese heroes and great historical and mythological characters, tending to glorify Japan and the Japanese race. Furthermore, it was found that the pupils of these schools were being taught Japanese history, with frequent allusions to "our army," "our navy," "our country," etc., thus Japanizing the attitude of these American-born children. The picture of the Emperor was also displayed in the schools and obeisance made to it.

As a result of these disclosures, feeling against the Japanese schools ran so high that attempts were made at the special session of the Territorial legislature in 1920 to enact legislation designed to abolish them. The counsel of a more moderate faction, comprising a number of the more prominent Americans of the community, prevailed, however, and instead a basic law regulating their conduct was enacted.

This law as first enacted required that no foreign-language school operate without a permit; also that all foreign-language school teachers be licensed. Before such license could be obtained, the teacher was required to show familiarity and sympathy with American history and institutions, as well as a general understanding of the ideals of democracy. A knowledge of the English language was not so strongly stressed, but as the examinations required to obtain the license were conducted in English it followed that the prospective teachers had to be conversant with the language.

The hours of attendance at the language schools were also regulated. These schools were required to operate not more than 1 hour a day after the hours of attendance of the public schools not more than 6 days a week, or 38 weeks in any school year.

Furthermore, each pupil of the foreign-language schools was required to have completed satisfactorily the first grade in the American public school or its equivalent before enrolling in the foreign-language schools. Later, in 1923, this provision was amended, requiring the completion of the first and second grades of the American public school or its equivalent before enrollment in the language schools. In 1925 the law was again amended abolishing this feature.

Another amendment to the original law required the payment of a head tax of $1 per year for each pupil enrolled. This tax was levied for the purpose of defraying the costs of administration of the language-school laws.

A supervisor of the foreign-language schools was appointed, and steps were taken to revise and regulate the textbooks and to arrange for the publication and sale of same. These new books were prepared with the idea of English being the basic language of the pupils, and in so far as possible English equivalents for the foreign words and phrases in the books were given.

Resentment and antagonism were aroused in the oriental communities (especially the Japanese), but they complied with the requirements of the new laws. The language schools operated under license, and the teachers organized classes to study American history and institutions. Most of them passed the examinations, receiving either permanent or temporary licenses.

The amendments of 1923 only served to add fuel to the flame. The Japanese, especially, resented those features of the law requiring the payment of the head tax and the use of textbooks prepared, approved, published, and sold by the Territory. Even the abolition of that part of the law requiring the completion of the first and second grades of the public school prior to entrance in the language schools failed to allay the growing antagonism.

It soon became apparent that the constitutionality of the act would be tested. Not all the Japanese schools, however, adopted an aggressive attitude. In fact, more bitter antagonism developed within the Japanese community than between the Americans and Japanese. By the middle of 1924 the Japanese were divided into two factions of almost equal strength. One faction, under the leadership of the *Hawaii-Hochi*, a vernacular paper edited by a half-caste Japanese, Fred Makino, comprised the radical and rabidly anti-American elements of the Japanese community; the *Nippu Jiji*, edited by Y. Soga, an alien Japanese, represented the attitude of the more conservative Japanese. The latter paper consistently urged the language schools to comply with the Territorial laws and at all times adopted a conciliatory attitude.

About half of the Japanese-language schools, under the leadership of *Hawaii-Hochi*, organized to test the constitutionality of the Territorial language-school laws. This organization was known as the "Japanese Language School Litigation Fulfillment Association."

The Chinese and Korean language schools, though in sympathy with the litigation, did not participate in it. They realized that in the event of the successful outcome of the legal controversy they would receive equal benefit, and in the event of failure they would not have lost the esteem of the community.

The litigants engaged as their attorneys Joseph B. Lightfoot and Judge J. B. Poindexter, and the wheels were set in motion to test the constitutionality of the law. The bitterness and antagonism was intensified in the Japanese community and found an echo in the English press.

A series of lawsuits were filed, based on the contention that the language schools were private institutions, and any attempt to regulate them was an abridgement of the rights of American citizens (fully 90 per cent of the children attending them are Hawaiian born).

They felt that the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in the case of the foreign-language school laws of Nebraska, Iowa, and Ohio would be followed in this instance.

An injunction was issued restraining the Territorial officials from enforcing the language-school laws. Later, on a motion filed by the government, this restraining order was dissolved. Following the dissolution of the order, and after a bond of $12,000 had been posted, the United States district court issued an injunction against the enforcement of the contested laws. The case was then taken to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in San Francisco. This body, in March, 1926, rendered a decision favorable to the litigants. The decision, however, was not unanimous, one of the three judges dissenting. The decision of this court was based upon the opinion handed down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Meyer *v.* Nebraska.

From the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals the case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, the attorneys for the litigating schools still relying upon the former decisions in the cases of language-school litigation in Nebraska, Iowa, and Ohio.

The decision of the San Francisco court was upheld, and on February 21, 1927, a verdict favorable to the litigants, declaring the foreign-language school laws of the Territory unconstitutional, was rendered. The opinion of Justice McReynolds is, in part, as follows:

> The school act and measures adopted thereunder go far beyond mere regulation of privately supported schools. They give affirmative direction concerning intimate and essential details of such schools, entrust their control to public officers, and deny both owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretion with respect to teachers, curriculum, and textbooks. Enforcement of the act probably would destroy most if not all of them, and certainly it would deprive parents of a fair opportunity to procure for their children instruction which they think important and we can not say is harmful.
>
> We, of course, appreciate the grave problems incident to the large alien population of the Hawaiian Islands. These should be given due weight whenever the validity of any governmental regulation of private schools is under consideration, but the limitations of the Constitution must not be transcended.

The *Hawaii-Hochi* immediately sponsored the organization of the "Japanese Language School Agitation Committee," composed of the leading spirits of the controversy. The purpose of this "agitation committee" was to organize and stage "victory celebrations" in all the Japanese communities throughout the Territory. At all the celebrations strong appeals for funds were made with which to defray the costs of the litigation, and beyond a doubt the "victory celebrations" were highly profitable to their organizers, despite the costly litigation expenses.

In April Governor Farrington signed a bill providing for the reimbursement of all the foreign-language schools of the 81 lead tax that had been assessed under the Territorial laws. This sum amounted to $19,441.

On June 30, 1927, the Territory relinquished all supervision, and the foreign-language schools were freed from all form of government regulation. They are not even registering as private schools. A recent check of the records of the department of public instruction reveals that there is no longer on file in that department a complete and accurate record of these schools.

Last July representatives of various Japanese educational societies met in Honolulu for the purpose of forming a central organization.

Prior to the passage of the Territorial language-school laws there had been an organization composed of various local language-school associations, known as the Hawaii Educational Association. This association had functioned for a number of years, up until the time of the initiation of the language-school litigation, in fact. This litigation, in splitting the language schools into two opposing factions of almost equal strength, naturally hampered its activities. It remained inactive all during the long fight through the courts, but, following the decision of the United States Supreme Court, steps were taken to reorganize the virtually nonexistent organization.

At the conference of last July, which was held at the Young Men's Buddhist Association headquarters in Honolulu, it was decided to disband the old association entirely and form a new organization. The result of the conference was the formation of the Hawaii-Japanese Educational Association, the membership of which is composed of language schools instead of local educational societies. One of the first steps to be taken by the new organization was the appointment of a committee to revise and systematize the textbooks used in the language schools. These books will probably be in use next year. So the matter stands at the present.

One of the outstanding personalities of the language-school controversy was Dr. Henry Butler Schwartz, the first supervisor of foreign-language schools for the department of public instruction. Doctor Schwartz came to Hawaii in 1920 to take charge of Japanese mission work in connection with the Methodist Church. He had been for about 20 years a missionary in the Loochoo Islands (Okinawa Ken). He continued his missionary work among the Japanese in Hawaii until his appointment as supervisor of foreign-language schools in 1923, a post he held until July, 1926, when he was superseded by Mr. Francis B. Stafford. Doctor Schwartz's knowledge of the Japanese and the Japanese language was, undoubtedly, a governing factor in his appointment. Doctor Schwartz is a good American and a man who conscientiously endeavored to discharge the duties of his office to the best of his ability. Naturally he earned the active enmity of the *Hawaii-Hochi* and its rabidly anti-American supporters.

The antagonism which he undoubtedly aroused among the litigating faction had much to do with his resignation, which was virtually forced upon him following the decision of the San Francisco courts. The dissatisfaction with his administration had been greatly augmented when it was found that the first edition of the new textbooks prepared by the committee of which he was a member contained so many errors that it had to be revised. The preparation and the revision proved to be very expensive, and the price of the books (revised) was about three times the cost of the books previously used in the language schools. The subsequent criticism was aimed directly at Doctor Schwartz, though the books were compiled by a commission composed of Doctor schwartz and three supposedly competent Japanese, one of whom was Dr. T. Harada, professor of Japanese at the University of Hawaii.

Following his resignation from the department of public instruction Doctor Schwartz returned to missionary work among the Japanese of the islands. He is now stationed on the island of Kauai (at Koloa). He is past 60 years old, rather feeble, and his public activities are practically over.

Mr. Francis B. Stafford, instructor of the Chinese language at McKinley High School, was appointed as the successor of Doctor Schwartz in 1926. Mr. Stafford has been a resident of Honolulu since about 1916. He was previously, for a period of six years, a missionary in China and is thoroughly familiar with the Chinese trend of mind, as well as the Chinese language, of which he has been a student for many years. He is well informed concerning world political affairs, more particularly the political situations of the Far East. He is in all respects reliable and trustworthy.

Upon his appointment to office he immediately undertook to put into force a more conciliatory policy in dealing with the Japanese-language schools. He changed the designation of his office from "supervisor of foreign-language schools" to "director of oriental-language schools." He next announced that the oriental-language schools would not be required to pay the $1 head tax that year. The decision of the ninth circuit court of appeals, he held, released the schools from that obligation. He made a tour of the islands, addressing the Japanese-language school societies and the teachers In all of his talks he was most conciliatory, but failed to gain the confidence of the litigating group. However, he held the post of director of oriental-language schools for the department of public instruction until it was automatically abolished June 30, 1927, as a result of the decision of the United States Supreme Court.

Fred (Kinsaburo) Makino was the leading spirit of the litigating faction. Makino, who is the editor of the anti-American *Hawaii-Hochi*, is a half-caste Japanese of a somewhat unsavory reputation in the community. He was born in Japan, his father being an Englishman named Higginbotham. Makino has been in Hawaii since some time prior to 1909, as he was an active agitator in the Japanese cane-laborers strike in that year and, it is said, afterwards went to jail for those activities. Again, in the second strike of Japanese plantation laborers (1920) he engaged in similar activities, but his habitual double dealing apparently lost him the confidence of large numbers of his followers, even before the end of the strike. He was denied a voice in any further labor activities by the leaders themselves. In 1924 he again espoused the cause of labor—this time in connection with the Filipino plantation strike. The failure of this strike, however, only resulted in additional loss of prestige for him.

He early saw in the foreign-language-school situation an opportunity to reinstate himself in the esteem of his countrymen, and build up the declining subscription list of his newspaper. From the first he was one of the leading agitators, and throughout the entire course of the litigation his editorials in the Hochi and the English sheet, the Bee, were of an extremely anti-American character. The Japanese were frequently warned of the oppressive measures that would be adopted by the Americans in the event the foreign-language school laws were upheld in the Federal courts. The same policy is followed and the same arguments used even yet in any discussion of the school system.

Makino's paper undoubtedly gained a large number of subscribers among the more radical element of the Japanese. Having exhausted the possibilities of the "victory celebrations," Makino then took up the cause of Pablo Manlapit, paroled Filipino labor agitator.

Joseph B. Lightfoot, the attorney who argued the case before the Supreme Court, was a naturalized American citizen of English birth. He had practiced law in the community since 1905, much of his practice being of rather a shady character. The foreign-language schools furnished the outstanding case of his career. He died December 18, 1927.

These four men, with William B. Lymer, secretary of state for the Territory of Hawaii, were the outstanding figures of the litigation. Lymer defended the school laws ably.

The immediate reactions to the decision of the Supreme Court were reflected in the press of the Territory. The *Hawaii-Hochi*, organ of the litigating group was wildly jubilant. Satisfaction with the decision was expressed by the *Hawaii-Chinese News*. The English press, on the other hand, voiced considerable disappointment, while the *Nippu Jiji* in an editorial dwelt on the bitterness and hatred that had been engendered by the litigation and reminded its readers that, while the Supreme Court had disposed of the Territorial language-school laws, the foreign-language-school question still remained.

It was the advice of both Governor Farrington and Victor S. Houston, Delegate to Congress from Hawaii, that, having won their point, the Japanese should either abandon their language schools or voluntarily submit to some form of regulation by the Territory. Such a course, they told the Japanese, would give greater import to their expressions of loyalty to the United States, and would allay the fear on the part of Americans that the foreign-language schools were inimical to American institutions and principles of government.

At the time of Governor Farrington's visit to Washington last October he represented to officials there that the foreign-language schools of Hawaii were a serious obstacle to the assimilation of the younger generation. It has been reported that, on the strength of his recommendations, attempts will be made at the present session of Congress to introduce measures providing for the regulation of all foreign-language schools by Federal legislation.

There does, indeed, seem to be little doubt that the foreign-language schools, more particularly the Japanese-language schools, are proving more of a handicap and detriment than an asset to the younger generation. Not only do they render more difficult the acquisition of correct English and nullify Americanization influences but, according to leading Japanese business men, they are failing in their most ostensibly important mission of teaching the younger generation the language of their ancestors. In speaking of recent graduates from the Japanese-language schools, a Japanese business man, addressing a recent commercial conference, said: "Their knowledge of the Japanese language is too deficient to be of any practical use in business houses."

Toward the end of 1926 the superintendent of public instruction made an inspection tour of all the islands. He found that among the teachers recently graduated from the Territorial normal school, most of whom were of Japanese parentage, the spoken English was largely of the "pidgin" variety. This survey of the island schools resulted in an investigation of conditions at the Territorial normal school. There it was found that a large per cent of the prospective teachers were markedly deficient in spoken English. Strict tests in oral English were held, and as a result 32 students were eliminated from the school. Twenty-six of these were Hawaiian-born Japanese. Others, less deficient in English, were allowed to remain conditionally. The new policy of the normal school resulted in an improved standard of English, as it was found that the attitude of the students themselves was so pronouncedly antagonistic toward the speaking of correct English that its use on or off the campus resulted in virtual ostracism. The new ruling accomplished much in correcting this condition and did much to improve the quality of spoken English in that institution.

Observation of the experiment as conducted by the normal school led to the University of Hawaii raising its standards of English requirements. Under the new rules no student from the high school whose English pronunciation, inflection, and diction is faulty is admitted to the university, regardless of qualification in all other scholastic requirements. This new ruling of the university caused considerable disappointment to numbers of Hawaiian-born oriental students, who had expected to enroll last September.

The ever anti-American *Hawaii-Hochi* carried a long editorial in the English section, The Bee, excoriating the university for its injustice in refusing higher education to those students who were qualified to enter in all but the one subject—the language of America. The matter was treated as another attempt on the part of Americans to penalize the Japanese for giving to their children the language and culture of their ancestors. The same editorial also charged the university with being the tool of the sugar interests and in league with them to force the younger generation to return to the plantations.

Several conferences of Japanese and Japanese-Americans have tended to bring out the fact that their faulty English is a distinct handicap to them in making a place for themselves in local industry. It seems that many of the Japanese themselves are beginning to recognize the fact. Mr. Soga, editor of the *Nippu Jiji*, referring to the recent intercollegiate debates, in which three students from the Oregon State University met students from the University of Hawaii in debate, said, in part:

> What impressed me most at the Oregon-Hawaii intercollegiate debate at the Mission Memorial Hall the other night was the considerable difference in English of the oriental debators and the purebred American orators, although the same could not be said of their argument.
>
> This is not only the impression of those who, like myself, are not qualified to discuss the English language, but also the unanimous sentiment of those who are expert in English. It is to be regretted, but facts must be admitted as such, and plans for the improvement of English should be made accordingly.
>
> The other day Principal Wist, of the normal school, gave a very instructive talk at a gathering of the Thursday Luncheon Club at the Nuuanu (oriental) Y. M. C. A. on the English difficulties of oriental students and methods for their correction. Mr. Wist pointed out the fact that, among the orientals, Japanese are most deficient in English. This is something that seriously concerns all Japanese and should merit careful consideration.

The address by President Wist, of the normal school, referred to above, contains, among other things, the statement that nearly

50 per cent of the pupils refused admission to the normal school on account of deficient English are of Japanese ancestry.

"The time will come," continued President Wist, "when the majority of our island teachers will be of oriental ancestry. This is a perfectly natural and inevitable condition in Hawaii.

"Unless we take steps to correct the English of our teachers-to-be, we will find ourselves in a 'ring-around-the-rosie' of poor English."

There is a factor in the language-school question, however, that is not usually taken into consideration when the subject is under discussion—that is, the religious factor.

The great bulk of the Japanese population is Buddhist. A religious census taken a few months ago showed that out of a population figure of approximately 130,000 Japanese scarcely 3,000 were affiliated with Christian churches, and many of even these are still Buddhist at heart.

The Japanese-language schools are, in the main, centers of Buddhism, controlled by the Buddhist missions and disseminating the tenents of that faith, on which is built up the traditions, ideals, customs, and culture of Japan. The principals and teachers of these schools are in most instances Buddhist priests and mission workers, and their influence upon the older generation is almost absolute. Regardless of how poor these families may be, they are virtually coerced into supporting the foreign-language schools and into sending their children to them.

From the beginning of Japanese immigration to the islands, the Buddhist priests have been carrying on their work among the immigrants and their Hawaiian-born children. Missions are now established in nearly all Japanese communities throughout the islands. Until 1924 alien priests continued to come to the islands to conduct the missions and foreign-language schools. With the passage of the Japanese exclusion clause of the immigration act of 1924, however, secular and religious instructors from Japan were no longer obtainable. This is a condition that will inevitably place the language schools in a precarious situation. Since they can no longer obtain teachers from Japan, they must look to the Hawaiian-born members of their race to carry on the work in the schools. The teaching qualities of the foreign-language school instructors has not been of a high order compared with American teaching standards even under the best of conditions. The second-generation Japanese are even less qualified to be language-school teachers, partly because, due to their environment, they have not been able to acquire the best Japanese, and partly because advanced courses in Japanese have not been available in the island schools.

Recognizing this condition, the Japanese Central Institute of Honolulu has included an advanced course in Japanese this year.

The Japanese high school of Honolulu has just announced that it will extend its curriculum to include a three-year normal-school course in an attempt to develop adequately trained teachers for the future needs of the language schools.

The same condition faces the Buddhist missions in Hawaii. With the present immigration laws operating against the entrance of alien priests, it is necessary to look to the island-born descendants of the Japanese to carry on the work of the missions. Each year the local Hongwanji mission awards three scholarships to local youths who wish to study for the Buddhist priesthood. After about five years of study in a Buddhist university in Japan, they are required to return to Hawaii to serve as Buddhist priests. Even this arrangement does not provide for a great many priests and mission workers. The matter was taken up at the annual conference of island Buddhist leaders last July, when it was recommended that steps be taken to organize a school for the training of Buddhist priests here in the Territory. The recommendation will be discussed further and perhaps acted upon at the next annual conference.

At the time the Supreme Court decision was handed down there were in all 150 Japanese-language schools in the Territory—practically all under Buddhist control and influence. About 80 of them joined the litigating faction.

Since the Territorial laws regulating the language schools have been set aside there has been a notable increase in the educational activities of the Japanese community, as well as renewed activities on the part of Buddhist leaders.

Many of the existing Japanese-language schools have enlarged their buildings and increased their teaching staff, and a number of new Japanese-language schools have been built or are now under construction.

Through the newly organized Hawaii-Japanese Educational Association efforts are being made to systematize the course of study and to centralize the control of the schools as much as possible. The association, however, has to contend with internal strife and politics, and, due to this condition, the superintendent of public instruction has expressed doubt as to its ability to function for the ultimate benefit of the children attending the language schools. Committees of this association from the different islands are now holding a three-day conference in Honolulu in connection with the compilation and revision of the new textbooks.

Due to the conditions previously enumerated, it would seem that it will be largely a matter of time until the language schools will either pass out of existence or cease to be a disturbing factor in the community. It is true that time and conditions are slowly but surely mitigating against these schools as one generation succeeds another.

If economic conditions alone controlled the matter they would probably cease to exist after a few years, but the religious factor is bound to prove a strong influence in keeping them alive.

In reviewing the history of the Japanese in Hawaii we find that they began to come to the islands in large numbers as contract laborers about 1880, approximately 70 per cent coming without children. Soon followed the "picture brides." The children of these immigrants (born in the islands) entered school about 1890. By 1900 these children finished the eighth grade and returned to the plantations as laborers. Their children started to school about 1910, finished the eighth grade about 1920 and the high school about 1924. They are now (1927) about 23 years old. Their children will start to school about 1932.

Without doubt the Japanese of the second generation are strongly imbued with the principles of Buddhism, as well as with the traditions, ideals, and culture of Japan. It is true that, of necessity, in their present environment they are departing in many ways from the customs of their fathers, but the consciousness of Japanese nationalism is deeply instilled into them, partly by the teachings and influence of their alien parents and their Buddhist priests and partly by the training they received in the Japanese-language schools. This is the consciousness that they are passing on to the third generation, though, perhaps, in lesser degree.

The failure of the Japanese-language schools to equip these young people to meet life in their own community is beginning to impress the Japanese themselves, and should the Territory take advantage of the situation by incorporating an adequate Japanese-language course in the public schools, to be optional, self-interest might eventually prevail against the influence of their Buddhist leaders, who in their efforts to keep the children Japanese are unfitting them for the life they must live in their home community.

Even so, the Americanization problem will not have been entirely solved, for a public-school education alone can hardly be expected to overcome completely the alien influences that will surround the Japanese-American children for some generations to come. They outnumber all other races in the islands and have assimilated to a lesser extent than any of the others, thereby retaining their racial purity; consequently their racial characteristics, ideals, and traditions may be expected to persist for a long time to come.

Due to their numerical strength, they will in a few years be in a position to control the political destinies of the Territory, which, owing to its geographical position, forms the principal military and naval outpost of the United States in the Pacific area. In view of this fact it seems that measures of some sort should be taken by the

Federal Government to insure the training of these citizens, who will be the voters of the very near future, in the principles of American government and American institutions and ideals.

The Territory can meet the language question by including a Japanese-language course in the curriculum of the public schools, but so long as the language schools exist the children will continue to be instructed in and imbued with a system of philosophy and thought that is in every way alien and contrary to the principles on which our democracy is founded.

The effects of this teaching is reflected in the attitude of the American citizens of Japanese parentage in the matter of expatriation. There are between 60,000 and 70,000 such citizens in the islands, and of that number only about 1,600 have expatriated themselves from Japan since 1916. Such a condition is not likely to improve so long as the Japanese-language schools, under the present Buddhist system of control, continue to exist.

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
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1928

O. N. I. BULLETIN—APRIL, 1928

FOR CONVENIENCE IN ROUTING

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First Division Officer			
Second Division Officer			
Third Division Officer			
Fourth Division Officer			
Fifth Division Officer			
Sixth Division Officer			
Marine Officer			
"V" Division Officer			
"A" Division Officer			
"B" Division Officer			
"E" Division Officer			
"M" Division Officer			
"N" Division Officer			
"R" Division Officer			
Radio Officer			

The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between February 25 and March 25, inclusive.

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FOREWORD

The Monthly Information Bulletin of the Office of Naval Intelligence has now been published for over nine years. It has a circulation of slightly under 800 copies, reaching all commands, afloat and ashore, except very minor ones, and, in addition, the State Department and the more important commands of the Army.

The attention of the service is invited to the fact that the Bulletin is the only medium of wide circulation which the service has for general information of a confidential or near-confidential nature. As such, it has vast opportunities for the expansion of its usefulness. At present, the great majority of the material for the Bulletin is received from a comparatively very small number of sources, and this material is usually in the form of intelligence reports. But it is felt that the Bulletin, to make the most of its opportunities, should draw from the service at large and should be the vehicle of expression of those confidential matters of most interest to the service at large.

Accordingly, the Office of Naval Intelligence desires and requests that officers submit to the Bulletin, for publication in the Special-Article section, articles of general interest on naval subjects which are of too confidential a nature for public periodical, such as the Proceedings of the Naval Institute. These articles might be such as comments on existing naval practices or activities, suggestions for improving same; ideas concerning naval activity abroad or in cooperation with other branches of the Government, etc.

But, furthermore, the Office of Naval Intelligence believes that the Bulletin should be something more than a technical periodical—it should be, as well, an instrument of education in those broad spheres in which our Navy should be increasingly interested as a representative of a world power whose interests are continually expanding. Hence this office also desires confidential articles from officers of the services on such subjects as our foreign relations; foreign trade and shipping; observations on the political economic, and social activities of foreign peoples, reports of travel abroad, etc., particularly, of course, as the subjects bear upon the mission of our Navy and Government in war and peace. A few hypothetical subjects, chosen at random, might be mentioned as: The clash of foreign interests in China, or in South America; Sea control of the oil routes of the world; Singapore versus Pearl Harbor; The political position of the United States in Panama; Communism in the Far East; A visit to the Dutch East Indies, etc.

Suggestions or comments from the service regarding these missions which the Bulletin desires to fill will be welcomed.

Special articles for the Bulletin should be sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, marked "For the Bulletin," in original and at least one copy. There are no other stipulations in regard to submission of such. Credit will be given in the Bulletin to the author of an article, but it is understood, of course, that no remuneration can be made.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF BRITISH ADMIRALTY.


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Note: Officials underlined once constitute the Board of Admiralty; of these, only those underlined twice are Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

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O. N. I. MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

Vol. X APRIL, 1928 No. 10

GREAT BRITAIN

A. NAVAL

1. *Organization of the British Naval Establishment.*

There is given below a description of the organization of the British Naval Establishment, prepared by the naval attaché, London.

The material for this article was gathered from information supplied by the British Admiralty in addition to numerous books, official publications, and pamphlets.

The organization of the Admiralty is always subject to change and at present a committee is considering some modifications. It is considered probable that the trade division of the naval staff may be abolished, at least in peace time, and that the duties of some of the other divisions of the naval staff may be merged together for peace administration, though a nucleus of any eliminated divisions would be retained so as to be capable of quick expansion in case of emergency. Considerable criticism in the House of Commons has been voiced regarding the tendency toward increasing unduly the size of the naval staff and the number of personnel assigned thereto, so that any changes that may occur will probably be designed to meet such views.

Attention is invited to the organization chart of the British Admiralty.

I. PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF BRITISH EMPIRE.

In a political sense, the British Empire is a loosely knit assembly of units of very varying degrees of importance and authority, bound together by no constitution and depending for its unity largely on sentimental feelings, bonds of race, language and religion, and above all loyalty to the throne and the person of the Sovereign and his family. Economic considerations also contribute to the vitality of the Empire.

In addition to Great Britain proper, the British Empire embodies the Empire of India, the six Dominions possessing complete responsible self-government, Northern Ireland, the status of which is more akin to a part of Great Britain, the channel islands and the Isle of Man which are possessions but not colonies, and some 39 colonies, dependencies, and protectorates which are not self-governing and are controlled in varying degrees of completeness by the Colonial Office of Great Britain. The mandated territories allotted to Great Britain and the British Dominions come under imperial consideration, as do certain British spheres of influence in the world, such as the southeast coast of Arabia. No uniformity whatever exists in the form of local government or control of these various units.

Thus, the extreme complexity of the political organization of the British Empire can be realized, but for a consideration of naval aspects it is not necessary to go beyond Great Britain and the six Dominions, namely, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, and the Colony of Newfoundland. The increasing independence of these Dominions and their rights and importance in all imperial matters were recognized by the imperial conference of 1926 which defined the status of Great Britain and them as follows:

> They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The title of the Sovereign, changed somewhat by the same imperial conference, is as follows:

> George V, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India.

In no more succinct form can there be expressed the subordination of the entire Empire to the throne, without sacrifice of mutual independence of self-governing units as between themselves.

The part taken by the Dominions in naval matters will be discussed later, after the Royal Navy proper has been considered. This leads, then, to the form of government in Great Britain, and the relationship of the navy thereto.

II. GREAT BRITAIN AND ROYAL NAVY.

(*a*) *Form of government.*—The form of government of Great Britain is that of a hereditary, limited, and constitutional monarchy, though there is no complete written constitution and though much of the character of the powers of the Crown and of the rights of the people is based upon such long custom and usage, built up from certain outstanding fundamental laws, such as Magna Charta, as to have now by common consent much of the force of constitutional law.

The executive government is exercised by a Prime Minister and a body of ministers chosen by him, with the approval of the King, their tenure of power depending upon the support of a majority of the House of Commons. On the resignation of a ministry which has ceased for any reason to command a majority in the House of Commons, the King sends for the political leader whom circumstances indicate to him as most likely to command such a majority, and invites him to form a new ministry. If the latter is assured of sufficient support from those with whom he works in Parliament, he accepts the responsibility, and submits to the King for approval the names of those whom he proposes to include in the cabinet (which is the inner circle of Ministers forming the real executive) and the offices which he desires them to fill. There are some 16 offices—including that of First Lord of the Admiralty—which by tradition carry with them a seat in the cabinet, and a few others which may or may not carry one, according to the decision of the Prime Minister.

As the continuance of a ministry is dependent upon the support of a majority of the House of Commons, it is regarded as necessary that ministers should be able to explain their policy and defend their actions in person there or in the House of Lords. All cabinet offices, therefore, and with some very minor exceptions all the ministerial offices outside the cabinet must be held by members of one or other of the two houses, and in practice they are distributed so that the ministry is very strongly represented in the House of Commons, and, as adequately as the case admits of, in the House of Lords.

It will be seen that all the members of the ministry hold office as a result of selection by the Prime Minister and approval by the King. This is true not only of the First Lord of the Admiralty, but also of his two parliamentary subordinates, the civil lord of the Admiralty and the parliamentary secretary, who are both selected by the Prime Minister, not by the First Lord.

The legal powers of ministers are derived from a variety of sources. Some ministers are the modern representatives of "Great officers of the Crown," or officers of the King's Household, and their duties are chiefly fixed by custom and tradition, although some duties may have been added or confirmed by statute. Others, with their duties, are entirely the creation of modern legislation. In many cases the duties actually discharged by an individual minister are legally vested in a committee of the privy council or an administrative board, of which the minister, although only the president, has become the sole working member.

In the case of the First Lord and the Board of Admiralty, the legal bases of their powers are:

(1) The appointment of a certain number of individuals (now eight) by royal letters patent (reissued on each occasion of a change in their membership) as lords commissioners to execute the office of the lord high admiral, and to carry out the duties of the extinct navy board and commissioners of victualing, i. e., to perform those duties in regard to the Royal Navy and the administration of naval affairs which belonged to the King's prerogative, as head of the State and responsible for its defense by sea, and which were formerly delegated by him to a "Great officer of the Crown" known as the lord high admiral, and to certain subordinate administrative boards.

(2) The membership of the Board of Admiralty consists, by order in council, of these lords commissioners, which order also prescribes that there shall be two secretaries to the board—the parliamentary and financial secretary and the permanent secretary—who shall have "the status of full members of the board."

(3) Certain statutes which give the consent of Parliament to the execution by the Board of Admiralty of the powers previously executed by the lord high admiral, and the subordinate administrative boards which belonged to them by statute and not by virtue of the royal prerogative.

(4) An order in council (above mentioned and reissued on each occasion of a change in the organization of the board), which prescribes the general method in which the powers conferred by the above-mentioned letters patent and by statutes are to be exercised, and that the first lord is to be responsible to the Crown and to Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty, the other lords commissioners and the parliamentary and permanent secretaries being responsible to the first lord for their performance of their respective duties as distributed by him among them.

(*b*) *Relationship of Admiralty to Crown, Parliament, and other departments.*—Every cabinet minister has the right of direct access to or communication with the King, and submits to the King direct any matters connected with his department which require the approval of or are of special interest to the King. For example, the first lord submits to the King recommendations for honors to naval and marine officers, nominations of officers for high commands, alterations in naval and marine uniform, and notifies him of any important naval events, the deaths of well-known flag officers, etc. It is an unwritten rule, however, that no minister should submit to the King, and thus implicate the Crown in, any matter that involves any other department or the cabinet, until agreement has been reached amongst the ministers concerned.

The authority of the Crown over the Admiralty is recognized by the resort to the issue of orders in council (technically decisions by the King "by and with the advice of" the privy council) in some matters. Originally an order in council represented the result of actual discussion at the council, and was a most important stage of the settlement of any administrative question involving expenditure, as it was the only stage at which the Lord Treasurer could be certain of an opportunity of bringing financial criticism to bear on proposals. But now that proposals involving expenditure undergo the criticism of the treasury as a matter of course, and the estimates presented to Parliament explain in considerable detail the services for which money is required, the obtaining of an order in council is only a formality, and is merely a convenient, formal way of giving authoritative effect to ministerial decisions where the matter dealt with comes within the royal prerogative and does not require legislation. The use of orders in council has been dispensed with in a great many cases in which it was formerly the rule.

However, the practice has grown up, in connection with legislation on subjects involving the application of complicated and perhaps variable regulations, of inducing Parliament to pass a statute which lays down main principles only and gives power to the Crown to issue detailed regulations by order in council. Most of the cases in which the Admiralty now obtains the authority of an order in council are under statutes of this character, instances being—

The naval and marine pay and pensions act, 1865, which provides that all pay, wages, allowances, pensions, etc., of officers and men or their widows or dependents shall be paid in such manner and subject to such conditions as are from time to time directed by order in council.

The dockyard ports regulation act, 1865, which authorizes the issue of detailed regulations applying to individual ports, by order in council.

The naval savings bank act, 1866, which leaves the detailed regulations for their management to be laid down by order in council.

The relationship of the Admiralty to Parliament may be said to consist chiefly of the following:

(1) The Admiralty representative has to present the navy estimates in the House of Commons, and to defend these estimates and the naval policy of the Government when they are under discussion.

(2) He also has to reply to parliamentary questions addressed to him, of which notice has been duly given by placing them on the order sheet of the House of Commons (unless the information asked for is confidential, or would cause undue labour to provide).

(3) In both houses the Admiralty representatives are required to take charge of, and explain as necessary, any parliamentary bill initiated by the department.

(4) In both houses they must be prepared to deal with any naval question, raised by way of motion or otherwise, in accordance with proper parliamentary procedure.

(5) A large number of returns, reports, etc., respecting the navy are regularly "presented to Parliament" by the Admiralty, in accordance either with statute or with custom; and in either house information can be "moved for," to be provided in the form of a parliamentary return, the first lord having discretion as to whether he will agree to furnish it or not. Certain orders in council (affecting naval pay and pensions, etc.) must also be laid before Parliament.

(6) The comptroller and auditor general's reports on the navy appropriation account, store accounts, dockyard expense accounts, etc., are considered annually by the House of Commons select committee of public accounts, which examines the accounting officer of the Admiralty (the permanent secretary) on matters arising out of the reports or accounts.

(7) The House of Commons select committee on estimates periodically takes the navy estimates, or some part of them, as a subject of special investigation and examines departmental witnesses.

(8) Either house may set up a committee to inquire into any naval or other subject affecting the public interest, and summon any witness or call for any documents, though obviously such action could not be taken unless the Government acquiesced in the proposal.

As regards the relations of the Admiralty to other departments, all departments, except the revenue-collecting and certain other departments which are subordinate to the treasury, are on an equality, each minister is completely responsible for his own department, and no minister can impose action on another minister. Concerted action by departments must, therefore, be by agreement, and in case of disagreement must be settled by appeal to the Prime Minister or cabinet. There are, however, two restrictions on the complete responsibility of a minister in actual practice:

(1) He is expected to refer to the cabinet, or at least to the Prime Minister, before deciding matters that have an important political bearing, likely to affect the credit of the cabinet as a whole.

(2) He can not approve action involving expenditure not already sanctioned by Parliament without obtaining the concurrence of the treasury (Chancellor of the Exchequer), from whose decision there is again an appeal to the Prime Minister or cabinet.

There are numerous interdepartmental standing committees to facilitate cooperation between them, the most important on which the Admiralty is represented being the ordnance committee, the wireless telegraphy board, the chemical warfare committee, and the navy, army, and air force institutes. The function of the committee of imperial defense is discussed later.

As regards the respective interest and responsibility of the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Air Ministry in Coast Defense, it can only be said that the general principle adopted provides that the army is responsible for all shore defenses, the navy for all defenses afloat, and the Royal Air Force for air defense, and that all three services are independent as regards their responsibilities. Cooperation is secured by very careful coordination of detailed arrangements, which are considered by joint conferences (i. e., local conferences, departmental conferences, or subcommittees of the committee of imperial defense, as the case may require), and these arrangements are then incorporated in detailed instructions.

Similarly, the general principle adopted in regard to general army and navy cooperation is that the army is responsible for operations on shore and the navy for operations afloat, the traditional dividing line being high-water mark. But the exact division of responsibility in joint enterprises of various types and the arrangements for securing cooperation are determined by detailed instructions agreed upon between the two services as best meeting the requirements of the case.

The officers of no one of the three services have any right to exercise command over units or personnel of either of the other two, except under special authority from the Government or in accordance with agreements mutually made either between the departments concerned or in emergencies between the officers locally in command where combined operations are in prospect.

(*c*) *Admiralty control.*—All personnel of the Royal Navy and the various forms of the naval reserves, and all matters concerned therewith, come under general Admiralty control.

The Corps of Royal Marines forms part of the regular land forces of the Crown authorized by Parliament in the army annual act, but it is under the control of the Admiralty, the expenses connected with it are borne by Admiralty votes, and the numbers are included in the numbers voted for the naval service.

Marine officers are commissioned by the King and men are enlisted and sworn according to the procedure prescribed for soldiers by the army act. Terms of enlistment, conditions of service, transfer and forfeiture of service are governed by the marine service acts.

While serving on shore, but not with the army, the corps is under the army act, and the Admiralty exercises over it various powers that are exercised by the higher military authorities and by the Crown in the case of the army. When borne on the books of a commissioned ship, royal marines, unless specially made subject to military law as provided in the army act, are subject to the naval discipline act and the laws for the government of officers and seamen of the Royal Navy.

When employed with the army, the precedence of the royal marines is after the Royal Berkshire Regiment. When royal marines landed from His Majesty's ships are acting with naval, military, and air forces, they take precedence with but after the Royal Navy, which is the "senior service," as compared to the army and air force, which follow in that order.

When royal marines are acting with the army, command is exercised by the senior combatant officer irrespective of the branch of the service to which he belongs. When acting with the Royal Navy, the position of royal marine officers is governed by their relative rank with naval officers as laid down by order in council, this relative rank being the same as prescribed for army officers of corresponding ranks.

When on shore in garrison with army troops, royal marines form part of the military forces under the area commander, and the command of the garrison itself may devolve on the senior officer, royal marines. The Admiralty, however, retains a first call upon their services, and places a restriction upon their removal from the garrison.

As regards the naval reserves, these are of three classes:

(1) The royal fleet reserve, consisting of men who have already served in the Royal Navy or royal marines.

(2) The royal naval reserve, consisting of officers and men belonging to the mercantile marine or engaged in seafaring occupations.

(3) The royal naval volunteer reserve consisting of volunteers from all professions.

Enrollment in (1) is in some cases provided for in the man's contract of service in the Royal Navy; in other cases it is voluntary. Enrollment in (2) and (3) is entirely voluntary.

The regulations for all naval reserves include periods of obligatory training and also provide for additional periods of voluntary training.

The regulations also provide for dismissal or discharge from the reserves, or forfeiture of retainer pay in certain circumstances, but except to this extent, the disciplinary control of the Admiralty over the reserves is limited to those reservists who are under training, unless the reserves have been called into actual service.

In emergency the reserves may be called into actual service by royal proclamation ("the occasion being first communicated to Parliament if sitting, or declared in council and notified by proclamation, if Parliament be not sitting or in being"), and thereupon they become for all purposes part of the Royal Navy.

The royal fleet reserve is administered under port divisions, an active service accountant officer being stationed at each of the three home ports as registrar of the reserves.

The royal naval reserve is administered under the admiral commanding reserves (assisted and advised by a Royal Navy reserve advisory commmittee, representative of various mercantile marine interests), the registrar general of shipping and seamen, board of trade, acting as principal registrar, and representatives of the board of trade or board of customs at the various ports acting as registrars.

The royal naval volunteer reserve is organized under local, geographical divisions, and is administered under the admiral commanding reserves (assisted and advised by a royal naval volunteer reserve advisory committee consisting of the commanding officers of the various divisions).

The chief duties of the admiral commanding reserves are—

(1) Command and administration of the royal naval reserve and royal naval volunteer reserve.

(2) Administration of shore wireless telegraph and signal stations and general technical supervision of the W/T equipment, machinery, and plant at the stations.

(3) Arrangements for signalling instruction to officers and men of the mercantile marine.

(4) Administration of the sea cadet corps (juvenile organization).

The control of the fleet air arm is a joint responsibility of the Admiralty and Air Ministry. The Admiralty, and under the Admiralty the commanders in chief, have operational control of the fleet air arm when embarked, and the Admiralty also states technical requirements to the Air Ministry. The Air Ministry provides the matériel to meet Admiralty requirements, and carries out the initial training of personnel.

There are, in addition to the fleet air arm, some flights (shore based) termed "coastal reconnaissance," or "naval cooperation flights," which are manned and administered entirely by the Royal Air Force, and the control of which in war would be regarded as a matter for cooperation between the Admiralty and Air Ministry.

The naval air section of the naval staff maintains a close liasion with the Air Ministry on all matters affecting the fleet air arm, and the matériel departments of the Admiralty and Air Ministry cooperate similarly on all questions of joint interest. This liasion is assisted by the employment of naval officers in the Air Ministry (at present, one captain and three commanders, Royal Navy) who are lent for service on the air staff and in the technical departments. Admiralty and Air Ministry representatives together form the "joint technical committee on aviation arrangements in His Majesty's ships" and the "advisory committee on aircraft for the fleet air arm." The Admiralty also sends a representative to the "standing interdepartmental committee on engines" and the "aeronautical research committee."

Seventy per cent of the pilots and all observers of the fleet air arm are naval (or marine) officers: 30 per cent of the pilots are Royal Air Force officers. At present the senior positions (headquarters staff) of the fleet air arm afloat are filled by Royal Air Force officers, but naval officers will eventually fill 70 per cent of these posts. The ratings are partly Royal Navy and partly Royal Air Force. Broadly, the skilled technical personnel are Royal Air Force and the unskilled, Royal Navy, but certain skilled naval ratings are employed, such as telegraphist air gunners, torpedomen, and carpenter boatbuilders.

The shore bases where personnel are trained, and where fleet air arm flights are periodically disembarked, are at present manned entirely by Royal Air Force, but eventually some arranged proportion of the senior posts (squadron leaders and above) will be filled by naval officers.

Air force personnel serving on ships of the Royal Navy are under the command and administration of the naval authorities afloat; they are subject to the naval discipline act and all laws and rules for the government and discipline of the personnel of the navy.

(*d*) *Committee of imperial defense.*—This committee is a standing body, founded in 1904 by Lord Balfour, when Prime Minister, for the consideration of questions bearing on the wide problem of imperial defense, the object being to create a machinery for bringing together and coordinating the views and requirements of the different departments concerned with the problem. It is for all practical purposes a committee of the cabinet with some experts added, which is presided over by the Prime Minister or in his absence by a minister representing him. The service departments are represented on the committee by the cabinet minister in charge and in addition by the senior service member of the board or council. The committee of imperial defense functions mainly, as will be readily understood, through subcommittees consisting of representatives nominated by the departments concerned, and its work is advisory, resulting in recommendations for the decision of the cabinet.

The membership of the committee is not fixed, the additional members being selected by the Prime Minister and being at present usually the following, though others are invited to attend when questions under discussion require their advice:

The lord president of the council.
The lord privy seal.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Secretary of State for War.
The Secretary of State for India.
The First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Secretary of State for Air.
The chiefs of staffs of the three fighting services.
The permanent Secretary of the Treasury.

The three most important subcommittees are (1) the committee of chiefs of staffs, for consideration of all major strategical questions and advice on all defense and military problems from the coordinated angles of sea, land, and air warfare; (2) the man-power committee, which deals with the organization of the man power of the nation for war; and (3) the principal supply officers' committee for consideration and coordination of all supply questions involved in the prosecution of modern warfare. The three services are represented on these subcommittees and on other less important ones as appropriate.

Thus the committee of imperial defense may be likened to a super war board, with the Prime Minister as president and with the three above-mentioned subcommittees corresponding to the members of the board or council of one of the service departments who are charged with, respectively, professional, personnel, and supply matters.

Though not a part of the organization of the committee of imperial defense, the recently created imperial defense college is designed to train a body of officers of the three services and of civilians from other departments of the Government in the broad questions of imperial strategy. It is contemplated that the chiefs of staff committee may ask consideration by the college of current problems of imperial defense. The first course of the imperial defense college started in January, 1927, and it is heralded as a marked step ahead in the coordination of the "fighting forces."

III. ORGANIZATION OF ADMIRALTY.

(*a*) *General comment and chart.*—It has been seen that, by royal letters patent, eight individuals are appointed lords commissioners for executing the office of the Lord High Admiral, and that one of these, designated the First Lord of the Admiralty, is charged by an order in council with distribution of duties among the others and the parliamentary and permanent secretaries and with responsibility for all Admiralty business. The other seven lords commissioners are:

The first sea lord and chief of naval staff.
The deputy chief of naval staff.

The assistant chief of naval staff.
The second sea lord and chief of naval personnel.
The third sea lord and controller.
The fourth sea lord and chief of supplies.
The civil lord.

These, together with the parliamentary and permanent secretaries, constitute the Board of Admiralty, which thus is seen to consist of eight lords commissioners as members and two secretaries having the status of members. Any two of the lords commissioners are legally empowered to sign as for the board; thus, for example, commissions of officers of the Royal Navy are signed by two of their lordships and countersigned by the permanent secretary, who is the mouthpiece of the board.

Except in certain aspects of the operational functions of the first sea lord, an individual lord commissioner has legally no real executive power as such, the Board of Admiralty being the one authority controlling all the rest of the organization. Each lord commissioner, however, is recognized by the board as a whole as having special cognizance over certain subjects, which are generally indicated in the various titles assigned to them, and in practice does cause orders on subjects within his province to be issued on his own responsibility though in the name of the board. The "controller of the navy" used to be a separate office, handling all matériel matters, which now come under the third sea lord and controller. The civil lord is specially charged with matters concerning public works and labor. Consistent with the principle of having a civilian as First Lord of the Admiralty, the parliamentary secretary, also a civilian and nominated by the Prime Minister, has come to be considered as having at least the veto power of the first lord in his absence, over proposals held by him to be contrary to the wishes of the people as represented in the House of Commons. The first sea lord, however, presides over the board in the absence of the first lord, and in all other respects is considered next in authority in the Admiralty after the first lord. The civil lord and the permanent secretary are also civilians, the former a political appointee of the Prime Minister, and the latter a civil-service officer of very lengthy Admiralty experience who continues on in spite of changes of Government.

The general organization of the Admiralty is shown on the accompanying chart, though it must be realized that there are many overlapping duties and that it is impossible to depict graphically a completely correct representation of this particular form of organization, especially as regards the duties and interrelations of the secretary's department. Many of the departments have activities under more than one member of the board, the chart attempting to show by their positions merely their paramount functions. In the case of three of them, a notation to the effect that they fall also under another member of the board is made, for in these cases the decision where they should be placed is particularly debatable. A brief résumé of the duties of the members of the board is shown on the chart, from which the reasons for the grouping under them of the various divisions and departments are obvious from the titles of the latter.

For greater clearness, however, the distribution of business among the Board of Admiralty is set forth below in more detail.

First lord

General direction and supervision of all business relating to the navy; political and board questions.

Scheme of Admiralty organization and distribution of work.

Promotions and removals from the service of naval and marine officers; honors and rewards.

Royal yacht, including appointment of all officers.

Appointment of flag officers and officers in command, including engineer vice and rear admirals, surgeon vice and rear admirals, paymaster read admirals, and staff appointments of royal marines.

Chaplain of the fleet, appointment of, and entry of naval chaplains and instructors.

Appointments of naval and marine officers to Admiralty departments (of and above rank of captain, Royal Navy, or to posts of assistant director and above).

Civil appointments and promotions (higher posts).

Naval cadetships and nominations to paymaster cadetships, Royal Navy.

First sea lord and chief of naval staff

All large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare. Organization and distribution, and fighting and seagoing efficiency of the fleet.

Advice as to, and general direction of, operations of war.

Internal organization and general direction of the work of the naval staff, and the cooperation of the naval staff with the matériel side of the Admiralty.

(To be kept informed of all important matters by the deputy chief of naval staff and assistant chief of naval staff.

Deputy chief of naval staff

Naval intelligence—its collection and utilization for naval operations.

All operations and movements of His Majesty's ships and cooperating aircraft, including auxiliary craft.

Consideration of strategic policy and plans relating to such operations.

Distribution of the fleet as affecting operations and movements.

Dates of refits and repairs in conjunction with controller.

Strategic aspects of land and wireless telegraphy.

Policy in relation to sea-borne trade and maritime transport.

Maritime international law.

Superintendence of hydrographic department, and of naval intelligence, operations, plans, and trade divisions of naval staff.

Assistant chief of naval staff.

Methods of fighting at sea generally. Tactical investigation.

Principles of training of the navy in combatant and staff duties.

Requirements of design of vessels and matériel in relation to policy and tactics.

Signaling in connection with tactics and weapons.

Fleet practices—coordination and standardization of methods.

Staff questions dealing with research and experiment.

Air development in relation to naval warfare.

Superintendence of training and staff duties, gunnery and torpedo divisions, and tactical and naval air sections of naval staff.

Second sea lord and chief of naval personnel

Recruiting and manning of the fleet; training of the fleet, in accordance with principles approved by the chief of naval staff; administrative arrangements connected with barracks, training, and educational establishments.

Complements.

Mobilization and other regulations for the personnel; and superintendence of mobilization department.

Service and appointments of officers of all branches (except as reserved to first lord).

Royal marines.

Reserve forces.

Hospitals.

Discipline.

NOTES.—(1) The chief of naval staff will be consulted by the second sea lord in regard to appointments to the Admiralty naval staff divisions and war staff appointments afloat and ashore.

(2) The proceedings of courts-martial will come specially under the review of the second sea lord and will be referred to other members of the board as necessary.

Third sea lord and controller

Provision (so as to meet the requirements of chief of naval staff) of matériel for the fleet, including ships and their machinery, armor, guns and gun mountings, torpedoes, mines, etc., and their respective appliances and stores; also docking facilities.

Design, manufacture, inspection, repair, and maintenance of, and alterations and additions to, such matériel.

Order of priority of work upon ships and matériel for naval service, including both new construction and repairs and alterations, on general lines laid down by chief of naval staff.

Selection of vessels for service as armed merchant cruisers or for fleet purposes, in accordance with the requirements of chief of naval staff; alteration and preparation of vessels for such service, and their subsequent maintenance and reconditioning.

Inventions relating to ships and other matériel, as above; questions as to their suitability and applicability to the naval service.

Supervision of general arrangements in regard to organization of scientific research.

Fleet issues of ordnance, torpedo, mining, etc., stores.

Administration of the dockyards, including provision of dockyard plant (except as dealt with by the civil lord).

Superintendence of departments of director of naval construction, engineer in chief, director of dockyards, director of naval ordnance, director of torpedoes and mining, director of naval equipment, director of signal department, director of electrical engineering, director of scientific research, and director of compass department.

Fourth sea lord and chief of supplies

Superintendence of naval store, fleet coaling, medical store, and victualing services.

Transport service, including hired auxiliary vessels for the supply services; passages.

Full and half pay; allowances and compensations, including table money, prize questions, pilotage and surveying pay, and all extra payments; debts of officers and men; naval and marine pensions; Greenwich hospital pensions (see note); widows' pensions; character, conduct, and badge questions; naval savings bank.

Medals; uniform regulations.

Naval detention quarters; rewards for apprehensions of deserters; removals of marks of desertion.

General salvage money questions and money claims for salvage of naval stores.

Collisions between His Majesty's ships and private vessels, etc.

NOTE.—Naval and Greenwich hospital pensions (officers') are to be referred to the first lord as well as to the fourth sea lord.

Civil lord

Superintendence of all works services.

Staff of civil establishments (except as reserved to first lord), including classification, appointment, promotion, pay, allowances, and pensions.

General labor questions.

Greenwich hospital business, including appointments (except naval chaplains to livings, superintendent of the Royal Hospital School, curator of the painted hall, and appointments to Greenwich hospital pensions).

Charitable fund, compassionate allowances, subscriptions, etc., and allowances to ministers of religion and grants in aid of churches and schools.

Marine and dockyard schools.

Special questions affecting retirement and pay of naval and marine officers and men, when discretionary power is specifically provided for by order in council.

NOTES.—(1) The civil lord, when a member of the House of Lords, will answer in that house for all naval and Admiralty matters, and is accordingly to be kept in touch with questions of general policy or of importance.

(2) Works questions of an important character, or if likely to affect questions dealt with by the parliamentary secretary, will be referred to the latter also.

(3) The civil lord will keep in close touch with the parliamentary secretary in regard to the parliamentary aspect of labor questions.

Parliamentary and financial secretary

All questions relating to finance, expenditure estimates, and accounts of sufficient importance to require his decision; and all important financial questions requiring reference to the treasury. (See note.)

Acts as chairman of the finance committee.

NOTE.—Proposals involving expenditure will normally be dealt with by the permanent secretary and the appropriate superintending lord, whose approval will be sufficient authority for incurring expenditure. Where the matter is of sufficient importance, or where the superintending lord so desires, reference to the parliamentary secretary will be arranged by the permanent secretary.

In dealing with Admiralty contract business the parliamentary secretary or the permanent secretary will keep in close touch with the controller on all important contract matters affecting production of material for which the controller is responsible.

Permanent secretary

Financial control subject to the final responsibility of the parliamentary and financial secretary, the first lord, and the board.

Accounting officer for navy votes and responsible for navy appropriation account.

General control of all the civilian departments and staff of the Admiralty, including their organization, economical methods, and discipline.

Admiralty procedure.

Recommendations for appointments and promotions in the Admiralty office.

Correspondence.

Communications with foreign naval attachés.

Communications with ministers of religion (other than Church of England).

NOTE.—Routine papers, as defined below, will be disposed of by the permanent secretary: (*a*) Such as require intermediate action or reference to render them sufficiently complete for decision by the board; (*b*) such as do not involve some new principle, establish a precedent, or occasion expense not provided for under existing regulations; (*c*) such as do not involve any point of discipline or affect the movements of or orders to a ship.

It is to be understood that in any matter of great importance the first sea lord is always to be consulted by the other lords and the parliamentary and permanent secretaries; but each lord and the parliamentary and permanent secretaries will communicate direct with the first lord.

Board business

The first lord will decide what business shall come before the board as a whole, and if a member of the board desires to have any matter brought forward he will refer it to the first lord for entry, subject to his approval, on the agenda.

The object of the weekly board meetings is to insure as far as possible that not only all large questions of Admiralty policy, but also all matters of general interest, especially those having an important bearing on the traditions, privileges, and well-being of the naval service, come before the board as a whole. Members of the board shall therefore regard it as a matter of duty to propose all such questions for entry on the agenda, such duty resting primarily on the member within whose sphere the question comes; but, in case of his omission to do so, on any member of the board after giving notice to the former of his intention.

It is not intended, however, that questions (except in special circumstances to be judged by the first lord) should be brought before the board until they have been circulated to and reported upon by the proper financial and administrative officers, and have been considered and minuted by the members of the board concerned. A member of the board dealing with any subject which he thinks to be a proper one to come before the board as a whole should not divert the papers from their ordinary course, but should add the suggestion to his minute thereon, and the first lord, when the papers reach him, will, if he concurs, arrange for the subject to be placed upon the board agenda.

Any question involving financial considerations shall be considered by the Admiralty finance committee before it comes to the board as a whole, and the report of the finance committee shall be circulated for the assistance of the board in dealing with the question.

To assist members of the board in keeping in touch with the work of the Admiralty generally, a weekly list of the more important questions initiated within the department, or from the fleet or from other departments, and a weekly summary of matters of naval interest, will be circulated. A list of the more important day-to-day decisions given by members of the board will also be circulated weekly, and will be brought up at the weekly meeting of the board.

In accordance with standing orders, the following matters are always to be brought before the board:

Navy estimates.

Shipbuilding programs.

Designs for new ships and alterations in weights of ships.

Alterations in the general regulations and all important orders of a legislative character.

Captains, Royal Navy; selections for acting flag rank.

Captains, Royal Navy; engineer captains, Royal Navy, and surgeon captains, Royal Navy; questions of compulsory retirement on promotion to rear admiral, engineer rear admiral, and surgeon rear admiral.

All naval officers; dismissals or discharges; retirement when unfit for or unworthy of further employment; resignations; restorations and refusal of restoration; decision as to nonemployment; alterations in record of dates of birth.

(*b*) *Naval staff.*—The naval staff is the branch of the Admiralty which is specially organized to deal with questions of strategy, tactics, naval operations, and naval intelligence, and to watch and advise upon the development of naval material, and naval training and fleet practices to meet war requirements.

The divisions of the naval staff are shown on the chart, where effort was made to show, however, that the hydrographic department, with its subdepartment under the director of navigation, is not a part of the naval staff, but is a separate department, which, owing to its close connection with certain divisions of the naval staff, is placed, for convenience, under the same "superintending lord" with them.

As the first sea lord is responsible for the fighting and seagoing efficiency of the fleet, all large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare, and the general direction of war operations, he must necessarily be the head of this special organization, and therefore he has the title of "chief of the naval staff." But in order to leave him free to devote himself to the widest and most important aspects of the work of the naval staff, the direct superintendence of its divisions and sections is assigned to the deputy chief and assistant chief of naval staff.

As far as possible, the functions of the naval staff have been arranged so as to make is responsible for expert advice, but not for carrying out the administrative and executive action arising out of the decisions reached.

Under order in council of October 31, 1921, the first sea lord as chief of naval staff is responsible to the first lord for the "issue of orders to the fleet affecting war operations and the movement of ships, which orders may be issued in his own name in his capacity of chief of naval staff."

The responsibility for these orders is not board responsibility unless the question at issue is referred to the board, as unless operation orders result from board decision, the responsibility of issuing them remains, under order in council, on the shoulders of the chief of naval staff and of the first lord. The procedure already described is, however, designed to insure that important operational matters shall be brought before the full board whenever the circumstances admit of this.

The deputy chief of naval staff will, in the name of the chief of naval staff and on his responsibility, issue operation orders, but only in accordance with the responsibility delegated or the instructions given to him from time to time by the chief of naval staff, and subject always to the reference of important matters to him.

In the absence of the chief of naval staff, the responsibility for operations falls automatically on the deputy chief of naval staff, who is necessarily in close and constant communication with the chief of naval staff. Should, however, a question arise which, in the opinion of the deputy chief of naval staff, is of such gravity as to require consultation with other members of the board, he should in the absence of the chief of naval staff, consult with the first lord and the second sea lord.

As the first lord is ultimately responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, it is necessary that he should be kept fully in touch with operational matters by the chief of naval staff, or any officer acting for the latter in his absence.

The superintendence of the seven divisions and two sections of the staff (as shown on the chart) is assigned to the deputy chief of naval staff and the assistant chief of naval staff in the sense that each director or head is responsible to one of these superintending lords for the work of his division or section as a whole. This does not, however, preclude the chief of naval staff from dealing direct with a division or section if necessary, nor the deputy chief of naval staff and assistant chief of naval staff from dealing direct with those not under their immediate superintendence, and divisions and sections are enjoined to refer freely to others, where the matter in hand requires such consultation. Staff meetings, attended by all directors of divisions and heads of sections under the presidency of one of the superintending lords are held periodically. Close touch with the plans division must be maintained by all others so that action taken by them may be consonant with approved plans for possible hostilities or for future types of ships and material, and with the naval intelligence division to insure that they are in possession of the latest intelligence bearing on the matter in hand.

Directors of divisions and heads of sections are authorized to act without further approval of superintending lords in cases where the principle has already been approved, but it is their duty to keep the superintending lords informed as necessary of such action taken by them. The deputy director of each division will perform such specific duties as are allotted to him by the director, but is to keep himself sufficiently conversant with the whole work of the division to replace the director in his absence. Where the expansion of the staff on the outbreak of war would involve the enlargement of one division into two separate divisions, the deputy director would, naturally, assume the position of director of one of them, and his duties should be arranged accordingly. The director of training and staff duties should always be consulted if any intended change in the internal organization of any division affects relations with other divisions or departments of the Admiralty.

The functions and activities of the various divisions and sections of the naval staff will be apparent from the following outlines:

Under the deputy chief of naval staff

Naval intelligence divisions.—Collection of naval intelligence.

Distribution of intelligence to the fleet and to all naval establishments.

Information as to the movements of British and foreign ships (movements section).

Supervision of naval attachés.

Censorship, aliens, passports, safe conducts, suspected persons, prisoners of war.

Regulation of confidential books.

Plans division.—Methods of naval warefare in general in so far as they affect policy and strategy.

General plans for future wars.

Defense of harbors and bases; instructions for entry into defended ports.

Types and numbers of ships; quantity and distribution of material affecting the above.

Plans of fleet maneuvers.

Strategical cooperation with the army and air force.

Plans division will be kept entirely free from all executive and routine work.

Operation division.—Operations, movements, and distribution of the fleet; preparation of orders dealing therewith, and issue of such orders, other than those dispatched by letter.

Patrol and mine-sweeping forces; fishing fleets.

Preparation of detailed plans for operations.

Letters of proceedings from commanders in chief and His Majesty's ships.

Advice on all questions which affect operations, movements, and distribution of the fleet.

Mine warnings.

Keeps movements section informed of distribution and movements of British forces.

Trade division.—Trade division is the connecting link with the mercantile marine and the economic departments of the Government.

Defense of British trade, which includes: Convoy, diversion of shipping, routing and war instructions to mercantile marine, information in regard to British shipping; defensive equipment of British merchant vessels and provision and training of personnel therefor.

Attack on trade, which includes: Blockade, contraband, and control of trade, enemy and neutral;

Questions of foreign policy, international law, and treaties, so far as they relate to above prizes and prize court matters.

Under the assistant chief of naval staff

Gunnery division.—Gunnery and chemical warfare policy.

Coordination and standarization in the methods of using weapons connected with the above and training in such weapons.

Advice in material in connection with above so far as tactical requirements and policy are concerned.

Scrutiny of reports of gunnery practices, and advice on coordination of such practices.

Air cooperation in gunnery matters.

Recommendations regarding type and allocation of targets.

Torpedo division.—Torpedo, mining, antimining, and antisubmarine policy.

Coordination and standardization in the methods of using weapons connected with the above, and training in such weapons.

Advice on material in connection with the above so far as tactical requirements and policy are concerned.

Scrutiny of reports of torpedo, mining and antimining practices, and advice on coordination of such practices.

Air cooperation in torpedo, mining, antimining, and antisubmarine matters.

Advice on the tactical requirements of coastal motor boats, distant control boats, and torpedo planes.

Training and staff duties division.—Organization of staffs ashore and afloat.

Coordination between the naval staff and other Admiralty departments.

Recommendations of officers for appointment to staffs.

Staff course and senior officers' courses.

Principles governing entry and training of officers and men.

Coordination of training.

Compilation of manuals dealing with strategical principles or staff training.

Coordination of all training manuals.

Preparation of historical monographs.

Tactical section.—Tactical problems and signaling in connection therewith, and with fighting instructions.

Compilation of tactical manuals.

Air section.—Air questions realting to naval warfare.

Coordination of all air matters dealt with by the naval staff.

Provides information on air matters required by any branch of the naval staff.

It is important to note the relationship of the naval staff to the matériel departments of the Admiralty. This may be summed up in the statement that it is the function of the naval staff to advise what matériel the navy requires and it is the function of the matériel departments to supply it. The naval staff divisions keep close touch with the technical and supply departments in order that, on the one hand, policy recommended may be compatible with material development, and that, on the other hand, the direction of development may be guided by the requirements of policy.

In practice, therefore, the qualities to be embodied in a new ship (guns, etc.) would be decided upon as a result of close collaboration between officers of the naval staff having tactical requirements, etc., uppermost in their minds, and officers of the matériel departments able to advise upon the means of fulfilling these requirements, and this process of collaboration between the two points of view would be carried up ultimately to the level of the members of the board concerned.

The naval staff having thus defined the requirements of the navy, the business of fulfilling them (involving the various stages of *design*—possibly preceded by *research* and *experiment*—*financial provision*, *contract*, *production*, and *supply*) would be carried out by the matériel and administrative branches of the Admiralty, reference being made to the naval staff only in case of doubt whether requirements were being met in every respect.

Similarly in regard to fundamental research, the naval staff settles the priority to be assigned to the various subjects, but having done so, is not concerned with carrying the program into effect or with obtaining results, the responsibility for which rests, under the controller, with the matériel departments in consultation with the director of scientific research.

The naval staff bears also somewhat the same relation to the personnel departments of the Admiralty, keeping in close touch with them to coordinate policy with personnel factors.

(*c*) *Admiralty departments.*—As will be seen from the chart, there are a great number of subdivisions of the organization outside of the naval staff that are generally designated as departments, each under a head whose title indicates the general scope of the duties for which he is responsible. Most of these departmental heads are officers, but a considerable number are civilians, and there is a far greater proportion of civilians in this part of the Admiralty than in the naval staff.

As regards the more technical of the personnel and matériel departments, the character of their duties places them quite naturally under one or other of the superintending lords for personnel, for matériel, for stores and transport, or for works and labor, and detailed description of their several activities is unnecessary. It is, however, pertinent to note that the judge advocate of the fleet, a civilian, has no real department as such, passing only upon the legal aspects of courts-martial, etc., which are very few, in the British Navy, because of the very extensive authority given to commanding officers for summary punishments without recourse to legal proceedings. International law, contract law, and other miscellaneous legal matters are handled elsewhere in the Admiralty or by the legal branches of other Government departments upon request.

It is also to be noted that the director of sea transport shown under the fourth sea lord is the civilian head of the sea transport department of the mercantile marine department, Board of Trade. In time of war this department would come under Admiralty control, and consequently in time of peace very close liaison is maintained with it, and Admiralty advice and requirements are freely given. Transportation of personnel or stores by commercial vessels is also arranged through this medium and officers of the navy are assigned as transport officers at Southampton and a few important foreign ports.

The financial and accountant functions of the Admiralty are very complicated, impossible to indicate graphically, and difficult to describe. The parliamentary and financial secretary and the permanent secretary are both greatly involved in these affairs, and the relationship between them is, as indicated on the chart, very intimate. The dealings of the Admiralty with the Chancellor of the Exchequer are very numerous, particularly in the preparation of the annual naval estimates, and the two secretaries must advise the board on a great number of financial matters. The entire accounting system of the navy and the naval establishment is of itself a huge task.

The four branches of the secretary's department shown on the chart are organized to deal with matters as indicated that fall in an executive sense under the cognizance of the second sea lord, fourth sea lord, assistant chief of naval staff, and third sea lord, respectively (from left to right), and are the connecting links between the permanent secretary and these officials. This department is a vast clearing house for Admiralty business, and there is practically none of it with which the permanent secretary or his subordinates are not in some way involved. It is the great coordinating center for the Admiralty and is responsible that all matters shall be considered by all who have any concern therein before board action is taken, and also that all information shall be properly disseminated to all concerned. The importance of this department and the influence it has come to exercise are noteworthy in any study of the Admiralty organization as a whole.

The finance committee, of which the parliamentary and financial secretary is chairman, is a very important body. It is purely advisory and has no executive authority whatever, but great weight is always attached to its reports.

IV. ADMINISTRATION OF NAVY.

(*a*) *General.*—The Board of Admiralty is the supreme authority for administering the navy. The "board patent" gives the lords commissioners power to issue orders to the navy, to make and revoke appointments of officers of the navy, to fix (with the consent of the treasury) the pay of the navy, and generally to administer the affairs of the navy.

The commissions issued to naval officers by the Board of Admiralty require them to obey orders received from the board or from their superior officer in the service.

The naval discipline act makes the Board of Admiralty the source of the discipline of the navy, as under it no officer can order a court-martial unless he holds a warrant from the Admiralty authorizing him to do so, and the Admiralty are empowered to settle the procedure of courts-martial (subject to approval by an order in council on a report of the judicial committee of the privy council), to review and modify or annul sentences of courts-martial, and to regulate the powers of summary punishment belonging to commanding officers.

The Board of Admiralty exercises its control by means of—

(1) Standing regulations for the government of His Majesty's naval service ("The King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions"), which are binding on all persons belonging to the navy, and the changes in which are formally approved from time to time by order in council.

(2) Various books of instructions, dealing with the performance of different naval duties in detail.

(3) Temporary orders ("Admiralty fleet orders"), which are issued weekly in printed numerical series to the whole service, in the name of the board and over the secretary's signature; these orders may affect the whole service or specified parts of it only and may be of purely temporary significance, or be permanent orders which are subsequently incorporated in (1) or (2).

(4) By special orders to individual naval authorities, which may be conveyed by letter, in the name of the board and signed by the secretary, by telegram or by wireless telegram.

The individual naval authorities through whom the Board of Admiralty exercises its control are, in the more important cases the commanders in chief of the three home ports; the rear admiral and commanding officer, coast of Scotland; the commanders in chief of the active fleets; the vice admiral commanding, reserve fleet.

Each of these authorities, in his turn, would convert the Admiralty order into a command to such authorities under him as may be affected (flag officers commanding squadrons, commanding officers of individual ships or fleet establishments, admirals, superintendents, commodores, or captains in charge of dockyards, etc.). In order to save time and clerical labor in the fleet, however, the Admiralty in many cases sends a copy of the order direct to the inferior naval authority, the inferior treating the communication so received as if it had come through the channel of the superior authority.

The "chain of command" and the "channels of communication" for administering both the fleet and the shore establishments may be considered as emanating directly from the Board of Admiralty (subject to an exception in operational matters noted later), passing through the permanent secretary's department for promulgation to commanders in chief and other senior officials, and being distributed as necessary by them for execution.

(*b*) *Fleets.*—The Atlantic and the Mediterranean are the two principal fleets at present, the bulk of the rest of the vessels in full commission being attached to the American and West Indies, the China, the East Indies, and the African stations. There are also special forces, such as the auxiliary patrol, antisubmarine force, and submarine flotillas not regularly attached to the Atlantic Fleet, which are in most respects separate commands. The reserve fleet comprises all vessels in reduced commission that are kept in a certain degree of readiness for service. The commanders in chief of these fleets and stations and the commanders of the other organization mentioned are the agencies through whom Admiralty control is exercised.

Questions of distribution, operations, and training of the fleet are the function of the naval staff, which advises the Board of Admiralty on these matters. When a board decision on such matters is reached, it normally rests with the permanent secretary's "military branch," which fulfills the purpose of a naval staff secretariat, to draft the orders, to ascertain that they meet the requirements of the naval staff, to issue them when finally approved, and to see that all departmental and other authorities affected are informed.

But this distribution of functions is interpreted in a commonsense manner and does not hinder the naval staff from proposing, when it appears necessary to do so, the precise form in which, for example, sailing orders for a fleet or ship, should go out over the secretary's signature, or from drafting telegraphic or W/T orders for approval and dispatch. In fact, the procedure may be and is shortened in appropriate cases, even up to the point at which a single member of the board takes the responsibility of giving the decision on behalf of the board, and himself drafts the orders for issue by telegraph or W/T. Moreover, as before indicated, a definite legal exception to the ordinary official procedure whereby the chief of naval staff is empowered to issue orders in his own name affecting war operations and the movement of ships is authorized. This power which is not often used, was given in order that the first sea lord might be able to issue urgent and important operational orders in such a way as not to throw a collective responsibilty upon the whole board, when circumstances had not permitted any opportunity of consulting the board about them.

The several commanders in chief afloat are entirely independent of one another, and are responsible directly to the Admiralty. The flag officers commanding squadrons which are part of the larger fleets are under the orders of the commander in chief of the station or fleet in which they are serving; each control the detailed administration of his squadron within limits prescribed from time to time by the commander in chief.

The reserve fleet is likewise independent of the other fleets and the vice admiral commanding is only responsible to the Admiralty.

When two commanders in chief are in company, the senior is in command, but would not interfere with the administration of the vessels commanded by the other.

A rear admiral, known as the rear admiral (S), is appointed to the command of the submarine training school and the submarine training establishments. As regards this part of his duty, he is under the general command of the commander in chief, Portsmouth, through whom Admiralty orders would pass. The rear admiral (S) is also responsible for the coordination of all questions relating to the personnel serving in submarines and their training, and is adviser to the Admiralty and to commanders in chief on all questions relating to submarines. For this purpose he is authorized to visit submarine flotillas of the fleet by arrangement with the flag officer commanding, and to receive reports from them, and is also placed in direct touch with the Admiralty, official Admiralty files being referred to him for report as if he were the head of an Admiralty department. Submarine flotillas based on the home ports also come under his direction.

The antisubmarine forces are under the control of the captain A/S. This officer comes under the commander in chief, Portsmouth, for administrative purposes, and is directly responsible to departments of the Admiralty for advising on technical questions, research, etc., in the same way as is the rear admiral (S) in regard to submarine matters.

The auxiliary patrol comprises the fishery protection cruisers and gunboats and the mine-sweeping flotilla, all of which are under the command of the captain, auxiliary patrol. The captain A/P is under the orders of the commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, for general purposes, but communicates directly with the Admiralty on questions relating to fishery protection or mine sweeping.

The "emergency destroyers," two of which are kept in readiness at each home port and at Rosyth, are under the direct control of the commanders in chief of the three home ports and the rear admiral and commanding officer, coast of Scotland. Two destroyers for similar purposes are maintained in Irish waters, under the control of the commander in chief, Devonport.

The status of destroyers in ordinary reserve is practically the same as that of other reserve ships. A lower status of "maintenance" reserve has, however, been adopted for a number of destroyers in reserve, which are laid up at Rosyth under conditions intended to minimize deterioration, but are not required to be ready for service at the same period of notice as other reserve ships.

(*c*) *Shore establishments.*—The shore establishments within any one of the three home port commands are all placed under the general authority and control of the commander in chief of that home port, and the Board of Admiralty exercises its control over them by the same means as it exercises its control over the fleet, namely, by the King's regulations, books of instructions, Admiralty fleet orders, and special orders sent by letter, telegram, etc.

As regards the chain of command and channel of communication of orders, however, more decentralization is allowed, the degree differing according to the type of establishment and the nature of the communication.

These establishments may be—

(1) "Fleet establishments," manned by naval officers and men, which are technically ships and which include the royal naval barracks, and most of the training establishments.

(2) "Medical establishments," i. e., naval hospitals, infirmaries, and sick quarters.

(3) "Civil establishments," which are mainly manufacturing and supply establishments, employing civilian industrial labor, such as the dockyards, victualing yards, and naval armament depots.

Establishments under (1) come directly under the commander in chief's authority as if they were ships, and communications to and from the Admiralty relating to them ordinarily pass through the commander in chief. Where, however, such an establishment has specialized duties (as, for instance, the royal naval barracks in regard to the drafting of personnel, or H. M. S. *Excellent* in regard to advice on gunnery matters), arrangements exist enabling communications on matters of detail to pass direct between the establishment and the secretary of the Admiralty, or the department of the Admiralty directly concerned. When, however, an inferior authority, either at the port or at the Admiralty, takes advantage of this short cut, he is always held responsible for bringing to the notice of his superior any matter of importance that emerges from such correspondence.

Establishments coming under (2) are under the commander in chief's general authority, and he is required to inspect and report upon them periodically. But he is enjoined not to interfere with their management unless some special reason exists, in which case a special procedure set forth in King's regulations is to be followed. Normally, communications pass direct between the medical officer in charge and the secretary of the Admiralty or the medical director general.

Regarding the third class of shore establishments at the four important home dockyards (Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, and Sheerness), an admiral superintendent or captain superintendent is appointed to be responsible, as the representative of the commander in chief, for the administration of the dockyard and the victualing, naval armament, naval store and fleet fueling, and works services. In such cases the commander in chief does not interfere with the management of these establishments and services, except under the circumstances and in the manner as mentioned under (2).

At the home ports, however, there is a further decentralization, since the admiral superintendent's responsibility for the victualing and naval armaments establishments, which geographically are separate from the dockyards, is only a coordinating one and not a managerial one. It covers such matters as personnel, labor, the use of materials; harbor craft, and proposals, as to works and machinery, and enables the admiral superintendent to preserve uniformity in the treatment of labor, and to utilize storage space, plant, etc., at the several establishments to the best advantage. In other respects the management of these services devolves upon officers in direct charge of them, namely, the superintendent and victualing store officer, armament supply officer, and mining engineer officer, who, except in regard to the matters coordinated by the admiral superintendent, correspond direct with the head of the Admiralty department responsible to the board for the service concerned, respectively, the director of victualing and the chief superintendent of armament supply (acting for the director of naval ordnance and director of torpedoes and mining). With these exceptions, correspondence relating to the work of the civil establishments at the home ports passes between the admiral (or captain) superintendent and the secretary of the Admiralty or the head of the responsible Admiralty department (the director of dockyards, director of stores, or civil engineer in chief).

At bases abroad, the admiral superintendent, commodore, or captain in charge, as the case may be, exercises a closer supervision over the work of all the civil establishments, including the victualing and armament supply depots, and correspondence relating to them passes through him, being addressed—according to the importance of the matter dealt with—either to the secretary of the Admiralty or the head of the responsible department of the Admiralty.

The limits of the home port commands ashore are as follows:

Coast of Scotland: Scottish border on east coast to Bennane Head on west coast (10 miles north of Loch Ryan).

The Nore: Scottish border on east coast to meridian of 0° 34′ E. on south coast.

Portsmouth: Meridian of 0° 34′ E. on south coast to meridian of 3° W. on south coast.

Devenport: Meridian of 3° W. on south coast to Bennane Head and coast of Ireland. This includes the whole of the North Channel.

No definite sea boundaries between the commands have been laid down.

The commanders in chief at the Nore, Portsmouth, and Devenport and the rear admiral and commanding officer, coast of Scotland, are the chief naval and disciplinary authorities within their respective commands, and have a general responsibility for all naval interests, including defense matters affecting the navy, within these commands, and for acting on behalf of the navy in any situation that arises.

They are independent of each other, each being personally responsible to the Board of Admiralty for his own command. In practice, however, as many questions arise, which have a common bearing, the three commanders in chief are in frequent communication with each other and reports or recommendations made to the Admiralty are often the result of consultation and conference between them.

The relations between the commander in chief of a home port and a seagoing fleet coming within the limits of his station are as follows:

(1) The commander in chief of the home port is empowered to consider all flag officers who are junior to himself and all ships present as under his orders, except such as are actually under the orders of a senior flag officer then present (though such vessels are to be under his control in all matters provided for by the regulations of the port); but he may not interfere with ships arriving or lying at ports within his station but not in sight of his flag, unless specially directed to take them under his orders, and except in some emergency not admitting of reference to the Admiralty, is not to send any ship to sea except those which have been specially placed under his orders.

(2) Any flag officer in command entering the limits of a home port, who is senior to the commander in chief of the port, is not in any way to interfere with the port duties, but is to direct by order or

signal that these duties are to be carried out by the appointed port authorities without reference to him, even should his flag remain flying.

As far as possible the services which the several shore establishments will be required to perform for ships belonging to the seagoing fleets are laid down either by standing regulations (scales of supply of stores, fuel, etc.) or by annual programs (the repair and refitting programs of the dockyards). In regard to the performance of such approved services, the commander in chief of the fleet concerned in important cases, or the commanding officer of the ship concerned in less important cases, deals direct with the establishment concerned. Any important change in fleet requirements, such as an alteration in the program of repairs and refits, the necessity to draw supplies on a large scale from one establishment that would normally have been drawn from another, or to exceed the normal scales of supply, would be the subject of communication between the commander in chief and the Admiralty, who would give the necessary orders to the establishments concerned.

It naturally follows in custom that the commander in chief, Mediterranean, or of a foreign station, exercises a certain degree of control over shore establishments located within the geographical area of his command which is denied to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet as regards the home establishments. This degree of control varies with the distance of the base from home and the resulting difficulties of complete Admiralty control, but is more a practical working arrangement adjusted locally than any recognition of theoretical or legal rights.

V. NAVAL FORCES OF DOMINIONS.

(*a*) *Origin and character.*—From the point of view of Great Britain, the existence and powers of each of the Dominions are derived from an act or acts of the British Parliament laying down a constitution for the Dominion and giving powers to its legislature (such as the British North America acts, Commonwealth of Australia constitution act, New Zealand constitution act, and the South Africa act).

These acts empower the respective Dominion legislatures to legislate for their own good order and defense, and these powers have been used, in the manner and to the extent to which each Dominion has seen fit, to raise naval forces for defense purposes, by acts of their own legislature.

The most developed of these is the Royal Australian Navy, which contains a number of vessels built at the expense of the Commonwealth, and now manned to a large extent by Australian officers and men. Canada has, so far, devoted herself mainly to raising and training personnel for the Royal Canadian Navy and her material has been restricted to what is necessary for training purposes and has been purchased from or lent or given by the Admiralty, though she is now proposing to build two destroyers. New Zealand is also gradually raising a trained naval personnel, but in addition bears the expense of maintenance of the New Zealand division of the Royal Navy on the condition that it is under the control of the Dominion Government and is used for the purpose of giving seagoing training to her naval force. South Africa is at a somewhat earlier stage, training South African naval personnel (mostly as a division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve), under the superintendence of the commander in chief, Africa station, in a few small vessels transferred by the Admiralty.

The establishment of a Royal Indian Navy has been authorized to replace the old Royal Indian Marine, but not much progress has thus far been made in the actual development.

Newfoundland also trained some naval reservists in a training ship loaned by the Admiralty, but this was withdrawn by the Admiralty for economical reasons after the World War, and now little more than the slight training of some voluntary cadet organizations is in progress. Newfoundland has a fine type of seafaring men and is anxious to renew their naval training, if a ship can be supplied.

Great Britain assumed, at least temporarily, the responsibility of the defense by sea of the Irish Free State, under the Irish Free State constitution act of December, 1922, and no naval enterprise is now undertaken in that Dominion.

(*b*) *Relationship to Crown and to Royal Navy.*—The relationship of a Dominion naval force to the Crown is the same, essentially, as that of the Royal Navy to the Crown. However, the line of connection is not through the Admiralty and the Executive Government of Great Britain, but through the Dominion naval authority (namely, in Australia the naval board; in Canada, the minister and department of national defense; in New Zealand, the naval board; and in South Africa, the minister and council of defense) and the Dominion Executive Government.

The relationship of the Admiralty to the Dominion naval forces in peace is purely that of advisor to the Dominion naval authority, the object being to assist the Dominion naval force to develop on similar lines to the Royal Navy. Orders and information communicated to the Royal Navy are, therefore, freely communicated to the Dominion naval authorities, so far as the stages reached in the development of the respective naval forces admit, so that it is at the discretion of these authorities to adopt similar arrangements. The loan of British naval officers and men, when a Dominion naval authority requires their services, is arranged whenever possible, and Dominion naval officers and men are received in British ships and training establishments for training. Arrangements also exist for exchanging ships between the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Navy, to facilitate fleet training and cooperation.

The relationship of the Admiralty to the Dominion naval forces in war would depend, in the cases of the Royal Australian and Royal Canadian Navies, upon the decision of the Dominion concerned at the time. Legal powers exist by which in war these Dominions can place their naval forces at the disposal of the Admiralty and the latter can accept the offer, in which case the Royal Navy and the Dominion naval force become one navy, the Dominion naval authority concerned carrying on its administrative and other duties as the local representative of the Admiralty. In the case of New Zealand the Dominion has provided by law in advance that her naval forces shall be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty in war. In the case of South Africa, that portion of her naval forces which forms a division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve would also pass automatically under the control of the Admiralty in war. Officers of the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, and the New Zealand division shall rank and command with officers of the Royal Navy according to their rank and seniority in these Dominion naval forces.

The position of the new Royal Indian Navy will be substantially the same as that of the Royal Australian or Canadian Navies.

2. *Entry, Training, and Promotion of Officers.*

The following article, prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence, has been compiled after reference to numerous reports, publications, articles, etc.

Method of entry

There are five methods of obtaining commissioned rank in the Royal Navy.

(1) By entry as naval cadet at Dartmouth.

(2) By special entry as naval cadet from the public schools.

(3) By obtaining a commission from the lower deck through the "Mate Scheme."

(4) By obtaining a commission from warrant rank.

(5) By obtaining a commission on the supplementary list. Open to Royal Naval Reserve officers who are selected after one year training in the Royal Navy.

Of these various methods the first two supply the great majority of the officers for the executive and engineering branches; the third system was inaugurated to open an avenue to promotion from the lower deck and will be fully discussed, as in the last few years, and more particularly in the last few months, the operation of this system has been much criticized in the British newspapers and service journals.

An outline and the approximate number of officers obtained through each system follows:

Dartmouth entry.—The normal system of entry of a cadet is through the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. No nomination is required by the candidate, who must be the son of British born or British naturalized parents and must be of pure European descent. Each applicant presents himself before a committee, who interviews each candidate separately. Appointments are made by the First Lord of the Admiralty from candidates recommended by the committee. After obtaining the appointment, the candidate must pass the qualifying mental and physical examination. These examinations are held thrice yearly in January, May, and September. The cadet must be between the ages of $13\frac{1}{3}$ to $13\frac{2}{3}$ years at time of entry. The period of training at the college is $3\frac{2}{3}$ years divided into 11 terms of 4 months each. The parents of the cadet must pay a yearly contribution of £150 toward the cost of training of the cadet (30 per cent of the entries may be given reduced rates of £100, £75, or £40 per annum). In addition to the above, the parent or guardian must pay the personal expenses; i. e., laundry, books, instruments, pocket money, sports, etc., of the cadet. If the cadet withdraws from the college or from the Navy before becoming a sublieutenant, £40 per term must be paid by the guardian. After $3\frac{2}{3}$ years at Dartmouth, the cadet is sent to sea for a further training period of 8 months. During this period instructional hours are allotted as follows: $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours in the forenoon and 2 hours in the afternoon. The subjects are seamanship, navigation, pilotage, gunnery, torpedoes, and engineering. Marks for this period are assigned and entered on the cadet's "junior officer's certificate" as former "service marks."

On the completion of the Dartmouth course, "passing-out" examinations are held and the order for seniority as midshipmen depends upon the result of these examinations. First, second, and third class certificates are given as a result of the "passing-out" examinations, which count afterwards for promotion to the rank of sublieutenant, promotion being accelerated four months for a first-class certificate and two months for a second-class certificate (prior to April, 1927, this was two months for a first-class certificate and one month for a second-class certificate). Eighty per cent of the total multiple on examinations is required for a first-class certificate, 65 per cent for a second-class certificate, and below 65 per cent a third-class certificate.

On completion of training as a cadet the Dartmouth entry is rated midshipman at the age of 17⅔ to 18 years.

Special entry.—Special entry cadets are admitted after examination before civil service commissioners from applicants who hold a certificate from certain designated high standard schools. The requirements as to pure European descent, etc., are the same as for the Dartmouth entry. A candidate may be rejected if in the opinion of the Admiralty he is not in all respects suitable to hold a commission. The candidate must be between the ages of 17½ and 18½ years. He must state his desire for either the executive or engineering branches. Special entry cadets designated for engineering are known as cadets (E). There is no distinction in their training from other special entry cadets. Special entry cadets are not sent to Dartmouth, but are sent to a ship in reserve for 12 months training. At the end of this period passing-out examinations are held and time for accelerated promotion to lieutenant is allowed as for a Dartmouth entry, namely, four months for a first-class certificate, and two months for a second-class certificate. On completion of these examinations, the special entry cadet is rated midshipmen at the age of 18½ to 19½ years—i. e., from 6 months to 18 months older than the Dartmouth entry, and come under the ordinary regulations for all officers.

A limited number of cadets are appointed from the nautical training ships *Conway*, *Worcester*, *General Botha*, and naval college, Pangbourne. These applicants must be between the ages of 16½ to 17½ years. Their system of training follows that of the public-school entry, except that it is one year and four months in length and these cadets are rated midshipmen at the age of 17⅚ to 18⅚ years—i. e., a few months older than the Dartmouth entry.

After becoming midshipmen there is no distinction between the Dartmouth entry and the special entry.

As to the relative numbers through each system at present, about 150 cadets enter annually through Dartmouth and 60 to 70 annually through the special entry. The special-entry system was instituted in 1913. In 1920 it was announced that 15 per year would be taken by special entry, but this has been increased until now about half as many cadets enter through this system as enter through Dartmouth.

As will be noted, the age at which a cadet becomes a midshipman varies within narrow limits, 17⅔ to 19½ years. For each class of entry the age does not vary over one year.

We have now brought all classes of cadets to the rank of midshipmen. All midshipmen of the executive branch and of the engineering branch are trained together. The midshipmen of the engineering branch are ordered to the engineering college at Keyham as soon as their cadet training is finished and undergo a four years' course in engineering. They will be discussed later. The midshipmen of the executive branch are sent to capital ships or cruisers for two years and four months. During this period the primary object is to obtain experience in the duties of officers. This training falls under two heads:

First. Acquiring experience as officers.

Second. Formal instruction.

The midshipmen are given theoretical and practical instruction in: (*a*) Seamanship, (*b*) gunnery, (*c*) torpedo and electricity, (*d*) pilotage, (*e*) engineering, (*f*) theoretical instruction, (*g*) French instruction.

Great stress is laid on seamanship, an examination in which all officers must pass before being rated acting sublieutenant. About two months' instruction in seamanship is allotted to one month in each of the other technical subjects. Practical instruction in each technical subject is carried out for one month. Theoretical instruction proceeds continuously. All midshipmen are required to have two months' engine-room training. At least one hour French instruction weekly is required. The period during which each midshipman performs duty in the various branches, navigation, torpedo, etc., is recorded in his "junior officer's certificate," and at intervals of six months marks in each subject are awarded called "former service marks." These "former service marks" are intended as an expression of the commanding officer's opinion of (*a*) the midshipman's officerlike qualities, such as leadership, ability, and attentiveness to duty, and (*b*) professional knowledge, and are combined with the marks received when taking the courses as sublieutenant to finally determine his date of seniority as lieutenant. The above instruction is designed to allow the midshipman to take the fullest advantage of the courses he will undergo as sublieutenant.

After two years and four months at sea every executive midshipman is examined in seamanship to ascertain if he has sufficient knowledge to perform duties of O. O. D. at sea and to perform the duties of a lieutenant. This examination consists of the following subjects:

	Marks
Rigging, oral	75
Anchor work	100
Rules of the road	75
Officer of the deck	150
Organization	100
General	50
Signal:	
Paper	50
Practical	50
Construction	100
Journal	50
Former service	200
Total	1,000

As a result of the seamanship examination time may be gained for accelerated promotion by the Dartmouth entry as follows: One month for a mark of 85 per cent, two weeks for a mark of 70 per cent.

On qualifying on the above examination, midshipmen are rated acting sublieutenant at the age of 20 years to 20 years and 4 months for the Dartmouth entry, and 20 years and 10 months to 21 years and 10 months for the special entry.

He is then sent to undergo the course for examination in the rank of sublieutenant. The marks made on these courses combined with his marks for former service, together with any time gained on the "passing out" and seamanship examinations, finally determine the date of his seniority as lieutenant.

Courses for acting sublieutenants for confirmation as sublieutenants

(All acting sublieutenants must qualify on all these courses before being confirmed.)

After completion of the two years and four months' cruise as midshipman, the acting sublieutenant goes to Portsmouth for short courses in submarines, physical training, and administrative work. These courses last three weeks. No marks are given in these courses, as they are qualifying courses only. On their completion he goes to the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, where for eight months he receives advanced instruction in mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc., to serve as a ground work for the technical courses which follow—i. e., gunnery, 3 months; torpedo, 1½ months; and navigation, ½ month. At the end of each course there is an examination. The results of these examinations, as before mentioned, finally determine the officer's date of seniority as lieutenant. Thus there are six examinations which (with addition of previous service marks) decide the officer's date of seniority as lieutenant, i. e.—

(1) Passing-out examination.
(2) Seamanship examination.
(3) Examination at end of Greenwich course.
(4) Examination at end of torpedo course.
(5) Examination at end of gunnery course.
(6) Examination at end of navigation course.

For the last five examinations, first, second, or third class certificates are given. A first-class counts 2 marks, a second-class counts 1 mark, and a third-class counts 1 mark. The maximum of five first-class certificates (i. e., 10 marks) entitles a sublieutenant to date his promotion to lieutenant only 13 months from his date of promotion as sublieutenant. If only five third-class certificates are obtained, he is not promoted to lieutenant until 36 months from his date of seniority as sublieutenant. On qualifying on the above examinations, the acting sublieutenant is confirmed as lieutenant, with seniority dated as follows:

Officers who have taken Dartmouth course.—Four to nine months from their date of seniority as acting sublieutenant, depending on time gained on "passing-out" and seamanship examinations (maximum of 5 months).

Officers who entered at age of 17½ years (special entry).—Same date as their date of seniority as acting sublieutenants, antedated by any time gained on "passing-out" examination.

Officers who entered from mercantile marine training establishment.—Five to nine months from their date of seniority as acting sublieutenants depending on time gained in "passing-out" examinations.

The Dartmouth entry and the entry from the mercantile marine training schools date their seniority from four to nine months from their date of seniority as acting sublieutenants, depending for the Dartmouth entry on the amount of time gained on the "passing-out" and seamanship examination (maximum five months) and for the mercantile marine entry on the time gained on "passing-out" examination (maximum four months). The special entry cadet, however, is conformed with the same date of seniority as his date of promotion to acting sublieutenant antedated by any time gained on the "passing-out" examination (maximum four months).

The result of this that the age limits corresponding to date of seniority as sublieutenant is practically the same for all classes of entry; that is, the Dartmouth cadet's date of seniority as sublieutenant is 20 years and 4 months to 21 years and 1 month from date of birth; the mercantile entry from 20 years and 6 months to 21 years and 11 months from date of birth; the special entry from 20 years and 6 months to 21 years and 10 months from date of birth; that is, the "brightest entry" from the public school can be confirmed a sublieutenant when only two months older than the "brightest" graduate of Dartmouth.

Lieutenant.—As before stated, the length of time served as sublieutenant depends solely on the marks made in the examinations on the course undergone while acting sublieutenant, and the seamanship examination, bearing in mind that in four out of five of these examinations the officer's "previous service marks" based on professional knowledge, ability, and attention to duty while a midshipman, have a weight of 20 per cent. Before promotion to lieutenant, a certificate of recommendation from the captain of the ship and a watchkeeping certificate is required. Consequently most lieutenants when promoted date their seniority back at least several months, as they have not spent enough time at sea (on account of the time spent undergoing the various courses) to obtain this certificate.

The date of seniority of a full lieutenant varies, as a result of the marks made on the various examinations and to a slight degree (maximum one year) with his age at entry, from 21 years and 5 months to 24 years and 11 months from date of birth.

These ages are as follows:

Special entry	21 years 7 months to 24 years 10 months.
Special entry (mercantile marine)	21 years 7 months to 24 years 11 months.
Dartmouth entry	21 years 5 months to 24 years 1 month.

To be the youngest age the lieutenant must have been both the youngest at entry and made the maximum on all examinations. To be the oldest he must have been the oldest of his entry and made the minimum on examinations. An examination of the navy list shows that out of the classes 388 midshipmen, approximately 33 per cent, gained the maximum time, and 30 per cent half the maximum time, the remainder gained no time.

An examination of the navy list shows that practically none of the sublieutenants, either acting or confirmed, have failed to take at least one second-class certificate.

It should be remarked that the normal officers seniority is not fixed until he becomes a lieutenant and is then fixed mainly by the courses he undergoes as an acting sublieutenant combined with his " previous service " marks. This seniority he retains until he becomes a commander.

Training as lieutenant.—After completing one year at sea in the rank of lieutenant, an officer may volunteer to specialize in gunnery, torpedo, navigation, signals, physical training, antisubmarine work, and surveying. Officers are accepted for the fleet air arm and for the submarine service while still lieutenants. The best time to specialize is between two and five years seniority. Officers selected to qualify in gunnery or torpedo undergo a preliminary course at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, lasting approximately six months. On completion of this course they proceed to the gunnery or torpedo school at Portsmouth for a practical course lasting about 10 months more. A final examination is held on completion of these examinations and a first-class certificate is awarded for a multiple of 80 per cent and a second-class certificate is awarded for a multiple of 65 per cent. Officers who qualify are thereafter denoted in the navy list by a (G) or (T) after their names.

An officer desiring to qualify in navigation must pass an examination in signals. He is then sent to the navigation school, Portsmouth, for a course of about five months and is then sent to a large ship of the Atlantic or the Mediterranean Fleet, in order that he may gain experience under the navigating officer in the navigating work of a fleet. Every three months during this period a report on his qualifications and general suitability for a navigator is submitted. Upon these reports and the results of the examinations at the navigation school, his permanent appointment for navigating duties depends.

After three years' sea service as lieutenant (N), including sea service as assistant navigator, he must present himself for examination as navigator of first-class ships. Prior to examination he is permitted to attend a five-week course at the navigation school. At the end of the course examinations are held and certificates awarded. An officer who fails to pass at second trial is removed from the list of navigating officers.

The letter (N) is prefixed in the navy list to the names of commanders, lieutenant commanders, and lieutenants who have passed for pilotage of first-class ships for so long as they are employed or available for employment, on navigating duties.

Navigating officers are also granted the facilities for attending the school for a month's course of study at periodic intervals during his subsequent career.

Officers are not required to continue navigating duties unless they so desire after promotion to commander.

Surveying service.—Officers may volunteer to specialize as hydrographic surveyors. Preference is given to lieutenants who have obtained their watch-keeping certificates and who have obtained a first or second class certificate as lieutenant (N). No special training is given. The officer is sent to a surveying ship for at least two and one-half to three years. A limited number are selected for the permanent surveying staff from those who desire to make surveying their specialty. Surveying duty counts up to two years as time necessary to pass for first-class ships. Officers of considerable seniority are not usually appointed and the majority are lieutenants of not more than five years' seniority.

Signals.—The general course to qualify as lieutenants (S) is as follows:

	Weeks
Visual signal course at H. M. Signal School, Portsmouth	18
Electrical course in H. M. S. *Vernon*	2
Wireless telegraph course at signal school	19
	39

The standard required in practical signaling to qualify is very high, being as 96 to 98 per cent of the total marks in semaphore, wigwag, and blinker, and 90 to 95 per cent in radio. To obtain a first-class certificate 90 per cent in the written and oral examinations in visual signals and 85 per cent in the written and oral examinations in radio is required. On qualifying, officers are denoted by letter (S) after their names in navy list.

On completion of the above course of nine and one half months a limited number are selected to take the advanced signal course at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, lasting about six months. Officers qualifying on this course are available for the most important radio jobs at sea and for the experimental staff at the signal school. Officers qualifying on advanced course are entitled to letters (ST).

Antisubmarine.—Officers selected to qualify as (A/S) officers are sent to the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, for a theoretical course lasting six months. (For detailed syllabus, see Admiralty Fleet Orders.)

This is followed by a practical course of 15 weeks at the Antisubmarine School, Portsmouth. The complete course lasts about nine and one-half months.

Certificates are awarded as a result of the practical course only, 80 per cent being required for a first-class certificate and 65 per cent to qualify second-class certificate.

Physical and recreational training.—Officers selected to qualify in physical and recreational training are sent to the physical, recreational, and training school at Portsmouth for a short course of two months, and from these short courses suitable officers are selected to undergo a further course lasting four months (long course).

Officers who make 90 per cent on the long course are awarded first-class certificates; 70 per cent is required to qualify.

Submarine officers.—Submarine officers are appointed for training and service in submarines as required, preference being given to officers who volunteer and are recommended.

Sublieutenants who have not obtained their watch-keeping certificates may do so while serving in submarines.

Appointments of sublieutenants are for a first period of three years, which they return either permanently or temporarily to general service. Before their return (by this time they have become lieutenants) they may volunteer to specialize in submarines, gunnery, torpedo, or navigation. Those who volunteer for submarines, and are accepted, return after one year general service, and from then on are regarded as submarine specialists, and will only revert to general service under the same conditions as other specialists—i. e., because of promotion, at own request, unsuitability, medical unfitness, misconduct, or lack of suitable appointment due to age and seniority.

On attaining eight years seniority as lieutenants (just prior to promotion to lieutenant commander), submarine specialists are sent to general service for two years and then return to submarine.

Naval observers.—Naval observers are selected from sublieutenants or lieutenants of about two years seniority. They are sent to the signal school, Portsmouth, for seven weeks preliminary instruction in signals and reconnaissance and four weeks preliminary course in gunnery. On completion of the above courses lasting about three months, they are sent to the school of naval cooperation, Lee-on-Solent (Royal Air Force school), and are given a further course of 18 weeks in application of the above subjects and specialized instruction in air subjects.

To qualify in air radio they must have a mark of 95 per cent in the buzzer course at Lee-on-Solent.

Officers who qualify in radio and make a satisfactory mark on other examinations, are designated "acting observers" and are sent to the fleet for observers duty for six months. On completion of this duty they are confirmed to naval observers. Naval observers retain naval rank and uniform.

Pilots fleet air arm.—Pilots fleet air arm must be not over 28 years of age, must be of rank of sublieutenant or lieutenant, must possess a watch-keeping certificate, and must pass a Royal Air Force medical examination.

Service as pilot in the fleet air arm involves attachment to the Royal Air Force for certain periods, the exact duration of which is decided by the Admiralty from time to time. The periods of attachment to the Royal Air Force and general naval service is as below:

(A) First period, air	Four years including a period of training.
(B) Second period, general naval service.	Two years.
(C) Third period, air	Two years for 50 per cent of the officers who have completed "A," the rest remain in general naval service.
(D) Fourth period, air	Two years for 60 per cent of the officers who have completed "C" (i. e. 30 per cent of original number who started) the rest return to general naval service.
(E) Fifth period, general service or air as required.	For the remainder (if any) of time in grade of lieutenant commander for all officers who have completed "D."

When embarked they have their rank, status, and authority while engaged in specialist air duties; when engaged in general naval duties they have their naval rank, status, and authority. They are available for ship duty as well as flying duty. They must have same sea service as other officers to qualify for promotion.

Specialist officers do not, as a rule, command ships until of commander's rank, when with the exception of a few employed on staff duties, they drop their specialist line.

Officers who do not specialize are known unofficially as "Salt-Horse" officers. They are employed either in watch-keeping duties, in training duties, or as executive officers of ships. They may on passing examination for command (which is required of all officers), be appointed to command a destroyer, sloop, or other small craft when still comparatively junior in rank. The examination includes gunnery, torpedoes, signal, navigation, and radio. No one less than five years' seniority as lieutenant is eligible for this examination and in addition the candidate must have been recommended in all respects suitable by his commanding officer.

As to the number and percentage of officers who specialize, the January, 1928, navy list shows that of 599 lieutenants of more than four years' seniority (very few specialists have been confirmed as such prior to this seniority except in submarines and air), 286, or approximately 48 per cent, have specialized. Of a total of 949 lieutenant commanders, 489, or approximately 52 per cent, have specialized. When commanders rank is reached most of the officers have dropped their specialty and of the 407 commanders, 90, or 22 per cent, are borne for specialists duties, mostly for navigation and surveying and submarine, none for gunnery or torpedoes. The following tables show the number of each of the above classifications and the percentage in each specialty. In the grade of captain all specialties have disappeared, except three or four borne as submarine specialists.

Number and percentage of total number in each specialty

Grade	Gunnery		Torpedoes		Navigation		Surveying		Submarines	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Lieutenant (of 4 years or more seniority)	46	7.68	23	3.84	36	6.01	18	3.00	63	10.52
Lieutenant commander	112	11.8	89	9.32	109	11.48	17	1.8	66	6.95
Commander	None.	-------	None.	-------	46	11.3	6	1.47	25	6.14

Grade	Antisubmarines		Signals		Physical and recreational training		Observers		Pilots	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Lieutenant (of 4 years or more seniority)	15	2.52	13	2.17	16	2.67	22	3.67	34	5.67
Lieutenant commander	11	1.16	43	4.63	17	1.8	20	2.1	50	5.00
Commander	None.	-------	None.	-------	9	2.21	6	1.47	None.	-------

Extra pay for qualification in various lines.—There are two forms of extra pay and allowances for qualification in certain lines. "Specialist allowance" is used to designate the allowances payable for qualification in the following lines: Torpedo, navigation, signaling, wireless telegraphy, staff, antisubmarine, and physical and recreational training.

Allowances are also payable for the following duties: Submarines, observers, flying, and surveying, but these are not designated specifically as "specialist allowances."

In general, the payment of these allowances is limited to the ranks of lieutenant and lieutenant commanders with the following exceptions: Navigating allowance is payable to commanders when qualified and actually engaged in navigating duties; submarine allowance is payable to commanders and in exceptional cases, such as during trials of a submarine, to captains; observers allowance is payable to commanders detailed as observers; surveying pay is payable to commanders and captains in charge of a survey, but commanders and captains are not eligible for specialist allowance for gunnery, torpedoes, signaling, physical and recreational training, antisubmarine, staff, or flying.

Lieutenants and lieutenant commanders who qualify as "specialists" draw this allowance at all times when on full pay, except when on duty at the Admiralty, from the date of their qualification until they are promoted to commander or permanently cease to be employed as "specialists."

We have now taken all cadet entries of the executive branch up to lieutenant and discussed their training up to and including that rank. There still remains the "mate scheme," the promotion of warrant officers to lieutenants, the entry of supplementary officers. These will now be taken up, and afterwards the selection of lieutenant commander to commanders, commanders to captains, will be discussed.

Mate scheme.—The avenue of promotion from the lower deck known as the "mate scheme" was inaugurated in 1913 as a result of the acute shortage in junior officers for the growing fleet. Under this system selected petty officers who had seven years' previous service were promoted and received commission as mates after a series of examinations. After a further service of two years as mates they became lieutenants. Because of the requirements of the seven-year previous service the majority of the mates did not reach the rank of lieutenant until they were 28 to 29 years old, whereas cadet entry reached this rank at the age of 22 to 23. Under this system a man promoted from mate had little chance of reaching any rank higher than lieutenant commander, as they were overtaken by the age limit of 45 years prior to reaching a position in the zone of selection as lieutenant commander. In 1920 the rules for promotion to mate were changed so that a man on reaching the age of 21, provided he had passed the requirements of a sea selection board, had passed the seamanship examination, and had taken a first-class certificate in mechanics, physics, history, geometry, and general subjects, was eligible for selection by the Admiralty selection board. As a result, those selected to fill vacancies became acting mates at the age of 21. On selection to acting mate the candidate is sent to undergo the following courses:

	Months		Months
Astronomical navigation	3	Navigation	2
Gunnery	3	Pilotage	2
Torpedoes	2	Divisional course	1

The time to be served as acting mate depends on the marks made on the examinations at the end of each course (following in general the same scheme as for sublieutenant). Eighty-five per cent is required for a first-class certificate, 70 per cent for a second-class certificate, and 60 per cent for a third-class certificate. An acting mate who fails on any examination is given a second chance, and, if he fails, he reverts to his former rank or rating. On successful completion of the above examinations the acting mate is confirmed as mate, and after two years and two months to three years and two months (depending on marks made on course) total service as mate and acting mate, is promoted to rank of lieutenant. From then on he comes under the ordinary rules for all officers.

The proportion of mate entries to cadet entries is at present about 5 per cent. The total number of mates (executive branch) selected per year is shown in the following tables. Note how the number has fallen off since the war.

1913	44	1919	0	1925	6
1914	31	1920	10	1926	9
1915	98	1921	6	1927	7
1916	51	1922	6	Total	415
1917	92	1923	6		
1918	43	1924	6		

The 1927 selections were made from the following ratings: 3 leading seamen, 3 able seamen, 1 leading telegraphist.

Only one mate has ever reached the rank of commander (December 31, 1926). The press during the latter part of 1927 and early 1928 have attacked the Admiralty on the ground that the mate scheme forms an avenue of promotion from the lower deck to higher rank in name only. The secretary of the Admiralty in reply to a parliamentary question stated, "At present all qualified candidates for mate who were considered to be suitable for promotion were being taken, but should a greater number come forward it would probably be found possible to increase the number somewhat."

Of the 400 ex-mates (executive), one has thus far specialized; at least two-thirds are in a definite nonpromotion status, such as reserve fleet units, training establishment, etc. The January, 1926, navy list shows 44 lieutenant commanders, ex-mate (executive), the most of whom are in back-water jobs.

One hundred and thirty-nine ex-mates were "axed" in the 1922 reduction.

Although A. F. O., April, 1926, states that lieutenants promoted from mate are eligible to specialize under the same conditions as other lieutenants, no ex-mates have been included in the specialist's course in 1927 and 1928.

The Admiralty early in 1928 announced special course would be established to help likely candidates qualify as mate.

The mate scheme lists in the engineering branch under much the same conditions as regards selections, except that the examinations are on engineering, heat and steam, mathematics, applied mechanics, general science, including electricity. The engineering mate is sent to Royal Naval College, Greenwich, for a one-year course. The ordinary period of service as mate (E) required to qualify for promotion to lieutenant is three years. At discretion of the Admiralty, 12 months may be allowed for a first-class certificate at Greenwich or 6 months for a second-class certificate.

The upper limit of age for a mate (engineering) is higher than that for a mate (executive), being for the former 30 years, for the latter 25 years.

The number of mates appointed for the various years is as follows:

1914	14	1920	6	1926	9
1915	28	1921	7	1927	7
1916	41	1922	6		
1917	52	1923	5	Total	206
1918	10	1924	5		
1919	10	1925	6		

A lieutenant (ex-mate) in the engineering branch is shown in the navy list as "engineering lieutenant," whereas the cadet entry of this rank is shown in a separate list as "lieutenant (E)."

Commission from warrant rank.—Promotion to the rank or equivalent rank of lieutenant may be made at Admiralty discretion from—

(*a*) Commissioned warrant officers who have rendered long and zealous service.

(*b*) Commissioned warrant officers who have qualified for early selective promotion by examination (in conjunction with seniority), by passing with marks not less than 75 per cent examinations in general knowledge, history, or geography, and professional subjects depending on the branch.

Promotion under (*b*) is restricted to gunners (T), gunner boatswain, signal boatswain, shipwright, engineer, and mechanician.

The number of lieutenants and above is 8 per cent of the number of warrant officers in each of the categories mentioned—i. e., to determine the number of the total of warrants, commissioned warrants, and lieutenants from warrant rank are added together and 8 per cent of this total is taken.

Half of these are appointed by the Admiralty for long and zealous service and half from those who have qualified under (*b*).

As the indication of the number selected to be lieutenants from warrant officers, the October 1, 1927, navy lists shows:

Shipwright lieutenants	11
Ordnance lieutenants and lieutenant commanders	2
Electrical lieutenants	4
Signal lieutenants	4
Telegraphist lieutenants	3

Because of age these officers seldom reach an age higher than lieutenant and never higher than lieutenant commander. They are automatically promoted to lieutenant commander after eight years as lieutenant.

Officers on supplementary list.—An officer of the Royal Naval Reserve may become an officer in the Royal Navy via the supplementary list. Candidates were selected from Royal Naval Reserve officers who have completed 12 months' training in the Royal Navy. The number is limited and the officer must be between the age of 22 and 32. At present there are 16 lieutenant commanders on the navy list. They are not eligible for selection to commander except in the cases of " very exceptionable service." None have been entered on the supplementary list of lieutenant commander since 1923.

Training as engineer officer.—The training of engineer and executive officers is identical until finishing their cadet training. Naval cadets selected to qualify for engineering on being rated midshipmen are sent to the Royal Naval Engineering College, Keyham, Devonport, for a three years and eight months course, followed by a four months course in electricity in H. M. S. *Vernon.* The training at Keyham and in H. M. S. *Vernon* comprises manual work in the workshops and drawing office, together with a course of lectures on marine and electrical engineering, the study of technical subjects on marine and electrical engineering, the study of technical subjects in class rooms and laboratories, and the practical working and testing of engines and electrical machinery.

The course includes instruction in the duties of a divisional officer and practice in exercising command. (The engineering midshipman has had no service as a midshipman at sea.) A certain amount of time is also allotted to general educational subjects, modern languages, naval history, and elementary economics. After two years and four months at Keyham midshipmen are promoted to acting sublieutenant (E) on condition they have passed the intermediate examination in marine engines and boilers, workshops, appliances, ship construction, mechanical drawing, electricity, mathematics, mechanics, thermo-dynamics, physics, chemistry, and metallurgy. (This intermediate examination takes the place of the executive midshipman's examination.)

Acting sublieutenants are confirmed as sublieutenants as follows, this being the same as for sublieutenants (executive branch), namely:

Dartmouth entry: After four to nine months seniority as acting sublieutenants (E), depending on time gained in "passing out" examinations and in the intermediate examinations.

Special entry: Immediately at end of two years and four months as midshipmen, except that seniority will be antedated by amount of time gained in "passing out" examination.

Special entry (mercantile): On attaining five to nine months seniority as acting sublieutenant (E) depending on time gained in "passing out" examinations.

On completion of the full engineering course final examinations are held and on the results of this depends the time to be served as sublieutenant (E) which varies between 13 and 36 months, the same as for a sublieutenant of the executive branch.

A certain number of lieutenants (E) are selected for an advanced course of two years instruction at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. This advanced course consists, namely, of training in design. The others are sent to seagoing ships to obtain their engineering watch-keeping certificates (usually granted after 6 months), and to gain experience in the maintenance and running of machinery and in handling men.

The "engineer officer" is the senior engineer officer on board in a battleship or cruiser; he is invariably of commander's rank. In destroyers, sloops, and other small craft he is a lieutenant commander and sometimes a lieutenant.

The "senior engineer" is what is known in the United States Navy as senior assistant engineer officer.

After two or three years watch keeping in a big ship a lieutenant (E) goes to a light cruiser as senior assistant and is then generally sent to a destroyer as engineer officer. (This is marked contrast with our method of having an ensign or lieutenant (j. g.) learn at the cost of destroyer machinery and then go to a post-graduate school for instruction.)

A lieutenant commander (E) usually spends at least two years as "senior engineer" (i. e., assistant engineer officer) of one of the largest ships.

Before continuing with the promotion and training of engineer officers a discussion of the various changes in status of engineer officers will be made.

For many years naval officers were divided into two branches only; i. e., military and civil. The military branch contained only those officers who succeeded to command of a ship—captains, commanders, etc.; in short, line officers. The civil branch comprised all other departments—engineers, paymasters, doctors, etc.

By 1914 all these lines had become classed as branches—military branch, engineering branch, accounting branch, medical branch, etc. The first two in relative rank were military and engineer. The military branch were distinguished by a curl (civil) on their upper stripe. Other branches were distinguished by colored cloth between their stripes.

January 1, 1925, in recognition of the importance of the engineer branch, it was brought into the military branch; although they were not allowed to succeed to command, they were given the civil, but retained the color between their stripes for those who had already entered. New entries wore the same uniforms as other officers of the military branch without any distinguished marks.

In the meantime all branches have been allowed the "curl."

From 1902 to 1922 executive officers might volunteer to specialize in engineering after reaching the rank of lieutenant, but on becoming commanders they had to either drop their engineer duties and revert to general service or renounce their ambitions for executive command, and thereafter serve as engineer officers. In 1922 the scheme was changed so that "at the stage of specializing the engineer and executive branches will finally separate . . . and officers selected to specialize in engineering will separate finally from executive officers and . . . though remaining in the military branch will forego all right to subsequent reversion to deck duties and to military command."

In 1925 an Admiralty fleet order definitely separated the engineering branch from the executive (military) branch, put back the distinctive shade of purple between stripes, and stated the right to command a ship or to exercise military command will be limited to executive officers. As a corollary they will be considered for promotion to commander (E) in competition with engineer officers and not in competition with executive officers.

This change has met with marked disfavor on the part of engineer officers, but is still in existence. Captain Lyon, Royal Navy, president of the Institute of Marine Engineers, in addressing that body in 1927, stated "the Admiralty Board by their recent action in taking away the military rank from the engineers, and other means, have put the clock back 25 years." He also stated that the number of Dartmouth entries volunteering for engineering was, 1925, 3; 1926, 13; 1927, 4; only 6 or 7 a year instead of 48 or 50 required to fill vacancies in the engineering branch each year.[8]

Generally speaking, engineer officers who have not taken the advanced course spend most of their time at sea until they become commanders. Those who have taken the advanced course spend most of their time ashore with enough sea service to keep them in touch with the sea service.

Promotion to lieutenant commander.—Promotion to lieutenant commander is automatic for all classes of entry including mate, and for both executive and engineer officers—that is, after eight years as lieutenant. The cadet entry officer reaches this grade at the age of 29 years 5 months, to 32 years 11 months, for the average officer at age of 31 years.

Promotion to commander.—Promotion to commander is by selection. Selections are made semiannually, in January and June. The Admiralty announces the "zone" of selection, which for the past year has been from two to six years' service as lieutenant commander. In the "zone" for selection in January, 1928, there were 484 lieutenant commanders of the executive branch; from among these 25 selections were made. The officers chosen were among the top 170 of those in the "zone," so that the selection board only went one-third of the way down the list. Of those selected seven had 5½ years, three had 4½ to 5 years, and one had 4 years seniority. The difference in seniority between the first and last was 21 months, and their number on the list of lieutenant commanders was 188 to 358, so that the actual zone of selection was a narrow one, although 145 out of 170 were skipped.

The following table shows the number of promotions in this rank during the last five selections:

January, 1928	25	June, 1926	20
June, 1927	25	January, 1926	20
January, 1927	25		

Of the 25 lieutenant commanders selected to commander, 5 were gunnery specialists, 4 were torpedo specialists, 2 were navigation specialists, 5 signals, 2 submarine specialists, 2 had passed through the staff college.

The number of commanders (E) promoted in January, 1928, was 4, of which 2 were ex-mates. The first ex-mate engineers to be promoted to commander (E).

The following table shows the numbers advanced from the three principal specialist branches over the past five years:

	Total rates	N	G	T	Others
1923	40	7	8	5	20
1924	42	5	7	3	27
1925	40	7	7	2	24
1926	45	5	6	9	25
1927	50	4	9	8	29

The probable age of the officers selected to commander in 1928 is estimated at 34 to 36 years.

The operation of the "zone" system is interesting. As before stated, the "zone" for lieutenant commander in the January, 1928, selection was from two to six years seniority. At that time there were 184 lieutenant commanders who were of more than six years seniority and hence were not considered for selection. They will remain on the active list until the age of 45 and will then automatically retire unless they themselves resign or take advantage of one of the temporary retirement schemes which are announced from time to time. About 20 lieutenant commanders were in the selection zone for the last time—i. e., they would be past the "zone" by the time the next selection board meets June, 1928. Of the 20, 2 were selected. As the "zone" works out, officers are in the part of the zone from which actual selections are made for about two years.

On the January, 1928, selection 10 lieutenant commanders (E) were promoted to commander, 3 of which were ex-mates who entered in the first class of mates—i. e., 1914. These are the first mates (E) who have attained commanders rank. Five engineer commanders were selected to captain.

Training of lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and commanders in staff duties

The course at the Staff College, Greenwich, is an annual course lasting about 10 months. Its purpose is to train lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and commanders in the study of war and in staff duties, with a view of providing suitable officers for duty on the staffs of flag officers and on the naval staff. About 25 officers qualify annually. Extra allowance is payable to lieutenants and lieutenant commanders qualified in staff duties.

Promotion to captain.—Promotion to captain is by selection. The "zone" of promotion is from commanders of from four to eight years seniority (recent selections). The zone is announced from time to time by the Admiralty and also the number of selections to be made.

The following table shows the number of commanders promoted to captains in the last five selections:

January, 1928	11	June, 1926	10
June, 1927	10	January, 1926	10
January, 1927	12		

In the January, 1928, selections there were 165 commanders eligible, i. e., within the "zone." The 11 promotions were made between the commanders 100 to 156 on the navy list. There were 91 commanders who were due to seniority past the age for selection. There were 13 commanders in the "zone" for the last time. The promotions were made from the upper 75 in the zone, no promotions being made among the 90 in the lower half.

Of the 11 selections made, four were of maximum seniority, i. e., 8 years and therefore in the zone for the last time, 4 had 7½ years seniority, one had 7 years, and two had 6½ years seniority, so that they varied between 6½ to 8 years seniority as commanders. Of these 11 officers all but one had previously specialized in navigation, gunnery, or torpedoes. Their age is estimated as 43½ years.

Training of captains.—The senior officers' war course, lasting four months, takes place twice a year at Greenwich. It is designed to give junior captains, prior to taking up commands afloat, an opportunity of studying the broader aspects of war. About 20 officers attend each course.

Promotion to rear admiral.—Promotion from captain to rear admiral is by seniority. To qualify for advancement he must have served in the rank of captain during peace 6 years, during war 4 years, during peace and war combined 5 years, of which 3 years in all cases must be in command of a "ship of war at sea." Captains who arrive at their turn of promotion without completing the qualifying service are retired. "As vacancies occur in the active list, the captain who has served his time for his flag will be promoted, but His Majesty's undoubted right of selection is reserved."

At present the advancements to rear admiral are slow. In 1927 there were 7; in 1926, 10; in 1920, 14. Under the present system when there appears to be no prospect of employment for a rear admiral, he is retired on reaching that rank.

It is to his advantage to immediately retire rather than wait for an appointment on half pay until he reaches the compulsory retirement age. (See p. 30.)

Several officers of 1916 seniority still are awaiting their flag after 12 years as captains. Before the war the average service as captains before promotion was 10½ years. Promotions for exceptional service during the war of a number of officers gave flag rank to some officers long before they ordinarily would receive it. For example, Capt. M. E. Dunbar-Nasmith, for submarine operations in the Dardanelles, promoted to commander and captain, was, in January, 1928, promoted to rear admiral at the age of 43. Capt. R. A. R. Plunkett-Erne-Erle-Drax recently reached flag rank at the age of 47.

Vice admirals.—Rear admirals rise to rank of vice admiral on the active list according to seniority.

Admirals.—Vice admirals rise to rank of admirals on the active list according to seniority.

Admirals of the fleet.—Admirals of the fleet are selected from admirals on active list who have served with distinction as flag officers.

The qualifying conditions are that they have served as first sea lord for 12 months or more, or have commanded the principal (at present the Mediterranean) fleet for a period of 12 months, or have performed special war or other conspicuous service since attaining captain's rank.

Training of senior officers, Imperial Defense College

This college was established in January, 1927, to train a body of officers of the army, navy, and air force, together with civilian officials, in the broadest aspects of imperial strategy. The college is under the supervision of the chiefs of staff committee of the committee of imperial defense. The commandant is selected from the navy, army, and air force in turn.

Senior officers' technical courses.—This course is designed to give flag officers, captains, and commanders an opportunity of studying the latest developments in technical subjects. Four courses of two months each are held annually. Fifteen officers attend each course.

Officers for whom no employment is available (i. e., the officers the Admiralty do not desire to employ), generally those who have been earmarked for nonpromotion, are put on unemployed or half pay and after certain periods as given below are retired for nonservice. In addition there is compulsory retirement for age in grade. This is shown below.

Rank	Age for compulsory retirement	Period of nonservice necessitating retirement
Admiral of fleet	....	Five years from date of promotion, but if then actually employed this may be extended to age of 65.
Admirals	65	Three years since last "service" as flag officers.
Vice admirals	[illegible]	Do.
Rear admirals	[illegible]	Two and one-half years since last "service" as rear admiral or [illegible] years since last "service" as captain, whichever is the earliest, or if they have not hoisted their flag at sea on promotion to vice admiral.
Captains	55	Two years since last "service" as captain, or if they have not served in the rank of captain 3 years from date of promotion.
Commanders	50	Two years since last "service" as commander, or if they have not served as commander 2 years since date of promotion.
Lieutenant commanders and lieutenants, except ex-warrants.	45	Three years since last "service" as lieutenant commander or lieutenant, or if they have not served in the rank of lieutenant 5 years from date of promotion to that rank.

Officers above rank of sublieutenant are placed on unemployed pay between appointments.

Ca-[illegible]
E. S. W.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

I. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

On March 24, the closing hours of the last session of the recent meeting of the preparatory commission for the disarmament conference held at Geneva were marked by a new British effort to further the limitation of the tonnage of capital ships. Lord Cushendun, the British representative, announced that a note had been addressed to the American, French, and Japanese delegations at the conference explaining concrete British proposals which Great Britain would like to see in effect before the beginning of the capital ship replacement program provided by the Washington convention. The British proposals which are the same with regard to capital ships as were presented by Great Britain at the tripartite naval conference last year were as follows:

(1) Reduce in size any battleship to be built in the future from 35,000 tons to something under 30,000 tons.

(2) Reduce in size the guns of battleships from the present limit of 16 inches to 13.5 inches.

(3) Extend the accepted life of existing capital ships from 20 to 26 years.

The note in which the British proposals were made stated that their fulfillment would mark a great step toward disarmament and would involve great economy.

There is abundant evidence that both nations are approaching what must be an open discussion of the whole Anglo-American naval question. There has seemed to exist on both sides of the Atlantic since the Geneva naval conference a rather tacit policy of avoiding public discussion and of proceeding as if nothing had happened. So far as the United States is concerned this attitude might well be continued until our naval program has worked itself out and the Washington conference of 1931 assembles. But the British situation is very different. The single thing which the British can not permit to happen, until they have exhausted every reasonable means of preventing it, is the expansion of the American fleet to its full strength without an agreement having been reached which will prevent the subsequent use of this fleet for the one purpose which in British eyes would be fatal, namely, against the British blockade.

It is this question of the blockade, by which in the past British security has been assured and victory in war ultimately achieved, which lies at the bottom of the position taken by British naval experts. The threat of the American naval program rests upon the fact that with sufficient naval strength the United States would be able to break the British blockade. British thought along these lines is concerned principally with the problem presented by the situation if, at a moment when Britain were involved in another great European war, the United States should refuse to accept the British proclamation of a blockade and undertake to convoy United States merchant ships in their pursuit of neutral trade. The real grievance of the British Admiralty over the Washington conference was not that Britain conceded parity to the United States in battleships, but that it agreed to the construction of a new type of cruiser, the 10,000-ton ship, which might be a deadly menace to British interests. At the recent Geneva conference the Admiralty was arguing with more than a little justice when it contended that Britain would, in fact, be accepting inferiority if the United States insisted upon cruiser parity measured by global tonnage and put all her tonnage into 10,000-ton cruisers, while Britain felt herself forced to divide tonnage between the 10,000-ton type and the smaller classes designed to patrol sea lanes. But such argument was centered around a minor point and served mainly to confuse the real issue. The disaster from the British naval viewpoint was that through a sufficient number of these large cruisers the United States would be provided with the type of ship best calculated to challenge the British blockade in any part of the world.

The present uncertain state of maritime law has been cited by "big navy" advocates in both the United States and Great Britain as an important reason for increased naval building. If countries can not depend upon any law defining their neutral (or belligerent) rights, it is argued, they must be prepared to defend them by force.

On February 21, 1928, Senator Borah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution seeking an expression on the part of the United States Senate that there should be a restatement of the rules of maritime law prior to the conference for the limitation of naval armaments in 1931. Holding that maritime law broke down completely during the World War, and that no clearly defined rules regarding the rights of neutrals and belligerents exist to-day, Senator Borah asked the Senate to state its belief that "the leading maritime powers owe it to the cause of the limitation of armaments and of peace to bring about such a recodification." Senator Borah's resolution reads as follows:

Whereas the rules of maritime law in time of war as codified at the second Hague conference and in the declaration of London were in important respects departed from during the late war; and

Whereas it is important as a condition of the limitation of armaments and of the orderly conduct of international relations that the rules of law as developed in the course of centuries be not left in doubt or uncertainty; and

Whereas the present chaotic state of maritime law—leaving the seas subject to no definite rules save that of force, and commerce to no ultimate protection save that of battle fleets—constitutes an incentive for great naval armaments: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States believes—

First. That there should be a restatement and recodification of the rules of the law governing the conduct of belligerents and neutrals in war at sea.

Second. That the leading maritime powers of the world owe it to the cause of the limitation of armaments and of peace to bring about such restatement and recodification of maritime law.

Third. That such restatement and recodification should be brought about if practically possible prior to the meeting of the conference on limitation of armaments in 1931.

If a conference to recodify the rules of maritime law is to be held, Senator Borah believes that it should be attended by all the participants of the World War and by neutrals as well.

In 1914 the law of maritime warfare was the result of a series of compromises arising from the long conflict between belligerent and neutral interests. In the armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800 some of the neutral countries of Europe organized to defend their neutral rights against belligerent encroachment, if necessary by force of arms. The rules they sought to defend, for example, that neutrals might trade in war as in peace except in contraband and with blockaded ports; that blockades should be effective in order to be binding; that these principles should be applied in prize courts, were not immediately recognized by belligerents. The attitude of the United States from 1793 to 1818 aided in upholding neutral rights and was an important factor in limiting belligerent claims to interfere with neutral commerce.

Neutral insistence that belligerents justify their interference with neutral trade in court served to clarify and delimit the rights and obligations of neutrals and belligerents. When a neutral vessel was seized for alleged carriage of contraband or some other alleged offense it was "put in prize;" that is, the captor was compelled to prove before a prize court that the capture was justified under international law. The prize court was a court created by the country (a belligerent) in which it sat, but the letter of the law it applied was international.

During the Napoleonic wars the impartial decisions of the famous British Admiralty judge, Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell), which are quoted in almost every study on international maritime law, contributed greatly to restraining belligerent pretensions and giving neutrals an established legal status. A half century later in 1856 the leading powers of Europe signed the declaration of Paris which practically codified maritime law on four important points involving the protection of private property at sea.

Similar attempts at codification were made at the two Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907. Convention XII of the 1907 Hague conference provided for the establishment of an international prize court to serve as a court of appeal from the decisions of prize courts of belligerents. The fact that a neutral was forced to plead his claim before a court of the belligerent which had captured his property was considered unsatisfactory. Though the prize courts claimed they applied international law, in fact they applied their own interpretation of international law. It was to do away with this unsatisfactory condition, which, however, still exists, that an international prize court was proposed.

Many countries were opposed to the establishment of the proposed court without a clear understanding as to the law to be applied. The British Government, therefore, proposed a conference to discuss the existing status of international maritime law. The conference met in London in 1908–9 and attempted to codify this law. Each country was asked to prepare a memorandum setting forth its view as to the correct rule of international law on certain suggested points. The conference attempted to reconcile divergent interpretations and put on a conventional basis what heretofore had rested for the most part on international custom—i. e., to obtain the express consent of nations for what had received their tacit consent through customary observance.

The ensuing declaration of London was in the main a statement of the rules of international maritime law as they existed in 1909. The declaration was signed by Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United States. Such a codification was bound to contain certain compromises which were for some nations new rules rather than principles to which they had previously given their tacit consent. Opposition to the declaration was to be expected and for various reasons ratifications of the declaration of London were never exchanged.

In Great Britain a bill modifying British practice in conformity with the declaration of London passed the House of Commons, but failed in the House of Lords. The United States Senate, on April 24, 1912, advised and consented to ratification of the declaration of London, but the failure of Great Britain to accept made the other powers unwilling to bind themselves by its provisions and the American ratification was never deposited.

Immediately after the outbreak of the World War the United States asked the chief belligerent powers whether they would agree to be bound by the provisions of the declaration of London during the war, provided such agreement were reciprocal. The United States said that acceptance of these laws by belligerents would prevent the possibility of grave misunderstandings in the relations between the belligerents and neutrals. Germany and Austria accepted the proposal and agreed to be bound by the rules in question on condition of reciprocity. Great Britain, France, and Russia replied that they had decided to adopt, generally, the rules of the declaration of London, subject to certain modifications which they deemed indispensable to their belligerent interests. However, since article 65 of the declaration of London stated that its provisions must be treated and accepted as a whole and since Great Britain, France, Russia, and Belgium had been unable to accept it without modification, the United States withdrew its suggestion. At the same time the United States added that it would insist that its rights and the rights of its citizens during the war be defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States without regard to the declaration of London.

Thus the declaration of London as such was never in force during the war and the decrees of certain of the powers, purporting to promulgate the declaration, subject to modifications, were merely statements of the law which they intended to apply in maritime matters.

The difficulties surrounding the application of the principal maritime laws, such as the law of contraband, the law of blockade, and the laws of seizure and confiscation during the recent war are apparent. Until the United States entered the war she continued to protest without success against the legality of the allied measures. It has been argued by advocates of a larger United States Navy that only our naval inferiority during the first three years of the war forced us to submit to humiliating regulation of our trade by belligerents. Theoretically the position of the United States would seem to be that the laws involving neutral rights remain to-day as they were in 1914. They have been violated, but this does not affect their validity.

The settlement of many debatable questions on maritime law has been left for some future date, as, for example: What is the status of neutral rights to-day? What is the extent of belligerent rights? How far is the international law of blockade different from what it was in 1914? Was international law modified during the war, or were the alleged modifications really violations? If a neutral is unable or unwilling to fight to prevent inroads on its neutral rights by one belligerent, has the other belligerent a right of retaliation? If so, against whom is there a right to retaliate? Against the neutral? Or is it against the belligerent enemy with incidental damage to neutral rights? Are the rights of belligerents to be stated in terms of means or of ends? For example, is the right of blockade a right to prevent all trade with the enemy (as both belligerents claimed during the World War) or is it a right to prevent ingress or egress of all vessels to the enemy coast?

Any conference meeting to restate and recodify the rules of maritime law will find itself divided on a fundamental issue: Should it be a law-stating conference or a law-making conference? Should it merely restate the laws as they exist or should it attempt to remake the laws? Should its function be declaratory or legislative?

There is little doubt that Great Britain would refuse to bind herself to any limitation of belligerent rights, but the lessons of the World War could with profit be examined in order to devise measures for the elimination of unnecessary friction between belligerents and neutrals. It has been suggested by certain British authorities that the only satisfactory solution would be a return to the old system which consisted in claiming certain specific rights such as: Search, seizure for adjudication, blockade, leaving the prize court to base its judgment on wide principles and established precedents, for it is pointed out that weapons develop so rapidly and different wars vary so greatly that the efficacy of international law can only be preserved by holding fast to a few elementary principles while retaining elasticity in their actual application.

This idea was thus expressed by a prominent British authority in a memorandum on contraband trade and continuous voyage:

> All law is resolvable into general principles. The cases which may arise under new combinations of circumstances, leading to an extended application of principles, ancient and recognized by just corollaries, may be infinite, but so long as the continuity of the original and established principles is preserved, pure and unbroken, the practice is not new, nor is it justly chargeable with being an innovation on the ancient law, when, in fact, the court does nothing more than apply old principles to new circumstances.

Great Britain probably would under any circumstances refuse to bind herself to any hard and fast code governing the conduct of naval war and would declare her intention of being guided in the future by certain recognized principles and rights the interpretation of which in her judgment should be left to the prize courts. Among the fundamental rights which the British would probably consider it their right to claim are:

(1) A belligerent has the right to bring every possible pressure to bear on any enemy consistent with due regard for innocent inter-

neutral trade and in accordance with those dictates of humanity which modern opinion regards as imperative.

(2) A belligerent has the right to prevent overseas supplies reaching the enemy, which may assist him in the prosecution of the war, and to attack his credit and resources by the restriction of his exports.

(3) The government of a neutral state must refrain from assisting belligerents or shielding them from the pressure of their enemy's hostility; but it is not incumbent upon such government to prevent its subjects from trading in contraband. The responsibility rests with the belligerents concerned.

It is not necessary here to point out that the prevention of enemy trade is one of the primary objects of maritime war. Any agreement to abolish restrictions on belligerent trade may react unfairly on the nations that trust to naval rather than military power and will almost infallibly break down when put to the test. It is unreasonable to suppose that a strong naval power engaged in a life and death struggle will not use its navy against maritime trade if the ability of its opponent to carry on the war depends on the continuance of oversea supplies. It is well known how the declaration of London was torn to shreds by the hard logic of events in the World War and how the possibility of ending the war by submarine attack caused Germany to renounce the rules of civilized war.

Some opposition to a conference to consider the present status of international maritime law may be encountered on the ground that the era of neutrality has passed. In modified form, and with exceptions, the idea that there should be no neutrals in future wars has been embodied in the covenant of the League of Nations and in proposals for the outlawry of war.

II. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

Canada
E. & W.

It is advisable to emphasize the importance now being attached by sober-thinking Englishmen to the question of Great Britain's relations with the United States. Englishmen given to reflection on international matters are fast realizing that the United States has become a world factor so potent and irresistible that the position and even the future of his own country may now depend to an extent never imagined before on close friendship with America. Until the Geneva Naval Conference and part, possibly, from the Anglo-American debt agreement, there have been of recent years few questions at issue between the two countries which have not submitted themselves to relatively easy settlement. The failure of that conference has now loomed up as a matter of first-rate importance. It has brought to light unforseen political considerations. Englishmen are finding themselves compelled to face the fact that world leadership is no longer centered in Great Britain alone. They instinctively feel a challenge which if ever taken up might result in the gravest consequences. For that reason they are watching with absorbed interest all major developments in the United States, particularly those relating to American foreign and financial policy.

That interest has often been as critical as it has been intense. The United States has for some months past been subjected to much acrimonious comment. This comment has ranged anywhere from sarcastic allusions to American "imperialism" and wealth to slurring gibes on certain phases of American life which Americans deplore equally with other people. It is only fair to say, however, that many deep-thinking Englishmen are to-day regretting this monotonous backbiting. They assume, incidentally, that anti-English comment is as habitual in the United States as its anti-American equivalent has been in Great Britain. They feel that efforts must be made to eradicate this more or less subconscious feeling of antagonism before it hardens and becomes a fixed attitude of mind.

Nothing could be more indicative of this growing spirit than the recent parliamentary debate on Anglo-American relations. The King's address revealed the fact, not yet generally known to the public at large, that the Government was studying the draft submitted by the United States Government for the new Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Particular interest was felt in view of the lengthy report in the press of the Franco-American treaty negotiations. Both Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Lloyd George raised the question in the House and Sir Austen Chamberlain replied to them, the substance of which may well be viewed as having particular significance. Sir Austen said that the proposed treaty, like its predecessor, the old Root-Bryce treaty, was confined to what were called justiciable differences, and that in addition, and like the old treaty, it excepted certain questions from its scope even though they were justiciable. He referred particularly to the United States Government's reservation of the constitutional right of the Senate to be consulted on each individual reference to a court of arbitration, and added that this was a reservation "of very wide scope and of a most important character."

Sir Austen Chamberlain then stated as follows:

> But there is a second treaty existing between ourselves and the United States, to which I think sometimes insufficient attention is paid—namely, the Bryan-Spring-Rice treaty (note: the so-called "cooling off" treaty), which provides, not indeed that there should be no recourse to war, not indeed a judicial tribunal for the trial and decision of all differences, but provides that any dispute between us should be referred to a commission of conciliation, that a year's time should be given, and that we should await the report of that commission before we take to arms. I am not at all sure that at the present stage

in Europe it may not be the case that the next advances may be made rather along the lines of the Bryan treaty than along the strict lines of arbitral agreements. (See following article entitled "Disarmament versus Security.") At any rate, when we talk of the treaties of arbitration, do not let us forget the very important and very useful and salutary provision of the treaty which was signed by Mr. Bryan and the late Sir Cecil Spring-Rice.

This paragraph perhaps may deserve special attention. It is considered by some commentators in England that Sir Austen made no idle reference to the Bryan-Spring-Rice treaty. According to this view, the Government may have reached the conclusion that in an extension of this treaty's scope lay the secret for perfecting the machinery of conciliation between the two countries. Such a treaty, if its scope could be extended, would conceivably amount to a non-aggression pact (without actually stating so in definite terms) for the obvious reason that public opinion in either country could hardly remain agitated, however dangerous a dispute might be at the time, if a longer period of time than one year were fixed by treaty before recourse to war.

Sir Austen Chamberlain continued, amid some enthusiasm, that war between Great Britain and the United States was "unthinkable." He referred particularly to the testimony of the Secretary of the Navy that the new naval program had been put forward with no thought of entering into an armament race with any foreign power, but only with the thought of the United States own needs, and that the fact that Great Britain had built a larger tonnage of cruisers than the United States had, was not to be imputed as a departure on her part from either the letter or the spirit of the Washington treaty.

Sir Austen then stated that he could say for the British Government, as Mr. Wilbur had said for the United States Government, that British building was not competitive and that British naval programs were framed only with the view to the necessary protection of British interests. One of the number of reasons for that feeling of injured indignation against the United States so discernible in Britain of late is the belief that the American public, fed on American press articles, which have been inspired, it is supposed, by interested "big navy" parties, has been accusing Great Birtain of breach of faith in regard to the Washington treaty. These remarks of the Secretary of the Navy and, even more, the recent press statement of Mr. Kellogg regarding the elevation of guns, have been particularly well received in London. Both were considerably valuable as tending to clear the air of the miasma of misunderstanding between Americans and Englishmen created by the Geneva failure. Incidentally, Sir Austen Chamberlain added in his speech that he did not think, and that he did not believe any other government thought, that "we" (presumably the British Government) would be "well advised" to take up the subject of limitation of naval armaments again at this moment.

But there are undoubtedly many in Britain who believe that the mere reiteration by prominent officials of statements on the "unthinkableness" of war with the United States is not now enough. These statements are perhaps too closely associated with other well-worn, stereotyped phrases such as "hands across the sea," etc., to be considered as of sufficient strength to bridge the gap that Englishmen fear is now growing between the two countries. The recent remarks of Admiral Plunkett have made a considerable impression in England. The feeling is growing that he spoke a half truth which past experience in another case has shown could in time develop into a whole truth. League covenant commitments, the "freedom of the seas," the Monroe doctrine, and other similar problems, as they affect Anglo-American relations, have consequently come under more searching observation than heretofore. Attention is invited to the remarks of Mr. Ponsonby, a Labor member, and Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in the Labor Government, who followed Sir Austen Chamberlain in the parliamentary debate. Mr. Ponsonby referred particularly to the American proposal to outlaw war as a matter of great importance. He said that more rapid progress might be made by a comprehensive agreement between nations in which the principle of the outlawry of war should be given expression to by governments with a sincere desire to come to an agreement. He intimated that he would ask the Prime Minister for further time for a general parliamentary discussion on the subject.

The reaction in Britain to the American proposal made to France for the initiation of a collective treaty to outlaw all war has been, on the whole, friendly but skeptical. As usually happens, discussion of imagined considerations, political and otherwise, behind M. Briand's gesture to the United States and motivating Mr. Kellogg's reply, have somewhat obscured the essence of the idea. The alleged technical difficulty of squaring the American plan with the commitments already entered into in the league covenant have also been advanced. For that reason English officials, while sympathetic, have been, presumably, well content to let France carry on the preliminary negotiations with the United States, to overcome this alleged difficulty and, furthermore, to take the responsibility if no solution is in the end found.

Yet, while the desire in Britain for some tangible, concrete understanding with the United States has been growing, there has also been a very evident inability to refrain from indulging whenever possible in criticisms of the United States with particular regard to its relations with Latin American countries and to its interpretation of the Monroe doctrine. Numerous articles appeared in the London press on the subject prior to and at the time of the opening of the Pan American conference at Habana. That conference, in particular, excited much interest in England. Hardly an article but refers to American "imperialistic" economic and political penetration of the countries to the south. Obviously it is to Great Britain's benefit to demonstrate her sympathy with those countries whose trade is both important and relatively easy to get. That, very possibly, rather than any antagonism to the United States, might be their main purpose. Great Britain is jealous of American trade success and is striving to regain those markets where once she was predominant. South America is perhaps the coming sphere of commercial expansion and political importance. The Monroe doctrine checks Great Britain from exerting that influence she has been accustomed to exert in other parts of the world. As South America develops this check will conceivably become more irksome. At the same time, one might argue, these articles, however much they may be primarily "trade display," come queerly from a country which more and more feels, and now openly expresses, the necessity of a better understanding with the United States.

It may be well to mention again Sir Austen Chamberlain's reference in his speech in the House of Commons to the Bryan-Spring-Rice treaty. His emphasis of its importance and usefulness may have been a "feeler" to ascertain whether the United States would respond favorably to the idea of an extension of its scope.

Let us now examine more closely the prospects for the arbitration treaty which is soon to replace the Root treaty of 1909, due to the expiration of this instrument.

The series of identic treaties which Mr. Root, as Secretary of State, concluded with several powers have been or are shortly to be succeeded. The first of these treaties to expire was with France, and the negotiations connected with the Kellogg-Briand treaty (signed February 6 last) were reported in a special article in the February BULLETIN, entitled "Treaty negotiations with France." It will be recalled, first, that the old Root treaty contained the traditional clause about disputes involving vital interests or national honor being exempt from the arbitration process; second, that Mr. Kellogg had desired to include in the new treaty with France a clause denouncing war as an instrument of national policy, but under the circumstances related in the above-mentioned BULLETIN article this was not inserted in the Kellogg-Briand arbitration treaty but has become the subject of further and separate conversations.

The Root arbitration treaty with Great Britain expires this summer, and it has been assumed, of course, that the replacing Anglo-

American treaty will follow closely the one recently signed in Washington between the United States and France. Attention has therefore been focused chiefly on the reservations contained in article 3 of the Kellogg-Briand treaty, particularly those two reservations providing that the treaty will not be invoked in respect of any dispute the subject matter of which depended upon or involved "the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe doctrine," and "the observance of the obligations of France in accordance with the covenant of the League of Nations." (These, it will be remembered, replaced the old "national honor, vital interests" clause.)

There is a shade of opinion in Britain which would seem to hold to the view that the acceptance by the United States and by Great Britain of the limitations specified under these two headings would imply a formal recognition on the part of Great Britain of the validity of the Monroe doctrine and the interpretation given it by the United States, and on the part of the United States of the validity of whatever measures Great Britain might feel obliged or inclined to take under the league covenant. This point has not been enlarged upon to any extent in the press, but it has without question been quietly studied by a number of acute-minded Englishmen, including, incidentally, some members of the present Government. Although the Anglo-French treaty is merely one covering arbitration under certain conditions, that fact would not seem to keep them from believing that those particular reservations hold a deeper meaning than possibly they were intended to hold.

Accepting this interpretation for the sake of argument, it would seem then that the United States, in order to validate the Monroe doctrine, is willing to recognize the validity of France's actions under the covenant and presumably Great Britain's as well, if the reservations are incorporated in the Anglo-American draft. Great Britain realizes that her great prestige in the league depends almost entirely on her power, if she should choose to use it, to influence and enforce league decisions. That power is chiefly centered in her navy. It is rendered very much less effective by the abstention of the United States from the league. Moreover, Great Britain—or, more exactly, intelligent British thought—is becoming concerned over the bare possibility that these league obligations may some day bring her into conflict with the United States on the sea over the old question of neutral rights and blockade. It is easier, therefore, to understand why certain Englishmen, anxious to bolster up British prestige within the league and apprehensive over league commitments as they might affect the United States, are straining to interpret sections C and D of article 3 of the Franco-American treaty in this light.

This apprehension and the clever means used to influence the United States in this matter were strikingly illustrated recently by Mr. Wickham Stead, editor of the *Review of Reviews*, and a publicist of some note. At a luncheon of the American Chamber of Commerce in London, Mr. Stead referred to "the really dangerous situation" which might arise between Great Britain and the United States in the event of Great Britain being compelled under the league covenant to cut off an aggressor nation from commercial intercourse with the rest of the world. He said:

> I do not look on Anglo-American naval relations as dangerous. Nor do I look on the mercantile marine situation as dangerous. We shall find a way out of that. The really dangerous situation may arise out of our obligations to the League of Nations. Let the American people lay down a peace doctrine which can be as easily understood as the Monroe doctrine. Let the American people say they will not allow a State which makes war and refuses mediation or conciliation to have any access to the material or financial resources of the United States. No country will ever dare to start a war if it knows that America is closed to it and that all countries associated with the League of Nations are closed to it.

In commenting on and repeating Mr. Wickham Stead's apprehensions and clever appeal to the United States the *Manchester Guardian* stated that the cutting off of an aggressor nation by Great Britain in fulfillment of her commitments in the league covenant was an obligation which Great Britain should always be exceedingly reluctant, and, under readily conceivable circumstances, unable to execute so far as American trade was concerned. The article continued:

> The danger is as great to the league as to Anglo-American relations, for it would be fatal to the league if the loyalty of its members were strained to breaking point. The whole danger would, of course, be removed if the United States were a member of the league. Since that is not now practical politics the problem is to find a plan which would enable the league to suppress a war-making State without incurring possible American hostility. There is a party in America which has long urged that the United States could at least go so far as to undertake not to insist upon her neutral rights of trade with a State which the league had declared to be an aggressor, and Mr. Wickham Stead urges that the American people should lay down a peace doctrine which should clearly embody this principle. In detail it might take different forms, but if the American Government would make it plain that it did not intend under any circumstances to make the sanctity of neutral trading rights an obstacle to the effective pursuit of international sanctions by the league, there can be no doubt that she could, without committing herself to the political entanglements of Europe, remove a grave danger to peace.

III. DISARMAMENT VERSUS SECURITY.

(Prepared by O. N. I.)

The preamble to Part V of the Versailles treaty reads as follows: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow." Article 8 of the covenant of the league reads in part as follows: "The members of the league recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety * * *. The council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction." In the correspondence which passed (during the negotiations connected with the treaty of Versailles) between M. Clemenceau, acting on behalf of the allied and associated powers, and the German representative, the latter agreed to the terms proposed for Germany's disarmament "provided this is a beginning of a general reduction of armaments." To this, M. Clemenceau replied that it was "the first step toward that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they (the allied and associated powers) seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventatives of war and which will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

These stipulations of the treaty and the covenant and the agreements contained in the peace negotiation correspondence were apparently not taken very seriously by the league until somewhat less than three years ago. The reason for this was that the league, up to that time, was almost entirely a league of victors, and having disarmed Germany, there was no great desire to disarm themselves. But in the summer of 1925 it became apparent that Germany was soon to enter the league and that such entry would, among other things, call to attention the above clauses of the treaty and the covenant. It would be very poor strategy to give Germany the chance to call the attention of the world to the neglect of the victors to do what they had bound themselves to do and had forced Germany to do. But it was realized that to accomplish the object enunciated in Part V of the treaty—"the limitation of the armaments of *all* nations"—would require considerable preparation, exploration of the subject, and a preliminary reconciliation or at least an understanding of numerous and divergent points of view. Hence the assembly decided that before calling a conference of plenipotentiaries to actually negotiate a treaty limiting the armaments of all powers it would be better to institute an inquiry by a supplementary body which would thoroughly study the vast subject at hand. Accordingly, in the session of September, 1925, the assembly created a body, the "preparatory commission for armament limitation," which body was to be composed of representatives of States which were members of the council, and, in addition, representatives of those States which felt that they had a special interest in the subject of the commission. The commission was charged with making all preparations for a conference for the limitation and reduction of armaments.

The commission first met in the spring of 1926 and has continued its deliberations intermittently since that time, the United States being continually represented. Far from arranging any agenda or making other definite preparations, the commission has so far been unable to even find a satisfactory basis upon which to discuss armament. The outward indications of this primary difficulty have been manifested by disagreements upon such questions as how is limitation to be actually effected; how measured; whether air, land, and sea armament must be considered as a whole, etc.

But, underlying these manifestations, there is a great question before the European nations which must first be satisfactorily answered before further progress can apparently be made. Europe has set up for itself a formulae of peace in which peace is to be obtained through a coordination of disarmament, security, and arbitration. Arbitration forms one of the two principal guarantees of security if their is disarmament. The other principal guarantee is united action (military, naval, or economic) against an agressor nation. But there is a wide divergence of view as to whether disarmament should precede and produce security or whether security is essential before disarmament can be undertaken. Now France and her bloc of continental allies adhere unhesitatingly and uncompromisingly to the latter view. Germany, Russia, and a few others believe in the former course; while Britain appears to be on the fence, if anything being rather lukewarm toward the French thesis.

The reasons for these respective attitudes are, of course, found in the national objectives of the States concerned. France having everything to lose and nothing to gain by changes in her boundaries, being determined that she will not again be invaded and having the greatest army not only of Europe but of the world, refuses to sacrifice the protection which that army assures her unless she is given a quid pro quo in the form of a water-tight guarantee of her security. She says, in effect, "My security is at present in my army; I am certain of this form of security; not believing that the German character is completely altered, I will not sacrifice my assured security for something ephemeral nor sacrifice it in the hope that something may then take place which will satisfactorily replace the security I am assured of by arms." Germany's point of view is predicated upon a quite human desire, namely, that since she is disarmed she wants everybody else to be likewise for she has everything to gain and nothing to lose by this measure. Being disarmed, she believes (what she never believed when she herself was armed) that the armies of Europe are a threat to peace, and that security, since it is a psychological and spiritual rather than a material thing, can never be assured until the threat of arms is removed. Hence she says to France: "You desire security; very well, disarm and, supported by the Lorcarno pact and the league, you will then possess a security of peace whereas now you possess a security of war." These respective German-French views are well expressed by the *Manchester Guardian* as follows: "One party says, get rid of your fears and your armaments will take care of themselves; the other replies, get rid of your armaments and your fears will take care of themselves." Britain tends to straddle the fence because this is in keeping with her historic policy toward the groupings of the continental States. She is inclined toward France not only for political reasons but because she is probably in no haste to disarm herself at sea and because she conceives of the problem of European security as being almost entirely confined to land armaments.

The preparatory commission, then, was brought fact to face with this question of security versus disarmament, and it became apparent in the discussions that no advance could be made along the lines of the latter until the relationship between the two had been investigated and a balance struck. Accordingly, last September the eighth assembly of the league created a commission on arbitration and security and recommended the encouragement of arbitration treaties and regional agreements as implements of fostering an increased sense of security. It was decided that the preparatory commission should also function as the commission on arbitration and security. Accordingly, upon the next meeting of the preparatory commission on November 30 last, this body gave itself another title and organization and proceeded to consider security. Russia refused to participate in the work of the security commission, as did the United States—the latter because the questions to be discussed were distinctly European ones and the United States thought it best to leave to Europe those matters which are peculiarly Europe's own concern. The new commission elected as president Doctor Benes, foreign minister of Czechoslovakia and probably the most brilliant and able statesman that postwar Europe has produced. The commission also elected a committee of rapporteurs and then adjourned until February 20.

It has been mentioned that the general problem facing Europe and its disarmament efforts was the reconciling of disarmament, arbitration, and security. The particular problems which faced the arbitration and security commission have been formulated by Viscount Cecil as follows: (*a*) What alternative method can be devised for giving justice to the nations of the world if they agree to abandon war as an instrument of national policy? (*b*) If the nations agree to a serious scheme of international disarmament, what guaranty are they likely to receive against a sudden and disloyal attack by a neighbor who has secretly retained the means of making aggressive war?

Now it is necessary to briefly note three earlier attempts which had been made in Europe to obtain security and arbitration. The first two of these—the treaty of mutual assistance and the Geneva protocol (1923–24)—proposed schemes of general international arbitration and general compulsory military effort against an aggressor state. (The aggressor was defined as one who went to war without submitting his case to arbitration.) These general and inclusive projects failed, principally because Great Britain refused to commit herself to sanctions in cases where she might not be directly concerned. (In this connection it is of interest to recall how, in 1924, during the régime of the Labor government, Britain tentatively offered to place her fleet at the disposal of the league for the enforcing of sanctions and how this offer was quickly withdrawn because of the storm of protest which arose in England.) Efforts toward some inclusive scheme of security through general compulsory arbitration and sanctions having failed, Europe adopted a new line of attack which found expression in the Locarno pacts. The essence of these pacts is that they are guarantees for a particular area or boundary, entered into only by those powers particularly interested in the area or boundary in question. The most notable of these agreements is that concerning the Franco-German boundary; here Britain agrees that she will take arms against Germany should the latter invade France, of against France should France invade Germany. The distinction between such " regional " and specifically defined agreements and the general, inclusive nature of the Geneva protocol is apparent. The truth of the matter is that the world is as yet not ripe for the protocol but it can hardly be doubted that eventually the theory of the protocol will underlie any instrument insuring the peace and security of Europe and its component parts.

With this background of the conflict of inclusive versus regional agreements, the arbitration and security committee, through its rapporteurs, began to examine anew the existing arbitration and security treaties and the covenant of the league with the aim of extracting from the former such essential principles as might be taken to compose the substance of further treaties or systems of treaties which will give to all the " insecure " States the confidence which might enable them to disarm.

The British and the German Governments sent to the committee memoranda outlining their respective points of view and suggesting the courses which they though best to pursue in order to solve the problem at hand. These memoranda will now be summarized.

(a) *Great Britain*

Those on the Continent who vaguely hoped for some new grandiose British scheme involving acceptance of the optional clause of the World Court (which makes it obligatory for the power concerned to submit to the court for judicial decision, all justiciable disputes) or of the Geneva protocol or suggesting the extension of the Locarno obligations were sadly disappointed. Those in Britain who, while disapproving of further European commitments, still insist that Great Britain should in some way blaze a new trail to world peace, were also disillusioned. The memorandum did nothing more than recapitulate in concise form the already known British views on arbitration and security, with some added warnings directed to continental States which look to Great Britain to carry the chief burden of European peace.

With regard to arbitration, after explaining why the optional clause of the World Court (a clause, which each nation may agree to at its own option, binding the nation so agreeing to submit all justiciable disputes to the court) was unacceptable, it advanced only two lines where progress in arbitration was faintly possible. One had to do with the broadening of the stipulation providing for the arbitration of disputes relating to the interpretation or application of treaties, the other with the possible widening of the scope of agreements dealing with justiciable disputes with particular reference to the formula of "vital interests, honor, independence, and the interests of third States."

With regard to security, the memorandum had nothing to offer except advice. It reaffirmed the Government's fixed intention not to contract any fresh undertakings of the Locarno character. It suggested that States feeling themselves endangered in any particular direction might follow the lead given them at Locarno and negotiate similar treaties. Its reference to the fact that no further treaties on the Locarno model had yet been registered with the League of Nations has been considered as a neat thrust at the treaties concluded by France with the Little Entente Nations (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania). The memorandum continued "in the opinion of His Majesty's Government such local guaranties (i. e., treaties of the Locarno type), directed to a specific danger and based on well-defined obligations, are infinitely more satisfactory than any comprehensive or universal scheme, which must necessarily be drawn in vaguer and more general terms and of which, consequently, the modus operandi and the probable efficacy must remain to some extent a matter of speculation * * * "—an oblique reference to some of the recent proposals advanced at the league by the French bloc and, possibly, to the American proposal for a collective treaty renouncing all war.

The memorandum further stated that the British Government "have felt constrained on more than one occasion to express themselves as opposed to the application of hard and fast rules to the interpretation of articles of the covenant." This last section is important, as it would seem to bear directly on the interpretation believed to be given by some continental States to certain articles of the covenant, notably articles 15 and 16. Successive British Governments have declined to accept the French interpretation of article 15 whereby individual league members, under certain circumstances and at their own individual discretion, could resort to war by entering an armed conflict "for the maintenance of right and justice." And with regard to article 16, the British Government may doubtless have desired to point out to those States. Members of the league, which advance the theory that Great Britain can automatically be involved in military sanctions without consulting the British Parliament, that the league council can only *recommend* the nature of the military force league members shall severally contribute to the common cause against an offending State.

The memorandum ended with an expression of the impracticability of any endeavors to define an "aggressor," the position already assumed by the British Government (and concurred in by our own). Whether or not its reasons may be considered justified, British unwillingness on this score is only part of the usual British policy of avoiding fixed rules which later might serve a purpose for which they were not intended. In short, Great Britain apparently prefers to be in a position to determine who an "aggressor" may be at any particular time and according to the circumstances. Throughout the memorandum the British Government is referred to as "His Majesty's Government in Great Britain."

The sum and substance of the British memorandum would seem to be that the other European States must look to themselves to insure their own security. The effect of this upon the work of the committee and upon the league efforts in general can well be imagined.

(*b*) *Germany*

The German memorandum accepts the optional clause of the World Court as offering "a satisfactory possibility" for the settlement of justiciable disputes (the German Government has previously accepted this jurisdiction of the permanent court, which Great Britain has refused). But, the memorandum continues to say, the question of highest importance is the settlement of nonjusticiable (i. e., political) disputes; Germany does not deem it practicable that, at present, purely political disputes can be settled by the obligatory procedure of an arbitration court. The memorandum suggests that the idea of mediation by the league council might be further developed. (But it might be suggested, in passing, that hell is paved with good intentions of mediation.)

The memorandum agrees with Britain in one particular, namely, that it condemns a rigid and inclusive system like the Geneva protocol. It expresses skepticism with regard to the value of international sanctions (penalties). And it reenunciates the German view when it states that attempts at security will be rendered much more effective by general disarmament "which in itself contains one of the most essential elements of security." Security, the memorandum says, must proceed from the peaceful treatment of all conflicts and not from sanctions or warlike measures.

In closing, the memorandum speaks favorably of such regional instruments as the Locarno pact and suggests what should, it is believed, form the background of all attempts at peace through security, namely, that the security of one State must not be achieved at the cost of the insecurity of another.

As a chain has the strength of its weakest link, so the scope of any plan for security and arbitration is determined by the attitude of the country which is ready to make the least concessions. France and her continental allies, it will be remembered, have consistently advocated such a general and "all-in" agreement as the Geneva protocol. In fact, Doctor Benes, the chairman of the rapporteurs for the security and arbitration committee, was one of the guiding spirits, if not the actual architect, of the protocol. But the memoranda of Great Britain and Germany set the pace for the rapporteurs; for a plan of security and arbitration which did not meet the views of those two countries would be entirely worthless. On February 13 the rapporteurs announced the result of their investigations and made their recommendations.

The chief feature of their report was the advocacy of regional agreements on the order of Locarno as opposed to a general security pact, on the order of the protocol. It was recommended that these regional agreements include the following provisions: (*a*) Exclusion of resort to war; (*b*) pacific settlement of disputes on a basis of obligatory arbitration for judicial disputes and conciliation procedure for other disputes; (*c*) establishment of a system of mutual assistance against aggression, in conjunction with the league council; (*d*) general institution of demilitarized zones. In addition to this, the rapporteurs suggested that hard and fast definitions of an "aggressor" should be avoided or that the powers might agree to empower the council to declare an armistice upon the outbreak of hostilities and that the nation disregarding this armistice would become the aggressor.

Two features of this program are worth noting in passing. First, the agreements were contemplated to be made not between friends but between prospective enemies; this is in marked contrast with the pre-war basis of agreements. Second, an agreement between two countries that they will in no case make war on one another ("*a*" above) is quite different from an agreement between two countries that they will help one another if attacked by a third party ("*c*" above). As Lord Cecil has pointed out, the latter, while quite unobjectionable on paper, is nothing but a treaty of defense on the old model—which is quite apt to drift into an ordinary treaty of alliance with the consequent creation of the old balance of power; such is the danger inherent in regional agreements.

With these recommendations of the rapporteurs before it, the full committee of arbitration and security met on February 20 to discuss these recommendations and evolve something concrete therefrom.

During the course of these discussions, certain national attitudes were made known by the various delegates, some of which were of course merely repetition of former assertions. For instance, Great Britain (through Lord Cushendun) dismissed the idea of a general treaty; opposed the rapporteurs' idea of an armistice upon the outbreak of war because (she said) such action would be impractical and ineffective; drew a very sharp distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable disputes, the former, she believed, should be submitted to arbitration, the latter to conciliation, and she declared herself willing to support both arbitration and conciliation treaties *with one qualification*, namely, that she could not accept for either form of dispute, machinery which admitted of no reservations (conciliation to be effected through a permanent body of five—each signatory to appoint one national and to invite one neutral and the chairman to be jointly chosen); and, finally, Lord Cushenden ridiculed the idea of model treaties for, he said, in effect, anybody can draw up a model treaty but applying it to certain peculiar conditions is quite another thing. The views expressed by the other powers at the session of the committee depended upon whether they stood to lose or gain by a revision of the present boundaries.

In concluding its labors for the present, the committee drew up six model treaties—three dealing with arbitration and conciliation and three with mutual assistance and nonaggression (security). It was stated that it was of great advantage to have identical texts for arbitration and conciliation pacts because the system of arbitration could thus be more easily generalized. The security pacts were largely fashioned after the Locarno instruments

Upon concluding these tasks the committee adjourned until June when there is to be a " second reading " of the draft treaties, in preparation for submitting them to the annual meeting of the assembly of the league in September.

These rather intricate, if not monotonous, details of the work and results of the arbitration and security committee (which, be it remembered, is a subcommittee of the preparatory disarmament commission, which, in turn, was created by the league to prepare for an universal disarmament conference) have been traced to indicate how Europe is wallowing in technicalities, pacts, protocols, formulas, committees, commissions, etc., in a mechanical effort to set up a mechanically assured peace. Europe generally seems to admit that the arbitration and security committee accomplished little; that when it came to the basic and nationalistic points of divergence among its members, it could do no more than had already been done; and occasionally a voice is raised in ridicule, recalling how at the outbreak of the World War there were no less than 67 arbitration treaties in force and how not one of these had the slightest effect in checking the catastrophe. Europe, it would seem, is endeavoring to carry, on one shoulder, guaranteed and certain peace; and, on the other, what each nation deems to be, for itself, absolute security and absolute protection of " vital interests." The results so far are not encouraging.

(The recent correspondence between the Governments of France and the United States regarding the outlawing of war have awakened much interest and comment in Europe and have had an important bearing upon the recent disarmament security and arbitration efforts of the league. The beginning of this correspondence was traced in the February BULLETIN in an article entitled " Treaty negotiations with France." This correspondence is not yet completed but when this point is reached, its developments will be reported upon in a special article in the BULLETIN.)

IV. THE ABOLITION OF THE SUBMARINE.

[*Prepared by O. N. I.*]

The recent action on the part of our Secretary of State, announcing our readiness to abolish submarines provided the other powers would do likewise, raises again a question which has been a recurrent one since the close of the war. This article will attempt to sketch the background of the subject and note the effect which the secretary's proposal has had upon the other nations of the world.

The active advent of the submarine in the World War brought forth such a new aspect to naval warfare and raised so many new problems that the legal status of its activities was clouded and the submarine itself became an anathema to most peoples. The disputes which it engendered ranged principally between combatants and neutrals. There are given below extracts from official documents setting forth various views of the United States and other Governments on questions raised by the submarine warfare.

(*a*) *Secretary of State to United States ambassador in Berlin, May 13, 1917:*

"The Government of the United States desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative."

(*b*) *Letter of Secretary of State to the British ambassador, January 18, 1916:*

"I do not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper use of submarines in the interruption of enemy commerce, since those instruments of war have proven their effectiveness in this particular branch of warfare on the high seas." (In spirit, at least, a contradiction of (*a*) and (*d*). But (*b*) was addressed to the British, while (*a*) and (*d*) were to the German Government.)

(*The Secretary continues*, setting forth a proposed agreement between all combatants, some of the stipulations of which are as follows:)

"A merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be attacked without being ordered to stop.

"An enemy merchant vessel, when ordered to do so by a belligerent submarine, should immediately stop.

"Such vessel should not be attacked after being ordered to stop unless it attempts to flee or resist, and, in case it ceases to flee or resist, the attack should be discontinued.

"In the event that it is impossible to place a prize crew on board an enemy merchant vessel or convoy it into port, the vessel may be sunk, provided the crew and passengers have been removed to a place of safety."

(*The Secretary continues*, on another subject:)

"Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive armament."

"It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels * * * that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever."

"I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly." (Note: Our Government has reversed its stand in this matter by taking the opposite view at the recent Habana conference.)

(*c*) *Reply of the British ambassador to* (*b*), *March 23, 1916:*

"From a strictly legal standpoint, it must be admitted that the arming of merchant vessels for defense is their acknowledged right."

(*d*) *Secretary of State to United States ambassador at Berlin, April 18, 1916:*

"The use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce, is, of necessity * * * utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, and long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of noncombatants."

(*e*) *Memorandum from the French Embassy to the State Department, August 21, 1916:*

"In view of the present condition of things, the Allied Governments hold that: Submarine vessels must be excluded from the benefit of the rules heretofore accepted in international law regarding the admission and sojourn of war and merchant in the neutral waters; any submarine of the belligerents that once enters a neutral harbor must be held there."

(*f*) *Memorandum of the United States to the French Embassy, August 31, 1916 in reply to* (*e*)*:*

"So far as the treatment of either war or merchant submarines in American waters is concerned, the Government of the United States reserves its liberty of action in all respects and will treat such vessels, as, in its opinion, becomes the action of a power which may be said to have taken the first steps toward establishing the principles of neutrality."

Under the above, the United States set forth the following:

Recognition of right of submarine warfare against commerce, although emphasizing that this is exceedingly difficult to accomplish legally.

Suggested rules of submarine warfare against merchant ships, they being the same, in substance, as for surface vessels.

The opinion that the arming of merchant ships alters the status of such ships to that of auxiliary cruisers.

Submarines, in neutral waters, have the same privileges and obligations as do surface craft.

Washington Arms Conference

At the Washington conference the question, first, of submarine limitation and then of abolition, became one of the most bitterly discussed topics. The controversy was principally between Great Britain and France, the latter actively supported by Italy and Japan. A synopsis of the various views expressed upon this occasion will now be given:

Great Britain.—(*a*) Submarines were by their nature illegal and dastardly instruments which were powerful for destruction of lines of commerce but powerless to protect them.

(*b*) The submarine question was of transcendent importance to the British Empire.

(*c*) If France proposed to build 90,000 tons of submarines, Great Britain could not place any limitation of any kind on auxiliary vessels.

(*d*) Great Britain desired not limitation, but complete abolition of the submarine.

France.—(*a*) Believes that submarines are a necessity as a defense to nations scantily supplied with capital ships.

(*b*) Submarines will have to protect French colonies and communication lines.

(*c*) In the question of submarine limitation, all nations possessing submarines should be consulted.

(*d*) Can not accept agreement based on the principle that the total tonnage of submarines and auxiliary craft should be in direct proportion to capital ship tonnage. In its opinion, the contrary view is the rational one.

(*e*) France can not accept abolition of submarines; reduction of total tonnage below what it considers an irreducible minimum (90,000 tons); or a limit on individual submarine tonnage.

Japan.—(*a*) Considered the submarine a necessary and effective weapon of defense.

(*b*) Disapproved of abolition of submarines.

Italy.—(*a*) The submarine is an indispensable weapon for the defense of the Italian coasts.

(*b*) All powers possessing submarines should be a party to submarine limitation.

(*c*) French naval program gave Italy serious concern.

(*d*) Disapproved of abolition of submarine.

United States.—The United States did not definitely express its views regarding the abolition of submarines. The original proposals advanced by Mr. Hughes did not contemplate such abolition, and later Mr. Hughes read into the record the report of the advisory committee to our delegation, which report was opposed to abolition. However, Mr. Hughes stated that he read this report, not as the opinion of the Government but as simply that of the committee. Later in the proceedings Mr. Hughes stated that a widespread feeling had been aroused in the United States against the submarine, but as not all of the submarine powers were represented at the conference, it would be difficult to speak of abolition. However, if later it were at any time feasible to take the matter up, the United States would give it most serious attention. The general impression created was that the United States was not disposed to abolish submarines, but it refrained from definitely committing itself in this matter because it was not forced to do so.

Although the conference did fail to abolish or even limit submarines, it did draw up a treaty relating to the use of submarines. This treaty was signed by the five principal naval powers. This treaty is rather ambiguous and contradictory and has never gone into effect because never ratified by France. Hence (*b*) and (*c*) below are legally noneffective. The treaty stipulates:

(*a*) Established rules of international law governing submarine warfare against merchant vessels. These rules are simply statements of existing international law applied to submarines. These are in effect among the signatory powers, regardless of the existing noneffectiveness of the treaty as a whole.

(*b*) That the signatories accept as binding on themselves "the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers," and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto. This stipulation does not go into effect until the treaty as a whole is in effect. Its ambiguity in the term "commerce destroyers" and its conflict with (*a*) are apparent.

(*c*) That any person in the service of any power who shall violate any of humane rules of existing law with respect to attacks upon, and the seizure and destruction of, merchant ships shall be liable to trial and punishment for piracy by the civil or military authorities of any power. This stipulation does not take effect until the treaty as a whole is in effect. It is replete with uncertainties within itself and constitutes a sweeping change in international law.

To date, then, the United States is legally bound by the generally accepted precepts of international law regarding submarine warfare which are, in brief, that the submarine must conduct its warfare under the same restrictions as do surface vessels; and furthermore, it is, in a sense, morally (though not legally) bound by the stipulations of the submarine treaty of Washington because that treaty was signed and accepted by our Government and ratified by our Senate.

Present attitude of the Government

On January 28, 1928, the Secretary of State addressed a letter to Representative L. A. Frothingham regarding a House resolution which the latter had introduced which expressed the opinion of the Congress against the use of submarines. In this letter the Secretary said: "The United States would be willing to sign a treaty with all of the powers of the world prohibiting the use of submarines entirely." Again, during the official visit of the Secretary of State to Ottawa, a short time later, the Secretary reiterated these views. This marks the first definite expression of our Government in regard to the abolition of submarines.

The reactions which this suggestion have inspired in the principal naval powers will now be summarized.

Italy.—The attitude of Italy toward the proposal was largely one of ridicule. Italy, it was said, could never agree to abolish submarines as these constituted one of her principal means of defense. Furthermore, the idea of America proposing such a course was, it was said, not to be taken seriously, as such a move was instigated by domestic political considerations.

France.—The proposal of the United States came as an unpleasant surprise to France, upon the eve of the signing of the Franco-American treaty of arbitration which was to mark the celebration of 150 years since the first Franco-American treaty was signed by Benjamin Franklin. The French took the following viewpoint in regard to this proposal: France can not afford large capital ships and cruisers; yet she must keep open her communications to her colonies in Africa, and for this purpose submarines are her cheapest and most effective weapons; France will never use these craft as did the Germans and, therefore, the submarine in French hands is as legal a weapon as battleships or cruisers. France explained her viewpoint thoroughly at Washington and stood in direct and unyielding opposition to Britain's proposal to abolish submarines. At that time, France had to bear the brunt of world criticism because of her attitude. This attitude was and is based upon circumstances which do not change and hence the factors underlying French need for submarines are as effective and as well known to-day as in 1922. Hence, as far as accomplishing anything, the proposals of the United States resemble the whipping of a dead horse. But, although these proposals are entirely ineffectual (and America knew that they would be ineffectual), nevertheless they again create an embarrassing position for France such as arose at Washington.

Such are the thoughts of France in regard to the proposal of the United States and from these there arose a feeling that was rather bitter. Fortunately, the French say, the proposals were not made to the French Government, and hence no official reply is needed, and France does not again have to publicly and officially state her case.

Japan.—The Japanese press is in agreement in believing that the suggestion is impracticable. Several papers recall the attempt made at the Washington conference to prohibit the use of submarines; and they believe that the circumstances which then led France and Italy to reject the proposal are still existent and would frustrate any similar attempt made at the present time.

The papers state that the Japanese naval authorities are not disposed to consider the suggestion seriously. Their opinion seems to be that the Secretary's announcement was a response to the horror which the recent submarine disaster in the United States brought forth, and that it is an expression of humanitarian feelings rather than a practicable proposal.

This point of view is clearly reflected in the editorials. The *Asahi* points out that the purpose of all forms of armament is the destruction of life, and that submarines must be retained by those powers "not rich enough to provide themselves with capital ships of sufficient strength." While this paper disclaims any suspicion of the honesty of purpose of the United States in advancing the suggestion, it observes that the American naval program "is liable to make one doubt their true intentions." The *Yorodzu*, which is consistently hostile to the United States, states "That the American Secretary of State made the announcement with his eyes wide open to the fact (of French and Italian opposition) seems to indicate that he intended it as a *ballon d'essai* for a future international disarmament conference. It may have been a device to influence the forthcoming presidential election in favor of his party." The Tokyo *Jiji*, as one of the most reliable papers, publishes the following as purporting to give the views of the Japanese naval authorities:

> We have received no official reports on the American proposal. It would appear, however, that the proposal is prompted for humanitarian reasons following the loss of the *S-4*. It is doubtful, however, if that will carry any weight in concluding a treaty. The submarine is the only effective weapon for countries with small navies and since France and Italy intend to make up in submarines for their weakness in ships of other types, it is plain that they would not readily assent to the proposal. At any rate, no treaty could be consummated unless all countries the world over agreed to the total abolishment of submarines.

The Japanese are not eager to see the abolition of submarines. Although the maintenance of an effective blockade could not directly bring about its defeat, it would undoubtedly cause Japan grave embarrassment in time of war and preclude any hope of victory. On the other hand, its island possessions are so distributed and the configuration of its coast line is such that it would be virtually impossible for a hostile fleet to maintain a full blockade against determined attacks by Japanese submarines. For this reason the value of this weapon to the Japanese as a defensive instrument can not be overemphasized. In recent years, however, the tendency in naval construction is to make the submarines capable of offensive operations, particularly against merchant vessels. It must be apparent to the Japanese that their submarines could not operate from far-removed bases with sufficient effect against American commerce, or against the commerce of any other western power, to influence the ultimate decision by major naval operations. On the other hand, the United States, Great Britain and France could employ submarines to good effect against Japanese commerce, for they possess bases from which Japan would be well within the cruising range of the modern submarine. In view of these considerations, the Japanese have indicated more interest in the possibility of limiting the size of submarines, so that they may be used for defensive purposes only, than in proposals to abolish this type of vessel or to allot by treaty maximum tonnages which each power might possess in submarines.

Great Britain.—The reception accorded to Mr. Kellogg's declaration that the United States would be willing to sign a treaty with all powers prohibiting the use of the submarine has, in a way, resembled that given to the American proposal to France for a multilateral treaty renouncing all war. In short, the declaration has been received with favor, but with marked skepticism as to any concrete result. Reference has been made to similar British proposals, notably that of Lord Balfour during the Washington conference. Some regret has been expressed that the United States had not seen fit to adopt its present attitude at that time.

But it is fully recognized in Britain that the submarine is a menace primarily to those powers maintaining, or about to maintain, a big navy for the protection of their lines of commerce, and that its abolition excites little, if any, enthusiasm in countries not similarly placed. The British viewpoint is clearly that if France and Italy refuse to adhere, such a treaty is out of the question. The British attitude, therefore, depends entirely on the French and Italians for the quite obvious reason that the Mediterranean is Great Britain's most important sea channel of communication. Japan, it is believed, would be taken less into consideration than hitherto chiefly because of the difficulty in any event of policing an area as large as the Pacific. The Mediterranean, an inclosed sea controlling the entrance to the Suez, Britain's pathway to India, is quite another matter. The British Government, upon being questioned in Parliament in regard to the proposal of Mr. Kellogg, stated that the British views in favor of abolition were made known at Washington and repeated at Geneva last summer, but that, of course, it was an essential condition, as Mr. Kellogg indicated, that abolition must be universal.

Hence, the reactions from this ballon d'essai (if such it was) of our Government indicate that the other powers consistently maintain their national views as expressed at the Washington conference and that the United States alone has changed and definitely committed itself as favoring the universal abolition of the submarine.

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The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between March 25 and April 25, inclusive.

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

FRENCH CARRIER BÉARN. RECENTLY COMPLETED, 25,000 TONS. ORIGINALLY LAID DOWN AS BATTLESHIP

CONFIDENTIAL

O. N. I. MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

VOL. X   MAY, 1928   No. 11

BRAZIL

A. POLITICAL

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

1. *Political Review.*

FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN INTERNAL POLITICS.

In general it may be said that Brazil is free from foreign influence in her internal affairs. Brazilians have a strongly national consciousness and promptly resent any suggestion of foreign interference. While the visit of Mr. Lloyd George in January, 1928, was in no sense an official one, it took on a political aspect when he improved the opportunity in an address at an official banquet tendered him, to exhort Brazil to return to the League of Nations. The present administration is said to be in favor of no further participation in the League's activities, as it is felt that the League is concerned almost exclusively with matters in which Brazil has little interest. (NOTE.—Brazil withdrew from the League two years ago.—ED.)

BEARING OF INTERNAL POLITICES ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

Internal political conditions have little influence or bearing on Brazil's foreign policy. Her own problems are economic rather than political. She seeks markets for her considerable exportation and desires to cultivate the nations which appear to be potential customers. The United States is decidedly the best customer Brazil has for coffee and is a heavy buyer of other products.

FOREIGN POLICIES AND RELATIONS.

(*a*) GENERAL AIMS, IMPORTANT POLICIES OR DOCTRINES

Brazil's international viewpoint is guided wholly by economic considerations. Her foreign policy is largely directed toward the development of markets for her products. She has enormous areas of uncultivated land and desires immigration. Fundamentally, her economic aspiration is to become self-sustaining.

She has no serious international question to settle, as nearly all of her boundaries are definitely marked, and she does not seek controversy with her neighbors. She considers that her occupation of half the territory of the continent and her heavier population entitle her to leadership in South American affairs.

All Latin America, aside from Brazil, is of Spanish origin, language, and traditions. This, in a sense, isolates Brazil from the others and gives rise to the fear that Argentina, and not Brazil, may lead them.

The traditional interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in Brazil has stressed its original purpose—that outside nations should not interfere in the affairs of the young American nations. A broader interpretation and application, however, grew out of the Pan American movement, and it became the tendency to refer to the Monroe doctrine as establishing the principle that America should not become entangled in the conflicts of Europe.

A still broader application was made at the time of Brazil's entrance into the League of Nations, which had for its purpose the application of the aims of the Monroe doctrine to the whole world. Since Brazil's recent experience with the league and her decision to withdraw from that body, most Brazilian political writers in connection with international issues are cynically disposed toward such an application and plead for a closer union of all the American countries in accordance with the original aims of Pan-Americanism and the Monroe doctrine: To secure solidarity and peace among the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

There is no sympathy on the part of the Government or of the public toward a definite Pan-Latin movement or union. This is due primarily to the influence and strong hold upon the country of the Pan-American idea.

(*b*) RELATIONS TO OTHER IMPORTANT POWERS; RECENT TREATIES

Argentina.—The keen rivalry for leadership in South America between Argentina and Brazil is the basis for a certain amount of suspicion and distrust reflected generally in Brazilian public opinion, and also in the formulation of strategic plans and policies which are largely predicated upon Argentina as a potential aggressor. There is a definite restrained rivalry between the two countries over their respective influence in Paraguay and Uruguay. Brazil regards Argentina's claim to the whole of the River Platte as unjust to Uruguay, and while Brazil does not directly interfere or attempt to exert her influence, it is believed that she would aid either of these small republics against undue Argentine influence. The question of relative rights to the enormous undeveloped power of the Iguassu Falls also looms up for future disagreement.

Chile.—Brazil formerly was closely allied with Chile, the common ground for this understanding being opposition to Argentina, as both countries then had boundary disputes with her. These having been settled, Brazil has shown no desire for particular association with

Chile and has met with indifference advances and proposals made, particularly that of naval limitation. Brazil feels more at home in the Peruvian-Bolivian pro-American group, which naturally discourages ideas of Brazilian-Chilean cordiality.

Other South American countries.—Benevolent indifference, with the desire that they shall look to Brazil for leadership rather than to Argentina.

Portugal.—Sentimental attachment on account of blood, language, and traditions. But for the Portuguese capacity and Portugal as a political unit Brazil feels a profound contempt, as she does for Spain also.

France and Italy.—Great admiration as centers of music, art, and literature. Brazil is fond of referring to herself as a "Latin race" and regards the accomplishments and achievements of the European Latin nations as her own.

England.—Profound respect for the commercial capacity of the British and for their military and maritime power as evidenced in the Great War. The Britisher enjoys a reputation for character and integrity higher than that of most other foreigners.

Other European nations.—Good-natured indifference, so long as they continue buying Brazilian coffee.

Japan.—There is a recent tendency on the part of Brazil to encourage Japanese immigration. This is reflected in the press and in recent publications. There is a strong encouragement of Japanese immigration by the Para government. The Federal Government itself, however, is disinclined to give very active support to plans for the importation of inordinately large numbers of any one nationality.

United States.—Brazil is the outstanding nation of importance in South America traditionally friendly to the United States and upholding our policies in general, the history of the diplomatic relations between the two countries bearing frequent witness to this sentiment of cordiality and mutual esteem. It was less than three months after the reading of President Monroe's message that the Brazilian Government proposed to the United States an offensive and defensive alliance on the basis of the Monroe doctrine, acting on the principle that it was not in accordance with justice and right that sacrifices, such as those which the United States undertook to make for the other American nations, should be accepted gratuitously. Again, of deep significance in this connection was the later action of the Brazilian Government in the World War in adopting the policy of the United States in declaring war on Germany.

Brazil's League of Nations policy in endeavoring to secure a permanent seat was also in line with her general aspirations in upholding the interests of America—in this case aiming at representation of the American Continent in the absence of the United States from the league.

The A. B. C. treaty.—The principal pact for the preservation of peace in South America was negotiated in 1915, signed by Argentina, Chile, and Brazil and known as the A. B. C. treaty. This treaty never became effective, as Argentina refused to ratify it. As far as known there are no treaties of alliance between any South American States.

(*c*) GENERAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION

Brazil's general international situation is satisfactory and there are no serious international issues pending at the present time. Brazil offers a market for manufactured goods, particularly machinery of all kinds, but gradually industries within the country are being started which will supply her needs. This is true especially of small articles.

Brazil expects tremendous development during the next few years. Brazilian writers frequently quote Roosevelt's opinion that, as the nineteenth century belonged to North America the twentieth will belong to South America.

NOTE.—Attention is invited to the article in the January *Bulletin* entitled "Latin American Relationships" for an exposition into the general subject of relations between the South American States.—ED.

FRANCE

A. NAVAL

1. Trial Runs of Light Cruiser "Duquesne."

The 10,000-ton light cruiser *Duquesne* (one of the four of this class now building) is at present undergoing trial runs off the coast of Lorient.

The following are the chief characteristics of the *Duquesne:*

Tonnage	10,000 tons.
Keel laid	October, 1924.
Completed	January, 1928.
Machinery	4 Rateau geared engines (turbines).
Horsepower	130,000.
Speed	33 knots.
Battery	Eight 8-inch; eight 3-inch antiaircraft; eight 1.5-inch antiaircraft.
Torpedo tubes	Six 21.7-inch.
Radius	5,000 miles at 15 knots.
Seaplanes	Two.
Complement	Officers, 30; men, 592.

Result of trial runs (press reports).—Maximum speed under forced draft (duration, 1 hour), 35.32 knots; speed maintained for 24 hours at 70,000 horsepower, 30 knots; fuel consumption per hour at speed of 30 knots, 30 tons; fuel consumption per hour at speed of 34 knots, 60 tons; fuel consumption per hour at speed of 15 knots, 4 tons.

NOTE.—In addition to the four vessels of this 10,000-ton class, France has constructed since the war three cruisers of 7,900 tons.—ED.

2. *Submarine Construction in France.*

An idea of the importance of the submarine shipbuilding industry in France may be gleaned from the construction of submarines for other countries by French firms since after the war. Submarines built, or building—

For Poland: One submarine mine layer (980 tons).
For Lithuania: Two submarines (400 tons).
For Serbia: Two submarines (809 tons).
For Greece: Five submarines (600 to 730 tons).

These submarines follow the general outline of the French 600-ton coastal submarine (*Ondine* class).

The above submarine construction represents a commercial value of 200 million francs ($80,000,000).

In addition to the above, French shipbuilding yards have built, or are building, 55 submarine units for the French Navy.

B. POLITICAL

1. *Foreign Policies and Relations.*

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

(a) BEARING OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

There are at present only two outstanding national questions having a bearing upon international relations. One is the question of international debts and the other that of security from attack. All political parties and all Frenchmen are interested in these questions and they are the subject of discussion amongst individuals and in the press; however, neither of them constitutes a political issue, above all neither constitutes a partisan issue. It can not be said that there are political parties or groups in France which favor paying the debts, or canceling them, and others which oppose these solutions. Similarly with regard to security, outside of the very small group of communists, all parties insist that whatever the Government does with respect to Germany, whether singly or in conjunction with France's former allies, the question of insuring the country against an armed attack from her eastern neighbors should never be lost sight of. This sentiment has nothing to do with politics, partisan or otherwise: it is a racial instinct, and no argument on the subject, however seemingly well founded, has any effect upon the average Frenchman.

The Locarno treaties for the moment have calmed the fears which have assailed all Frenchmen ever since the rejection by the United States and Great Britain of the treaty guaranteeing France against attack from Germany. It is true that there are many Frenchmen who are still far from convinced that the Locarno pacts ensure their country from German menace: nevertheless, the cries of alarm heard on every hand three years ago seem now to be lessened, perhaps through the prevailing uncertainty in regard to national finances and the fear of seeing the socialists come into power.

Because of her embarrassing financial situation France's foreign creditors have been slow in pressing for a final settlement of the interallied debts. The French Government itself has been dilatory regarding a settlement hoping that delay might bring about a more favorable attitude on the part of the creditors toward whole or partial cancellation. France has considered that her sacrifices in men during the war offset the sacrifices of other nations in money. In other words, she considered British and American loans as subsidies: that is, contributions to a common cause by nations in duty bound to contribute whatever they had available: and that cancellation would be only an act of justice. Although the Governments of Great Britain and the United States do not favor this cancellation, it is recognized that any settlement must include a long moratorium and a considerable reduction.

One other internal question bearing indirectly upon foreign relations is the length of military service and the size of the army resulting from the term of service decided upon. On this matter there is a division somewhat along party lines. The conservative groups in principle favor a longer term of service and a larger army: the radical groups demand a reduction, decrying a larger army and so-called militarism. It is to be noted that since the armistice the term has been reduced from 3 to 1½ years and according to a recent vote of Parliament it will, in 1929, be reduced to 1 year. This action is a result in part of the sense of security which the Locarno agreements have produced on the official mind, but its adoption has come about by the intense agitation of the left groups of the chamber. The socialists have made it a party cry and many radical-socialists joined in. In part it is an election maneuver and probably a necessary one for the government.

(b) GENERAL AIMS.

France's foreign policy since the treaty of Versailles was signed has been dominated by her own conflicting interests. It was necessary that Germany should pay reparations or France would go bankrupt; in order to pay much, Germany had to become prosperous; if she became prosperous she would become powerful, and the moment she was powerful she would again attack France. To protect herself from this contingency, France proceeded to strengthen Poland and the Little Entente, loaned them money which she could ill spare, and made political and military conventions with these countries. Ambition and sentiment likewise played a part in such decisions. This policy of alliances conduced to the estrangement of Great Britain, convinced as she already was that a prostrate Germany was a disaster for British trade. At the same time Great Britain objected to making a military convention for the defense of France against Germany, and refused to aid France in forceful measures intended to make Germany pay. France felt the need of Great Britain's support, and to obtain or keep it she has shown a willingness to concede much along every line except in the matter of her security from German attack. Thus France's foreign policy was at every step dominated by anxiety over the war which every Frenchman believed Germany was preparing and by the desire to propitiate or enlist the support of other nations which are in a position to help when the critical moment arrives.

This was the situation up to the signing of the Locarno agreements and Germany's entry into the League of Nations. These events have brought France and Great Britain closer together, and if they have not diminished the old prevalent fear and suspicion of Germany, they have at least given rise to the belief—slowly augmenting—that Germany is now less free to prepare her revenge than she was and that in case she decided upon war France would not be left alone to meet the attack.

(c) RELATIONS TO OTHER POWERS; ALLIANCES; TREATIES.

The signing of the Locarno pacts in October, 1925, and Germany's entry into the League of Nations have placed French foreign relations in a more satisfactory state than they have been since the armistice. There is first the Rhineland treaty basically between France, Belgium, and Germany guaranteed by England and Italy; second, the technical arbitration treaty between Germany and France; third, a similar treaty between Germany and Belgium; fourth, an arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland; and fifth, an arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia. There is also an agreement of mutual guarantee between France and Poland and a similar guarantee between France and Czechoslovakia. An arbitration treaty between France and Yugoslavia was signed on November 11, 1927. The French foreign office announced that this treaty falls within the requirements of the League of Nations and the Locarno agreements. These arrangements have resulted in a calming down of anger and fear toward Germany and the establishment of more comfortable relations.

Following the signing of these treaties Mr. Briand, the Foreign Minister, declared that the Rhenish pact was a voluntary recognition of the treaty of Versailles, since Germany now freely recognized the territorial status quo and proclaimed the inviolability of the Franco-German-Belgian frontiers determined in June, 1919. Furthermore, Germany and France were now reciprocally pledged not to resort to war until arbitration has been fully tried and failed. This points toward peace at last, with French security assured better than it had ever been before.

Franco-British friendship has been at various times severely tested since the war due to the opposing interests of the two countries. Great Britain has not favored such indemnities from Germany as would lead to crippling a good customer; she has feared to see France take Germany's place as master of the Continent, and she has felt that it was unsafe and unwise to guarantee the frontiers of Poland and other European States. She was willing to guarantee only to France and Belgium the frontiers established by the treaty of Versailles. France felt she could not accept the limited guarantee offered by Great Britain, and stoutly held out for reparations payment in full from Germany. The Dawes plan and the Locarno treaties have now adjusted these disagreements and French quarrels with Great Britain seem over.

France's relations with Italy during recent years have been largely at the mercy of the press—free, but often irresponsible in France; in Italy, chauvinistic and seemingly seeking by its tone to curry favor with the Fascist Government. France was accused of harboring enemies of the Fascist régime and of permitting anti-Fascist newspapars to poison French opinion regarding Italy and encourage Italian malcontents. France's Republican press, and especially the Communist sheets, criticized Fascist methods of government with a frankness wholly unacceptable across the Alps. The reply of the Italian press was to assail French Republicans for the disorder and license they permit and even encourage. Here was a bitter dispute regarding two theories of government added to the older and more materialistic causes of friction. Among these latter may be mentioned Tangier, Tunis, the frontier of Libya, rivalry of influence in the Balkans and Italy's claim to mandates. At last, in December, 1927, the machinery of rapprochement was started by Mr. Briand, aided by England's influence and accepted by Mr. Mussolini. Great hopes are now held for the success of these negotiations.

Russia's political relations with France have become about what they are with Great Britain or indeed with the United States, except the fact of formal recognition. Sporadic efforts are made to create a current of trade between the two countries but nothing ever comes of it. The conference for the settlement of the Russian debts to France has died of anaemia and is only brought up from time to time for political purposes. There is no likelihood of any satisfactory solution resulting.

Mr. Rakowsky's recall as ambassador to France was the occasion of a line-up in the country of those for and those against continuing diplomatic relations with the Soviets. The contest ended in a draw—Mr. Rakowsky was sent away but diplomatic relations continue, thanks to support from the radical left.

France and Spain finally came together and successfully eliminated the Riff problem. The congenital indifference of all Spaniards to what goes on outside of Spain, combined with their happy self-satisfaction, makes of Spain an easy enough neighbor to get along with when no source of national irritation and humiliation, such as the Moroccan difficulty, exists to make people sensitive. The King's well known sympathy for France and the great influence of his most skillful ambassador in Paris makes it easy sailing at the present time for Franco-Spanish relations.

Belgium and France are very closely allied and in case of war or threat of war with Germany the two countries and their armed forces may be taken as constituting one, and that from the very start. In all the discussions regarding security, the danger arising from German intentions, and the matter of forcing Germany to pay the agreed-upon indemnity, the two countries have acted in close accord. Where divergences of opinion existed they were ironed out beforehand and a united front usually presented to Germany.

Turkey and France have had less causes of friction than a few years ago. The French Government is now more capably represented in Syria and the former incidents so frequent on the border have ceased for the present. The arrest and long detention of a French steamship commander in Constantinople, under circumstances which would seem to us outrageous, was handled with great restraint by the French Government, and this spirit of tolerance seems the prevailing one at the foreign office under Mr. Briand.

The only point of divergence existing between France and the United States is the war debt owed by France. Through her unrelenting attitude regarding payment of the debt, the United States has become unpopular, though it can not be said that the cordial relations between the two countries are deeply affected by this sentiment. The United States has no desire to assume the rôle of a harsh creditor, but its position is that France must realize that the interests of the American taxpayer can not be neglected and that this matter must not be relegated to the realm of dormant academic questions. Since September, 1926, press sentiment in France has been more favorable toward some reasonable settlement; before that time the press was a unit in urging rejection of all arrangements so far proposed as being unfair and impossible of execution.

In November, 1927, the matter of tariff changes on American goods was settled comfortably. The month of discussion which preceded the final agreement was marked by toleration on both sides and a mutual comprehension of the opposing points of view. The French press—outside of professional trouble makers of the extreme left—failed to use this discussion for the purpose of attacking the United States.

The present Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Briand, and his chief assistant Mr. Berthelot, are men of the highest technical ability, experience, and knowledge in their department and to their skill is due in large measure the present tranquil state of France's foreign relations. Mr. Briand was an outstanding influence in bringing to a successful conclusion the Locarno treaties which give France that assurance of security for which she has been striving ever since the war. He has gone the limit in smoothing over the troubles between France and Germany which arose several times in 1927 as a result of violent speeches by German public men. He has sometimes gone so far as to be accused of weakness by the French conservative press. He asserts his sincere belief in Germany's pacific intentions.

France's stand on disarmament is not one of obstruction but she does demand a positive guaranty that other nations' men and munitions will, in time of need, replace any reduction made in her own, and she has no intention of signing any agreements which do not bring her this assurance in positive and practical fashion. The French insist they are willing to submit to a full examination of their military power and the uses to which they are likely to put it, but they want the same examination made of other countries' military resources and in these, they say, should enter every warlike asset. They want this examination made not once for all but frequently, and the results published. France makes claim to no more virtue in her attitude than other people; she does not make claim to more logical reasoning regarding it than some nations display. Official people in France have little hope of arriving at an early agreement, chiefly because of the present British attitude, which, is, that the British fleet is the protection of liberty and civilization throughout the world and as such can not be considered in the same category as the French Army; moreover the former is preeminently a force maintained for defense, the latter one whose rôle is offense. The French think that it is going to take a long time before this attitude can be so altered as to enable a general reduction of armaments to be undertaken.

France's territorial aspirations have been the same for well-nigh a thousand years. They have been frequently interrupted, but whether as a national instinct or a deliberately pursued political plan they have never changed. France has always sought to attain what her best statesmen have defined, and her people gradually accepted, as being the country's natural frontiers. These may be given as the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean to the Alps, the Alps to the Jura, the Jura to the Rhine, the Rhine to the Sea, and the coast from there back to the Pyrenees at San Sebastian. Most of the wars fought for a thousand years have been to attain or defend these frontiers. But to-day France's aspirations are much more limited.

The effort made during the peace negotiations in 1919 to establish the eastern frontier along the lower Rhine to the boundary of Holland was not so much a manifestation of the age-long push in that direction or even the desire to acquire more territory, as it was an endeavor to insure security from any future German invasion. It may be said therefore that France has reached the limits of her aspirations in the matter of her European frontiers. She has no designs upon Belgium or Holland and it would require another great upheaval before the question of attaching the German Rhine provinces to France could ever again be considered.

The territory in and outside of Europe acquired by France, absolutely or by mandate, is all that she can absorb or govern. Her holdings in Africa and Asia are immense and some of them constitute a weakness rather than any additional strength. She has more territory than she can usefully administer and in some cases only national pride impels her to retain regions which are a burden rather than an asset. This is distinctly true of Syria. This attitude is natural, and for the most part politically wise, since France's colonial empire rests to a considerable extent upon her prestige as a great nation, and to give up any part of it would be to weaken the whole. The war in Morocco was a patent example of this condition of affairs. France had no real use for the few hundred square miles for which she fought Abd-el-Krim, but he had to be beaten at whatever cost if her hold upon North Africa was to be maintained. The war in the

Riff—as that in Syria—was not waged for the territory involved but for the colonial empire as a whole.

NOTE.—As so much of France's present problems is bound up with the specific problem of security, attention is invited to the article in the last *Bulletin* entitled "Disarmament vs. Security."—ED.

GREAT BRITAIN

A. NAVAL

1. *Fleet Exercises.*

The value of analyzing the character of fleet exercises of foreign navies is apparent. By so doing we can closely estimate what their solution would be of a particular problem. There is given below an analysis of three recent problems engaged in by the combined British Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets and notes upon the maneuvers engaged in during the course of these problems

(*a*) FIRST PROBLEM.

Eighty-two vessels engaged, including 11 BB, 3 CC, 2 CV. "Blue," Atlantic fleet; "Red," Mediterranean.

Blue forces consisted of 10 capital ships and a preponderance of light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and mine layers.

Red forces had superiority of four capital ships but had no submarines.

March 8: Blue fleet at Gibraltar. Red at Malta.

March 10: Blue en route Gibraltar to Malaga, making ready for fleet problem and engaging in gunnery exercises; 4-inch guns of *Repulse* fired at moving targets but *using the 15-inch gun fire control system. Hood* attacked by six torpedo planes which then alighted on the *Furious* who received them while steaming at full speed. Two destroyers tending *Furious.* In preparing for firing, cabin fittings were dismounted, all wooden doors unshipped and all the crew carried gas masks.

March 12: Red fleet sorties from Malta. Light forces engage in search problem when main body is passing out. Once at sea Red fleet divides into two groups to practice for coming problem. Groups separate and then seek contact. As soon as contact is made, opposing forces make aerial torpedo attacks. BB's assist in laying smoke screens. BB's maneuver behind DD smoke screens. Night attacks made by CL's and DD's. BB's, in night action, use searchlights and immediately afterwards star shells.

March 14: Problem begins.

Conditions of the problem.—Alboran Island is assumed to be a Red base, invested by Blue and can only be approached by a channel of 200 miles in length which varies in width from 2 to 17 miles and which twists between numerous islands. *The geographical realities of the problem indicate beyond all doubt that Alboran Island simulates Singapore*, the channel being a replica of that which approaches Singapore from the west. Blue in this problem probably refers to our Orange. Red decides to relieve Alboran at all costs. Red's general scheme of operations is push through to a decisive engagement with Blue's main body. Blue will endeavor by mine fields and torpedo attacks to wear down Red before engaging with main body and then fight a long-range action with Red while the latter is embarrassed by submarines and mines.

Blue lays three rows of mines across the channel, the farthest at some distance from Alboran.

Red approaches channel with entire body. Blue begins to worry Red at the first mine field by attacks with DD's, SS's, and CL's. Blue torpedo planes first attack Red when about 100 miles from Alboran. Early Blue attacks concentrated upon CV's. Mines and SS's bothered Red considerably. Several mine casualties, paravanes used. Blue timed itself so as to make contact between the two main bodies when Red was in midst of second mine field. Red was forced to deploy in the face of this mine field and numerous submarines; Red suffered numerous additional casualties and fleet speed reduced. Red desired to close but mines prevented. Blue covered its own deployment by smoke screen made by destroyers by funnel smoke (black) and smoke boxes (white).

At night, Red approached the third mine field. Here Blue concentrated all of light forces for final attack. Intensive attacks by DD's and CL's, singly and in pairs. Red formed BB's in two columns. Blue DD's penetrate screen and get between columns. One attack by three DD's causes one column to change course 30° away. At 3 a. m., when Red was pretty well shattered, Blue attacked with main body. Main battery range for night action, 2,000 to 3,000 yards. BB's fired torpedoes. Results of problem not known but undoubtedly Blue was given the decision.

NOTES ON PROBLEM

All batteries engaged.

Each side used aerial torpedoes, *but no mention of bombs.* Torpedoes not actually dropped and mines not actually laid.

No train or convoy on either side.

Channel marked by anchored auxiliaries.

Ships made no effort to fire (simulated) through smoke screen; when screen was laid, action was suspended.

No counter measures taken against SS's.

Searchlights are used to first pick up a target and then star-shell illumination begins.

Artificers on board carry axes, smoke helmets, and plugs. Oil lamps and candles distributed before action; ventilation reduced to a minimum.

(b) SECOND PROBLEM.

Same number of vessels engaged.

"Blue," Atlantic fleet; "Red," Mediterranean.

In this problem, the distribution of forces is altered. Red is weaker than Blue in large units but Red possesses submarines and mine layers while Blue has none.

The problem is as follows: Red (probably simulating France or Italy) has been investing Gibraltar. Blue (Britain) is proceeding to the relief of that fortress, coming from the Atlantic. Red goes out to meet Blue to fight a delaying action, before lifting the investment and retiring to a Mediterranean base. Blue will press for a decision.

March 23: Blue steaming east, approaching Straits. Blue formed as follows: BB divisions with fleet flag; 3 to 4 miles ahead and on either beam, DD antisubmarine screen; 12 miles ahead, CC's; more than 18 miles ahead, CL's strung out across fleet course; astern of BB's, the *Furious* (CV). Blue desires to engage hotly during daylight and then work around Red's northern flank during the night to get between Red and Gibraltar and then fight to finish at dawn.

Red slightly west of Straits, steaming slowly west. In same formation as Blue except submarines and mine layers are on Red's scouting line with Red CL's.

Contact made between opposing CL's at 5 p. m. Opposing CC's go to support of CL's but Red CC's and CL's retire upon Red BB's. Blue CL's lay smoke screen to hide movements of main body. BB's make contact and *Nelson* opens fire at "fully" 32,000 yards. Visibility conditions become very unfavorable for Blue and Blue BB's cease firing. At dusk, Red DD's attack Blue main body and *Adventure* (cruiser mine layer) lays mine field ahead of Blue BB's. Later, Blue DD's attack Red main body *from astern*. Blue fleet shadowed through night by a Red CL who followed from astern to report movements only. Operations ceased at midnight when it became apparent that Blue could not catch Red.

NOTES ON PROBLEM

Several constructive ships and divisions were used.

Two fleets supposed to have 24 capital ships between them.

Opposing BB's and CC's assumed to be equal in individual strength.

Searchlights and star shells used as in first problem.

No capital ship engagements at night.

Each DD captain was provided with a sealed envelope only to be opened at a certain time at dusk. This envelope contained a list of damages and casualties which his particular DD had suffered during the day engagements. The DD flotillas had to be quickly reorganized for the night actions on the basis of the damages and casualties which each DD had suffered.

DD's actually fired torpedoes.

No aircraft activities were engaged in because of the motion of the *Furious*. The fleets were steaming in the trough of a long swell described by an observer in the foretop as sufficient to roll the *Nelson* "gently to and fro." The *Furious* is of 20,000 tons, the *Nelson*, 35,000. It was said that had this been an actual war engagement, the *Furious* would have launched planes, but did not do so because of the possible risk.

(c) THIRD PROBLEM.

Vessels engaged: Atlantic fleet, in passage Gibraltar to Plymouth.

The problem is as follows: Convoy protection and attack. BB's and CC's represent transports proceeding to make a landing of their troops on hostile soil (Plymouth). Transports protected by DD's, CL's, and *Furious*, all in antisubmarine screen. Convoy speed, 11 knots; convoy zigzagging. When approaching Plymouth, *Furious* dispatched four planes for scouting. Three hostile planes were observed by the convoy and at dusk three hostile SS's. Problem lasted only one day.

2. *The "Royal Oak" Affair.*

The recent courts-martial of Capt. K. G. B. Dewar and Commander H. M. Daniel, H. M. S. *Royal Oak*, have excited deep and widespread interest in Great Britain. The results of these courts-martial, as well as the Admiralty action in the case of Rear Admiral B. St. G. Collard, commander of the first battle squadron, have now been announced and the case is reviewed below for the information of our service.

Admiral Collard took command of first battle squadron on January 1, 1928, flying his flag in *Royal Oak*. Captain Dewar commanded *Royal Oak*, and Commander Daniel was her executive officer.

Trouble started very soon after Admiral Collard came aboard. On January 12 the officers were giving a dance on board *Royal Oak*. Admiral Collard and his party came on deck and the admiral spoke rather harshly to Captain Dewar about the apparent neglect being shown ladies by the officers. The admiral then became incensed at the manner in which the marine band was playing. He called the bandmaster with the words "Come here, you," and then told the bandmaster that he had never heard such a bloody noise in his life and that he should be sent home. The admiral then told the commander that he wouldn't have a ——— like that in his ship.

Apparently these remarks of the admiral spread among the officers and crew very rapidly and caused considerable bitterness. The day after the dance, the bandmaster went to the chaplain, relating the incident and stating that he desired to resign and forfeit his pension. The chaplain then went to the admiral to explain that the bandmaster felt he had been insulted and could not reply. The admiral threatened the chaplain with court-martial. Eventually this dispute was patched up by the captain and the commander, who extended the admiral's apologies to anyone who felt themselves insulted.

On March 5, while the *Royal Oak* was at sea, the admiral sent word to the captain that he desired to go ashore as soon as the ship anchored and if it were too rough for the barge to come alongside, he would use a Jacob's ladder. After anchoring the captain desired to wait for the chain to veer and ship to swing head to wind before calling the barge alongside. This did not meet with the admiral's approval and he called the captain and commander aft and in an apparently furious manner demanded an explanation. The admiral said that he could not get a single order obeyed, that he was treated worse than a midshipman and that he was fed up with the rotten ship and would have his flag shifted. The admiral personally directed the men rigging the ladder and upon leaving the ship, he walked past Captain Dewar without returning the latter's salute. After this, the captain ordered the commander to write a report to him of the incident. The captain himself wrote one and included therein, the dance incident of January 12. The following day, the captain presented these reports, addressed to the vice admiral, to Admiral Collard. The latter took them to the vice admiral, who, in turn, took them to the commander in chief of the fleet.

The latter ordered a hurried court of inquiry which met the day before the fleet was scheduled to sail for maneuvers. Before the court met, Commander Daniel read in the wardroom of the *Royal Oak*, the letter of Captain Dewar to the vice admiral. He did this, he said, in order to determine if the wardroom officers would testify as to the accuracy of the captain's statements. The court concluded its duty the day it convened, and shortly before sailing the commander in chief ordered Admiral Collard to strike his flag and ordered Captain Dewar and Commander Daniel out of the ship.

The captain and commander, in accordance with the British custom, requested a court-martial.

The court-martial met at Gibraltar on April 1. Four specifications were preferred against Commander Daniel, growing out of two charges—namely, that in his letter the commander had used terms subversive of discipline, and that he had read this letter in the wardroom of the *Royal Oak*. Captain Dewar was charged in two specifications with having forwarded the subversive letter of Commander Daniel to the vice admiral. On April 4 the court found Commander Daniel guilty of all specifications, and on April 6 the court found Captain Dewar guilty of the first specification. The court sentenced both officers to be dismissed their ship and to be severely reprimanded. The findings were sent to the Board of Admiralty for approval and review.

As soon as the convictions of the two officers were announced, public opinion in Great Britain, as expressed in the press and in Parliament, became bitter because the captain and commander had been punished, and, apparently, the admiral had escaped. It is impossible to say how much these expressions of opinion influenced the Admiralty, but at any rate on April 17 the First Lord announced the final action of the board, which was that the sentences of the captain and commander were confirmed while Rear Admiral Collard was placed upon the retired list. The First Lord stated that the punishments against the captain and commander did not preclude them from further employment, but skepticism was expressed in Parliament as to when use would be found for their services.

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3. Inspection of Singapore Floating Dock.

An opportunity was recently afforded for an inspection of the floating dock for the Singapore Naval Base now nearing completion at the shipyard of Swan, Hunter & Wigham Richardson (Ltd.), Walls-end, Newcastle-on-Tyne. This inspection consisted of a walk along the length of the floor of the dock, up to the top of one side wall, along its length across the bridge, and along the top of the other side wall. The permission granted did not include a visit to the dock control room at one end of the upper side wall, nor were any plans available for inspection. The information obtained on the visit was supplemented to a limited extent by that obtained at a lecture on floating docks given under the auspices of the Admiralty by the naval constructor lately in charge at Malta.

The naval estimates for 1927–28 designate the dock as *Floating Dock No. IX*, designed by Sir W. J. Berry, K. C. B., the director of naval construction, and to be completed in the financial year 1928. The estimated expenditure for 1926 is given as £25,849, the estimated expenditure for 1927 as £374,719, or a total for the two years of £400,568. The contract awarded Swan, Hunter & Wingham Richardson requires delivery of the dock at the Singapore Naval Base, and it was stated that the dock when completed would cost three-quarters of a million pounds. The Admiralty is responsible for the design of the dock, and the contractors are required to test the dock for operation by submergence to the 25-foot water level (about the level of the pontoon deck) at Wallsend before disassembly for towing to Singapore and again a similar test after assembly at destination. No actual docking trial of a vessel is required under the contract.

General arrangement.—The dock has an overall length of 885 feet, an overall width of 172 feet, width inside walls at top 140 feet, at pontoon deck level 135 feet. The maximum draft of water over the keel blocks was said to be "about 38 feet." The capacity of the dock was said to be 50,000 tons. (Press notices have given this capacity as high as 54,000 tons.) The weight of structural steel used in building the dock was said to be 20,000 tons. The dock is constructed in seven sections. The power plant and auxiliary machinery and other accommodations are located on the flat below the tops of the side walls.

Blocking.—A center row of keel blocks are in place throughout the length of the dock. These blocks are spaced 2 feet 6 inches center to center. The lower block, of a timber called greenheart and obtained from British Guiana, 15 by 12 inches by 4 feet 6 inches, is secured by angles to the pontoon dock. Above this is a block made of two cast steel wedge-shaped blocks, and above this two greenheart blocks of the same size as the lowest block. The ends of the wood blocks are bound with bar steel about 2 by ⅝ inch in section, with one wood screw on each side. The assembly is also held on the fore and after side by diagonal bar tie rods. The block assembly was said to have been tested in compression as a column to 750 tons. The greenheart was said to have been selected not only on account of its strength but because it is not attacked by animal life. In addition to the center line blocking a line of portable blocking on each side is being supplied under the contract. These blocks have a cast-steel base block in addition to the two wedge-shaped cast-steel blocks, forming an assembly that will not float. These blocks will be secured by lashings to ring bolts on the pontoon deck as required for each docking.

Protective coatings.—The outside of the pontoon portion of the dock is protected by bitumastic enamel. The inside of the pontoon compartments are said to be coated with humidine, a thick reddish brown compound put on with trowels and remaining more or less soft. The upper portion of the side walls and the floor of the dock and cofferdams are protected by red lead.

Bridge.—Access from one side wall to the other at the top level is provided at the control house end of the dock by a swinging steel bridge. This bridge is in halves, of swinging jib type pivoted on brackets at end of side wall at each side. The ends of the bridge meet on a perpendicular from the end of the pontoon at the center line of the dock. Each half of the bridge when in position forms the hypotenuse of a triangle of which the sides are approximately 70 feet and 50 feet. The bridge is operated by use of capstans on side walls.

Power plant.—Four oil-burning boilers are installed on the flat in the wall on the side opposite that which carries the control house, two boilers, complete with auxiliary machinery being located in each of two adjacent sections of the dock about as shown in sketch. Half the boiler power is thus available in case the other boiler-room section had to be docked. There are three Lawrence & Scott turbo generators rated 1,000 kilovolt amperes, providing current at 1,050 volts and two smaller 500 kilowatt motor generators for converting the alternating current to direct current at 220 volts. There are two main condensers and three evaporators with distilling plants for providing fresh water.

There is also an ammonium hydride ice machine plant both for the making of ice and for providing magazine refrigeration for vessels in dock.

Main pumps.—There is a main pump room on the main flat in each transverse dock section and electrically driven Drydale centrifugal pumps with capacities as follows: For three center sections 6,000 tons per hour, adjacent sections on each side of center sections 4,000 tons per hour, and end sections 2,000 tons per hour. The driving motors are on the top flat, and the centrifugal pumps at the bottom of the tanks, driven through spindles fitted with Michell thrust bearings, the operation of these pumps being controlled from the valve control house. The valves have Westinghouse pneumatic electric control. Safeguards against undue flooding accidentally is provided by the locations of the bottoms of the air escape pipes, flap valves that can be operated locally to close the intakes, and by the provision of a water-tight flat in the top of the side walls to provide a reserve of buoyancy. The pumping capacity according to design is sufficient with a 50,000-ton ship in dock to dock the vessel in 4 hours.

Auxiliary machinery; miscellaneous outfit.—There are eight electric capstans, four about equally spaced on the side wall throughout their length, each has deck control adjacent to capstant and a capacity on test of a pull of 16 tons at a speed of 45 feet per minute.

Complete wash rooms and toilets are provided for the use of the crews and officers of vessels in dock.

Complete oil-fired galleys, Wilson Liverpool type, are provided for the use of crews of ships when ships' galleys are under repair.

Pneumatic pressure is provided by two large and one small electrically driven vertical compressors with sufficient capacity to provide air for the pneumatic valves, for the use of ships in dock and for the service of 50 pneumatic tools. Two 100-pound air lines, estimated 6 inches in diameter, run the length of the dock on each side, one line at the level of the pontoon deck and the other at about 25 feet above this level.

There are two Diesel generators, Bellis and Morcom type, one on each side of the main machinery installation, the capacity of one unit being 250 kilowatts and of the other 40 kilowatts.

Drainage pumps are provided for pumping out standing water and for the drainage service of the sanitary spaces. Heating boilers are provided, two in number, for hot water service to living spaces.

Two travelling electrically driven jib cranes are to be provided on each side wall, running on tracks, practically the length of the dock. These cranes were said to have a capacity of 2 tons at 40 feet and 4 tons at short radius. These cranes, it is understood, will be placed in position and secured when the dock is towed to Singapore.

Towing.—It is understood that the dock will be towed to Singapore, the towing contract to be given by the builders to a Dutch firm, certain details regarding the insurance now being negotiated. The dock will be broken at joints between sections 2 and 3 and 5 and 6, and the four end sections riveted together, i. e., one tow will be sections 1, 2, 6, and 7, and the other tow will be sections 3, 4, and 5. It is understood the Admiralty required to sections to be riveted for the towing in order to avoid excessive stresses.

Structure.—The dock was built on the universal system of mild steel throughout, and it is claimed excellent results were obtained in the fairness of rivet holes on assembling. The sections were assembled individually on the ways, the side walls of the dock extending across the ways, and then launched. Water-tightness in the joint between sections is obtained with a molded rubber gasket about 1 inch in section.

Control house.—This was not available for inspection but is understood that all control of the dock is exercised from this house, including the control of the main pumps. As an emergency measure, men will be stationed in the pump houses in communication with the control house by telephone. There are various gauges, etc., for observing the operation of the dock, including trim indicators and deflection or alignment indicators. In addition to clinometers for the latter purpose, a telescope is provided to measure deflection by sighting on a station at the opposite end of the dock with a scale at the middle of the dock for a measure of the hogging or sagging of the dock. Gauges are also provided to give the depth of water over the keel blocks at the four corners of the dock. The vessel is warped into the dock ordinarily by the use of the capstans, and is centered in the same way, no side shores or rams being provided. A number of bitts are provided along the length of the side walls for handling lines—also along the floor of the dock for handling the individual sections of the dock.

Machine shops.—On the flat of the side walls, very complete machine shops are provided with machine tools, benches, etc., both for the use of dock crew and for the use of ships in dock.

Quarters.—Living accommodations are provided for the dock crew, including a cabin, stateroom, and office for the dock master.

Fenders.—Heavy wood curved fenders are permanently secured in a vertical position on the inboard corners of the side walls, to protect against the rubbing of vessel entering or leaving the dock on the corner of the side walls.

Galleries.—Galleries are included at the four outside corners of the dock and at two levels for access and for securing small vessels alongside.

The largest dock in the world has been generally thought to be the Southern Railway Dock at Southampton, with capacity for docking a vessel of 60,000 tons. It was stated that the largest dock in the world is not the Southampton dock but the Admiralty ex-German dock at Malta, which has been lengthened by the addition of a deep middle section built at the Chatham Dockyard and towed to Malta, so that the capacity of this dock as altered is now sufficient to dock a vessel of 65,000 tons, and its length is 982 feet overall against 960 feet for the Southampton dock.

The two 32,000-ton docks, now at Portsmouth and Devonport, were also mentioned as having done excellent service particularly during the war. These docks are about 680 feet long with length of keel blocks about 640 feet. One of these docks, the one now at Portsmouth, was taken north during the war and was used to great advantage in docking damaged vessels. A slide was shown illustrating the docking of a battleship of the *Barham* class, in which the vessel was docked some 4½ feet down by the head and with a list. The dock was given the required list and trim and the vessel raised until the weight was taken by the dock, then the dock was righted. Another case was cited of a large merchant vessel that had to be docked with a badly damaged bow. In this case, the dock master said in reply to the question as to the maximum amount that the dock could be trimmed down with safety by one end, that the change of trim should not exceed 5 feet according to Admiralty instructions. The order was given to give the dock 25 feet trim. The purpose of these examples was to show the value of a floating dock for handling damaged vessels with considerable trim and list.

4. *Imperial Defence College.*

A call was recently made on the commandant of the Imperial Defence College, Vice Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, and the activities and purposes of that college were discussed at some length. It is apparent that the period of experimentation as to the best form of course is still in progress. No syllabus of the course has been prepared and the nature of the studies and lectures is worked out for only a short period in advance.

It having been noted in public utterances that the Imperial Defence College is in a sense a subordinate agency to the Committee of Imperial Defense and that the latter might refer specific questions to the college for study and report, special inquiry was made as to this phase of the matter. It was stated that some authorities felt that this partially executive function should be applied to the college, but the commandant is opposed to that principle, arguing that the staff is not sufficiently large to undertake such specific tasks and that the student body should not be called upon for such work, both because of interrupting their normal studies and because students should not be regarded as authorities. No instance has yet arisen where such a question has been referred to the college, though theoretically the Committee of Imperial Defense might do so, and it is believed that the views of the present commandant will crystallize into a permanent policy.

It also had been heard that there was a probability that the Imperial Defence College would eventually come to be regarded as in the nature of a supercollege, having some degree of authority and control over the war colleges and staff colleges of the three fighting services. In this matter, also, the present commandant is very much opposed to any such movement and there is no tendency in that direction at present, though, of course closest liaison is maintained with the other specalized institutions.

It does not seem to be intended now that the number of students at the Imperial Defence College should be materially increased, as had also been rumored. The present feeling is that any much greater number would prove unwieldy to handle, and that a comparatively few from carefully selected students would produce better results than a larger number among whom such special aptitude might not always be practicable. It was argued that the number of posts for officers taking this coures is not large and that the present output of graduates should be sufficient for all needs now in sight.

Attending the 1928 course are 5 captains in the navy, 12 army officers of Great Britain, India and the Dominions of the rank of major and above, 4 officers of the Royal Air Force of wing commander and above, 1 representative of the board of trade and 1 of the treasury.

A representative of the foreign office also attends many of the college sessions, though not free to give his entire time to the course. The hope was expressed that representatives of additional civil departments of the Government would attend hereafter, and the great advantage accrued from the attendance of civil-service officials was said to be noteworthy.

Great satisfaction was expressed over the result of the first year's course, and the college authorities are much encouraged by the enthusiastic response that has come from the various branches of the government as a result of their first year's efforts.

NOTE.—Several articles on the Defence College were given in the *Bulletin* at the time the institution was established last year.—ED.

B. AERONAUTICAL

1. Notes on Aircraft Carrier.

A description of the activities on board an aircraft carrier during fleet exercise problems has been given by a correspondent on board. The carrier is not named, but from its description it is undoubtedly the *Furious* (20,000 tons, originally laid down in 1915 to be a large, fast, heavily armored cruiser, altered and refitted first in 1918 and again in 1925; speed, 31 knots).

Navigating bridge disappears flush with deck when flying is in progress. Plane wings are folded before being sent below. Wind screens are of perforated steel, raised or lowered electrically and controlled from a central position. Hydraulic elevators used. Boiler smoke discharged either from orifices aft in flight deck or through ducts along the ship's side. Ship carries fighting, torpedo, spotting, and reconnaissance planes. All observers are naval officers; 30 per cent of pilots are Royal Air Force men, remainder being naval officers holding temporary commissions in Royal Air Force.

The ship is the headquarters of the fleet air arm, but the captain (a naval officer) is entirely responsible for flying operations. Pilots and observers receive orders from him. His senior aviation assistant is the senior officer of the Royal Air Force.

"While flying off or on is in progress the captain occupies a small platform on the starboard side of the flight deck forward, fitted with the usual compass, engine-room telegraphs, and other navigational appliances, and maintains a steady course in the wind's eye, the speed of the ship depending upon the wind velocity. He is in communication with the wing commander in a similar platform on the opposite side of the deck, who exhibits the necessary signals for the machines to land or gives the signals for taking off. There is no question of dual control, though a great deal must necessarily depend upon the personalities of the officers concerned."

During the fleet exercises six torpedo planes from the *Furious* staged an attack upon that ship. The ship increased speed and commenced a series of turns when the attacking planes became visible. The planes divided into three groups of two each, and their attacks were made upon this basis of two. A group would dive steeply and release their torpedoes when very close to the water. Of the six torpedoes fired, four hit.

JAPAN

A. NAVAL

1. Naval Gunnery School, Yokosuka.

The naval gunnery school at Yokosuka was visited recently.

The gunnery school has been in existence since 1881, and was reestablished in its present location in 1906. During the 47 years of its existence the following numbers of officers and men have completed courses at the school:

Commissioned officers	4,083
Warrant officers	42
Naval reserve officers and men	3,412
Petty officers and men	28,591
Chinese officers	79

The staff and complement of the school consists of the following officers and men:

President: Rear Admiral S. Kanoye. Executive officer: Capt. K. Hara

Officer instructors	41
Civilian instructors	2
Special officers and warrant officer instructors	30
Petty officers and men (other than enlisted men under instruction)	525

The courses are as outlined, with the addition of a postgraduate course. At the present time there are the following numbers of officers and men enrolled in the various courses:

OFFICERS	
Ordinary course	92
Superior course	28
Special course	4
Postgraduate course	3
Merchant-marine course	--
Total	127

ENLISTED MEN

Ordinary course	394
Superior course	371
Range-finder course	40
Total	805

NOTE.—Range-finder course, includes searchlights and firing circuits.

Vessels attached to the school at present are: Battleship *Yamashiro* (1915, 30,000 tons, twelve 14-inch guns); light cruiser *Isuzu* (1921, 5,570 tons); destroyers *Katsura*, *Kayede*, (third division) *Nadakaze*, *Shiokaze*, *Shimakaze*, *Yukaze*.

A broadside 5 5-inch gun drill was held for the inspecting officer. The following points were noted:

(1) No director gear on gun.

(2) Trainer on right side of gun, pointer on left side. Elevating and training wheels are horizontal, being mounted on vertical shafts which are geared to the training rack and elevating arc, respectively. These horizontal wheels can not give the same fineness of control as our two-hand drive. Prismatic type telescopic sights, with axis near gun slide.

(3) Salvo latch.

(4) Air blast does not open automatically but is opened by plugman before opening plug and closed after loading.

(5) The loading drill can best be described as "by the numbers." The loading itself was fast, but many seconds were lost by men clicking their heels together and "thinning out" between every operation. After gun is loaded, the crew stands at attention facing outboard. The plugman after each salvo reaches over and opens a switch in the firing circuit which is on the side of the slide, closing the same switch after gun is loaded and plug closed. In ascertaining if bore is clear, the gun captain squats down in rear of gun, putting his head practically in the breech, thereby using up a second or more of valuable time. There was much loud giving of orders, each man giving a shout after he had completed his allotted operation (before coming to attention). The drill was entirely lacking in the smooth silent teamwork of one of our gun crews and indicated a rigidity that would be detrimental in case of casualties.

(6) This gun uses separate ammunition and the powder is brought up from magazines in a container which is made of heavy waterproof paper fiber about one-eighth inch thick. The cover of this container fits loosely over the end with a single flexible leather hinge and is not water-tight. The container is neither air-tight nor flame proof. It is light and strong, however, and easily handled. The

conducting officer stated that the powder is kept in these containers in the air-tight metal powder tanks which are never removed from their racks in the magazines. This method of handling powder would appear to have the following disadvantages: (a) Extra cost, extra weight, and extra space, required in powder tanks; (b) containers are not flame proof or water-tight and powder is not so well protected at gun as with our powder tanks.

There are two old 12-inch turrets mounted on concrete bases for drill purposes. In visiting these turrets it was stated by the conducting officer in reply to questions that—

(1) On their recent ships they have neither a turret officer's booth nor separate bulkheads between guns.

(2) All of their turret machinery is hydraulic.

(3) They fire both single-barrel and double-barrel salvos.

(4) They have done very little with airplane spotting.

(5) They have done away with the old short-range practices and for turret guns using reduced charges, the average range of practices is 10,000 yards.

Several projectiles for instruction purposes were seen. The length and radius of ogive of a 16-inch projectile appeared to be about the same as ours. The rotating band, however, was much narrower, with no lip at rear of band. Three 8-inch projectiles cut through the cross section were seen. Two were high capacity and one was armor piercing.

There is a spotting range across a small valley about 150 yards in length. Silhouette targets of ships are placed on one side of the valley, the spotting tower or platform being on the other side.

The inspecting officer was not taken in the spotting room. It was stated that they have no fire-control installation other than spotting equipment in the school, and that this instruction is carried out aboard the ships attached to the school. It was further stated—

(1) That their present broadside and turret director installations are Vickers type.

(2) That they use both the Anschutz and Sperry compasses, but prefer the former.

RUSSIA

A. POLITICAL

1. *Political Review.*

(Source: M. I. D.)

FOREIGN INFLUENCES IN INTERNAL POLITICS.

Up to the present time foreign influence has played little or no part in internal politics. Even the desire of the communists to obtain foreign credits has not induced them so far to assume a conciliatory attitude. Stalin and the majority appear to be convinced of the desirability, if not the necessity, of establishing more friendly relations with foreign states and of introducing foreign capital into Soviet Russia. In view of the fact that the present leaders are primarily interested in securing the cooperation of the Russian peasantry, together with the adoption as official doctrine of the belief that with the cooperation of the peasantry socialism can be established in Russia without the aid of the international proletariat, it would seem reasonable to suppose that Russian national interests would begin to take predominance over the ideals of world revolution. The defeat of the opposition leaders, however, is apt to involve the incorporation into the majority program of certain planks of the opposition platform, thus causing a swing to the left.

BEARING OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ISSUES.

While the international situation exerts little or no apparent influence on the internal policy the converse of this proposition can not be said to be true. The internal and international situation of Russia are in their very nature inseparable; the internal policy is fundamentally international. It is because of the doctrines of the Communist Party that Soviet Russia remains an outcast among nations to-day. The continued policy of confiscation and repudiation, together with attempts to foster revolution abroad through communist propaganda, has alienated the leading countries of the world. The international character of the proletarian régime forms a source of much friction with governments which have any sort of relations with the Soviets.

FOREIGN POLICIES AND RELATIONS.

GENERAL AIMS, IMPORTANT POLICIES OR DOCTRINES

In its nature and in its aims the Soviet Government is different from every other government in the world. By its own confession it is not a national government, but an organization working internationally with a subversive purpose. All internal and international problems and issues are subordinated to the principle of establishing communism throughout the world. It is only to further this purpose that the present group in power is trying to ameliorate the internal economic situation. Even with Russia as a lever, the probability of the communist leaders' inaugurating world proletarian rule is small, but without it, it would be next to impossible. The Soviets are beginning to manifest a nationalistic policy, as in contrast to their previous internationalism. Generally speaking, this may be said to be the result of the embarassing economic situation which has compelled the leaders to conciliate the peasantry—a class to whom internationalism means nothing.

RELATION WITH OTHER IMPORTANT POWERS

The Soviet union has now been recognized de jure by 23 countries, including all the first-class powers of the world, except the United States. But so far recognition has not been instrumental in promoting commerce between the countries granting recognition and the Union. Under the present Russian system, it is practically impossible to carry on business with any degree of security for investment. The principle of government trade monopoly permits wholesale rearrangement of existing economic relations. (An example of this was the removal of the entire Russian trade delegation from France to Great Britain following the unfavorable decision of the French courts in the Optorg-Buniatyan case.) Moreover, the periodic campaigns of the authorities against private trade disrupt enterprise and create a sense of instability and apprehension which destroys business confidence.

United States.—The policy of the United States regarding recognition of Soviet Russia remains unchanged. While the Soviet Government claims to desire political relations with the United States, chiefly because that country is practically the only one from which loans and credits of any practical size can be obtained at present, it has so far been unwilling to meet the conditions laid down by Secretary Hughes. A considerable amount of trade between the two countries is carried on now, there being no legal restriction whatever to private trade and commerce as far as the United States is concerned.

Great Britain.—Soviet Russia has no treaties with Great Britain. As will be recalled, two treaties were negotiated between the Labor Ministry of Great Britain and the Soviet Government in 1924 after four strenuous months of conference, only to be scrapped by the suceeding Conservative Ministry, and the trade agreement of 1921 was renounced when diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed last May at the instance of the British Government. The British Government claims that the soviets are propagandizing Great Britain itself as well as carrying on agitation in British India and in Persia, Afghanistan, and China for the purpose of arousing animosity toward the English in those countries, while Moscow still professes to believe that the British conservative administration is organizing an antisoviet campaign for the overthrow of the communist régime in Russia.

France.—Relations between Russia and France became strained following the signing of a communist manifesto last August by Rakovsky, the soviet ambassador to France. Rakovsky was, upon France's insistence, withdrawn by the Soviet Government and relations remained unbroken. The French policy toward Rumania causes the soviets a certain amount of dissatisfaction because of the Russian desire of eventually reabsorbing Bessarabia (Rumania being an ally of France). The French effort to come to an agreement with Russia regarding debts has so far been futile.

Germany.—At the present time relations between Russia and Germany are based upon the treaty of Rapallo of 1922 and are very friendly. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government fears that the continual pressure exerted by western powers to bring about the orientation of Germany with Europe will lead the Germans to cast aside Russian friendship. The policy of Germany toward Russia will undoubtedly be dictated by the exigencies of the current situation, but the fact that the products and requirements of the two nations are supplementary to one another should not be lost sight of, as it has a direct influence on the policy of both countries. Since the war Germany has realized the necessity of Bismarck's historic policy of friendship with Russia.

Italy.—The Italo-Russian trade treaty, executed when recognition was effected, failed to be the source of any great volume of trade, owing to the economic stress in Russia. Until capital is available for the development of the resources of the country this will necessarily remain the case, and no relief can be expected from Italy for that nation possesses no surplus funds for foreign investment.

The recent moves of Italy toward increasing Italian influence in the Balkans, especially the ratification on March 9, 1927, of the protocol awarding Bessarabia to Rumania, have been regarded with intense disfavor by Russia.

Poland.—Russia claims her attitude toward Poland is of a peaceful character, and that the soviet nonaggression and neutrality pact with Lithuania in no way infringes upon the treaty of Riga between Russia and Poland. The Polish desire to secure a collective east European guaranty treaty with the Russians, who view this attempt as an effort by Poland to secure a protectorate over the Baltic States, has been thwarted by soviet encroachments on Baltic solidarity.

Rumania.—Russia has never sanctioned the annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania. The creation of the Moldavian Republic on the Russian side of the Dniester, within the Ukraine, was admittedly a political move designed to bring about an uprising of the Moldavians in Bessarabia; but, while a great deal of dissatisfaction with Rumanian administration is evident in Bessarabia, little disposition to take advantage of Russia's interest appears visible at the present time. The protocol awarding Bessarabia to Rumania, it will be remembered, has been ratified to date by four (Rumania, Great Britain, France, and Italy) of the five signatories. It requires the additional ratification by Japan to legalize Bessarabia's transfer. The United States never agreed to this transfer, holding that Bessarabia belonged de jure to Russia and should not be taken from her during the weakness of the latter.

Baltic States.—It is hardly to be expected that Russia will forever be content with the existing limited exit to the Baltic Sea. With the exception of Finland, an attempt to reabsorb the Baltic States in some form or other, may be looked for when Russia's domestic problems are solved. Lithuania has always looked toward Russia for support against Poland in the Vilna affair, and Baltic unity has been further disturbed by the conclusion of a series of agreements between Soviet Russia and Latvia, by which it is interpreted that Latvia has renounced the Latvo-Estonian united front policy respecting Russia.

Japan.—The attitude of Japan toward Soviet Russia is one of tolerant friendship, a position dictated by the Japanese desire to obtain resources in Siberia. Russian attempts to disseminate communist propaganda in Japan and in Manchuria, where Japan is interested, are viewed with suspicion and are met with complete firmness on the part of the Japanese. No armed conflict between Soviet Russia and Japan is anticipated in the near future.

China.—Soviet Russia has suffered a setback in prestige in China. The reaction to Moscow tutelage began last spring following disclosures made as a consequence of the raid on the Soviet military attachés office in Peking under northern direction, an act which caused the withdrawal of the Soviet ambassador though diplomatic relations remain unbroken. While Chang Tso-lin, the leader of the northern military forces, has always opposed the spread of communist doctrines in China as detrimental to China's best interests, the Nationalists, on the contrary, permitted communism to become so strongly organized in southern China that for a time it seemed questionable if the moderate elements could discard communist aid at their discretion. Matters reached a climax in December, when all Soviet agents were expelled from territory under nationalist control. The definite swing away from the left in the Kuomintang recently leaves the Russians thoroughly discredited throughout China.

GENERAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION.

In conclusion it may be stated that while the return of Russia to her pre-war place among nations is unquestionably important, as well as highly desirable, to world progress, closer intercourse seems almost impossible. It is apparent that up to the present time the leading countries of the world have felt that such intercourse would be dearly purchased at the cost of internal disturbances through subversive propaganda and the surrender of principles which have obtained the sanction of international usage. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Government can afford sufficient inducements to change this decision.

NOTE.—When studying the foreign relations of Soviet Russia it is important to evaluate correctly the relative weight which communistic and national interests play. The conflict between communism and nationalism forms one of the paradoxes of Russian life to-day. Of course, the two are the antithesis of each other and in domestic matters there is no question but that communism plays the leading rôle. But so often, in foreign affairs, we are presented with the spectacle of a communistic government which is as nationalistic as was ever that of the Czars. Witness Russia's present attitude toward the Baltic States, toward Bessarabia, the Straits, India, Persia, Manchuria, etc.—all purely Russian nationalistic attitudes.

We may deduce the following as a statement of the line of action of Russian foreign policy: Where the vital foreign interests of the Russian people and the historic Russian State are not in question, the Soviet Government presents a communistic and international front to the world. Where those vital interests are concerned, the Soviet Government proceeds along the nationalistic lines of the former Imperial Government.—Ed.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

I. FORTY-FOUR HOURS ON THE BOTTOM OF THE SEA.

[*Source: German press*]

On December 18, off the coast of Massachusettes, the American submarine *S-4* with a crew of 35 men and 4 officers was rammed by a Coast Guard ship, formerly a destroyer in the American Navy. The submarine, whose forward and aft compartments were leaking from the impact, sank immediately to the bottom to a depth of 140 feet. In view of the fact that the American submarine *S-51* was also lost under similar circumstances in September, 1925, and that in America voices are lifted here and there calling attention to the very small losses suffered by the German Navy at a time when the submarine weapon was still in the initial stages of development, we have asked the expert opinion of chief quartermaster, Paul Ordtolf, who had a wide experience during the war, and who, on one occasion, spent 44 hours in a submarine which had sunk to a depth of 440 feet. He has made the following statement:

"So far as we are able to learn from the reports of our press concerning the American disaster, it would appear that the fault lay with the submarine. During the war the German vessels of this type were equipped with excellent listening devices, which enabled them, even when at great depths, to ascertain whether any ships were in the immediate vicinity, and as a further precaution there was a regulation in the German Navy to the effect that before emerging the submarine must first be brought to periscope depth (30 feet) so that the commanding officer, before proceeding further, might make absolutely certain that no ships were in the neighborhood. By obeying this order, even if the listening apparatus failed, all possibility of accident was precluded.

"Such a mishap is unknown to our submarines. It is true that we have only a very faint idea of the nature of the fate of the 204 which vanished during the war. We know of losses through ramming in the initial stages of the submarine war, but these occurred when a submarine, as was our humane custom, emerged before torpedoing noncombatant vessels, and was thus frequently the victim of ramming or sudden bombardment. It is obvious, however, that these war-time incidents can not be compared to the accident suffered by the *S-4*.

"The first catastrophe in the early days of the submarine—the first, that is, since 1851 when the pioneer submarine, built by a native of Dillingen on the Donau, was lost in Kiel Harbor—was the sinking, in 1911, of the *U–3* in the aforesaid harbor owing to a defect in construction of the diving rudder. This vessel, which lay at a depth of from 140 to 150 feet, was raised by the salvage ship *Vulkan* in 13 hours, and with the exception of three men, who were suffocated by poison gases due to the penetration of water into the storage batteries, the entire crew was saved.

"The second misfortune occurred during the war, in 1917, when the *U–21* sank, with shattered stern, in 60 feet of water at the Imperial Dockyard at Kiel, following the spontaneous ignition of a torpedo. In this case salvage operations were rendered doubly difficult, since, owing to the fact that the submarine sank close to the quay wall, the *Vulkan* could not be used, and it was only after long and tedious effort that the divers were able to place the lifting chains about the hull. No answer was given at the time to the divers' signals. After 16 hours it was succeeded in raising the vessel by means of two large cranes, and it was found that the survivors were already standing in water up to their chests. Five men had been killed by the explosion.

"And now I wish to speak of an incident in which I myself played a part, and which is a convincing proof of the fine quality of the material and the excellence of the construction of our submarines.

"On September 20, 1918, off the west coast of England at the entrance of the Bristol Channel, a convoy of merchant ships was attacked by the *U–B 86*, on which I was serving at the time. After torpedoing the first steamer the commander of the submarine wished, as was the customary maneuver in such cases, to dive under the torpedoed vessel, so as to efface the track of the submarine, and in doing this it happened that either owing to the suction of the sinking ship, or to her bearing down upon us, our depth manometer dropped with appalling rapidity to 330 feet. This instrument was not gauged for greater depths than this, but the chart showed 440 feet. The scraping on the outer wall indicated that we were on rocky bottom. As we had submerged only a short time before plenty of electric power was available, but the diving tanks appeared to be damaged and water was trickling in at every rivet and flange; the wall of the submarine, however, withstood the enormous pressure of 14 atmospheres. Our first task was to trim our ship, which had sunk "by the head" (that is, nose down). We were fairly successful in this, but every attempt to empty the diving tanks by means of compressed air, and thus to acquire buoyancy, failed. The vessel did not budge from the spot where she lay. The supply of compressed air was soon exhausted and the prospects of rescue dwindled.

There were 37 of us, and after 20 hours the air could have been cut with a knife, in spite of the fact that from time to time we had purified it by means of the potash cartridges. It became constantly more difficult to breathe; a terrible lassitude assailed us, and after 28 hours the first man became unconscious, and after 32 hours the first death occurred. Apathetic, with our hearts beating at a furious rate, we others were barely able to move; with each weak and panting breath only vitiated air reached our lungs. After 34 hours the second man died, and after this things happened more rapidly. Our commanding officer, Lieutenant Hübsch, died, and shortly after this the torpedo seaman; this was four deaths in 36 hours. We were in desperate straits; we lay about moaning and gasping, and ever more urgent was the prayer to be put out of our misery. I tried once more to start the fans, but my powerless arms refused the task. Agonizingly the hours crawled by, and we knew that we had been there for 42 hours. All hope had vanished.

Finally, the torepdo mate asked me to come forward with him, and suggested that since we must all die, why not make an end of it at once and release the torpedoes. Two stokers dragged themselves forward with us, and with a tremendous effort we started to unscrew the cover of a tube in order to flood the torpedo, as we had been taught that even with an external pressure of three atmospheres, hence at a depth of 130 feet, a torpedo will ignite spontaneously. We waited impatiently for the explosion which would put and end to our misery, but nothing happened. Was it a case of a misfire? Weak and gasping as we were, it took us almost an hour to loosen the cover of the second tube—and our efforts were rewarded by the same strange silence.

"We knew now that even a pressure of 14 atmospheres would not cause a torpedo to ignite, but still inspired by a faint hope we attacked the other two forward tubes. I crawled back to the central station, the torpedo mate behind me. We pressed the four buttons of the electric ignition simultaneously. Were there rocks ahead of the submarine which would cause the torpedoes to detonate? The slight trembling due to firing was again followed by the same strange silence, but the bow of the ship, made lighter by the loss of the torpedoes, was lifted upward. Every attempt to pump water from the aft to the forward compensating tanks and thus assume a normal position was unsuccessful. The pump failed to work, but in spite of this the movement of the ship had revived our spirits. There was one more desperate attempt to be made, namely, to release the aft torpedo. In view of the position of the submarine the projectile would be obliged to hit directly on the rocky bottom, and thus the end would come.

"We had been imprisoned at this terrifying depth for 44 hours when the aft torpedo was freed and I pressed the electric ignition button. An uncanny stillness followed; whether the torpedo was deflected upward owing to its buoyancy or whether we were no longer resting directly on the bottom it is impossible to determine.

"As we waited suddenly some one cried out '170 feet.' With one accord we turned to the depth manometer and saw that it was slowly creeping upward, and at 45 feet we saw, through the thick glass disk, that the water had become a light green—then suddenly we were clear. I attempted to open the ports, but my strength failed, and two members of the crew came to my assistance. The first breath of fresh air burned my mouth and throat, accustomed for hours to oxygen, like liquid fire. With the knowledge that we were saved, I sank into a deep faint from which I could not be roused for four hours.

"Of the 37 men of the crew 9 were still living. The other 28 had not been able to survive the terrible hours. The outer hull of the submarine was dented like a preserve tin which has been wantonly struck with a hammer, the diving-rudder engine was destroyed, submersion could no longer be considered—but we were again breathing fresh air.

"Faithfully we nine survivors held together. As senior, I had taken command of the ship. In nine days, always at the surface, and passing around Ireland between the Shetland and Orkney Islands and through three English coast-guard lines, we arrived at Bergen (Norway). The fresh water in the tank was mixed with sea water, and our provisions, except for bread, of which we had a sufficient supply, were wet and uneatable; but in Bergen, with the assistance of the German consul, we took on supplies. We left here on the approach of nightfall and eluded an English warship which had evidently been warned of our presence. The next morning we were able to get into radio communication with Norddeich, and near where the Skaggerrak battle took place we were picked up by a German destroyer flotilla, which had been sent to meet us, and were safely conducted to our home port, Kiel.

"We were closely questioned at the navy department at Berlin, and I was personally presented to the Kaiser. Praise and recognition were not lacking, but all of my memories of the submarine war, of the blazing heat in the Mediterranean, or the icy cold of a winter cruise to Archangel, all of the many hard and happy days on shipboard, the dull explosion of depth bombs about a submerged submarine, all of the dangers and adventures (once I was taken prisoner, but only for a short time, by English coast guards off Hammelfang, on the Irish coast) pale before the memory of the 44 hours during which we lay at the bottom of the sea off the Bristol Channel. It all came back to me with a strange vividness when I read of the sad lot of the brave American sailors on the *S-4*, a lot which under very different circumstances I once escaped in so strange a manner."

II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS.

There are in the United States organizations devoting themselves to the discussion of our foreign affairs. Two of the most prominent of these are the "Council on Foreign Relations" and the "Foreign Policy Association." The following articles on these bodies have been written for the "Bulletin" by gentlemen who are members of their respective organizations and who are in a position to know the history and aims of each.

In presenting these articles, it is not the intention of this office to recommend either one or both of these organizations. It is desired here to simply call the attention of the Service to the fact that these organizations exist and to remind the Service that the subject of foreign affairs must always be one of vital interests to it.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

(25 West Forty-third Street, New York City)

HISTORY

During the war there was organized in New York the "Council on Foreign Relations," with the object of promoting interest in foreign affairs among a group of leading citizens of New York, by discussions at dinner meetings where distinguished foreigners would be entertained. In Paris, during the peace conference an American "Institute of International Affairs," corresponding to the British organization of the same name, was set up for the scholarly and dispassionate study of international relations. Before the close of 1920 it became apparent that the Council on Foreign Relations had a strong local membership and a sound financial basis, but that it lacked a policy of enduring usefulness. Accordingly, a fusion was effected, between the American Institute of International Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations, with the understanding that the membership, academic and professional, was to be extended outside New York with a lower membership fee, and that the aims of the institute were to be effected through the combined organization. While retaining and increasing the local membership and the dinner discussions, the council has steadily extended its outside membership to include the former members of the institute and men of similar interests. The membership is limited in order that freedom in discussion may be maintained.

PROGRAM

The purpose of the Council on Foreign Relations is to provide a continuous conference on the international aspect of America's political, economic, and financial problems. The council is not a trade nor a profit organization, nor has it any connection with any political party or religious or social reform agency. It is an entirely nonpartisan body, pleading no special cause, and committed to no particular point of view or program. Its aim is to aid by scientific and impartial study, in the development of a better understanding of international problems, and a reasoned American foreign policy.

In addition to the more general dinners where distinguished American and foreign guests are entertained, and an opportunity is afforded for discussion of the broader phases of America's attitude toward current international problems, the council promotes through smaller groups, drawn from its membership, research studies in more specialized fields. There are at present organized groups studying the Far East, Latin America, Germany, and the Near East.

PUBLICATIONS

In 1922 the quarterly review Foreign Affairs was launched by the council, under the editorship of Prof. A. C. Coolidge. At the end of the five-year period, in 1927, the council undertook to put Foreign Affairs on a permanent footing. An endowment fund has been started, which includes Mr. Elihu Root's gift of $25,000. Foreign Affairs has established itself as the most authoritative American review dealing with international relations.

The Council on Foreign Relations has recently established a department of research under the direction of Mr. Charles P. Howland, which will prepare for publication three series of books.

1. An annual survey of American foreign policy. This survey is intended to examine, analyze, and set forth the international events in which America participates or has a direct interest and the general position of the United States as it develops in the family of nations, with a continuity, comprehensiveness, and unity not aimed at by departments of history, political science, or economics in the universities or by individual historians or publicists, the aim of all of whom is to explore special fields or situations.

It is expected that such a publication will derive authority from the character of its editorial staff, from the standing of the Council on Foreign Relations, and from the opportunities for obtaining authentic information which the organization itself and many of its members can furnish.

2. In addition to the annual survey, it is planned to publish from time to time special foreign policy studies, each treating some subject chosen from a considerable range of topics—political, economic,

or social—in the international field. These will be written by experts in the particular subject. It is expected that these studies will be valuable additions to our knowledge, and while the subjects chosen may be influenced by current interests and by the possibility of securing competent writers, they will not be dealing primarily with matters of merely ephemeral or momentary character, nor will they be purely technical. One such book has already been published by the council—Dr. H. Foster Bain's " Ores and Industry in the Far East." This is written by a recognized authority with full command of the technical sources of information, but in discussing the mineral resources, especially iron and coal, of the Far East, it makes a contribution not merely to our knowledge of economic possibilities, but to the probable limitations the deficiency of iron places on political developments in this region.

3. The council has recently published a " Political Handbook of Europe: Parliaments, Parties, and Press," the first issue only partially covering the field. This is based on questionnaires and information furnished by the foreign correspondents of the council. This is being enlarged to cover the world instead of Europe alone, and is to be published annually. It gives information which is necessary to an intelligent understanding of foreign policies and events, and which is nowhere else gathered together in available form.

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

(18 East Forty-first Street, New York City)

From a debtor nation, depending upon foreign capital for developing American resources, and owing foreign countries more than $4,500,000,000, the United States has emerged since the war as the world's greatest creditor country. To-day it is estimated that American investments abroad have reached a total of $14,500,000,000, not including the amounts due the United States Government on account of war debt. If these are included, our total overseas holdings approach the staggering sum of $25,000,000,000—$5,000,000,000, more than British foreign investments at their peak.

These figures graphically describe the transformation which, in the short space of 10 years, has thrust the United States into the very forefront of world affairs. The importance of our new stake in international affairs has emphasized the paramount need for accurate information on which sound judgments may be based. While many propaganda groups exist for the purpose of urging this remedy, or advocating that reform in the conduct of our foreign policy, there are very few organizations in the United States equipped to disseminate impartial data on international affairs.

The Foreign Policy Association is one organization whose primary purpose is to stimulate an interest in foreign affairs, and to serve as an impartial clearing house for unbiased information. The association was founded about 10 years ago in New York. To-day it is a national organization, with a membership of 9,000 in 48 States, and with branches in 14 cities.

The object of the Foreign Policy Association is to furnish a background against which people may form independent and accurate judgments on international events. It has no interest to serve; no formula to impose; no postulate of government it wishes adopted. It seeks to create a wider interest in foreign affairs, not through propaganda, but through compilation of accurate data and through public discussion of the facts underlying international events by authoritative spokesmen representing different points of view.

Discussion meetings at which important subjects of international interest are presented by authoritative spokesmen, representing divergent opinions, are held in New York and the branch cities. The association has made it a rule to present two or more views in the discussion of each subject considered. The discussions are free quently reprinted in pamphlet form, and the New York luncheons are broadcast over the red network of the National Broadcasting Co. Audiences of over 25,000, including many distinguished people, attended these discussions last season in New York and the branches.

The Foreign Policy Association maintains a research staff composed of experts technically equipped to compile authoritative data on foreign affairs. The research department, under the direction of Dr. Raymond Leslie Buell, formerly of Harvard University, publishes a biweekly information service which is used by more than 700 newspaper editors, by business men, bankers, libraries, college professors, writers and others who help to shape public opinion. Each number of the information service presents the factual background of one current international question without argument or special pleading. Special supplements dealing with larger questions, prepared by the research staff or by outside experts, are published every three or four months.

The research department, in addition to publishing the information service, serves as a fact-finding agency for individuals, organizations, and firms interested in foreign affairs. Special surveys and memoranda have been prepared for organizations and individuals. During the past year the research department has answered more than 2,500 special inquiries and requests for information.

The association publishes a concise two-page news bulletin with comment upon the most important international news of the week. Many libraries, clubs and classes in history, political science, and current events subscribe.

The association encourages complete freedom of opinion among its members, who represent many sharply divergent views. The only requirement for membership is a willingness to face facts, and an interest in foreign affairs.

III. ATTACKS ON AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWS.

Lieut. Commander H. C. Davis, U. S. N.

The Hawaiian Islands, owing to their geographical situation at the western entry to America, remote from other shipping and supply bases, with their large proportion of Asiatic and Polynesian population, from the natural center of two widely divergent activities. from a strategical standpoint, they represent the keystone of our national defense system in the Pacific. Also, not only because of their central situation in the Pacific Basin, but because of the mixed racial character of the population, they lend themselves readily as the central point of distribution of a great deal of more or less subtle propaganda of a pacifist and even anti-American nature.

The atmosphere of Hawaii acts as an inspiration to those who dream of universal peace and the "brotherhood of man." The apparent tolerance with which the various races (Asiatic, Polynesian, Southern European as well as Caucasian) mingle in all business, professional, and philanthropic activities, lead many to believe that, in the "melting pot of the Pacific," racial differences have been successfully ironed out and assimilation of American ideals completed.

Chief among the agencies that are serving to mold the thoughts and color the views of the strongly pacifist elements in Honolulu, are the Pan-Pacific activties and the Institute of Pacific Relations, both of which maintain their central headquarters in Honolulu. Both organizations have ramifications in countries bordering the Pacific, and are especially strong in Japan and China.

The very nature of these two organizations, which strive in an unofficial way to influence national policies, attracts the interest and cooperation of those elements in America that oppose the use of force in settling international disputes. Social agencies, such as the Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A., as well as numerous church activities, also lend themselves to pacifist propaganda.

In Hawaii, the national defense program and the Japanese exclusion clause of the immigration act of 1924 come in for frequent criticism. Of the two, the immigration act invites the bitterest attacks. The latest argument in favor of the lowering of the immigration bars against the Japanese, emanated from Mr. Frank C. Atherton.

Mr. Atherton is one of the most influential men in Hawaii. He was born in Honolulu; is a member of one of the early missionary families, who so firmly entrenched themselves into the social and economic life of the community as to wield enormous power and influence. He is an official of many of the long-established business enterprises of the islands, and was until comparatively recently owner of the "Honolulu Star-Bulletin." Apart from his business interests, religious and philanthropic activities claim his attention. He is actively connected with the Y. M. C. A. and with various church activities, as well as being actively interested in schools conducted on a religious or philanthropic basis. In addition, he was one of the leaders in the organization and establishment of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is at the present time treasurer of the institute. He is a known pacifist and a critic of those national policies designed for the protection of American interests at home against alien penetration.

He has only just returned from Europe, where he has been for about a year in connection with research work for the Institute of Pacific Relations. A large part of that time was spent in the study of the workings of the League of Nations. As a result, he finds much in America's foreign policies to criticize. In the course of a recent address, he is quoted as follows:

"In my opinion, the immigration bill was one of the most unfortunate mistakes made recently by the United States. * * * Outside the ethical standpoint, I do not believe the immigration law is sound business. We can not throw open our doors to all the millions of the Orient, but we should rectify the impression that the discrimination was made on a racial basis as soon as possible. * * * This is a problem which should be studied and we should see how this feeling of discrimination can be relieved."

The above, which refers to the Japanese exclusion clause, came toward the end of an address on the League of Nations and America's relations with other countries in the increasingly great trade competition. It was made in connection with his assertion that America's future opportunities lay in the building up of her foreign trade in the Orient and to that end advocated placating Japanese resentment against us for the enactment of the exclusion laws.

His attack upon the immigration law called forth a prompt and emphatic defense on the part of one of those present, Mr. Henry Day, of Los Angeles. In his reply, he declared that the United States had nothing to apologize for in the enactment of the present restrictive immigration laws. Answering Mr. Atherton's contention that Japanese pride had been deeply wounded by the manner in which Congress passed the exclusion bill, he said that he, too, had been in Japan recently and had failed to find evidence of the strong resentment that Mr. Atherton spoke of. He continued, that when

8,000,000 intelligent Californians backed the bill they were actuated by apprehension lest " the doors be opened to a flood of cheap labor that would not assimilate and would drag down American laboring standards."

According to an observer, the reaction of practically the entire assembly toward Mr. Day's defense of the immigration policies of the Government was one of intense resentment and hostility. He was hooted and jeered when he persisted in finishing his speech, despite the efforts of the president to call him to order.

Mr. Atherton replied that he had suggested neither apology nor any proposition to open the doors of the country to a flood of cheap labor; but that he did feel that some means should be found to handle the situation, which would have the practical effect of excluding aliens in large numbers without incurring the resentment caused by the feeling of unfair racial discrimination.

The significant feature of the incident lies in the fact that the gathering of more than 200, which apparently to a man, evinced such violent hostility toward Mr. Day was in the main made up of white Americans—men prominent in business and professional circles and of recognized standing in the community. There were also a number of Oriental business and professional men present.

The observer reported that one of the latter, Mr. Yew Char, Hawaiian-born Chinese photographer and member of the Territorial Legislature, approached Mr. Day after the luncheon and undertook to heap verbal abuse upon him. In fact, he so grossly insulted Mr. Day that it seemed for a time that blows would ensue. According to the report, Yew Char's actions appeared to reflect the more restrained sentiments of the entire assembly.

This incident is indicative of a certain definite element of thought in the community. As previously stated, the significance of the situation revealed in this particular instance lies in the caliber of the men who are the exponents of policies which if put into effect would seriously undermine the efforts of the Government to safeguard national interests. They are, many of them, actuated by altruistic aims; but, laudable as such aims may be, it can not be denied that they lend themselves admirably to enemy purposes in spreading propaganda tending to nullify any legislative measure designed for the protection of American interests at home or abroad against the peaceful or hostile invasion of Oriental hordes from across the Pacific.

Japanese propagandists are quick to see the value of gaining the sympathy and support of this particular element in the social structure of the country.

A nation highly ambitious and greedy for a place among the world powers; a nation whose ratio of food supply to population is an increasingly appalling problem, Japan looks to America and to the British dominions for an outlet for her surplus population, and for the subtle penetration of Japanese culture and civilization. The strict exclusion laws of the United States and the British dominions have blocked her, and in America, at least, she is striving through subtle propaganda to effect an opening in the wall. She has found it comparatively easy to gain the support of those agencies and individuals who seek to settle vexatious world problems on the basis of the "Golden rule." The logic of the Japanese plea appeals to those who fail to understand the psychology of a people habitually accustomed to use words to conceal, rather than to reveal thought and purpose.

There is another type of propaganda advanced in favor of modifying Japanese immigration restrictions. That is propaganda directed toward business interests. It is the point touched upon by Mr. Atherton in his address last week, and was the point most strongly stressed by Chester H. Rowell in an address before the convention of the western division of the United States Chamber of Commerce, held in Honolulu in February.

Mr. Rowell, a publicist and writer, is a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and in that capacity attended the second conference of that body last July. His address before the chamber of commerce convention is, in part, as follows:

"As business men, you might be presumed to be interested primarily in the commercial relations and opportunities of the Pacific. Yet behind all these business questions lie the greater social ones of the relations of the cultures, the races, the populations, the institutions and migrations of the Pacific. If humanity can successfully face these questions, business men will know how to face the business ones.

"Here in Hawaii, as in a labratory, we are faced with the whole problem. East of the east and west of the west, these tiny islands in the mid-Pacific are the focus of great forces which are to determine the future of mankind. Here impinge the races and cultures of the East and the institutions of the West. Occidental in ownership, in government, in business, and in education, yet oriental in nearly all their population, these islands are the proving ground of the new contact of the two great halves of the human race.

"Around this great basin of waters are now settled two peoples, opposites in nearly all their situation and historic and economic background. One set of lands is occupied by peoples of European race, newly come to the Pacific, occupying rich lands, sparsely populated, with the highest standard of living the world has known. And all these except South America, whose eye is still on Europe, speak

English and have the peculiar virtues and limitations of the English-speaking peoples.

"The other set of lands is occupied by persons of the oriental races, settled there for ages in population, ancient in culture, but with a standard of living incomparably lower and with an economic structure in which, for the most part, the industrial revolution has not taken. These peoples share with the rest of us the aspiration to a higher standard of living, though not the delusion that this is the sole aim of man. Like waters of unequal depth on the two sides of a wall, they tend to flow together toward the direction of least pressure the moment the wall is penetrated. In our time the wall has been penetrated and the movement quite automatically began.

"Then with one accord the people of European race around the Pacific began to resist it. The United States passed the Chinese exclusion law, which later applied to all orientals except the Japanese, and later when Japanese immigration began to increase, first entered into the 'gentlemen's agreement,' and later, under circumstances which are still in controversy, included the Japanese in the general oriental exclusion law.

"The other English-speaking nations around the Pacific have adopted the same policy in substance and purpose, but they have been more considerate of oriental sensitiveness in the form of it. Australia, for instance, excludes orientals much more completely than America does, but you can read no statement expressly saying so in the words of the law. The same is true, in different ways, of Canada and New Zealand.

"In the beginning this migration problem was regarded by those on the other side of the line as of pressing practical importance. Because anyone of them could relieve his personal situation by moving to a less crowded and more prosperous country, it was easy to jump at the conclusion that the whole situation could be relieved by the general freedom of migration. In recent years, however, the oriental leaders have come to the contrary conclusion. They now realize that the time has passed when any major problem of population on this shrinking planet can be solved by mass migration. The numbers involved are too great; they do not want to move in such numbers; they could not be moved, even if they wished; and if they were moved, instead of solving their problem, they would merely carry it with them to the new territory. So the problem as it now stands is no longer primarily one of the preservation of racial integrity on the one side of the line or of relief of economic pressure on the other. It has become one of national and racial dignity.

"For a long time American and European business men in the Far East, British civil servants in the government of India, and

Americans in the Philippines, have thought it necessary to maintain their prestige or 'face' by this attitude of personal and racial superiority. There may have been some excuse for it in the past, and we can doubtless 'get by' with it for a limited time into the future. But we no longer do it in Japan—for the obvious reason that the Japanese will not tolerate it, and are able, in their own country, to insist on their own standards—and we can not permanently do it anywhere. If we persist in it, the price will be that, by the time oriental business becomes stupendously worth while, as it is bound to do within this generation, we shall not be the ones to do it."

Following the same line of reasoning, the Honolulu Advertiser of a recent date, editorially advocated modification of the immigration laws affecting Japanese immigration. Under the title: "Justice for Japan," this paper said in part:

"Economic and social factors existing before the United States propounded and enforced the principle of immigration restriction, no longer threaten. With the restrictive policy a fact and in successful operation, the need for any check beyond that contained in the normal working of the immigration law has disappeared. Under the present quota system, Japan would send only 100 immigrants annually to the United States. Should the national origins system eventually be adopted, the Japanese population of 111,000 in the United States in 1920 would permit a quota of 158. Holding to the present policy means discord and unrest. Abandoning it means concord and amity. This, it would seem, is a small price to pay for the many advantages apparent in correcting an act that originally had small reason to support it.

"It has never been made clear why the Japanese should have been excluded from the immigration restriction measure while other nations were let in. Economically, racially, socially, so small a number of Japanese immigrants as could have come in if unnamed and on a parity with immigrants of other nations could have meant nothing. In Hawaii, where information concerning Japanese resident in large numbers is easily obtainable, there is no feeling of fear concerning them. In fact, the Japanese are acknowledged to be a clean, industrious, studious people, loyal to the Government. As for the ability to assimilate and to maintain American social standards, the statistics of crime and dependency are greatly in their favor. Compared with immigration from Mexico, for instance, the entire number of Japanese in America is hardly equal to the number of immigrants that come into the United States annually from the former country, because it is of the Western Hemisphere, and its immigrants come in totally unrestricted by any quota limitation. And it would scarcely be argued that the Mexican immigrant is preferable to the Japanese.

"The United States is avid for progressive trade relations with all countries, and is proclaiming daily its desire for amicable relations with South American countries. The reasons advanced for this attitude are no more cogent for American prosperity and peace than those which might be advanced for close and friendly relations with Japan.

"As a simple act of justice, to say nothing of its apparent advantages, the United States should make haste to place Japan on a parity with all other nations under the restricted immigration ruling."

This represents two examples of the speciousness of the argument designed to appeal to that class of persons whom it would be difficult to reach by an appeal to sentiment. The adroitness of it is that it is directed to those who, by dint of financial success and political power, are able to exert considerable influence upon our legislative departments.

It is evident that Japan, by dint of subtle propaganda, by threat of loss of trade, as well as by open discussion and appeal, is conducting a strongly organized drive against the barriers that exclude her nationals from the coveted advantages and opportunities that America offers. It is a campaign calculated to reach Americans in all spheres of influence, and because the appeal is based on such apparently reasonable and logical grounds the true motive back of it is apt to be lost sight of.

IV. ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

Reports from London on April 16 stated that a high authority there had made known the fact that Great Britain has recently been organizing a small but highly efficient and fully equipped special expeditionary force. The reports added that the unit is being equipped for tropical service but is is not certain whether it is being prepared as a precaution in case of trouble in Egypt, or for use on the northern Indian border in the event of an attack from Russia. All things considered the former supposition seems the more likely especially when the proximity of Egypt to Arabia is considered in conjunction with the present disturbed conditions and involvement of British interests in all that section of the world. British forces already in Egypt number approximately 12,000.

The British connection wih Egypt dates from the purchase of Suez Canal shares by Lord Beaconfield on behalf of the British Government in 1875. Supervision of the financial resources of the country by England and France followed. After the revolt of 1882

Egypt was occupied by British troops, France and Italy declining to cooperate.

It will be seen that before the World War the international position of Egypt was an anomaly. In theory the country existed as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire governed by a Khedive whose obligations to the Turkish Sultan amounted to little more than the payment of tribute. In actuality, Egypt was largely under the control of Great Britain who had maintained her occupation of Egypt ever since 1882 and whose officials exercised a predominant influence in the country's administration.

When the World War broke out it became necessary for Great Britain to regularize her position in Egypt. Accordingly, on December 18, 1914, two weeks after its declaration of war on Turkey, the British Government proclaimed that "Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British protectorate." The Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was abolished, the Khedive deposed, and Prince Hussein Kamel proclaimed Sultan. He died in 1917, and his brother Fuad succeeded him.

After the war, Turkey by the treaties of Sevres and Lausanne renounced all her rights and titles over Egypt and over the Sudan as from November 5, 1914.

Meanwhile a strong Nationalist movement had developed in Egypt and toward the end of 1918 had assumed large proportions as a result of the agitation carried on by the "Wafd," an organization formed by Zaghlul Pasha. This Nationalist leader and all his sympathizers demanded complete independence for their country. The British Government refused to take any steps. It was not till the end of November, 1919, after the general Egyptian rising of that year, that a commission of inquiry, headed by Lord Milner, was dispatched to Egypt. Following the report of this committee the British Government on February 28, 1922, made a unilateral declaration, recognizing the independence of Egypt, but reserving to its own discretion four points: (1) Safety of the Empire's communications; (2) defense of Egypt against foreign aggression; (3) protection of foreign interests in Egypt; (4) the Sudan question.

Immediately after the British Government's declaration of February 28, 1922, Sultan Fuad issued a rescript proclaiming the independence of his country and assumed the title of King. A constitution for the State providing for a government by a constitutional king, assisted by responsible ministers and by an elected parliament was promulgated on April 21, 1923.

During the first years after the issue of the British declaration, a political crime wave in the course of which many British were assassinated spread over Egypt and culminated in the murder in Cairo on November 19, 1924, of Sir Lee Stack, the sirdar of the

Egyptian Army and the Governor General of the Sudan. The British Government ordered the immediate dispatch of naval and military reinforcements to Egypt and the Sudan and made the following demands on the Egyptian Government:

1. An apology for the crime.
2. Punishment of the assassins.
3. Suppression of political demonstrations.
4. A fine of £500,000.
5. The immediate withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and the purely Egyptian Army units.
6. A notice that the Sudan Government would increase the area for irrigation from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need arose.
7. The withdrawal of all opposition to the British Government's wishes in respect of foreign interests in Egypt.

When the Zaghlul cabinet, then in power, refused to comply with all the demands, British troops seized the customs offices in Alexandria. Zaghlul Pasha thereupon resigned and was succeeded by Zirwar Pasha. The new Government immediately accepted all the British terms and the troops were withdrawn from the Alexandria customs offices.

The declaration of February, 1922, had been intended as only a temporary measure. A permanent basis for Anglo-Egyptian relations was to be established later in the agreement on the four reserved points. But six years have since elapsed and no agreement between the two Governments has yet been reached.

Another effort to come to an agreement was begun last July, during King Fuad's visit to London. At that time, Sarwat Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, who was accompanying the King, opened conversations with the British Foreign Minister. These conversations led to concrete proposals and finally to the negotiation of a draft treaty. At the end of last February Sarwat Pasha presented the draft to his cabinet and to the "Wafd," upon whose cooperation the Government depended. The treaty proved unacceptable to the "Wafd" and the cabinet rejected it.

On March 4 Sarwat Pasha handed to Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner, a note in which he said:

> My colleagues have reached the conclusion that the draft, by reason both of its basic principles and of its actual provisions, is incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt and moreover that it legalizes occupation of the country by British forces. My colleagues have accordingly charged me to inform His Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they can not accept this draft.

Sarwat Pasha then tendered his resignation to the King.

The Egyptian rejection seems to have been due to article 7 of the draft treaty which provides for the maintenance in Egypt of

British armed forces for the purpose of protecting the lines of communication of the British Empire. The text of this article is:

> In order to facilitate and secure to His Britannic Majesty the protection of the lines of communication of the British Empire, and pending the conclusion at some future date of an agreement by which His Britannic Majesty entrusts His Majesty the King of Egypt with the task of ensuring this protection, His Majesty the King of Egypt authorizes His Britannic Majesty to maintain upon Egyptian territory such armed forces as His Britannic Majesty's Government consider necessary for this purpose. The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt. After a period of 10 years from the coming into force of the present treaty, the high contracting parties will reconsider, in the light of their experience of the operation of the provisions of the present treaty, the question of the localities in which the said forces are to be stationed. Should no agreement be reached on this point, the question may be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. Should the decision of the League of Nations be adverse to the claims of the Egyptian Government, the question can at their request and under the same conditions be reinvestigated at intervals of five years from the date of the League's decision.

When Sarwat Pasha's late cabinet rejected the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on March 4 the British Government through the High Commissioner in Egypt addressed the Egyptian Government a warning note expressing the strongest misgivings. Sarwat's cabinet decided not to reply to that note, which was considered by many as a proper and statesmanlike thing to do, partly because the note's actual wording was so framed as not to demand an answer, and partly because it was obvious that any direct retort was almost certain to provoke a clash with Britain.

When Mustapha Nahas Pasha, who is now Premier, assumed office it came as a surprise in political circles when it was learned that he had handed to the High Commissioner, Lord Lloyd, an official reply to the British Government's warning note. The Egyptian reply said in part:

> The aide-memoire in question constitutes a perpetual interference with the internal conduct of Egyptian affairs, paralyzing the exercise by Parliament of its right to legislate and to control administration and rendering impossible the existence of a government worthy of the name. Such can not clearly be the intention of the British Government. For these reasons the Egyptian Government can not admit the principle of an intervention which would be tantamount to its veritable abdication.

The following is the text of the reply which Lord Lloyd transmitted to Nahas Pasha:

> I duly referred to my Government the note which your excellency addressed to me on March 30, and I am now instructed to state that His Majesty's Government can not accept your excellency's note as a correct exposition of the relations existing between Great Britain and Egypt or of their respective obligations.
>
> By the declaration of February 28, 1922, His Majesty's Government declared the independence of Egypt subject to the four reservations set out therein. His

> Majesty's Government accompanied the announcement of their decision to foreign powers by the statement that the welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognized by other Governments. In calling attention to these special relations as defined in the declaration, His Majesty's Government stated that they would not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other power; that they would regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another power; and that they would consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command.
>
> In view of the responsibility thus incurred toward other powers and of the vital importance to the British Empire of British interests in Egypt, His Majesty's Government reserved by the aforesaid declaration to their absolute discretion:
>
> (*a*) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
>
> (*b*) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference direct, or indirect:
>
> (*c*) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and the protection of minorities:
>
> (*d*) The Sudan;
>
> until such time as these matters should have been settled by agreements between the British and Egyptian Governments. His Majesty's Government sought and they believed they had found such a settlement by that treaty which was negotiated with the late Prime Minister of Egypt.
>
> The Egyptian Government having refused that treaty, the status quo ante continues. The reserved points remain reserved to the absolute discretion of His Majesty's Government, the Egyptian Government exercising its independent authority subject to satisfying His Majesty's Government on these matters.

Perhaps recent direct statements from the Prime Minister of Egypt and the British Foreign Secretary may serve to reveal more clearly the impasse that has been reached in Anglo-Egyptian affairs.

In announcing the composition of his cabinet, Nahas Pasha, the new Prime Minister, made the following statement:

> The cabinet does not intend, in taking office, to accept or admit anything encroaching on the complete independence and sovereignty of the country. I am certain that they will reach a solution which will secure the independence of Egypt and provide for British interests where they are consistent with that independence. The rejection of the draft treaty between Egypt and Great Britain caused the downfall of the last cabinet. Five previous attempts to arrive at a solution of the matters at issue between Egypt and Great Britain have been made and failed. It is not believed that further efforts will prove more successful if the policy outlined above is adhered to. The ministry, the majority of whose members belong to the Wafd party, is strongly opposed to the treaty proposed by Great Britain.

Speaking of the draft treaty of alliance with Egypt, Sir Austen Chamberlain, British Foreign Secretary, said:

> We must wait for developments of the policy of the Government which rejected that treaty and is now responsible for carrying on the existing régime. We shall try to get in harmony and friendship with them, but the vital interest

of this country in Egypt can not be whittled away, can not be altered, and can not be challenged, and until, if ever, Egypt is ready to accept such a treaty of alliance as we proposed the other day, we stand by the declaration of 1922, and we shall insist upon its fulfilment.

From the British point of view, British and foreign interests in Egypt must be protected, and no relaxation of the British control of the Sudan and the Suez Canal may be expected. Nevertheless, there is evident a disposition on the part of the British to give the Egyptians any concessions that will not interfere with effectual British control. There is little prospect of actual open warfare between the two countries at the present time or in the immediate future.

NOTE.—*Since the above was written, Anglo-Egyptian relations have gone through one of their periodic flare-ups which gives an excellent indication of Britain's method of handling her relations with Egypt.*

Last January, the Egyptian Chamber (the Lower Legislative house) passed the public assemblies bill, defining the rights of public assembly and the relation of the police thereto. Great Britain objected to two provisions of this bill—one forbidding the police to take any action against disorder at a public assembly except at the request of the organizers of the particular assembly or unless grave disorders actually occur; the other providing a heavy fine for policemen for taking such action. Britain objected to these provisions because, she said, they would tend to endanger the lives of foreigners with whose protection she is charged under the declaration of 1922.

On April 29, the bill came up before the Egyptian Senate and it was apparent that the Government of the day was determined to press the bill. On the same day, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, acting under instructions from London, presented to the Egyptian Government an ultimatum requesting "categorical assurance in writing that the measure will not be proceeded with." A time limit of 48 hours was set for a satisfactory reply, after which, the British Government "will consider themselves free to take such action as the situation may seem to them to require."

Simultaneously with the dispatch of this ultimatum, two battleships and three cruisers of the Mediterranean fleet were dispatched from Malta to Alexandria to back the demand.

Egypt, of course, was considerably perturbed. The Senate went into secret session and the bill was withdrawn by the Government. And nine hours before the time limit set by Britain, the Egyptian Government replied saying that it was withdrawing the bill until the next session of the Egyptian Legislature; that it desired and *realized the necessity for the friendship of Britain; but denying as a matter of principle the right of Britain to interfere with this legislation.*

British tactics, being so conclusively successful, the British warships, which had not yet reached Alexandria, were ordered by radio to return to Malta.—Ed.

V. THE NATURE OF NAVAL STRATEGY.

The following article is a review of the prize essay on the above subject recently published by the German "Marine Rundschau." The author of the original essay was Lieutenant Commander Grassmann, of the German Navy. Following the review, there are given two discussions on this prize essay by two other German naval officers. The original article and the discussions are of interest and value, not only because of the thoughts which they contain, but because they serve as an indication of how the German Navy to-day looks at the general subject of naval strategy.

In the introduction the author discusses the general lack of a proper appreciation of the value of naval strategy in the German Navy before the war. Bitter war experience has revealed this grave shortcoming. Regarding the attitude of the officer corps before the war, the author quotes the remark frequently expressed in the officers' mess: Naval strategy? There is no such thing. The sea is an open surface without frontiers, roads, or topography. We simply put out to sea until we encounter the enemy at some point which we can not predetermine and then fight. In the opinion of the author many officials in high places also shared this view, as evidenced by their attitude and neglect in the early stages of the war; even the sound plan of putting to sea to meet the enemy was dropped. The author continues:

To some extent this attitude may be explained by the fact that the fundamental conceptions of naval warfare were derived in part from the work of Clausewitz, "On War," which appeared to cover the whole problem of warfare in all its aspects. His dictum, "Strategy is the employment of battle for the purpose of the war," was generally known and accepted. Since this appeared to apply to the German situation in a war with England, and since such a battle would of necessity be decisive with respect to the war, it seemed only necessary for the fleet to stand out into the open North Sea and to engage the Grand Fleet anywhere at any time. Evidently the battle or the course of the action would then be determined by tactics, which comprised the highest concept of naval warfare in the sense employed by Clausewitz in his classic definition. Nothing else mattered.

Further, the above-quoted statement, "the sea has no frontiers, roads or topography," shows that strategy was considered only in connection with war on land, while the classic dictum, "approach with divided forces—fight with concentrated forces," was familiar even to those who had not studied Clausewitz. On land the slow movements of the opposing armies limited by geographical and topographical conditions, led from one battle to another; but this obviously could not apply on the open seas.

Such faulty comparisons with the war on land and a misguided logic were responsible for the above-mentioned trend of thought which held that well-grounded strategic concepts for the conduct of the war at sea were useless. Actually, however, such comparisons must serve to show that the concepts of strategy as evolved for the war on land are either not applicable or can only be applied in a conditional manner to the war at sea; the fundamentals must be thoroughly mastered and new concepts evolved for the problems of naval warfare paralleling the concepts developed for war on land. Not simply academic studies, but clear, well-defined concepts on which to base operations, plans, and orders. Such concepts were not formulated at the outbreak of the war, although demanded by those charged with the execution of such operations and essential to the success of the mission.

But Germany was not the only nation to sin in this respect. Little as the naval officers of the various navies are differentiated by their uniforms, so little do they differ in general in their conception of the fundamentals of their profession. Thus in practically every large navy the following unanimous opinion prevailed: Practical experience is decisive in naval warfare, as in fact in every branch of the naval profession. The practical ability of the leader and his subordinates decides the question of victory or defeat. No master of theory, no "battle student," can stand on the bridge of the flagship amidst the hot shell fire and the rapidly changing kaleidescopic picture presented and hope for victory; he will and must be inferior to the "practical man," trained by long experience to make instantaneous decisions and avoid surprises, provided only that the strength relations on the opposing sides are not too unfavorable and he possesses an inflexible will to conquer. In this conception there is only one thing, but that decisive, which is open to discussion (only the requirements of battle itself are here considered). The commander in chief of the fleet is here considered as the supreme commander in naval warfare, corresponding to the highest field marshal on land, and from this it follows as a natural consequence that the technical training for the higher naval command and the tactical training for the units of the fleet is the ultimate problem of the war at sea. Practice is everything. If anywhere, theory dies in naval warfare. Therefore theory was killed, or more correctly, remained dead.

And finally, to take another example from the obscure conceptions prevalent in those times: In the event of war what person could have or should have ordered a capital ship engagement as a result of a theoretical study of the situation? In the army the chief of the general staff or a similar officer, appointed in time of peace and recognized as the military leader, would take the responsibility for the military operations, this arrangement being as readily conceivable as the necessity for the special training of such officers. But in the navy, aside from the office of commander in chief of the fleet there was no recognized supreme leader for the conduct of the war at sea. No naval power possessed among their naval staffs any person charged with such definite responsibility and accorded similar freedom of action to the chief of the general staff. With regard to their powers or duties in a coming war there was no clear conception. Hence the above-mentioned conclusion, “the commander in chief of the fleet is the supreme commander in naval warfare” with disastrous consequences in so far as pertained to the development of thorough comprehensive theoretical-strategic plans.

Finally, a short psychological explanation: Were the commander in chief the supreme naval commander in time of war then his post would represent the highest office in the naval service, the ultimate goal of the professional career. Therefore, intensive practical training should be the aim of every officer and any endeavor which bears the odium of “theory” should be avoided at all costs. Since, for similar reasons, there exists in no navy a naval staff corps paralleling the line corps, there is lacking any incentive toward a sphere of activity which savors of purely theoretical studies, foreign or detrimental to advancement.

II

In the foregoing an effort was made to show why there existed no well-defined and clearly thought out concepts of naval strategy in the German Navy before the war and why the importance of such studies was so much underestimated. However, some foreign navies with traditions over centuries old were in a hardly better state of intellectual preparedness. Lord Haldane, writing in the preface of King-Hall's well-known book, Imperial Defense, states: “In the year 1911 there was a conflict between the Admiralty and the War Office with regard to the strategy to be followed in the event of a war with Germany. The navy had then nothing resembling a true general staff, and its chiefs were opposed to anything of the sort. Their strategical ideas were not based on extensive study. At the meeting of the Council for Imperial Defense after the premier had spoken sharply against the conceptions of the Admiralty regarding the superfluity of a naval staff, the navy was forced to accept a war staff, which, however, was in a chaotic form. It should be added, however, that at least a beginning was made and a definite problem presented, and that in the few years intervening up to the outbreak of the war it was possible for a few energetic individuals to give form and substance to this body.

In the German Navy there was also some intellectual preparation alongside intensive practical training. Where this was not directed towards technical specialization in ordnance, engineering, etc., it was devoted toward the intelligent building up of the High Seas Fleet, which was raised at the turn of the century from a position of political unimportance to a sea power of the first order, designed to frighten Albion away from aggressions against the rapidly increasing overseas commerce of Germany. There lay the great problem confronting the best minds working in theoretical quiet such as " Nauticus " and " Marine-Rundschau," whose mission was to awaken in the masses of the people a proper appreciation and understanding for the German need of a powerful navy. Political, historical, and statistical memoranda filled the press and the Reichstag debates until little by little the mighty structure was reared. The navy department was fully occupied with the acquisition of new matériel and personnel, while the officers in the fleet were working together day and night to weld together a battle instrument of the greatest fighting ability. Meanwhile, for the reasons before mentioned, the wings of the naval staff were trimmed and its work underestimated, with the consequent detrimental influence on the nature and extent of its labors. Instead of grappling with the fundamental problems of naval strategy, which clearly formulated would have formed a basis for defining the primary mission of the navy in war, some excellent detail work was done; but up to August, 1914, there existed no large scale operations plan which would indicate the means to accomplish the ultimate aims of the navy in war commensurate with its actual strength.

Having shown in the previous sections the trend of thought in the pre-war days regarding naval strategy, we shall now attempt to outline the nature of naval strategy on the basis of our actual war experience or on supplementary knowledge. First, we shall consider the primary missions in any theater of war which must be solved by each of the combatants. These problems are:

(*a*) Cutting of the enemy lines of communications overseas.

(*b*) Maintenance of own line of overseas communications.

(*c*) With great restrictions, coast protection, i. e., keeping the land boundaries free from besieging forces. This problem will be solved with the solution of (*a*) and (*b*) or else may be regarded as the combined mission of the coast defense forces and the naval forces allocated to such coast defense, but not as a strictly naval strategic problem.

The English writer, Hall-King, defines the mission of the navy in war as follows: "It is the business of the navy in war to so operate that a situation is created in which we are able and our enemy is not able to use the seas for transport purposes." Coast defense is left out of consideration. But even then the specter of an "invasion" was ever present in the English mind, as indicated by the barely broken off defensive action of the Grand Fleet in the first months of the war. (Hartlepool. 16/12/14.)

We should emphasize here that a clear conception of the "problems of the navy in war" is certainly not superfluous, since such axiomatic statements form the basis of the operations plans. That such problems are not self-evident to laymen and even to a large circle of naval officers is shown by the experience of the war. They are not nearly so clearly comprehended as the problems of the army, which may be generally expressed as "rendering impotent the enemy army in enemy territory." In the German Navy the concept expressing the most important problem of the navy was often expressed as "gaining control of the seas," which, in my opinion, does not conform to the logic of the matter as it is necessarily coupled with the primary mission of the fleet and should be more correctly stated as "gaining control of the seas for the purpose of maintaining the essential overseas imports and maintaining control of the seas to cut the enemy life arteries where possible, thereby breaking the enemy will to fight."

It must be repeated that a clear statement of the fundamental mission is essential in order that the nation at large may gain a clear comprehension of these duties, and to avoid misunderstandings among a people brought up under the restrictions of narrow continental ideas without a clear comprehension of the nature of sea power. The consequences of such a failure to comprehend the mission of the navy are disastrous, especially when they proceed from high political authority and thus paralyze the activities of the navy in time of war. An order issued to employ the full strength of the battle fleet against enemy forces without restriction carries with it such heavy responsibility for the person issuing the order that it becomes intolerable unless that person is thoroughly convinced that the mission of the fleet can only be accomplished by such means. It is quite possible that the outcome of such an engagement will be decisive in the war and will certainly and in any event determine the world status of the nation for a decade after the war. Possibly such a thought was in the mind of Bethmann-Hollweg when he made his fatal speech in which he stated that the fleet was to be held intact to throw into the balance on the conclusion of peace. This idea must certainly have influenced the high command to issue the order to the commander in chief of the fleet to "avoid serious losses" and possibly passed through the mind of the commander of the Grand Fleet at Jutland when he broke off the engagement on the evening of May 31, 1916, without clear tactical reasons.

Thus the whole war experience may be summarized, as far as pertains to the navy: The battle fleet will only be employed to its full extent and without restrictions when the higher political and naval authorities, and not simply a few of the commanders at the front, fully realize that the mission of the navy and its aims can not be accomplished and its aims achieved without such complete employment. But such a realization can not be expected unless the way has been paved years beforehand by intelligent preparedness. Thus the earlier statesmen and politicians are initiated into the war problems of the navy for the better for the navy, if the freedom of action necessary to accomplish its mission is to obtain. Where an organization for cooperation, such as the English Council for Imperial Defense, is lacking, then the military and naval leaders must keep in mind the necessity for the establishment of such an organization, and dare not let the matter drop on account of the lack of such a coordinating body.

Another lesson from the war: The German Nation had the proper idea when they asked why the battle fleet did not fight. Their instinct was right, even though they did not fully understand the basic reasons; they simply argued, "The army is fighting and bleeding, why not the navy?"

Therefore the aim of the naval strategic preparatory work should be the clarifying of the following concepts:

(*a*) The mission of the Navy in time of war.

(*b*) The importance of this mission with respect to the course of the war.

(*c*) The questions of international law which must be taken into consideration and whose disregard might bring about foreign complications.

(*d*) The employment of the full naval strength for the solution of these problems.

In addition to this the preliminary work must be checked to determine to what extent the Navy should be employed for subsidiary purposes, for example, for the supply of matériel and other questions beyond the actual sphere of the naval activities proper, and with respect to economic and industrial problems.

The author then takes up a discussion of the problems arising as an illustration of the nature of naval strategic concepts.

(*a*) PROBLEMS.

War on land.—Safeguarding the frontiers, carrying the war into enemy territory, conquering the resistance and the will to fight of the enemy troops.

These problems are presented of themselves immediately on the outbreak of war, both parties seeking the quickest solution, which can only be obtained by the party assuming the aggressive, otherwise the enemy will solve the problem.

War at sea.—Cutting the lines of the enemy overseas transportation, the maintenance of own overseas lanes of transportation, coast defense (under the restrictions enumerated above).

On the outbreak of war and during the first few months of the war these problems are not always clearly recognized, since there is at times no appreciable urge for their solution, i. e. strategic offensive, brought about by the activities of the enemy, contrary to conditions in war on land.

(*b*) INFLUENCE OF THE SOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS ON THE WHOLE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

War on land.—Keeping own country free from the devastation of war, weakening the material and normal resistence of the enemy by the occupation of extensive areas of enemy territory, preventing as many enemy forces as possible from active participation. These are clear and comprehensible and long experience has shown that such solutions will break the enemy will to war, thus reacting directly on the whole conduct of the war.

War at sea.—Weakening of the enemy fighting ability by preventing sources of supply reaching enemy territory, maintenance of own resistance and fighting ability by drawing on extensive foreign sources for supplies and munitions for the defense and protection of own territory, and protection of the sea borders.

The results of such action are clear when the problem is thoroughly understood, but the influence on the whole conduct of the war is not so evident without considerable study. This will vary in case to case for the different nations and depends on the geographical situation, the economic and industrial organization of the country, its available supplies of raw material, and the political grouping of the "benevolent neutrals," etc. Only a comprehensive study will reveal the importance of this problem. Although it may not be evident in the first months of the war an underestimation of its importance or a belated realization, when the time for an offensive is past, may be accompanied by disastrous consequences.

(*c*) INFLUENCES BROUGHT ABOUT BY ALLIANCES AND THE RESULTANT INFLUENCE ON THE FOREIGN POLICIES.

The World War has shown that the strategy on land and sea sooner or later comes into conflict with the recognized principles of international law, and that finally each nation will decide the issue on the basis of self-preservation. The conditions may vary in every war, but in the end the war measures and the war offensives undertaken in the international seas will finally involve the recognized rights of nations and their foreign poicies.

(*d*) EMPLOYMENT OF ALL AVAILABLE WAR MATÉRIEL IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS.

This question comprises the essence of "strategy." As applied to the dictum of Clausewitz, the phrase "employment of all available war matériel" may be substituted for "employment of the battle," while "solution of the problem" is only another conception of "for the purpose of the war."

War on land.—Mobilization and the advance on the enemy frontier and the enemy location will soon be known. The military leaders may always bring battle contact, their method of accomplishing this revealing their genius. The forces on each side will draw each other on.

War at sea.—The method of employment of the naval forces is manifold, since the greater mobility of the forces in comparison with the forces ashore admits the elements of surprise and flexibility in their employment. Contrary to war on land, however, numerous questions arise, owing to the usual uncertainty regarding the location and intentions of enemy forces. How may I approach the enemy if I wish to engage him? How can I force him to accept battle? Must I actually engage to solve the problem, and if so when?

This brief illustration will show the manifold problems and questions presented to naval strategic leadership, as it will generally be necessary to deal with many unknown factors, as opposed to the conditions of war on land. There is here required an inflexible will with a singleness of purpose which can seek the goal and on occasion even create by force the conditions necessary to success. To summarize, naval strategic leadership is not only absolutely indispensable, but involves responsibility on those entrusted with its solution at least equal to those of the military strategic leaders on land.

Naval strategy determines the missions which fall to the lot of the navy with respect to the purpose of the war, as well as the proper time for their execution. It controls, therefore, the corresponding distribution and employment of the entire naval forces.

(N. B.—If this concept is extended to strategic aerial warfare, in which there is little experience available, it will be found that the problems are even more self-evident than in naval warfare.)

IV

These studies of naval strategic problems in peace time will determine the operations plan and the operations orders for the initiation of naval warfare. But the naval strategic problem does not cease then. The leaders must constantly check the varying situation, since, as shown by the World War, the opposing fleets show a certain nervous reaction in their operations which constantly alters the stragetic situation. One need only recall the retirement of the Grand Fleet to the harbors in the west of Scotland on the first appearance of the German submarines in the North Sea; the detachment of whole squadrons of battle cruisers over half the earth to hunt down Spee's squadron after Coronel, reversing the normal strength relations and leaving the Germans with a superiority in battle cruisers, and finally the continuous moving of the high seas fleet back and forth through the Kiel Canal on unconfirmed rumors of English forces in the entrance of the Baltic or the southern North Sea. These examples suffice to show that the operations plans and the initial operations orders may become obsolete within a few days owing to changes in the naval stragetic situation and that it is fundamentally wrong to simply "await the development" of a strategic plan without a most careful daily scrutiny of the whole situation. This shows a marked contrast with the strategic operations of the war on land where the preparations for extensive operations may take months to consumate. From the war dairy of Admiral V. Polh it appears that the chief of the German Naval Staff spent weeks at general headquarters occupied with questions of foreign policy such as the attitude of Turkey toward the Central Powers, while the naval strategic plan was still "running on." The critical observer must have seen that this had become obsolete as a result of English naval strategy. The navy had its "Marne battle" also at about the same time as the army.

Finally, another distinction: The leadership of the army rests on two fundamental elements—strategy and tactics, while in the navy we have to consider three—viz, strategy, operative leadership, and tactics. Tactics on the field of battle, strategy on the part of the supreme naval command and, replacing the former where the undertaking leads to no tactical engagement, "operative leadership," beginning when the forces stand out on their mission and ending on the return to port. The responsibility for the three basic elements can not be too strongly emphasized; the question of naval strategy falls to the lot of the chief of naval operations (naval staff), who must maintain close relations with the general staff and the supreme war commander that he may keep the ultimate aims of the war constantly in mind. The leaders at the front, the commander in chief of the fleet, is only concerned with the strategic problems in so far as they are disclosed to him in operation orders and plans; for the rest he is charged with the operative and tactical leadership. This was certainly not clearly recognized during the war, since the commander in chief was frequently held equally responsible for purely strategic questions, while at the same time he was denied the essential operative freedom of action as a result of the unsound warnings to "avoid material losses."

These general rules are valid to-day, even more so as a result of the great extension of the radius of naval communications, since the main theater of war may lie far from the headquarters of the chief of naval operations. But a sharp distinction must be drawn between the strategic leadership which is indispensable and only concerned with a determination of the strategy necessary to accomplish the ultimate ends, and the unrestricted leadership of the commander in chief in his operative and tactical decisions. In this connection the behavior and neglect of the naval staffs concerned between the battles of Coronel and the Falklands Islands is particularly instructive.

V

The above-mentioned naval problems can only be considered as theoretical or abstract; the concrete problems based on the situation and the decision as to the probability of success of any operation plan must be thoroughly studied. In any case, however, it may be taken as axiomatic that problems which are apparently capable of solution should be undertaken at all costs. The following brief review will indicate the points of view which must needs be considered:

Of decisive importance will be the geographical situation of the powers concerned, whether it is possible to interrupt or prevent enemy overseas transportation, their sources of supply, etc. This may be regarded as the necessity for blockade in its widest sense, necessitating operations in the area between enemy coast and sources of supply, while the maintenance of own overseas supplies will necessitate the transfer of the operations areas to those localities where own overseas trade is exposed to enemy offensive measures. A glance at the chart will show the connection. It is also evident that if such operations are to be effective they must be carried on without interruption in the above-mentioned areas. Is our own force sufficiently strong to operate continuously in these areas with sufficient strength? Can they resist the concentrated enemy offensive and defensive forces in these areas? These questions show the decisive importance of naval bases in so far as pertains to naval strategic problems. All vessels must be enabled to return after a shorter or longer period to port to replenish supplies, refuel, and rest, as well as to effect repairs after battle, etc. At the beginning and end of every cruise there must be a naval base, the location of which is decisive with regard to duration of the cruise and, in a restricted sense, on the nature of the undertaking or the offensive operations. Thus the naval forces are dependent from beginning to end on their bases for their freedom of action, and only such problems can be solved in which the location and number of these bases admits the required freedom of action.

However, the geographical situation must be accepted as it is, whether favorable or unfavorable, since few nations are able in time of peace to acquire and construct extensive outlying naval bases. This does not mean that the problem of the supply of munitions and material need be abandoned as hopeless, since a policy of foreign alliances in time of peace as well as close cooperation with the army may go far to improve an initially unfavorable situation. No means must be left unused, where the problem is of such decisive influence on the final outcome.

Another question, however, needs to be answered: shall the naval strategic problems be solved by means of a strategic offensive or defensive? In this connection we must remark that tactically with the means available to the navy there can only be an offensive, since a defensive means simply conscious or unconscious submission to the enemy will and finally defeat. Above all, however, serious considerations must decide as to the nature of the strategic attitude. It may be that the geographical situation will automatically determine the attitude of one party to the conflict, who may then decide on a strategic defensive; the other party will then be forced to assume the offensive if fortune is to be turned in her favor.

England cut the German lines of overseas communication at the outbreak of the war while maintaining her own, and Germany decided on a strategic defensive!

Another important point, perhaps the most important, which can not be forgotten when operations plans and orders are in course of preparation. Like the army, the fleet consists of men. Men are the carriers of the naval warfare, not the squadrons, flotillas or ships. These are only the means of transportation over the dividing seas which permit the men to close to battle. If the spirit of the organization is sound there will exist the will do battle from the first day of war. This is the supreme reason for their existence. If they are withheld from battle for long periods their fighting ability deteriorates. The decision on which the operations orders are based must take this fact into consideration and not burden the spirit of the fighting forces with the dead weight of inactivity.

As a final consideration the numerical strength relations of the opposing forces must be given some weight in determining the nature of the operations, but not as was done in Germany before and during the war when dead statistics were permitted to control the destiny of the fleet. Such statistical relations should only be given decisive weight when the fighting ability of the forces and the confidence inspired by the leaders is also taken into consideration. No mere balance of dead figures. Strength relations are subject to constant alterations in the course of the war and should therefore not be made the primary basis of strategical considerations, thus running the danger of obscuring the ultimate aims and problems of the war. To summarize, first the naval strategic aims must be clearly recognized and then the means for their solution clearly and carefully thought out.

VI

The foregoing may be considered as theory and evaluated as such. The following examples are given to illustrate the concrete case put into the form of questions and answers for greater clarity. Situation: As of July, 1914.

1. Question. What are the naval strategic problems in a war between Germany and Austria against the Entente Powers, including England, to be solved by the German Navy?

Answer. The cutting of the English and Russian overseas lines of transportation, maintainance of own overseas transportation for supply of food-stuffs and munitions, protection of German coast against landing and similar enemy undertaking by naval forces (secondary mission). On the other hand secondary missions may arise which may be solved in conjunction with the other military forces of the country.

2. Question. What importance attaches to the solution of these problems in connection with the main issues of the war?

Answer. As a result of England's island location and the impossibility of an enemy making a direct attack on her outlying territory such as India, her vulnerable point lies in the necessity for the country obtaining food supplies from overseas. Thus the cutting of these transport lines automatically insures the solution of the problem and the winning of the war. With regard to Russia, her military strength can be greatly reduced by cutting off her communications with her western allies, thus exerting great influence on the entire course of the war. Her industrial situation is weak and most of her munitions must be received from overseas.

Germany can not sustain a very long war on her own sources of supply alone, while such materials as rubber, high-grade ores, etc., are not obtainable in own country. Hence the maintenance of her trade lines will materially strengthen her military situation.

The solution of the coast-defense problem will materially lighten the problems of the land forces, since a landing of Russian troops in the Baltic areas will bring serious disadvantages for the army, giving the Russians a possibility of attacking our own troops in the rear.

3. Question. What influences will the geographical situation exert on the attempt to solve these problems?

Answer. With regard to naval war, the position of Germany with respect to England is the most unfavorable imaginable. Since England's position toward Germany is practically a blockade position for German overseas commerce, the German naval forces must be employed in the channel and to the westward of the British Islands to maintain own lines of communications and to cut the English lines. Thus to solve the problem they must be employed far from own home bases. This unfavorable situation can hardly be improved in time of peace, since it would be highly difficult to negotiate for the use of bases in the Scandinavian or the Iberian Peninsulas or in other possibly neutral countries. Thus on the outbreak of the war it must be assumed that this very unfavorable geographical situation will obtain. After the outbreak of war a possibility for improvement of this situation is given by the strategic objectives of the right wing of the army, which will advance through Belgium and northern France. Cooperation with the general staff of the army will insure the prompt occupation of the Belgian and northern French channel ports as part of the operations plan of the army. If these operations are successful, the geographical situation will be greatly improved, since the bases for the naval operations will then be located much closer to the principal operations area. Even this will not, however, be decisive, but must be extended. If military means fail, then resort must be had to political means. Politically and geographically considered, England has one vulnerable point—Ireland. So long as the momentary strength ratio is maintained. England has nothing to fear on this point. Should, however, politics succeed in this field and the situation be altered to such an extent that German ships might lie openly in Irish harbors, the original geographically unfavorable situation would be reversed, in that German ships would stand between the enemy and her overseas commerce lanes, thus making the blockade position and the blockade defense effective. The problem would then be fully solved.

With respect to Russia there are four possible lanes of overseas trade routes with the outside world—through the Baltic, through the Black Sea, through the northern Arctic Ocean, and through the Sea of Japan. The route through the Baltic will probably be closed at the eastern exit without serious difficulty. Possible negotiations may be opened with the adjacent States (Denmark and Sweden) regarding details for permanent exclusion of traffic. Although a certain amount of traffic might be maintained between Russia and the harbors of Finland and northern Sweden, it may be considered that the Baltic route can be "effectively" closed. In this respect the situation of Germany to Russia is similar to England's geographical position with respect to Germany. The overseas communication through the Black Sea stands or falls with the decision of Turkey; whether to remain neutral or enter the war on the side of Germany. No means should be neglected to bring about the latter desirable consummation which would result in an ideal solution. In importance the other two sea routes are almost negligible in comparison, since the trade capacity depends on two very long extended single lines of rails. At the same time the German Navy has good reasons for maintaining good relations with Japan on account of Tsingtau. A threat against German overseas communications by Russia can only be expected in the Baltic, and there only in the northern parts where the situation is not unfavorable to Russia. Here also adequate cooperation with the army will insure undertakings such as the occupation of the Russian harbors of Libau and the northern harbors and the islands of Aland, which will reverse this geographically unfavorable situation in the northern Baltic. Since, however, the routes in the northern Baltic lie largely through international waters it is hardly to be expected that a continuous threat against German lines of communication can obtain.

With regard to the employment of the German naval forces for coast defense in this area, it will not be necessary to discuss the geographical situation in detail.

4. Question. Taking into account the considerations mentioned under questions 2 and 3, in which sequence should the problems be attempted?

Answer. First. The cutting of the English overseas commerce lines. As a necessary assumption for this consummation the establishment of German naval bases in France and Belgium and, if possible, their extension to Ireland.

Second. Safeguarding own lines of communication in the North Atlantic and the North Sea. Necessary requirements for same as under the above.

Third. Cutting of the Russian lines of communication in the Baltic. No special requisites necessary in this case, and the operations necessary to the solution of this problem may be undertaken on the outbreak of the war.

Fourth. Cutting the Russian lines of communication through the Black Sea. Presumption in this case the entrance of Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

Fifth. Safeguarding own communications through the Baltic; in this connection there is a possibility of improving the geographical situation by the employment of the military forces ashore or by naval operations.

5. Question. For the solution of these problems is an offensive or defensive strategy demanded?

Answer. These problems can only be solved by an offensive strategy. What is the proper time for the inauguration of these operations? Since, on the outbreak of the war the intentions and the strategy of the enemy will probably be obscure for a certain period there will be granted a period of respite to the navy of short duration until this lack can be supplied. Meanwhile the army will be advancing toward its objectives on the channel. The naval offensives must then be undertaken at the latest when the objectives are about to be taken. If the operations ashore are prematurely halted then the naval operations against the Grand Fleet must be initiated without regard to this as soon as the required purely naval strategic (not geographical) conditions can be created. In general it may be stated that the maximum effectiveness will result when both the naval and military offensive reach their height simultaneously with regard to the ultimate objectives.

6. Question. What should be the conduct of the fleet during this strategic period of waiting?

Answer. Tactical offensive within a geographically restricted area. This limitation is lifted in the event of battle contact with the enemy. The commander in chief has complete freedom of action with the sole restriction that the battleships and battle cruisers shall be brought to action in close concentration.

7. Question. How shall the strategic offensive be initiated?

Answer. By the employment of the concentrated naval forces available (including mine layers, submarines and air forces) in battle against the English Fleet, which will create the conditions favorable to operations in the areas to the westward of the British Islands.

8. Question. Is there not danger that such a battle, even though favorable to the German forces, may be of indecisive importance on the outcome of the whole war and degenerate into a "battle for itself," and therefore of secondary importance?

Answer. A battle between the High Seas Fleet and the Grand Fleet will never become a "battle for itself" if fought through to a conclusion. Only by means of this battle can the closed door be forced open—the door which closes off the German Fleet from its primary operations area where its problems must be solved. In addition to this such a battle will have a far-reaching political influence not only on the principal parties concerned but also on the allies and neutrals. Only such a battle fought through to its conclusion in favor of Germany can bring about a discharge of the political tension in Ireland and therefore pave the way for the establishment of the necessary naval bases in that country. A battle for itself can only come into consideration in this connection where only units of the Fleets are engaged and which results in no practical change in the existing strength ratios. If the two main bodies make contact then every effort must be made by the Germans to force the battle to its conclusion since otherwise there will always be the necessity for a repetition under possibly less favorable conditions.

If we fail to engage in battle then we renounce from the start the solution of those problems which alone can be decisive in the final outcome of the war. Nothing can be accomplished toward improving the geographical position without such a battle in the open sea; the possibilities of any political success along these lines is not to be expected. There can be no "jockeying for position" in a naval war as in warfare on land.

9. Question. Is there not the possibility that the operations leading up to such a decisive engagement of the fleets might result in failure in that the English fleet, which has already probably solved the first two problems, will remain passive or in any event avoid a decisive action?

Answer. The operations must be so planned from the start that the English Fleet will be forced to accept battle, which will lead to a decision. Both nations have an "Achilles heel," or vulnerable spot which they must perforce protect—Germany the eastern exits of the Baltic and England the channel. Any serious threat against the channel on the part of the German naval forces and in particular in the early stages of the war during the land operations in Belgium and northern France will draw on the English Fleet regardless of where same is based, and force them to employ their full strength. The operations plan will bring about these conditions. The question as to where the battle is fought is immaterial and may be decided by purely tactical considerations.

10. Question. With regard to the existing strength ratios of the fleets is the German Fleet in the position to force such an action with any reasonable certainty of success?

Answer. This question can not be answered with absolute certainty. With regard to the prospects for victory the following factors must be considered: First, our personnel has had the most intensive training extending over many years which has brought the organization to the highest possible state of efficiency. According to our thorough knowledge of the English Navy our training has been the more intense. Our tactical leadership and our technical knowledge of ordnance is in no wise inferior to that of our opponents. For years our leaders and men have lived in the knowledge that everything depended on this one battle to the death with a numerically superior enemy force. By bringing on this action the unavoidable tension in the fleet will be relieved, and the battle will crown their work of years. With the knowledge that their achievement is of equal importance with that of the brother service on land and that possibly the most important decision of the war rests with them if the personnel is fully prepared to accept this challenge.

Second, ships and matériel are the best which can possibly be produced by German technical ingenuity, and there is no reason to suppose that they are in any way inferior to those of our opponents.

Third, with such operations we obtain for ourselves the full benefits of surprise in that the action can be forced at any time our fleet is ready, while this will not be the case for the enemy. Experience has shown that no fleet can be kept at all times in a state of complete preparedness. Thus our numerical weakness can be considerably nullified by this factor of surprise. A comparison of the dry statistics is of little value; it shows only that the longer we wait the less favorable for us will be the strength ratios.

Fourth, behind the fleet is the knowledge that this engagement is the only operation which offers any promise of success in attaining the ultimate aims of the war. This knowledge is the driving force which inspires the will to victory.

VII

The examples cited are all of course based on events after the fact, and experience has shown the correctness of what was to be proven. However, this was done simply to illustrate the points in question and not as an attempt to show how much better it might have been done.

DISCUSSION BY CAPTAIN CLAUSSEN (GERMAN NAVY)

The writer (Captain Claussen) wishes his remarks to be considered not as a criticism of the article by Commander Grassmann, but rather in the sense of supplementary remarks.

In the original article, Commander Grassmann summarizes the third mission of the naval forces as follows (Sec. III):

"Under great restrictions: Coast defense, i. e., the safeguarding of the coast, the sea borders, and the outlying possessions. This problem is frequently solved automatically with the solution of problems (1) and (2); or as a "joint problem" of the naval forces and those forces restricted to coast defense, but not as a strictly naval strategic problem."

However, the strict definition of the primary and secondary problems, when compared with the rather vague definition of the tertiary problem as enunciated by Commander Grassmann, shows that this tertiary mission is not clearly comprehended. If we regard this tertiary mission from a broader standpoint it is seen to be a purely naval strategic problem. Commander Grassmann considers the coast defense problem in the nature of a relief of the military forces on shore. Pursuant to this line of thought the writer restates this tertiary problem of the naval forces, in general terms, as follows:

Support of the military forces and operations ashore by the navy.

Such support of the military strategy on shore may take two different directions—either as an offensive or else as a strictly defensive operation. The purpose and aim of war is the breaking of the enemy will to fight by the employment of coercive measures under the political leaders. Naval strategy offers one means of accomplishing this purpose by preventing the enemy from receiving supplies and munitions from sources overseas. This may result in weakening the enemy both physically and morally until a point is reached where he is forced to sue for peace. The effectiveness of this naval strategic method will depend very largely on the extent to which the enemy nation is forced to rely on such importations from overseas, even in those cases where the navy is enabled to cut off all overseas communications. If the nation is absolutely dependent for such overseas trade for its own necessities of life, then they may be compelled to give up the struggle in a short time; but, on the other hand, if the enemy state is relatively independent of such overseas importations, such naval strategic operations can never be decisive in attaining the ultimate aims of the war. It is one of the peculiarities of naval warfare that it is powerless to make a thrust past the coast into the heart of the enemy country. Thus, if the conduct of the war is dependent on the naval strategy alone, it may be possible to isolate the enemy from all overseas sources of supplies, but naval strategy alone is powerless to influence the length of time which must elapse before such measures become effective.

Therefore, in the nature of things, naval strategy will always remain an indirect war measure. Military strategy on land is needed, therefore, to supplement the naval strategy. In its nature military strategy has for its problem the conquering of the enemy directly by force of arms, by the occupation of enemy territory, and the administration of same, thereby forcing the enemy state to capitulate. Where naval strategy is unable with its means to attain these ultimate aims of the war it must be supplemented by the armed forces on land. This again presupposes that the naval forces are able to exercise control over that portion of the seas which must be traversed by the army in passing from own into the enemy country. In this fact lies the justification of that much abused term "control of the seas," as the naval forces must safeguard the troop transports during the expedition and maintain control of the seas during the whole period of the land operations in the overseas enemy territory.

The interruption or the cutting of these lines of communications spells disaster for the troops in the enemy territory even though these may have achieved initial success.

The best known historical example of this is the defeat of Napoleon's armies in Egypt and Syria. As a direct consequence of the battle of Aboukir and the resultant impossibility of the French to maintain communication with their sources of supplies overseas in the home country, their armies were doomed to defeat without a possibility of being saved. The fact that Napoleon failed to comprehend the true nature of the relation between military operations on shore and the control of the seas is evident from his later conduct. With great hardheadedness and determination he planned the invasion of England, working out in much detail a scheme for maintaining control of the English Channel for the few hours necessary for the transportation of his troops only. Had Napoleon actually succeeded in effecting this landing he would have ultimately suffered defeat in spite of any initial successes of his troops on shore, as the English, in the nature of things, must soon have regained control of the channel, thus completely cutting off his expeditionary force from all communications with the home country. Therefore, for military strategic operations overseas, the control of the seas remains absolutely essential. This can only be attained by the complete annihilation of the enemy naval forces or by holding them definitely in check.

The defensive support of military strategy on shore consists in covering the wings of the army which base on the seacoast, the protection of the rear and the coast line from enemy attacks from the sea and attempted invasion. Such defensive measures may be incorporated under the general term "coast defense." In the coastal waters and in narrow areas of the sea the naval strategic problem of coast defense is solved by mounting long-range guns, the erection of barriers, the planting of mine fields, the employment of patrol forces and aircraft. The protection of the outlying waters and possessions is a problem for the naval forces alone.

The mission of naval strategy in supporting the military strategy on land plays a very important rôle in naval history and lessons derived from this source indicate the necessity for the closest possible and most intelligent cooperation between the forces. Thus the three main problems of naval strategy may be restated as follows:

(1) Cutting the enemy overseas communications.
(2) Maintaining own overseas communications.
(3) Supporting the military strategy on land.

In the article under discussion Grassmann has designated the three fundamental elements of naval leadership as follows: Strategy, operative leadership, and tactics. The introduction of the term "operative leadership" is comprehensible from a psychological standpoint.

Up to the present many activities in this field have been referred to as strategic. One need only mention the term "strategic reconnaissance." For this reason it seems that the term "operative leadership" may well be introduced to bridge the two elements and to remove the word strategy from a sphere where it does not properly belong. Thus the field of operative leadership borders closely on tactics and comes under those particular activities of the commander in chief of the fleet in which he is necessarily accorded full freedom of action.

DISCUSSION BY COMMANDER NEUMANN (GERMAN NAVY)

The author of the article "On the Nature of Naval Strategy" touches on a very difficult and complicated subject, which demands the most profound study and experience. If he succeeds in arousing greater interest in this subject amongst the naval personnel, he will have accomplished much good work, as the knowledge of this subject was admittedly fragmentary in the old navy. In his discussion of the trend of thought in the old navy and the general lack of any true conception of the nature of naval strategy the author appears to have exaggerated. The questions propounded have, indeed, been made the subject of discussion before the war, and much was written on the subject in the old navy before 1914. (Here follows a list of articles on the subject published at that time in the Marine Rundschau and a list of books by well-known German naval officers and others brought out prior to the war.)

The fact that a more general knowledge of these works was not prevalent in the old navy and did not come much to the attention of the younger officers in particular may be attributed largely to the circumstances explained by Grassmann himself. The German Navy was of too recent origin and the attention of the seagoing officers was largely focused on other matters of vital importance. The organization of a special corps of staff officers similar to the staff corps of the army and the creation of a special office charged with the responsibility for the working out and development of naval strategic plans, as suggested by the author, was actually much under discussion in pre-war days and would have doubtless been realized in fact had not the war broken out when it did. This failure must be charged to the restrictions in time which permitted only the most essential problems faced by the old navy to be solved one after the other.

It is quite comprehensible that many officers may have shown a lack of understanding for naval strategy as there were many who inclined more to practical activities than to studies of this nature. To conclude, however, from the expressions of such officers that the navy as a whole did not realize the importance of naval strategy is to be guilty of gross exaggeration. In the old navy much work of this nature was done in quiet. The author might also be interested to learn that during the great war game at the naval academy lasting for a period of four weeks most of the time was devoted to a study and working out of strategic problems, while the whole course was concluded by a relatively brief tactical problem. It is admitted that in the field of naval strategy we have no such recognized authorities as military strategy is able to show in the names of Clausewitz, Schlieffen, Moltke, etc., but in spite of this there does exist a very comprehensive literature on the subject of naval strategy. These were naturally largely the writings of English and French experts; a circumstance easily comprehensible, as these nations have possessed navies for several centuries. Otherwise the student must dig out the historic lessons of naval strategy with great effort in the voluminous works on naval history. Thus for the naval officer the study of naval strategy is more time robbing and tiresome than similar studies of military strategy on the part of the army officers. The fact that such studies had to be pursued in private, in addition to the strenuous routine requirements of the naval service, shows that our lack was not so much a failure to realize the importance of naval strategy as a fault of organization. We were not equipped to evaluate such studies by means of practical work in this connection. Where the author advocates an organization which will permit such study and practical work he should be supported.

Where the author states that the commander in chief of the fleet was regarded as the supreme naval leader for the conduct of the war he is mistaken; such a conception can only represent the attitude of mind of the uninitiated. If his office was considered the highest attainable in the navy, such an attitude represents only the ambition of those whose tendencies are toward practical activities rather that studies of the elements of the profession. The commander in chief of the fleet can not and should not be other than the tactical leader in battle. In addition to this his staff is inadequate for other duties than those of a tactical and administrative nature. As a matter of actual fact the conduct of the naval warfare from the beginning lay in the hands of the naval staff at general headquarters (if we omit from consideration the supreme commander, i. e., the Kaiser) where, under the influence of those who were not experts, all of the detrimental restrictions to the naval warfare originated. The fact that the naval staff should have been so disastrously influenced by the unitiated in naval warfare must be charged against the organization. If we had had a naval staff organized in peace times consisting of the best brains of the navy, and supported by the navy department, we might have had an effective naval general staff for the conduct of the war. We can not even designate it as a "tragic fault" that such an organization was lacking, since in the nature of things, there was inadequate time for the organization and creation of such a staff, considering the relative youth of the German Navy. Matters were not ripe for the creation of that office at the time. But even this does not tell the whole story. The most capable organization in the world is powerless if the best brains and most efficient men are deliberately shunted out of such office and not permitted to carry on such constructive work in times of peace in preparation for war. Thus there was also a question of the conflict of personalities which is well known to all. Such a conflict was also responsible for the fact that such a supreme naval staff was not created even after the outbreak of the war, although its necessity was well recognized and its organization demanded.

In this connection it might also be stated that after the outbreak of the war the various staffs attempted to make up this lack of peace time preparation by extraordinary efforts and by the most exhaustive study of strategic problems.

It would be impossible here to go into detail concerning such labors. As an example, however, it might be stated that much of such labor was done by the fleet staff (operations section) on the startegic problems which culminated in the battle of Jutland and also in the work done in preparation for the planned offensive which was to have taken place toward the end of the war and which was interrupted by the outbreak of the revolution. Naturally, this work was not generally known and in the nature of things it could not be known to the officer corps of the navy as a whole. It would, however, be erroneous to state that all " well thought out strategic plans were lacking."

With regard to the other points brought out in the Grassmann article covered in Section III to VII, there remains only one point to be discussed. In the article in question the author has listed the three main problems of the naval forces as follows:

(1) Cutting the enemy lines of communications overseas.
(2) Maintaining own line of overseas communications.
(3) Coast defense, under restrictions.

In this summary there is lacking the one essential point—namely, measures to damage, annihilate, or hold enemy naval forces in check.

The fact that such measures are essential follows naturally from the arguments advanced in the original article, although it is not definitely enunciated as the primary mission of the fleet. If the above mentioned three main problems as listed are taken literally there is danger of arriving at the false conclusions which were advocated by the French for such a long period of time. The supporters of this theory wished primarily to solve the secondary problems of naval warfare with the consequence that both by training and organization the French became unable to cope with the vital problem of naval warfare. If the ultimate goal is not clearly recognized then the means necessary to attain this end will not be properly chosen. He who succeeds in annihilating or holding in check the enemy naval forces will not have to worry about the solution of problems (1) and (2) or (3). Whether or not in special cases it will be possible for the fleet to inflict such damage on the enemy or to hold his forces in check, having regard to the relative strength ratios of the forces in question, is another matter, which need not however be treated in the discussion of the general nature and problems of naval strategy.

Similarly, the expression "control of the seas," which was so much in vogue in the days before the war and which has been so very much criticized, does express, in effect, the primary requisite—the principle mission—to which all else in naval warfare must be subordinated.

In fact, the expression "to obtain control of the seas" is very happily chosen, in that it defines a definite aim without the necessity for enumerating the particular means or the special secondary aims necessary to its accomplishment. This conception may be extended to cover the whole theater of warfare or it may with equal propriety be restricted to certain small areas of the ocean. For example, a relatively weak navy at war with a stronger naval power may obtain control of the seas in certain bays and coastal waters as a result of strong shore defenses, barriers, and patrol forces, and in this manner the weaker may maintain his shipping in such guarded waters. To this extent the weaker may be said to "control the seas" in the areas in question. It might be assumed that this is a play on words, but it is, in reality, a fact. The nature of the fundamental concepts will be characteristic of the spirit of the officer personnel, whether they are trained to defensive measures or to take the aggressive. The repeated admonitions of the author (Grassmann) for an active offensive in naval warfare is therefore one of the outstanding merits of the article under discussion.

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The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between April 25 and June 1, inclusive.

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

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O. N. I. MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

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ARGENTINA

A. POLITICAL

1. The "Yankee" as He Appears in Argentine School Books.

South Americans are taught from childhood to look upon the Yankee, as Americans are called, as an uncultured person without any humanitarian instincts and whose sole object in life is the acquisition of money. The following paragraphs have been translated from an important geography textbook that is used in the upper grades of the elementary course in the public and private schools of Argentina. The book is called "La Tierra" (The Earth) and is a study of the physical, ethnic, political, and economic conditions of the various countries. It is approved by the school authorities, and its general acceptance is witnessed by the fact that it is now in its twenty-first edition.

> Of Anglo-Saxon blood, the Yankee, or American, as he calls himself, is tall and generally overbearing in his manner. He gives one to understand by his attitude that, as Carnegie says, "The American is superior to all other men because he is a composite of the best of all the nations." This vaunting statement, engraved in the very foundations of the *character* of the citizen of the Union gives him that courage, that *intrepid* activity, that desire for action which is noticeable in all his behavior, and which constitutes his outstanding characteristic.
>
> The spirit of *initiative,* developed by suitable education, is the distinctive feature of his temperament. The American has one goal to which he drives himself energetically; that goal is *riches and wealth.* The American is always lying in ambush to seize the opportunity to launch himself in business and make a fortune. He does not become discouraged, he does not quail in the face of danger because, says P. Adams, "The American disdains ruin as the hero disdains death." "The young people," says J. Fraser, "have no other ambition than to make their way in the world, work hard, and become rich through their own efforts."
>
> This activity, this thirst for riches, is helped by a *practical intelligence,* developed by an education ad hoc. Culture or instruction is made to serve for the acquisition and employment of wealth. Both primary and secondary edu-

cation in the United States, says G. Blondel, by methods designedly practical, whose tendency is to develop the economic aspect of the boy's character and not the humanities as in the European countries. For this reason the artistic and literary studies are left to the women, since they are of no use to the men. In short, the American character is a type of intensive action, of *annihilated* emotivity, or precocious development driven by an exalted determination to one sole end—wealth.

American types.—The *American workman* lives in the big industrial cities of the East. He is tall, blonde, impetuous and good natured. He considers himself the equal of his employer and seeks the improvement of the instruments and tools which he uses, sure in this way of obtaining an increase in salary. Active, but unstable, he is always looking for more remunerative work. His practical and not his technical intelligence helps him to overcome all difficulties and makes him climb out of the ranks of the workingman to the category of an employer. This is his ambition and this explains the many business failures in the United States.

The *American farmer* lives on the plains in the Central and, more particularly, in the Western States. He is large and muscular, of Scotch origin, and he thoroughly despises English methods. He buys the most modern machinery, sacrificing newly bought apparatus for others which he knows will render better service. The eastern farmer, as a rule, is more backward and disdains the new scientific methods.

The great *industrial or capitalist* seems to have as his only aim in life the piling up of money. To this end he sacrifices everything and abstains from the use of wine and liquors in order to have the liberty of spirit which the administration of his business demands. Sometimes he becomes philanthropic and spends enormous sums in charity.

Negroes.—Marriage between whites and blacks is prohibited in the Southern States. It would create a scandal to admit them to eat at one's table. The white people find fault with them for their inclination toward stealing, toward laziness and vanity, and from this feeling comes (this one may say without justifying the action) the odious practice of "lynching."

Religion.—There does not exist what might be called a national religion, but there are a multitude of Protestant sects (about 100) due to which there reigns a veritable Babylonian confusion. This confusion is increased periodically by the appearance of still other new sects.

Education.—The instruction in all the day schools is coeducational, a defect which will undoubtedly disappear in time.

CHINA

A. ECONOMIC

1. Economic Summary.

[*Source:* M. I. D.]

ECONOMIC PENETRATION OF FOREIGN INTERESTS.

The predominant influence wielded for decades by foreign powers in China's economic life is showing signs of breaking down. The British have given up their territorial concession at Hankow and the Belgians have expressed willingness to relinquish theirs at Tientsin. The Peking Government is denouncing the old treaties conferring special economic privileges on other nations as fast as they come up for revision and is refusing to negotiate new ones except on terms of absolute equality. The Nationalist Government at Nanking is likewise denouncing the so-called "unequal" treaties. Both the North and the South have succeeded in collecting higher customs dues than have been legalized and are agitating for greater customs autonomy.

The economic penetration by foreign nations was acquired in several ways: As the price of military defeat, by political pressure, as a return for loans, and by bribery of officials. The most extensive concessions are held by Japan, who has, in addition, invested upwards of $1,000,000,000 in business undertakings in China. Great Britain comes next in economic interests and influence. The United States ranks third, with the distinction that American trade and investments have developed along legitimate lines without territorial or economic concessions.

PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF NATIONALS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

The Chinese have become the small retailer of the Far East (exclusive of Japan) in addition to contributing to the force of manual laborers. From Siberia to the Dutch East Indies the Chinese are found doing the hardest physical tasks in addition to dominating the small trade of the country.

BEARING OF ECONOMIC SITUATION ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

China's economic situation has been closely connected with the international political situation practically from the first days of the nation's intercourse with foreigners, and at no time more than now. Foreigners have developed mines, factories, and various forms of industries; they have financed and built railroads, and instituted steamship lines, trade routes, wireless stations, cables and banks; they have administered the maritime customs, salt gabelle, and in part, the post office, the first two in the interest of foreign loans; they have spent enormous sums in the transformation of concession areas into the most desirable sections of the respective cities and have maintained their own administrative, police, and judicial systems in those areas. To protect these interests and the lives of their nationals resident in China against the antiforeignism which reached its peak in the first half of 1927, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy despatched to China troops and naval contingents, a large part of which are still on duty patroling the rivers and seacoast or guarding the concession areas. A delicate political situation resulted which has lessened in intensity somewhat since Soviet Russian influence was removed from the Nanking or Nationalist Government; but the day when foreign nations may acquire special economic privileges in China at the expense of the Chinese has doubtless passed.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

China has abundant natural resources including a large industrious population of simple, frugal habits. The mineral resources are not as extensive as was thought at one time, but China has a commanding world position in two essentials—tungsten and antimony. Modern industry has been but little developed, comparatively speaking, and the return of normal conditions will doubtless see a great advance along this line. China, however, will be a predominantly agrarian nation for a long time to come. Most of the present mining and industrial regions are approachable from the sea.

China has been called a "Land of famines," 1,828 famines having occurred between 108 B. C. and 1911 A. D., characterized by an abundance of food in one Province and starvation in an adjoining Province. Such a famine is now going on affecting 4,000,000 in Shantung. The needed correctives are: Reforestation; flood control; more and better transportation facilities, i. e., hard-surfaced roads and railways; cessation of warfare and banditry; and better economic conditions to relieve the present hand-to-mouth existence of the bulk of the population.

Because of the crude native methods employed in the majority of Chinese industries, a war emergency would result in no material increase in present production of war supplies or of material for their manufacture.

Of all China, Manchuria (or the "three eastern Provinces") alone has made recent progress. Excellent crops increasing in size have prevailed there for years, and railway building barely keeps up with the influx of new settlers. The presence of the Japanese in Liaotung Peninsula (Dairen) and in the South Manchuria Railway zone has been a stabilizing factor, and it is to the interest also of Chang Tso-lin, the northern generalissimo, to keep strife out of Manchuria because his greatest monetary support comes from that region.

In China proper, intolerable conditions gradually becoming worse are the general rule, and this situation may prevail for many years. No accurate prediction can be made, because the numerous factions now show small inclination to compose their differences. Until political unity is attained, the economic situation will continue to retrograde.

According to present indications, foreigners and foreign interests will not be driven out of China, and politico-economic questions pending between China and other nations, such as tariff control, extraterritoriality, and concessions will be settled in the course of time without recourse to arms.

GREAT BRITAIN

A. NAVAL

1. *H. M. S. "Courageous."*

The flying-off deck is left bare and is without catapult or arresting gear of any description. Safety nets for personnel are installed at the deck edges in the manner shown on photographs and in Jane's Fighting Ships, also side angles inclined 45°, with fore-and-aft wires to act as safety stops for planes not under complete control. Wireless antenna are carried on six built-up, hinged masts, three per side, as previously reported.

Hangar spaces.—There are two hangar spaces, one above the other, and each extending the full length of the upper inclosure. The width of the hangar spaces was estimated as equal to the beam of the ship at the old maindeck line, less 11 feet each side (the depth of the boat and gun recesses), about 60 feet. The clear height of each hangar space—that is, upper and lower—is the same and approximately 17 feet. The flare of the upper hangar deck was said to be 13 feet on each side. The hangar decks are supported by transverse girders about 5 feet in depth and spaced about every 16 feet. The space between girders is utilized for the stowage of spare parts, wings, and dismounted machines. The upper hangar deck is continuous and clear to the bow to provide for planes taking off from this space. The forward end is closed by a large steel door in halves, hinged at ship's sides and operated hydraulically. Forward and clear of the swing of these doors is a windbreak across the forecastle, estimated 17 feet high, made of punched steel plate, the holes being about 1 inch in diameter and extending across the deck. The windbreak is power operated, although the type of power was not stated, and is so arranged that it can be dropped when the plane is ready to take off. The deck on the forward side of this windbreak is sloped up sufficiently so that when the windbreak is down the plane passes over the windbreak in the stowed position without difficulty. Four cranes are provided for lifting damaged planes or stores on board, and these cranes are located at the four corners of the hangar spaces. The forward end of the hangar space is approximately 198 feet from the bow of the vessel, and the after end approximately 98 feet from the stern.

Two wide hydraulic elevators of the shape shown are installed, each operated from a recess just below the lower hangar deck to the flying-off deck. The elevators have the same width as the hangar space and are operated by wire ropes leading from pulleys to hydraulic plungers. The fore and aft length of the elevator platform was said to be 33 feet, the capacity of each elevator 20 tons, one elevator being located in the forward hangar space and the other elevator in the after hangar space.

All movement of the planes in the hangar space was said to be by hand, although portable hoists could be attached to the girder structure throughout the length of the hangar spaces. No electric circuits, ventilating fans, etc., are permitted in the hangar spaces. The lighting is indirect, as for magazines. The main battery control is located at the four corners of the flight deck and just below its level. One searchlight is also provided at each corner, with one navigating light on forward bridge and one on the bridge aft of the stack.

The petrol is stowed in regular ship's tanks below without special means for its protection. The petrol is pumped to ready service tanks in compartments at the side of the hangar space, and planes are serviced on both hangar decks by means of portable hose from these pump rooms.

The compartments fore and aft along the sides of the hangar spaces are used for stores, for shops, etc., the corresponding spaces on the level of the lower hangar deck being utilized principally for boat and gun recesses. These side compartments are also used for access between the upper and lower hangar spaces. The shops are understood to comprise the usual shops, pump rooms, and store rooms.

There are six flights of airplanes on board, as follows: 1 flight, single-seater fighter; 2 flights, torpedo planes; 1 flight, spotting planes; and 2 flights, observation and reconnaissance planes.

NOTE.—Attention is invited to the illustration of the *Courageous* in this issue and to the article appearing in the May *Bulletin* entitled: "Notes on aircraft carrier."—ED.

JAPAN

A. POLITICAL

1. Communistic Activities in Japan.

On March 15, 1928, Premier Tanaka ordered the arrest of about 1,000 persons throughout the empire, charged with being leaders in communistic activities. Of this number about 90 were indicted and will be brought to trial. The original arrests included seven workmen employed at the Maidzuru Naval Station.

Following this episode the Minister of the Navy issued an order to the commanders in chief of all naval stations and to commanders of fleets and squadrons, directing that necessary steps be taken to suppress any communistic or socialistic activities among navy-yard workmen and among enlisted men.

The first ideas of socialism were introduced into Japan as far back as 1882. These ideas were first confined to the intellectual classes. The number of adherents gradually increased, and in 1893 a society for study of socialism was formed. In 1901 a socialistic organization for further disarmament was ordered dissolved by Prince Ito. This organization again sprung into existence a year or so later and was suppressed by Prince Katsura.

Following the Russo-Japanese War, a socialistic group founded a newspaper called the "Heimin Shimbun" (journal of the people), which was suppressed by the authorities. Between 1908 and 1918 all forms of advanced socialistic activities were dealt with severely, but in 1919 a society known as the "Heimeikai" (literally, the "Aurora") was formed among the university center for the "furthering of liberal ideas."

In 1920 the socialists founded the "Socialistic Union of Japan," comprising about 1,400 prominent adherents. The communistic group of this union were led by Sakai and the syndicalist group by Osugi. After several months of activity the union was ordered dissolved by the Government. Sakai was sent to prison and Osugi was subsequently assassinated by a Captain Akamatsu during the disorders that followed the earthquake in 1923.

In June, 1924, the Japanese communists were represented at Moscow by one Kabayama at the fifth session of the "International," and in the summer of that year the Japanese Government for the first time consented to the Labor Party sending a delegate to Geneva. The Government desired to name the representative, but the Labor Party succeeded in naming their man, one Bunji Suzuki.

"May day" demonstrations have become a part of the proletariat activities. In 1925, 10,000 workers in Tokyo and 20,000 in Osaka paraded the streets, surrounded by strong detachments of police. This year the metropolitan police of Tokyo have issued, among others, the following regulations regarding the May day parade:

(1) Number of participants limited to 8,000.

(2) No speeches or distribution of literature permitted.

(3) No music or singing allowed.

(4) No flags other than those of the labor organization permitted and "must not have points like spears or swords."

In 1927 the Communist Party was reorganized and brought within its membership many university students. The group in Yamagata adopted a revolutionary program identical with that of the third international. The main objective of the party is to replace the present Government with a government of laborers and farmers. The communistic organization is active in Kwanto, Kwansai, Kyushu, and Hokaido. The activities in each area is directed by a central committee in Tokyo, whose funds, it is believed, are supplied from Moscow.

The actual membership of the Communist Party has not been great to date, but due to the inflammatory propaganda which has been circulated many new recruits are joining the ranks. The general election of this year afforded the communistic party an excellent chance to circulate their doctrines among the masses.

At present the labor party and workingmen's party have eight members of the lower house.

It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the seriousness of communistic activity in Japan at the present time. It can be said, however, that the general social and economic unrest affords a fertile field for communistic and socialistic thought. The Government is determined to spare no measures in suppressing such activities. It is a debatable question, however, whether or not the stern repressive measures being adopted, will not fan the flames of unrest, much more than measures which would tend to meet the demands of the working classes.

B. ECONOMIC

1. Economic Estimate.

ECONOMIC PENETRATION BY FOREIGN INTERESTS.

Japan is exceptionally free from economic penetration and encroachment on the part of alien powers. This is due to strict governmental control directly through ownership of many of the large interests and indirectly by means of subsidies and protective tariffs favoring Japanese concerns. There are no strictly foreign companies with large capital investments in Japanese business. However, 3 large firms (2 American and 1 German) have amalgamated with Japanese electrical companies. Japanese companies have borrowed about $120,000,000 in America for improvement purposes, most of it being for electric water-power development.

Foreigners of reciprocating countries may now own land in Japan except in fortified areas. Citizens of a state (part of a country) discriminating against Japanese ownership may be barred from ownership in Japan.

ECONOMIC PENETRATION INTO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Japanese penetration, economically, of neighboring territory on the Asiatic mainland has progressed rapidly. Investments in China both by the Government and by Japanese citizens total about $1,000,000,000 gold of which probably more than half is in Manchuria. The iron production of China is practically controlled by Japan and likewise a considerable portion of the coal output. There is a large number of textile and other factories owned by the Japanese. Japan's control in South Manchuria, because of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchuria Railway, is very complete. Through agreement with Russia, Japan has important oil concessions which she is developing in North Saghalien. Japanese are also working timber concessions in eastern Siberia and fishing along the Siberian shores. The large number of Japanese in Hawaii, the United States, and Brazil have important agricultural interests in the countries where they reside. The Japanese in the Philippine Islands have important holdings in the Davao hemp district of Mindanao.

INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC SITUATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Japan's basic policy is the economic domination of the Far East and the northwestern Pacific.

Japan's present international policy has been very largely based on the acquisition of those raw materials which are scarce within the Empire and the maintenance of markets in those countries which purchase quantities of products from Japan. Most especially marked has been the effect on relations with China. By all manner of dealing Japan has secured control of much of China's iron and coal, but also needs the Chinese markets. Japan therefore fears the economic effect of the Chinese boycott and desires to avoid it.

There are the usual treaties of amity and commerce with most countries. The treaty with Germany gives especial consideration to dyestuffs. Treaties with Russia give concessions for oil and coal in North Saghalien, fisheries along the coast of Siberia, and forestry concessions on the mainland. There are contracts with Brazil pertaining to the encouragement of Japanese emigration to that country. The Twenty-one Demands (treaty of 1915) and the Shantung Agreement of 1922 gave Japan important economic advantages in China, especially in Manchuria and Shantung.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

Japan is confronted with a rapidly increasing population in very limited territory. She must markedly lower the birth rate, greatly stimulate emigration, or industrialize. Most of her efforts have been given to industrialization, but there are few basic resources at home. Japan is striving to secure control of the raw materials necessary to industrialization from her neighbors, more especially from China, and feels that she is entitled to these supplies regardless of the attitude of other countries.

Japan is actually short in more than half of the important war commodities. Appreciating this deficiency, she is accumulating reserves, especially of oil and iron ore. These reserves would probably last her one year in a great war. Japan produces two-thirds of the world's supply of silk and crude camphor, both of which are important to the United States. Antimony and tungsten, strategic raw materials for the United States, are produced in China, where Japan might control them.

If Japan proper were closely blockaded, she could meet her food shortage, as the deficiency would be only about 7 per cent. The deficiency of annual consumption over annual production would exceed 80 per cent in the case of such vital essentials as oil, iron, cotton, wool, rubber, nickel, nitrate of soda, tin, automobiles, hides, and many others. With the routes open to northeastern Asia, with the trans-Siberian railway converted largely to bringing supplies to Japan from Europe, and with the credits in foreign countries to pay for these supplies, Japan would probably be short only in oil, iron, cotton, and sugar.

Japan's gold holdings are now only about $630,000,000. They have fallen 40 per cent since 1920 and continue to fall. Japan must be able to maintain her export trade or have extensive credits abroad to maintain an expensive major war. This would be especially true in a war with the United States, for in such a case Japan's foreign trade would probably fall at once to 50 per cent of normal and exports to less than 30 per cent of normal.

Japan has considered national security above everything else. The extensive rail and road systems, ports, and naval bases are built with national defense in view as well as peace-time utility. They are ample for Japan's domestic, economic, and military needs. Augmented by the extensive merchant marine Japan could maintain an army of 1,200,000 to 2,000,000 men for several years within Japan and neighboring countries—provided trade routes were left open.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

I. STATUS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN REGARD TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

There was given last year in this publication an article on this subject for the particular information of ships cruising or officers traveling abroad. This article has been revised and brought up to date and is again included.

Attention is invited to the fact that the status of certain countries or areas is not definitely established, while the withdrawal or granting of recognition to any foreign government by our own is at all times possible by Executive action. Hence the following is continuously subject to change.

A. Governments recognized by the United States and with whom it has direct and normal diplomatic relations

Rank of our senior representative	Country	Rank of our senior representative	Country
2	Albania.	2	Irish Free State.
1	Argentina.	1	Japan.[b]
2	Austria.	2	Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
1	Belgium.		
2	Bolivia.	2	Latvia.
1	Brazil.	3	Liberia.
2	Bulgaria.	2	Lithuania.
2	Canada.	2	Luxemburg.
1	Chile.	1	Mexico.
2	Colombia.	4	Morocco.
2	Costa Rica.	2	Netherlands.
1	Cuba.	2	Nicaragua.[c]
2	Czechoslovakia.	2	Norway.
2	Denmark.	2	Panama.
2	Dominican Republic.	2	Paraguay.
2	Egypt.	2	Persia.
2	Estonia.[a]	1	Peru.
3	Ethiopia (Abyssinia).	2	Portugal.
2	Finland.	2	Poland.
1	France.[b]	2	Rumania.
1	Germany.	2	Salvador.
1	Great Britain.[b]	2	Siam.
2	Greece.	1	Spain.
2	Guatemala.	2	Sweden.
5	Haiti.	2	Switzerland.
2	Honduras.	1	Turkey.
2	Hungary.	2	Uruguay.
1	Italy.	2	Venezuela.

[a] The present spelling of the former Esthonia.
[b] See also "D" (Countries with Special Status) and "E" (Mandated Territories).
[c] The present régime in Nicaragua was recognized by the United States on November 17, 1926.

Key to above:
1. Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.
2. Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.
3. Minister resident and consul general.
4. Diplomatic agent and consul general.
5. High commissioner with the rank of ambassador extraordinary.

B. Governments which the United States has recognized but with whom it has not established normal diplomatic relations

Rank of senior U. S. representative	Country	Rank of senior U. S. representative	Country
2	Afghanistan.	2	Monaco.
2	Andorra.	1	San Marino.
2	Liechtenstein.	2	Oman (Maskat).

Key to above:
1. Consular representative.
2. No representatives, either diplomatic or consular.

C. Governments which the United States has not recognized

Rank of our senior representative	Country	Rank of our senior representative	Country
1	China.[a]	2	Yemen.
1	Ecuador.[b]	2	Hejaz and Nejd.
2	Russia.		

[a] The United States has not dealt with any régime as the government of the Republic of China since the termination in 1926 of the Provisional Government of China under Tuan Chi Jui as chief executive, but neither country has withdrawn its diplomatic or consular representatives. American representatives in China deal in particular matters with the various Chinese authorities on the basis of regional jurisdiction.

[b] On July 9, 1925, recognition was withdrawn from Ecuador and though the new régime is not recognized neither country has withdrawn its representatives, diplomatic or consular. This nonrecognition is purely a transient condition.

Key to above:
1. Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.
2. No representatives, either diplomatic or consular.

D. Countries with special status in their relations with the United States.

1. Free City of Danzig.

The Government of the United States recognizes the status of the Free City of Danzig as established by the treaty of Versailles. The foreign relations of Danzig are handled by Poland, and the United States maintains only a consul in Danzig. Flag of Danzig should be saluted in Danzig.

2. Iceland.

The United States recognizes the independence of Iceland, but the foreign relations of that country are handled by Denmark. United States has no diplomatic nor consular representatives in Iceland. The flag of Iceland should be saluted in Iceland.

3. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Great Britain and Egypt exercise a condominium over this country. No United States diplomatic nor consular representatives in this territory.

4. New Hebrides.

Great Britain and France exercise a condominimum over these islands. No United States diplomatic nor consular representatives in these islands.

5. British Dominions (Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Irish Free State).

The status of these countries appears to be in a state of transition and their position on many questions is somewhat uncertain. In effect if not in form their status is one of complete independence. The late Imperial Conference in its report on interimperial relations defined the status of Great Britain (England, Wales, and Scotland) and the Dominions as follows: "They are autonomous communities, within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." And again, "Every self-governing member of the Empire is now master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever." And further, "Equality of status, so far as Britain and the Dominions are concerned, is thus the root principle governing our interimperial relations." The Irish Free State and Canada are now represented in Washington by ministers and we have ministers in Dublin and Ottawa.

The above is noted to show the trend of affairs in the British Empire. An inquiry is being made of the Department of State as to which flag should be saluted when a United States naval vessel enters a port of the British Dominions.

E. Mandated Territories.

Many questions in regard to these territories are unsettled, and hence the status of some of them on certain questions is in doubt. Mandated territories comprise the former German and Turkish possessions, and are by the treaty of Versailles allotted to various powers under mandates of the league, which powers to account to the Council of the League for their administration of these mandates.

In treaties with these mandatory powers, we have recognized the status of the mandate territories as established by the treaty of Versailles.

The mandates are divided into three classes, depending upon the economic, social, and political conditions in the territories concerned. The relations of these territories with the United States will be discussed below.

1. "A" mandates:

Mandated territory	Mandatary nation
Mesopotamia (now Kingdom of the Iraq)	Great Britain.
Palestine (Palestine and Transjordania)	Great Britain.
Syria and the Lebanon	France.

Territories whose "existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of the administered advice and assistance by the mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." Our relations with these territories are more in doubt than are those under "B" and "C" mandates. We have concluded a triparte treaty with Great Britain and Iraq which has the effect of recognizing the sovereignty of the King of Iraq, consistent with the mandate. We have treaties with Great Britain and France regarding the rights of the United States and its nationals, respectively, in Palestine and Syria. At the present time it is believed that British or French ships visiting a port in Syria or Palestine salute the mandatory flag; but, on the other hand, British ships visiting Bassra, the port of Iraq, salute the flag of the Kingdom of Iraq. What our own ships would do in visits such as these is in doubt. It is probable that, in view of our treaty, we should salute the flag of that Kingdom and not that of the mandatory, Great Britain.

2. "B" mandates:

Mandated territory	Mandatary nation
Ruanda-Urundi (a portion of former German East Africa)	Belgium.
Tanganyika (a portion of former German East Africa)	Great Britain.
French Togoland	France.
British Togoland	Great Britain.
French Cameroons	France.
British Cameroons	Great Britain.

Areas administered by the mandatory under conditions which will "guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals," and prohibition of the slave trade, arms, and illegal traffic, fortifications, military and naval bases, etc.

In this class of mandates, as seen by the above abbreviated definition, the power of the mandatory is much more extensive than in the case of "A" mandates, while the mandated territory possesses a correspondingly less amount of sovereignty and independence.

In the case of all mandated territories, however, our Government has never subscribed to the thesis that sovereignty over the territory is vested in the mandatory power. It is the right of administration only which is so vested. This, however, does not preclude saluting the mandatory's flag, and in the case of "B" mandates, salutes, and courtesies should be rendered to the mandatory power.

3. " C " mandates:

Mandated territory	Mandatary nation
Former German Pacific possessions, south of Equator (except Samoa and Nauru)	Australia.
Former German Pacific possessions, north of Equator	Japan.
Samoa	New Zealand.
Nauru	British Empire.
South West Africa	Union of South Africa.

Territories which " can best be administered under the laws of the mandatory and integral portions of its territory subject to the safeguards " mentioned under " B " mandates for the interest of the indigenous population.

The United States does not hold, however, that even the complete administrative powers invested in the mandatory of a class " C " mandate, gives to that mandatory title to sovereignty. Salutes and courtesies to be rendered to the mandatory power.

II. THE FOREIGN COMMERCE SERVICE AND THE NAVY.

The following article has been written for the Bulletin by Dr. Julius Klein, director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce.

With the increase of our foreign trade, foreign investments, and foreign commercial committments in general, there comes an increase in the significance of the world position of the United States. Britain affords the great historical example of the position in which the foreign commercial committments of a state will place that state politically. To state that our Navy has a vital interest in our foreign expansion (whether commercial or political) is merely to repeat a well-known axiom. But it is an axiom which can well bear repetition as well as serious study of its significance. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of Commerce is the governmental mainspring of our foreign commercial activities.

To " see the world " is proverbially one of the privileges of Navy men. The Navy personnel has, indeed, exceptional opportunities to view, shrewdly and understandingly, the doings of this mundane sphere. So the Navy men—like the foreign traders whom we of the Department of Commerce are endeavoring to serve—have undoubtedly observed that to-day we are really confronted with a new world. The shocks of the war, the shifts of the readjustment period, have shattered much that once seemed lasting. Much else has been thrown out of alignment. There have been violent disappearances, strange metamorphoses, auspicious emergences, and rebirths. And especially has this been true in the economic field.

International affairs and international relations have become predominantly economic. Material factors—considerations of trade, finance, shipping, and industry—are strongly to the fore. They include many things that are relatively unfamiliar to the average American. New industries are coming into being; new standards of living are being developed in hitherto backward regions; there are new movements, schemes, and devices in the commercial world, such as the great international cartels or combinations which European industrialists are now forming so prolifically and in such varied lines.

For these reasons it is highly essential that the United States should have an economic intelligence service that is constantly on the "qui vive." In the domain of international economics we must know definitely where we are going—and why. Hence our foreign commerce representatives—the commercial attachés and trade commissioners—must be everlastingly alert, and their service, to be effective, must be both concise and prompt. Such service the far-flung organization of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce is striving to provide.

The bureau is endeavoring to live up to both parts of its name. While its efforts overseas have, of course, a more direct bearing on Navy interests, it may be well, before discussing these in greater detail, to speak briefly of what we are trying to do in the domestic field. Broad studies are being carried out with a view to eliminating, so far as possible, the present great wastes in our methods of distribution. Then, too, scientific analyses of nine definite marketing regions of this country are being made. Two of these—covering, respectively, the Southeastern States and New England—have already been completed. It is the purpose of these surveys to present a compact statement of the fundamental commercial conditions within a given area, indicating the buying power of each region, its marketing methods, and all tangible and intangible factors affecting trading within the region.

Another example of domestic-commerce work is the Atlas of Wholesale Grocery Territories, typical of similar commodity studies which might be of interest in the supply work of the Navy. Each is based upon a study of actual trade practices. One competent authority has estimated that the Wholesale Atlas is worth $5,000,000 to American business men. Some trades have greatly changed their methods of marketing their products as a result of studies made by the bureau.

Studies of the costs of marketing and distributing goods are revealing possible savings in wholesaling and retailing. The extension of credit both on open account and on installments is being studied.

Finally, the bureau has set up a section which devotes itself entirely to answering inquiries regarding domestic business—a Government clearing house of business information.

In these and other ways we are seeking to enable all Americans to form a just idea of the economic fabric of their country. This work, we believe, is not only highly important in itself but serves to complement our activity in the foreign field, whose nature I shall now try to outline somewhat more definitely.

The Department of Commerce has been very active in recent years in connection with certain foreign raw materials which are of high importance to the Navy. It has been especially concerned with the effort to ameliorate the bad conditions resulting from arbitrary foreign " controls." One example of this is in the case of nitrates, which are so essential to the manufacture of explosives. In Chile the production and exportation of nitrates were formerly subject to rigid monopolistic restrictions. The Department of Commerce carried out an exhaustive investigation of the Chilean industry, with a view to possible economies and consequent lowering of prices, and also studied the situation in the United States and Europe with particular reference to substitute sources of supply, such as " air nitrogen." This comprehensive survey helped very materially to clarify the true position of affairs and to stimulate remedial measures. At the present time Chilean nitrate is free of all " control " other than that involved in an export tax of 25 per cent.

The Navy uses countless articles into whose make-up rubber enters. Navy men are doubtless thoroughly familiar with the campaign of education and protest waged by the Department of Commerce in the matter of the rubber restrictions imposed in certain producing regions of the "middle east." The situation was carefully studied, very extensive conservation and reutilization of rubber were brought about in the United States, " noncontrolled " areas of production were sought, research was furthered, and the public was made aware of the evils inherent in the restriction system and of the developments in the direction of relief. This spring the British Government formally announced that restriction is to end November 1. At the present time the price of rubber is less than one-sixth the figure that it attained at the peak.

Indirectly perhaps, but none the less certainly, the United States Navy has benefited in these matters from the work of the Department of Commerce.

It is obvious that the first essential of an effective commercial intelligence organization is a prompt and accurate communications service. One striking example of the way in which the Navy Department cooperates with the Department of Commerce to the advantage of general American interests is in this particular respect through the use that we are permitted to make of the naval radio service. Our bureau is indebted to the Navy Department for the invaluable privilege of using this service directly to London, Panama, Manila, Shanghai, Peking, and Tokyo (and it is employed also for the greater part of the distance to Singapore and Batavia). In our communication with certain of these commerce posts the traffic is very heavy. To Manila, for instance, we send, each month, messages whose total words vary between 1,600 and 4,000, and receive from the same post between 1,900 and 3,500 words. Monthly messages sent over the naval radio to our office in Shanghai vary from 1,600 to 2,500 words, while those received, through the same medium, from our men in that great far eastern port vary from 2,300 to 3,600. For wireless messages to our district offices in the United States (I may mention in passing) a comparable service is rendered by the Signal Corps network of the War Department, which contributed substantially to the 420,000 words in our bureau telegrams within the United States from July, 1927, through March, 1928.

Many reports of great importance to American business men reach Washington from foreign countries over the naval wireless. Such facilities, I need hardly say, are immensely helpful in furthering the work of our organization. Trade information is highly "perishable," and speed in transmission is vital to its usefulness. Thus the radio cooperation between the departments is making it possible for our business men to act quickly and intelligently in overseas transactions and thus garner profits that might otherwise escape them.

Another instance of cooperation that has been particularly pleasant—and notably fruitful of good—has been that between Department of Commerce representatives and Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol. This is cited merely as one example of what has been accomplished through action shared by these two departments. The cordial relations with Admiral Bristol began when he became United States high commissioner to Turkey in 1919, and they have continued to the present day. In the Near East our commercial attachés and trade commissioners supplied much data to the admiral and were in turn immeasurably aided by his influence, advice, and exceptional knowledge of affairs. The Secretary of Commerce has said, in speaking of Admiral Bristol, that "no American active in postwar reconstruction abroad has touched a higher standard in the rendering of substantial public service." Our commerce men have considered it a rare privilege to be associated, in any degree, with such work as this distinguished naval officer has performed.

When Admiral Bristol was a delegate to the Conference at Lausanne we again had the opportunity of cooperating with him. And since he became commander in chief of the American Asiatic Fleet, that cooperation has been very effectively resumed—this time through Commercial Attaché Julean Arnold, Trade Commissioner A. Bland Calder, and others of the Foreign Commerce staff in China.

In its trade-promotion work the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce tries to provide American business with a "service that serves." It is ready to respond to every variety of commercial request—even to find markets for glass eyes or rattlesnake skins; to aid in developing a trade in Central American "love birds"; or to satisfy a patent-medicine vendor who inquires, "What are the locations best suited to rheumatism?" Such amusing and rather freakish efforts—let us hasten to add—form only a very minor "sideshow" to the body of solid service that the bureau is performing in answering the 10,300 queries now being submitted to it every day. These replies provide abundant foundation material for the building up of foreign markets for typical American products and the enhancement of efficiency in export technique.

By the terms of the Hoch Act, signed by the President on March 3, 1927, a permanent legislative status is given to the Foreign Commerce Service. The law defines the duties of the field representatives, provides for their appointment, classification, and salaries, and deals with other necessary administrative matters. With an assured statutory foundation, the bureau can now send out its expert trade representatives to any of the markets of the world to investigate officially into the possibilities for American trade—receiving, on such missions, due recognition from the representatives of other American Government departments.

The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce is the outgrowth of an item in the regular appropriation for the then Department of Commerce and Labor of March 3, 1905. This provided the sum of $30,000 for the investigation of trade conditions abroad by agents of the department, with the object of promoting the foreign commerce of the United States. From this beginning has grown the present-day network of economic observers and reporters who serve American business through the Department of Commerce. The present budget of the organization, at home and abroad, is about $4,600,000.

The commercial attachés and trade commissioners suggest agents and representatives for American business in foreign countries. They supply lists of foreign importers of particular commodities. They make special investigations concerning existing and possible markets for American products. They watch foreign tariffs and taxation legislation. In general, they keep the bureau at Washington, and, through it, the American business community, in touch with current economic and financial happenings and furnish up-to-date statistics of production, exports, and imports.

The field force of the bureau now numbers 161. Their services are supplemented by the efficient activities of the consular officers of the Department of State—some 700 in number. These consuls devote a good deal of their time to collaboration with the Department of Commerce staff in obtaining information on foreign trade conditions, and their economic reports are transmitted by the State Department to the Department of Commerce for analysis and publication. Data of much value and significance are thus procured, particularly in the preparation of lists of foreign dealers, in which the consular staff is in a position to render notable service.

The Foreign Commerce Service also receives important information from foreign government offices, from trade associations at home and abroad, from periodicals, and from a variety of other sources.

The information gathered by the field men is received by the bureau headquarters in Washington, where it is classified and distributed. The bureau also keeps in constant, direct touch with American manufacturers and exporters, and guides the foreign offices of the department into those fields of investigation which will be most valuable to American business. The information received in Washington from the field is distributed through a number of publications and news "releases" from headquarters, as well as from local or district offices throughout the United States.

In order that the greatest practical value may be given to its trade investigations, the bureau at Washington is organized primarily on the basis of commodities in trade. In consultation with foreign trade groups and permanent committees from the different industries, there have been established divisions dealing with agricultural implements, automotive products, chemicals, electrical equipment, foodstuffs, hides and leather, iron and steel, industrial machinery, lumber, minerals, paper, boots and shoes, rubber, textiles, specialties (such as office supplies, motion pictures, and musical instruments), and transportation equipment. These commodity divisions are in charge of specialists who are in constant and direct touch with their respective industries and who guide and stimulate the field offices in their investigations designed to hold old markets and to develop new ones.

Besides the commodity divisions, there are also seven technical divisions. One (known as the division of commercial laws) collects information concerning the commercial laws and judicial procedure of foreign nations, and receives and distributes data concerning domestic, foreign, and international arbitration. It assists frequently in the settlement of claims and trade disputes. It also renders important service in the protection of American patents and trademarks abroad.

American manufacturers very often need advice concerning customs duties of foreign countries, and their import and export regulations; pure food and drug laws, where such exist; sales taxes, and the treatment accorded to commercial travelers and their samples. Such advice is given them by the division of foreign tariffs.

The finance and investment division keeps in close touch with the financial and credit situation all over the world. It serves banks and private business men in problems concerning Government loans, investment operations, and exchange.

There are two divisions dealing with statistics. The one known as the division of statistics works in cooperation with American customs offices and collects and compiles for publication figures on the import and export trade of the United States. The division of statistical research, for its part, gathers trade statistics of foreign nations and arranges and interprets them, besides compiling the Commerce Yearbook and the Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Classified information on freight rates and service by rail, air, and ocean, is compiled and furnished to shippers by the transportation division. This section of the bureau also gathers and distributes data concerning telephone, telegraph, cable, radio, and postal communication all over the world.

The commercial intelligence division, which has a mass of exact information concerning some 400,000 foreign business firms, furnishes American exporters with lists of foreign importers and firms potentially interested in American goods. The reports gathered by this division are in the form of a card index known as the "World Trade Directory of Foreign Firms." The division also aids American companies in the selection of their foreign sales agents.

As supplementary to the work of the commodity and technical divisions the bureau has established a "division of regional information." One of its sections covers Latin America; another, the Far East, Australia, and New Zealand; and the third, Europe, Africa, the Near East, and Canada. This division serves the commodity divisions (and through them the respective industries) by keeping them informed concerning current economic conditions. It also revises and prepares for publication the weekly and monthly cable reports sent in by commercial attachés and trade commissioners describing general trade conditions in the countries in which they are stationed.

The publications of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce are many and useful. Each commodity division sends periodical circulars to its trade, and some publish general handbooks of foreign market information, kept up to date by weekly bulletins. Certain of these circulars and bulletins are mimeographed, but many of them are printed.

Probably the two publications of the bureau that are most generally useful to Navy men are the Commerce Yearbook and the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The yearbook is now published in two volumes—the first relating to the United States and the second covering foreign countries. In these studies the outstanding facts of trade, production, price changes, and market conditions are tabulated and analyzed. They form, together, an authoritative review of the economic year throughout the world. The abstract, which is purely statistical, contains a wealth of data on the industrial, commercial, and financial status of the United States Navy men will find in these books numerous facts that are likely to be helpful to them in various phases of their work.

For general use by business men, probably the bureau's most important publication is the weekly illustrated magazine Commerce Reports, containing cablegrams and other current trade information gathered by the bureau's field men and by consular officers in every quarter of the globe. The bureau publishes a monthly dealing with statistics of imports and exports (showing the countries of origin and destination, known as the Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States. It also brings out an annual book of statistics entitled "Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States," which deals with the statistics of export and import as well as shipping.

The American commercial attaché in foreign countries has an official status and a rank in all activities of the mission to which he is attached. This status helps him in approaching officials of foreign governments as well as private business interests.

As it is now developed this field service of the bureau involves a threefold duty for its staff. Commercial attachés and trade commissioners are reporters of everything of any commercial or economic significance that happens in the country to which they are appointed. They report—by mail, radio, and cable—facts, tendencies, laws, official utterances, statistics, and policies (with such interpretative comment as may seem necessary or desirable) to the bureau, which, in turn, relays the information, in such form as seems most suitable, to the American business world. At the same time the bureau transmits any useful economic data to the Department of State, which, in its turn, sends the Department of Commerce copies of the commercial reports of its staff abroad. Some of these reports are submitted in response to requests from the home office—while many are prepared on the initiative of the man in the field.

In the preparation of these reports the Foreign Service officers of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce travel all over their territory for information, talk with government officials and business men, and sum up situations themselves. The information that is worked up in response to "questionnaires" from the bureau covers points raised by American commercial interests which contemplate trade with the territory under consideration.

Another task which engages a large part of the time of commercial attachés and trade commissioners is replying to requests for information and advice, either by letter or in personal calls from business men. The gathering of information wherewith to reply to these trade letters of inquiry, and the acquiring of the background necessary to advise business men when to engage in business in the territory—and when not to—requires much patience and industry.

The third important phase of the work is that of assisting the ambassador, minister, or other head of the mission on all subjects of an economic nature which come before the diplomatic mission for settlement. Such matters are constantly increasing, not only in number, but in the proportion they bear to the total of the activities of our diplomatic posts.

These duties are not, by any means, the only ones, but they are, so to speak, the major classifications.

The foreign representatives of the Department of Commerce work in close cooperation with the secretaries and other personnel of our missions abroad, with the consuls, and with the military and naval attachés. The reports of commercial attachés and trade commissioners of the Department of Commerce are, naturally, always open freely and fully to representatives of other Government departments in the field.

I have tried, earlier in this article, to show that, in times of both peace and war, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce is in a position to cooperate effectively with the Navy Department in a variety of matters. A number of other examples of this fact seem suitable for mention here. Not long ago the textile division of the bureau—together with the Bureau of Standards and the Navy Department—was instrumental in helping American textile manufacturers to develop a new type of parachute-silk fabric which was built into parachutes and in official tests proved superior to the imported Japanese fabric generally used for the purpose. The Navy Department placed a contract for 326 parachutes made from the new American fabric and thereby saved more than $20,000.

When the United States entered the World War there was an insufficient supply of platinum in the country to meet the needs that were certain to arise in connection with the manufacture of munitions. An international search for available supplies of platinum was started by the bureau in April, 1917. In May the commercial attaché in Petrograd ascertained that, although the production in Russia was greatly under normal on account of labor shortage, there was a certain stock in Ekaterinburg that would be augmented by production in 1917, some of which could no doubt be obtained for our war needs. This was brought to the attention of the Council of National Defense and other Government agencies, which took such action as was necessary to secure the desired supply. Again in August, 1917, the commercial attaché at Petrograd, in the face of a rumored 70 per cent increase in the price of platinum, arranged to procure from the Russian Government an export license for platinum which was to come to the United States. The shipment arrived according to schedule, and played its part in the successful operations of our naval and military forces.

Somewhat similar work was done by the commercial attaché at London, who took over the entire handling of the Swedish iron ore and Norwegian molybdenum contracts, for which the President put at the disposal of the Department of Commerce $6,000,000 out of the national security and defense fund.

All through the war the Foreign Service of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce furnished highly important information to such bodies as the War Trade Board, the War Industries Board, the Food Administration, and the Shipping Board, as well as the Navy Department and the War Department—thus contributing, in no inconsiderable degree, to the victorious termination of the struggle.

So, in war and in peace, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce can aid (and in turn be aided by) not only the business men of our country but its armed forces also. Close cooperation with other Government departments is one of the watchwords of its service.

III. ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

The Junkers (German Aircraft) Co. recently reported that it would inaugurate a regular air service from Teheran to the Persian Gulf via Ispahan to Bushire beginning April 20, 1928. This is but an additional indication to previous ones that the Germans, as well as the Russians, are at present actively interested in promoting Persian air routes. Considerable international air rivalry has developed in this region, taking the form largely of Soviet-German-Persian cooperation in opposition to British plans.

In this connection it may be recalled that in September, 1926, the British Imperial Airways announced that arrangements had been made to open an Egypt-to-India air route of about 2,500 miles on January 1, 1927. A large amount of preliminary organization on the part of the Imperial Airways and the British Air Ministry, which was subsidizing the route for five years, was necessary in order to link up the wireless and meteorological stations, to arrange the main and subsidiary bases and stopping places, and to fix the operating schedules so as to secure an efficient service at the most reasonable costs.

An agreement between Persia and Great Britain to fly over Persian territory on this route had actually been signed, but the Persian Government suddenly reversed its policy. Subsequent negotiations between the two Governments seem to have made little progress.

The German explanation of the difference which has arisen between Persia and Great Britain on this score is of interest. It is reliably stated that about the time the agreement between Great Britain and Persia was reached, Germany, Russia, and Persia discussed an agreement calculated to consolidate the air lines of these three countries and thus indirectly to drive a wedge through the British Egypt-to-India route. This move has been described as a part of the international struggle for the domination of the air lines running from Europe to Bagdad and India—in other words, the old rail question transferred to the air. The plan was at the time taken up by the Junkers Co. and by the German Government, but when the Persian Government attempted to extend the air lines from Teheran to Bagdad the Iraq Government refused to allow the so-called Persian planes to fly over Iraq. The Persian request to make such flights was apparently considered tantamount to seeking an extension of the air route Berlin-Moscow-Teheran to Bagdad; and therefore the Iraq Government, allegedly under British pressure, insisted that only the British Airways Co. was entitled to fly across its territory. It might therefore seem not extraordinary that Persia, probably with encouragement from Moscow and Berlin, canceled the permission given the British to fly across Persian territory, thus blocking the British air route to India. It is interesting to note that both Soviet and German official spokesmen asserted at the time that the Persian Government had acted independently. In view of the monopolistic concessions that the Junkers concern enjoys in Persia there has been a widespread belief that Germany greatly influenced the Persian air policy.

Incidentally, the British investments made in Persia preparatory to establishing the air line across Persia to India may be forfeited because of the Persian prohibition and British planes may be obliged to fly across northern Arabia instead of southern Persia. In addition to the losses entailed by the expenditures made in surveying the Persian routes fueling difficulties will also be created. Along the route across Persia the British could rely on the Anglo-Persian oil depots for gasoline, but if this route is denied them, they will undoubtedly be forced to transport their gasoline under the most severe handicaps to fueling stations in Arabia.

Although it is said to be impossible to confirm the statement that there is an actual tripartite agreement in regard to coordination of the air services of the three countries there is little doubt but that an agreement exists between Germany and Russia and another between Russia and Persia which, taken together, amount in effect to such a tripartite agreement. The successful coordination of the respective air services of Germany, Russia, and Persia will in a certain degree realize in the air Germany's pre-war dream of direct Berlin-to-Bagdad communication by rail. The new scheme, if successful, will establish a unified passenger, mail, and freight service from Germany across Russia and Persia to the Persian Gulf.

It will be remembered that the three powers concerned have at various times in past years struggled for supremacy in Persia—Germany, in order to advance her "Drang nach Osten" (push toward the East) policy toward India; Russia, oscillating between the policy of constructing a railway through Persia to the warmer seas or through Afghanistan to reach India; and Great Britain, most profoundly interested in the safety of her commerce and the security of her Indian Empire.

Differences between Russia and Great Britain in regard to Persia were settled temporarily by a convention signed on August 31, 1907, the chief provisions of which were:

(1) North of a line drawn Kair-i-Shirin, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kakh to the junction of the Russian, Persian, and Afghan frontiers, Great Britain undertook to seek no political or commercial concessions and to refrain from opposing the acquisition of any such concession by Russia or Russian subjects; (2) Russia gave to Great Britain a like undertaking in respect of the territory south of a line extending from the Afghan frontier to Gazik, Birjend, Kerman, and Bander Abbas; (3) the territory between the lines above mentioned was to be regarded as a neutral zone in which either country might obtain concessions; (4) all existing concessions in any part of Persia were to be respected; (5) should Persia fail to meet its liabilities in respect of certain loans contracted before the signature of the conven-

tion Great Britain and Russia reserved the right to assume control over the Persian revenues payable within their respective spheres of influence. With this convention was published a letter from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stating (1) that the Persian Gulf lay outside the scope of the convention, (2) that Russia admitted the special interests of Great Britain in the gulf and (3) that these interests were to be maintained by Great Britain as before. Great Britain thus obtained control over the strip which lies along the outlet from the Persian Gulf, and gained the right to construct a strategic railway from Bander Abbas to Seistan, which would flank a Russian attack on India passing by Herat and Kandahar.

One of the chief reasons for Britain's anxiety with regard to Persia has been the scant supply of oil in the British Empire. In 1914 the British Government purchased control in the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., and increased its holdings further in 1917 to £5,000,000, the object being to make certain of at least sufficient oil for the requirements of the British Navy. The oil concession granted by the Persian Government to the company covers nearly three-quarters of the whole area of Persia, and with it were given no guarantees of police protection by the Persian Government. Only a portion of the concession has yet been prospected or worked. The main field is at Maidn-i-Naphtun. The pipe line begins about 48 miles north of Ahwaz, runs along the Karun Valley to Wais, where another line joins it, and then proceeds along the east bank of the river to Mohammerah.

With the creation of a Bolshevist State in Russia, the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 was repudiated by that country, and in 1919 Great Britain and Persia signed the Anglo-Persian agreement, by which the British were to grant Persia a loan, recognize her independence, and reorganize her army and finances. This agreement, however, was not ratified, and lapsed in 1921, with the result that all British officers left Persia, and were replaced by an American financial and organizing mission. Doctor Millspaugh, who headed this mission, has since resigned and the position which he filled in Persia has been taken by a German banker.

The departure of the British was followed by the rapid rise to power of Riza Khan (1921) "the strong man of Persia," first as Prime Minister and commander in chief, and eventually as dictator and successor of the former Shah to the throne of Persia in 1925. Riza Khan is endeavoring to make Persia a strong national State and for this purpose is pursuing the following lines of policy:

(*a*) The creation of an efficient national army by the introduction of conscription of all males between the ages of 20 and 45 (two years with the colors); (*b*) the destruction of the power of semi-independent tribes which have kept certain areas in a state of anarchy for years; (*c*) the reorganization of the finances of the country and the placing of them on a sound footing; and (*d*) a progressive policy of railway construction aimed chiefly at giving Persia her own port on the Persian Gulf with a trunk line from the Caspian through Hamadan and Teheran to Mohammerah.

The policy of constructing a railway from north to south in Persia is not the one most suited to British interests. Persia is a buffer against Russian expansion toward Iraq, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and Baluchistan. At present, owing to the scarcity of communications from the northern boundary and the Caspian it is an efficient buffer; but the development of a north-to-south railway will tend to assist Russian penetration. On the other hand, Persia is also a corridor between Iraq and Baluchistan, and the construction of an east-to-west railway through Baluchistan and Persia to connect India with Iraq would benefit all these countries, would form a link in a future fast railway route from India to Europe, and would, if running through southern Persia, be comparatively secure, as far as British interests are concerned.

Speaking generally, Persia's main external danger lies on the north. Many British military authorities have expressed the belief that Persia's security would best be insured by a series of small independent border States on this front. The protection of her frontiers would then be a task well within the capacity of the army she could hope to raise. On the other hand, the menace of a great and united power, such as the old Russian Empire, is one that could only be adequately met by the creation of a large army, capable of expansion by means of an efficient system of reserves. Such an army is beyond the capacity of Persia in the immediate future, though from an economic standpoint it need not be so if later on Persia takes advantage of her latent resources and the inherent capacity for development which she undoubtedly possesses. Until such development takes place, bringing into the realm of possibility the creation of a large army, capable of withstanding any menace, Persia's best hope for protection from considerable external dangers lies in alliance with powers upon whose friendship she feels she can depend and who have their own reasons for desiring her advancement.

For many years the most serious problem to be dealt with in Persia is that of internal security. This is due to the large number of well-armed, wandering tribes that inhabit different parts of the country, that refuse to settle down to regular pastoral or agricultural pursuits and that have lived largely by robbery and pillage. It is not only difficult to collect taxes from such people but their raids impede trade and commerce and so diminish the revenues of the country. For a number of years past, under Riza Khan, the military policy has been to create a sufficiently strong army to maintain order within the Persian borders and subdue all elements which defy central authority. Such an army has been created and an attempt has been made to equip, organize, and train it along modern lines. It consists of about 40,000 men of all ranks, exclusive of the gendarmerie for the surveillance of roads. Military service became compulsory by royal decree in November, 1926.

It is impossible as yet to predict the ultimate outcome of the rule of Riza Khan in Persia. Russian influence may prove a disturbing element, and he has to contend with the apathy of his own subjects. From the British viewpoint, if Britain is not to be allowed to dominate Persia, a strong Persia, capable of resisting Russian military or political penetration, is greatly to be desired.

IV. MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF WAR.

The following article has been written by Mr. J. L. Garvin, of the London Observer. Mr. Garvin is one of the most eminent of English publicists. The negotiations between the Government of the United States and the Governments of Great Britain, Japan, France, Germany, and Italy looking toward the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, are still in progress. When these are completed, the history and results thereof will be traced in the Bulletin. The following article is indicative of a good portion of English thought on this subject.

Pitt was called frigid by comparison with his father. Peel's coldness was described as forbidding. Many critics labor a similar complaint, or hint it, against the Foreign Secretary. His reserve is a disadvantage, as in the case of both Pitt and Peel, but belongs in the same way to a character combining excessive moderation with inflexible honesty. Some people's hearts are so usually worn upon their sleeves as to seem inseparable from their buttons, but Sir Austen Chamberlain is not of that kind. One of the least showy of men, he is one of the soundest of foreign secretaries. For some necessary reasons and some wise ones he has kept us waiting. But his statement on the greatest question of our time removes uneasiness, largely if not yet wholly, from our minds, and strengthens the only sure hope for the world's future.

Nearly two months ago Washington mooted the epoch-making proposal for the mutual renunciation of war amongst themselves by six great powers, to begin with. We wrote, then, that for the British Empire, "the question can admit of but one answer—acceptance, prompt, unconditional, and whole-hearted." Owing to some unavoidable difficulties in Europe and overseas, the response has been less prompt than we desired. But the other conditions seem assured of fulfillment in the name of the Dominions as well as the Mother Country. In the foreign office debate the House of Commons was heard at its best. Both Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Lloyd George spoke like national statesmen.

Public opinion has awakened with extraordinary slowness to the absolutely historic importance of Mr. Kellogg's memorable proposition. When we call it epoch making we weigh the word. Why is the American plan bigger than the Locarno policy? Why is it the biggest event since America went out of the league eight years ago? Why is it of more solid and powerful promise than any covenant unsupported by the United States? The replies to these questions are sun clear. Nurse Cavell's famous phrase applies to many things, but we can not use it to express a surer and deeper truth than when we say that the league by itself is "not enough." Without America's definite cooperation in the cause of world peace the league never can be enough. The tendency to rely on Geneva without Washington—or possibly against Washington, as egregious zealots in various countries sometimes speculated—has been in Europe and Latin America not only the most baseless theory but the most dangerous delusion of the whole postwar period.

Why has the cause of disarmament made no genuine progress? Because every nation feels and knows that the league by itself is no substitute for defense; that as yet it can not offer sufficient security; that it has no power to guarantee the peace. Nearly 10 years after the covenant was framed and adopted, armaments continue. Why? Because uncertainty persists; because there are deep and vital differences about the demarcation of boundaries and the distribution of peoples under the Versailles system; because the future of Russia and the future of Asia are vast enigmas; because the latent, lurking fear of some ultimate crisis and catastrophe remains undiminished. That is why the league, as it stands, is inadequate to insure the main object for which it was founded.

Let us not be misunderstood for a single moment. Collaterally, the league already serves a thousand good purposes, apart from the main object. It is one of the greatest organs of collective civilization. It is the nearest thing to a parliament of man. It is invaluable for research, ideas, moral suggestion, practical aid, and no less as a means for regular intercourse and clearer understanding between statesmen of many nations. But for the one supreme and final cause of insuring the preservation of world peace—especially by that strongest of all modern weapons, the bloodless force of economic pressure—Geneva without Washington is not only inadequate but impotent. Let us not risk losing the end by making a fetish of one imperfect means. To serve the end surely, to achieve it at last and forever, we must reinforce and extend the means. The chief European nations and Japan must link up with America upon the best terms that American conditions yet allow. To face this truth is the first duty of every friend of peace. To blink this truth or palter with it, to try to dodge it or to juggle with it, is either a mental blunder or a moral crime, or both.

This, then, was the dissatisfying and disquieting state of the question of the century when President Coolidge and his Secretary of State came forward, after long and mature consideration, assisted by the advice and reports of America's principal ambassadors abroad. Mr. Kellogg declared, in his speech of March 15, before the Council on Foreign Relations:

> The purpose of the United States is, so far as possible, to eliminate war as a factor in international relations. In addition to treaties there must be an aroused public conscience against the utter horror and frightfulness of war. The peoples of the world must enjoy a peaceful mind * * *. Certainly the United States should not be backward in promoting this new movement for world peace, and both personally and officially, as Secretary of State, I shall always support and advocate the conclusion of appropriate treaties for arbitration, for conciliation, and for the renunciation of war.

Mr. Kellogg invites France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan to enter with the United States into a six-power pact to renounce war amongst themselves. We say that this pact would be more efficient, morally and practically, than any covenant unshared and unsupported by America. We repeat that it proposes to put the whole question of world peace on a new and firmer basis. It is the very key of salvation in this matter.

The six-power pact, says Mr. Kellogg, would be open subsequently to the adherence of any and every nation. And what does it imply as a safeguard—as a mode of action in emergency? It means this, above all, that any contracting nation which might be tempted otherwise to break loose in an access of passion will think thrice and ten times before violating an engagement with the United States. Another month's delay in 1914 would have saved the world. The American plan means that every principal nation would have to adopt the vital maxim "wait before you fight." We say vital because we consider one thing to be as certain as anything can be in this mortal sphere. If on the plain lines of the American plan we eliminate the possibility of another world war in a hurry, there will never be another world war at all.

After the Foreign Secretary's speech we can not doubt that the American plan will be carried as regards five of the six negotiating powers; and we can not believe that France will commit the perhaps irreparable error of staying out. Germany, guided by Herr Stresemann's adroit ability, was the first of the invited nations to sign the Washington program. We frankly envy her that priority, but it was easy. Berlin, by comparison, was on velvet. The terms of Mr. Kellogg's invitation enabled Germany to agree without prejudicing her special understanding with Soviet Russia. For Britain and France alike, and especially for our neighbors, the position was less facile. Sir Austen Chamberlain had no less good will than Herr Stresemann, but he required more time. His explanation on that head to the House of Commons was cogent enough; but we all know that his case is stronger and more honorable than he was able to say.

M. Briand's difficulties had to be considered. The French Foreign Minister was compelled to temporize until a critical general election was over across the channel. He was, and is, embarassed by the special French alliances with Poland and the Little Entente. Without unwisdom and discourtesy, and without serious disservice to the moral interests of the American proposition itself, Sir Austen and the British Government as a whole could not leave France in the lurch, openly isolated. Mr. Kellogg will be the first to appreciate this position. His first pourparlers for the mutual renunciation of war were opened last year with Paris separately, not with London. Herr Stresemann himself, and every person who understands intimately the diplomatic situation of Europe, will agree that no good purpose could be served by weakening M. Briand's hands. They would have been seriously weakened by brusquely separate procedure on the part of Mr. Baldwin's government without regard to French feeling and the special circumstances of the electoral period.

But a new and strong Government in Paris is now in a position to act for itself. The British Government must act for itself. Sir Austen has happily dropped the dangerous suggestion which he touched for a moment—that of submitting Mr. Kellogg's proposal to a conference of jurists. Upon no account can we allow direct and friendly dealings between the English-speaking peoples to be hung up a moment longer, or hindered in any way, by the more complicated and delicate discussion which the Quai d'Orsay may think it necessary to conduct.

We must face this problem squarely and set out in the straightest terms those facts and necessities to which every Government in this country must bow. The fundamental and unchangeable principle of the British peoples is that good relations with the American people shall come first, eliminating absolutely every possibility of war with the United States. It is infinitely important that our French friends and every other country in Europe and Asia should realize how finally and impregnably fixed is this principle, and the hopelessness of imagining that it can be modified in any conceivable circumstances. Our continental policy and our position in the league are unconditionally subordinate to our purpose of maintaining good relations with the United States in a manner excluding all ambiguity whatever. Upon this condition the cohesion and existence of the British Empire depend. By one of the greatest changes of its kind in all history—though a change creative in its effect and wholly favorable to the future of all the English-speaking peoples—sole sea supremacy is no longer in our insular hands and never can return to them.

Sea supremacy is in commission on equal terms between this island and the United States, the mighty offspring of Britain, " mother of nations." In no possible contingency henceforth can the British Empire join with France or Japan, or even support the league, in any policy involving maritime friction, much less naval hostilities, with the American Republic. By that means we could not help anyone if we would; and we would not if we could. As soon as a shot was fired the British Empire would be dissolved by any attempt of that kind. It never will be made.

Canada, for instance, desires immutable concord with her giant neighbor and friend, and will not quarrel with the United States for the sake of any European or Asiatic interest. To suppose that Australia, South Africa, or India, not to speak of the Irish Free State, would support any hostilities against the United States is dull lunacy. For such reasons before our old treaty with Japan expired we struck out of it the contingency of conflict with the United States. Mr. Baldwin's government must make it clear that the precedent applies strictly, both at Paris and Geneva. The covenant, the Locarno policy, and our sincere entente with France, must all be read subject to the condition that none of these shall endanger the peace of the English-speaking peoples. The whole world must understand once for all that this stipulation is the foundation stone of our foreign policy, that it governs all our naval and military arrangements, and that it never will be changed.

In this bigger matter another muddle like that for which the pigtailed pendantry of the Admiralty was largely though not wholly responsible at the Geneva Naval Conference, would have destroyed the Unionist Party at the next general election. Happily, this danger has been avoided. But the delay of our answer to America, by comparison with Germany's promptitude, has now been more than sufficient to cover all our moral obligations of courtesy and considerateness toward France. The nation expects that Mr. Baldwin's government shall expedite the frank acceptance of Mr. Kellogg's proposals, and that as the strongest of all examples and inducements to the rest of the world, war between the English-speaking peoples shall be utterly and forever renounced.

It must be understood that this course on our part, though demanded in any case by the feeling and mind and life of Britain and the Dominions, is as vitally necessary to a sane outlook both at Geneva and Paris. Anything like a hostile policy toward the United States would disrupt the league and would be the death of France. In no circumstances henceforth, without agreement between America and Britain, can decisive sea power be used in support of either France or the league. Unless Germany goes mad a second time, as in the universal submarine guerilla of 1917, the armed weight of the American people will never again fall on that people. German statesmanship for the next generation will use every effort to keep its policy toward America within the most-favored-nation clause of diplomacy.

France, by a contrary course, alienating American opinion more and more, would condemn herself to ultimate isolation. As the result of that sort of policy, Poland and the Little Entente would prove broken reeds in emergency. We hope and trust that M. Poincaré and M. Briand will recognize, once for all, that in the new conditions the real first principle of French security is unbreakable friendship with the United States. When Italy and Japan are certain to follow the British example, we can not believe that French statesmanship at this juncture will fail in foresight and decision.

We do not pretend to exhaust this subject in a single article. We are well aware of all the subsidiary doubts and difficulties. Our present duty is to state the main point in the plainest language. The democratic opinion of the British Empire declares absolutely and without reserve for the renunciation of war in the sense of Mr. Kellogg's proposition. We look to France to insure the success of the six-power pact. It is not possible for Britain and the Dominions to make common cause with any nation on the basis of any other policy. The American plan is in no way inimical to the league, but is indispensable as a double security. Any peace system with the United States "in" will be far stronger for the supreme purpose than any system whatever with the United States "out." Those who do not see this have no world vision. As Chatham said in another connection, the victory has to be won in North America. It never can be won in Europe alone. You can no more secure world peace at Geneva without Washington than you can irrigate the waste places of the earth by working a parish pump.

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The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between June 1 and July 1, inclusive.

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

M.I.D., G.S.U.S.A., 1926, MAP NO. 113.-

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O. N. I. MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

VOL. XI JULY, 1928 No. 1

NICARAGUA

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A. POLITICAL

A SUMMARY OF EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO THE CONDITIONS EXISTING IN NICARAGUA IN APRIL, 1928

PART I

General Situation.

In order to visualize more clearly the region of which we are speaking, it will be well to describe briefly the country in question.

Nicaragua is the largest Republic in Central America and is a trifle larger than the State of New York. It has a population of about 650,000 inhabitants.

The concentration of the population in a few centers has intensified all of the conditions which have worked against peace in Central America and has made Nicaragua the most turbulent of the five Republics. The history of Nicaragua has been one long struggle between the Conservative Party at Granada and the Liberal Party at Leon for the control of the Government and direction of the affairs of the nation.

The total number of Americans, exclusive of the force of occupation, is approximately 1,100. The principal American investments in Nicaragua are estimated to be $22.000.000, in fruit lands, mining, railroads, and timber enterprises. The British interests amount to $3,900,000 in loans and customs bonds. French interests are estimated at $1,000,000.

Nicaragua has the most meager means of transportation of any of the Central American Republics. The only railroad of any consequence is the "Pacific Railroad of Nicaragua," a narrow-gauge line with a mileage of 159 miles. The main line extends from Corinto to Granada, with a branch line from Masaya to Diriamba. There are three so-called motor roads with a mileage of 126 miles, but the best of these routes is rough and often impassable in the rainy season.

United States Policy.

The Monroe doctrine, the Bryan-Chamorro treaty of 1916, and the "General treaty of peace and amity" have determined our Nicaraguan policy.

The present development of the Monroe doctrine has been summed up in the military intelligence summary of January 20, 1928, as follows:

> The controlling influence of the United States in Latin-American international relations is due not only to the recognition of the Monroe doctrine, but also to the extension of the United States defense policy to assure protection of the Panama and Nicaraguan routes, and to the leadership in the United States in the development of Pan Americanism. The increased interest of the United States in the Caribbean for purposes of defense has led, at times, to direct interposition of the United States in the domestic affairs of the Caribbean nations.

The salient features which the Bryan-Chamorro treaty of 1916 granted the United States are: The right to build a canal in Nicaragua by such route as may be deemed feasible; leases for 99 years of the two islands Great and Little Corn, with the privilege of renewal for 99 years; permission to establish a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca.

The United States is not a party to the "General treaty of peace and amity" concluded on February 7, 1923, but did sponsor it. This treaty was ratified by Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, and by El Salvador in modified form. The salient articles are here quoted:

> ART. II. Desiring to make secure in the Republics of Central America the benefits which are derived from the maintenance of free institutions and to contribute at the same time toward strengthening their stability and the prestige with which they should be surrounded, they declare that every act, disposition, or measure which alters the constitutional organization in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the peace of said Republics, whether it proceed from any public power or from the private citizens.
>
> Consequently the Governments of the contracting parties will not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the five Republics through a coup d'état or a revolution against a recognized Government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country. And even in such a case they obligate themselves not to acknowledge the recognition if any of the persons elected as President, Vice President, or chief of state designate should fall under any of the following heads:
>
> (1) If he should be the leader or one of the leaders of a coup d'état or revolution, or through blood relationship or marriage be an ascendent or descendent or brother of such leader or leaders.
>
> (2) If he should have been a secretary of state or should have held some high military command during the accomplishment of the coup d'état, the revolution, or while the election was being carried on, or if he should have held this office or command within the six months preceding the coup d'état, revolution, or the election.

Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a government which arises from election to power of a citizen expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the constitution of his country as eligible to election as President, Vice President, or chief of state designate.

ART. IV. In case of civil war no Government of Central America shall intervene in favor of or against the Government of the country where the conflict takes place.

ART. V. The contracting parties obligate themselves to maintain in their respective constitutions the principle of nonreelection to the office of President and Vice President of the Republic; and those of the contracting parties whose constitutions permit such reelection obligate themselves to introduce a constitutional reform to this effect in their next legislative session after the ratification of the present treaty.

ART. XIV. Each of the Governments of the Republics of Central America, in the desire to maintain a permanent peace, agree not to intervene, under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, in the internal political affairs of any other Central American Republic; furthermore, not to permit any person, whether a national, Central American, or foreigner, to organize or foment revolutionary artivities within its territory against a recognized Government of any other Central American Republic. None of the contracting Governments will permit the persons under its jurisdiction to organize armed expeditions or to take part in any hostilities which may arise in a neighboring country, or to furnish money or war supplies to the contending parties; the contracting Governments bind themselves to adopt and dictate any effective measures, comparable with the political constitution of their countries, that may be necessary to avoid the occurrence of acts of this nature within their territory.

Immediately after this treaty is ratified the contracting Governments obligate themselves to present to their respective Congresses such projects of law as may be necessary for the due fulfillment of this article.

Subsequent Events.

An electoral law was drafted by Dr. H. W. Dodds in 1924, affording the people free and fair elections, and was subsequently enacted by the Nicaraguan Congress. As a result of this law being enacted and the subsequent elections it was the intention of our Government to withdraw the legation guard stationed at Managua shortly after the inauguration. The contemplated move was a source of apprehension among Government officials, natives, and foreigners. In order to permit the Government time to organize a constabulary, the departure of the marine detachment was delayed until August 4, 1925.

Immediately after the withdrawal of the legation guard the political situation became so disturbed that the department dispatched two vessels of the Special Service Squadron to Nicaraguan waters.

In October, 1925, Gen. Emiliano Chamorro made demands on President Solorzano, who was forced to retire. As a result of this coup d'état, Vice President Sacasa fled from Nicaragua to Honduras.

On January 3, 1926, General Chamorro was elected senator from the Department of Managua.

Early in January, 1926, Congress declared the Vice Presidency vacant, and although the President submitted his resignation Congress refused to accept it, but did grant him an indefinite leave of absence. In the meantime General Chamorro assumed the Presidency as first designate and took charge of the executive power on January 17, 1926.

In May, 1926, due to disturbed conditions caused by Liberal revolutionists, detachments of marines and bluejackets were landed at Bluefields and vicinity to protect American lives and property.

As a result of the continued disturbances by the Liberal revolutionist General Chamorro in October, 1926, formally turned over the executive power to Sebastian Uriza, who had been appointed designate by the Congress, which General Chamorro controlled. Our Government refused to recognize Uriza on constitutional grounds. Uriza then convoked Congress in extraordinary session. Adolfo Diaz was elected first designate, and on November 11, Señor Uriza turned over the executive power to Diaz, who was inaugurated President on November 14, 1926, to fill out the unexpired term of former President Solorazo.

On November 30, 1926, the former Vice President, Juan B. Sacasa, landed at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, with a party of his adherents and placed himself at the head of the Liberal revolution and proclaimed himself constitutional President of the Republic.

American interests located on the Atlantic coast made repeated requests for protection, due to the interference with their business by the Liberal revolutionists. The commander, Special Service Squadron, had likewise obtained unmistakable evidence of the Mexican Government's failure to maintain a neutral attitude by allowing a flow of arms and ammunition to the Liberals.

Shortly after President Diaz assumed the executive power he addressed a communication to the American Legation to the effect that owing to the hostile attitude of the Mexican Government toward the constituted authority of Nicaragua, without motive, he, the President, could not guarantee safety and tranquillity to foreigners and their property in the Republic. The President solicited our aid to solve the problem. In the meantime the revolution became general throughout the Republic.

A Marine Corps expeditionary force, consisting of 15 officers and 383 enlisted men, established a neutral zone (one company) at Rama on January 10 and another neutral zone at Corinto on January 24.

On February 1, 1927, a legation guard of 150 officers and men was established at Managua. Intense fighting was going on at Chinandega and vicinity and the situation was becoming serious for the Government. The commander, Special Service Squadron, deemed it necessary to maintain the line of communications open from Managua to Corinto, and therefore a force of about 850 officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and Navy was landed. A few days later this force was augmented by 206 officers and men.

A force of 75 officers and 1,520 men of the Marine Corps and Navy were disembarked on the 9th and 10th of March at Corinto. Early in May the force ashore in Nicaragua was augmented by the arrival of a force of 825 officers and men. On June 13, 1927, the total force ashore in western Nicaragua was 187 officers and 2,892 men.

Mr. Henry L. Stimson arrived at Managua as the personal representative of President Coolidge, in order to present certain views of our Government and at the same time ascertain the entire situation in Nicaragua. He immediately conferred with President Diaz and other officials of the Government, also with leaders and representative members of the Liberal Party. On April 22 President Diaz made the following proposal of peace terms to which he was prepared to agree:

(1) Immediate general peace and delivery of arms simultaneously by both parties to American custody.

(2) General amnesty and return of exiles and restoration of confiscated property.

(3) Participation in the Diaz cabinet by representative Liberals.

(4) Organization of a Nicaraguan constabulary on a nonpartisan basis commanded by American officers.

(5) Supervision of elections in 1928 and succeeding years by Americans who will have ample police force to make supervision effective.

(6) Continuance temporarily of a sufficient force of marines to make the foregoing effective.

The Liberal representatives practically concurred in the terms, with the exception that General Moncada, urged the immediate substitution for Diaz of some other person for President, chiefly as a point of honor to pacify his army. He, however, stated that he would not oppose the United States troops if that country insisted on the Diaz issue.

General Moncada finally recommended to his troops that they yield, and a general disarmament of both sides began along the Tipitapa River, where the United States marines had been stationed in anticipation of this move.

By the end of June, 1927, the entire Republic was quiet, with the exception of the activities of the revolutionary general, Augusto Sandino, who, with a few followers, had refused to lay down his arms and retired to the mining region in the Department of Nueva Segovia, gathering adherents en route.

The forces ashore in Nicaragua were later reduced by the transfer to other stations of 83 officers and 1,521 men.

On July 2, 1927, President Coolidge nominated Brig. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, as head of the electoral commission to supervise the elections to be held in Nicaragua in the fall of 1928. This was in accordance with the promise to the Nicaraguan Government and Liberal Party to assure a free and impartial election.

A formal agreement was signed on December 22, 1927, between the United States and Nicaragua for the development of a constabulary force under the direction and with the assistance of American military personnel. The Nicaraguan Congress at its last session failed to ratify this agreement.

During the period from July to December, 1927, activities against outlaws were confined to the Departments of Nueva Segovia, eastern part of Jinotega, and northern portion of Matagalpa. In that period the Marine Corps and Guardia Nacional forces had 30 contacts with outlaws. The losses sustained by the Marine Corps and Guardia Nacional were 16 killed and 31 wounded. The outlaws' losses were 124 known dead and at least 267 wounded.

Owing to the increase in bandit activities the department dispatched early in January, 1928, a force consisting of 71 officers and 1,170 men of the Marine Corps and Navy to Nicaragua under the command of General Feland.

Early in the year the brigade commander effected a reorganization for the purposes of administration, supply, and to facilitate the prosecution of the military campaign against Sandino; divided the country into three areas, as follows:

Northern area: All of western Nicaragua north of the general line, Somotillo-Jinotega.

Southern area: All of western Nicaragua south of the general line, Somotillo-Jinotega.

Eastern area: The east coast of Nicaragua and such Nicaraguan territory inland as can be controlled by troops supplied from the east coast of Nicaragua.

PART II

RECENT REPORT COVERING ACTIVITIES FROM APRIL 19, 1928, TO MAY 31, 1928

During April and May, although there has been no change in the organization, there has been a marked expansion of the territory operated over and now held.

The forces in the eastern area are now occupying Bucbuc (on Rio Coco at mouth of Rio Waspook), Mineral de Pis Pis area, and the Mineral de la Concepcion area; small operations are being pressed to Bocay and toward Casuli (west of " P " in " Prinzapolca "). The area comander plans to establish a small detachment at Rama (on Rio Escondido) soon and to retain indefinitely detachments at Bucbuc, Mineral de Pis Pis area, Mineral de la Concepcion area, El

Gallo, and Rama; also to continue patrolling the Rio Coco for the purpose of intercepting outlaw supplies, particularly ammunition. It is interesting to note that the marines plan to construct their quarters at Bucbuc almost solely from materials available in the wilderness; one such building has been completed there.

OPERATIONS.

Eastern area.—Operations in the eastern area have been confined to the expansion of territory above mentioned. Until just recently the rivers have been low incident to the close of the prolonged dry season. Transportation in the eastern area is practically all by rivers, and our men have worked their way up these streams and kept themselves supplied by most arduous effort. The movement up the Rio Prinzapolca to the Mineral de la Concepcion area was accomplished by several days of actual poling of small boats. After the destruction wrought by the outlaws at La Lux mine (in Mineral de la Concepcion area) and Neptune mine ("Bonanza" in Mineral de Pis Pis area) they fled before the movement of marines inland. Only two contacts were gained by our troops; these were on May 4 and on May 6, when a small detachment under Captain Edson encountered about 50 outlaws in the valley of the Rio Waspook.

Northern area.—The forces in the northern area have conducted small operations into the central part of Jinotega Province, patrols have gone to the northeastern part of Chontales Province and down the Rio Grande to Paigua. The only marked expansion of territory occupied in western Nicaragua is in eastern Matagalpa Province, where a detachment has been established at Muymuy and two semipermanent detachments are now located to the north of that place.

Central Jinotega.—For the past three weeks a mounted platoon (Captain Phipps) has been operating in the vicinity of Casuli, pressing reconnaissance to the east and well to the north of that place.

Patrols from Corinto ranch (about 10 miles northeast of Jinotega), Jinotega, and Quilali have operated over this exceedingly difficult terrain. This region is so rugged and heavily wooded that it is believed the outlaws have succeeded in evading our patrols therein; but it is further believed that whatever bands have sought to hide in this region have been forced to keep moving.

Nueva Segovia and northern Esteli.—Vigorous patrolling has been kept up in this section against the bands of "Ferrara" and Jose Leon Diaz. These outlaw bands have been given no rest; and, as a result, Diaz is believed to have gone east of the Rio Coco into central Jinotega, while "Ferrara" remains in western Nueva Segovia near the Honduranian frontier, which he ("Ferrara") frequently crosses to escape the continuous and to him confusing activity of our patrols.

During the middle of May patrols were pushed into northeastern Nueva Segovia toward the Rio Potega. One patrol (Lieutenant Ridderhoff) from San Albino mine discovered a prepared outlaw rendezvous where sleeping quarters for about 100 men and quantities of supplies had been provided; the whole establishment was destroyed.

Southern area.—A very large section is garrisoned by slightly more than a battalion; intensive patrolling from a chain of outlying detachments has denied this important and productive agricultural district to the outlaws.

Trinidad-S. Isidro (near boundary between Matagalpa and Esteli).—This general area has been infested by two local bands, a "Liberal" band under one Sevilla and a "Conservative" band under one Hernandez. During the present calendar year we have moved many troops and supplies through this area en route to Esteli with practically no interference; but these bands have kept that neighborhood in constant terror. For the past six weeks patrols from Dario (western Matagalpa) and Esteli have given these marauders no rest until the "Liberal" band under Sevilla appears to have been forced toward Jinotega (city), where he (Sevilla) at 7.30 p. m., May 30, 1928, surrendered to the commanding officer of marines with 20 followers, 11 rifles, 2 pistols, and some ammunition.

Aviation.—With the departure of the bulk of the outlaw forces from Nueva Segovia to the east, aviation based on Managua has extended its reconnaissance into the central part of Nicaragua. Some transcontinental observation flights have been made; the valley of the Rio Grande has been repeatedly observed; eastern Chontales has been reconnoitered, and recently the planes have been especially active over central Jinotega.

Because of the rugged and dense nature of the terrain over which our most distant patrols have been operating, frequently the planes have great difficulty in effecting liaison with friendly ground troops.

From now until the end of the rainy season bad visibility and violent thunder storms creating dangerous flying conditions are apt to prevail in the afternoons. It has been necessary to curtail afternoon missions as much as possible.

Another transport plane has arrived, bringing total number of this type to four.

Contacts and casualties.—There were reported for the period. January 15 to April 18 (inclusive), 1928 (a total of 95 days), 28 ground contacts, with known outlaw casualties as 66 killed and 29 wounded. During the period of this report (total of 43 days) there have been only 10 ground contacts, with actually known outlaw casualties of 6 killed and 5 wounded. There has been no relaxation of activity in this brigade; a comparison of the foregoing summaries of contacts and outlaw casualties is but a reflection of the following:

The apparent loss of aggressiveness by the outlaws.

The greater difficulty of the terrain in regions where the outlaws seek to hide.

Capt. Robert S. Hunter, United States Marine Corps, in command of a detachment of 26 marines and 10 guardia which left Quilali on May 9, 1928, engaged a group of about 75 outlaws well up the valley of the Rio Cua, central Jinotega (this river has its source near Pena Blanca and flows in a generally northwestern direction instead of a westerly direction as shown on the map), on May 13 and again on May 14. These were the principal contacts during the period covered by this report. On May 13 Captain Hunter was mortally wounded. Corpl. William L. Williamson, United States Marine Corps, was killed, and one marine was wounded (now in Managua and expected to recover). After these contacts this detachment remained for several days near by, practically immobilized by the seriousness of the late Captain Hunter's wounds and isolated from friendly troops; but the outlaws made no aggressive move, which fact may be indicative of severe losses having been inflicted upon them.

Present operations.—A concentration of guerrilla forces with about 200 rifles appears to have formed in the wild country north of Pena Blanca in central Jinotega Province. On May 31, 1921, preparations were completed, and this date (June 1, 1928) operations are proceeding against them. A force of about 125 men (Major Rockey) from Quilali and a company of about 90 men from Corinto ranch (about 10 miles northeast of Jinotega) will be directly employed in this operation. It is believed that the outlaws have established some sort of a supply point in this area.

In the eastern area a small force is pressing to and has almost reached Bocay; and another small force from the Mineral de la Concepcion area is pushing forward toward Casuli.

Future operations.—The bulk of the outlaws are in remote and almost inaccessible regions; the wet season has already arrived in the mountainous districts. These facts will necessitate a decrease in the actual "man-miles" of our patrolling. Studies are being made with a view to determine a troop distribution and to adopt methods which will give this decreased activity a maximum and constantly harassing effect.

Guardia Nacional.—The present enlisted strength of the Guardia Nacional is 1,016, only 219 more than three months ago. This nonpartisan organization is greatly handicapped by the party prejudices which control all people of Nicaragua. The guardia is resented by many of the political leaders of the country.

On January 8, 1928, there was a mutiny in the guardia detachment at Somotillo. On May 14, 1928, during the engagement of the late Captain Hunter's detachment with armed outlaws, eight of the 10 guardia in this combined detachment of marines and guardia ran to a position of comparative safety, but Cadet Blackburn (NCO, United States Marine Corps, commanding these men), did all in his power to prevent his men from running, and being unsuccessful he (Blackburn) stood his ground. With these exceptions, there is no criticism of the conduct of the guardia's enlisted personnel, which has been selected with utmost care before enlistment.

Comparatively little active field work is being done by the guardia; by far, the greater portion are on, or in the immediate vicinity of, the railroad and in the more important towns. Brig. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, has been designated for, and accepted, the Nicaraguan civil position, president of the national board of elections. By decree of the President of Nicaragua dated March 21, 1928, the office now held by General McCoy was from thence forth given authority "to command the services of the Guardia Nacional and to give to that force such orders as he may deem necessary and appropriate to insure a free and impartial election." Under these conditions this brigade can obtain but little assistance from the Guardia Nacional in active field work against the organized outlaws in Nicaragua.

It is the present plan to increase the enlisted strength of the Guardia Nacional to 2,000 men. Sufficient funds for this increase are assured. The present rate of selective recruiting is approximately 100 men per month, and it is believed that the total strength of the organization will be about 1,500 men at the time of the coming election. With that strength (1,500), the guardia should be able to police all the more important towns. With a rapid expansion to 2,000, many of the personnel would not be properly indoctrinated; furthermore, 2,000 is a large number of arms to be distributed in the country, and the undersigned will endeavor to secure proper safeguards against the dangers that might arise from such a situation.

Great difficulties are faced in organizing and commanding the Guardia Nacional, and it is believed that that organization will not be a self-reliant body and capable of maintaining order in Nicaragua until from three to five years more.

The Nicaraguan Congress failed to pass a transitory electoral law satisfactory to our Government, which it was felt would assure the holding of free and fair elections. Following the failure of Congress, President Diaz issued a decree covering the approaching elections, acting under article 3 of the constitution. The election will be held on November 4, 1928. In order to carry out the provision of this decree General McCoy submitted a request on the commander Special Service Squadron for the services of 557 officers and men for electoral duties, as follows: For secretaries of 13 Department boards of election; for chairmen of cantonal boards of election, 450. An additional 20 per cent margin is required to allow for casualties and replacements.

The Liberal Party held its convention in February, 1928, and nominated Gen. Jose M. Moncada and Dr. Antonio Mediano as presidential and vice presidential candidates.

The threatened split in the Conservative Party materialized on May 20, when two candidates for President were nominated by two separate conventions of Conservatives. One convention, which indorsed the administration and has the support of President Diaz, nominated Foreign Minister Carlos C. Pasos. The Chamorrist Conservatives nominated Vicente Rappoccioli.

Late in May a third party, known as the Autonomist Guardia Party, was organized in Nicaragua by prominent citizens.

NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS.

The commanding general's comments as to the helpless impotency, dishonest conduct, and partisan revenge of the civil officials of the Nicaraguan Government still apply. This brigade has to keep close watch on the Nicaraguan Government in order to see that its officials do not take revengeful partisan advantage of results obtained solely by our forces. No change in this aspect of the present conditions is foreseen, and with a new administration seated as a result of an election supervised by us no change in this respect is anticipated. While the relations of this brigade's personnel with the people of Nicaragua are cordial, that the majority of Nicaraguans resent our presence and have no love for Americans is a fact that exists and can never be overcome in our time, due to the radical differences in the antecedents and the culture of the two peoples.

Unfortunate occurrences.—With our campaign against armed outlaws largely in the immediate hands of junior officers and noncommissioned officers as patrol leaders, there have been a few unfortunate occurrences wherein personnel and property injury has been inflicted through errors of immature judgment. On the whole, such instances have been extremely rare and investigation usually discloses action in good faith by our patrols. The brigade is directly concerning itself with these cases by announcing to all officers its policy of protecting innocent people and their property, and investigations are being made and placed on official record of every case which might tend to bring discredit to our service in Nicaragua.

The following is a brief summary of conclusions and reiterations deemed appropriate:

(*a*) Our tactical methods and hard campaigning against organized armed outlaws is being crowned with success.

(*b*) Sandino and his followers will not be able, by force, to exert any appreciable influence to prevent the holding of a fair and properly supervised election.

(*c*) The relations of the personnel of this brigade with the citizens of Nicaragua are extremely cordial.

(*d*) A supervised and fair election in Nicaragua will not immediately relieve the necessity for keeping a large military force in this country.

(*e*) The present strength of this brigade should be maintained by replacements.

(*f*) An increase in evacuations must be expected during the coming six months.

(*g*) An intelligent news and publicity service maintained in Washington, D. C., for the purpose of combating propaganda in the American press derogatory to this brigade would be helpful.

(*h*) The chief condition adversely affecting the early and full accomplishing of our mission is the total lack of civil authority by this brigade over any person in Nicaragua except its own personnel.

Summary.

It is the opinion of the military authorities that the supervision of the elections this year will be only the first step toward stopping the political wrangling in that country. Regardless of the immediate results of the supervised election, American troops will have to remain in Nicaragua if the fairly elected administration is to remain in power without another civil war. It is the further opinion of the military authorities that Sandino and his followers will not be able, by force, to exert any appreciable influence to prevent the holding of a fair and properly supervised election.

The relations between the American forces and the Nicaraguans have been cordial, but a majority have no love for Americans and resent our presence in their country.

The strength of the Marine Corps and naval personnel serving in Nicaragua on May 31, 1928, is as follows:

	United States Marine Corps	United States Navy	Grand aggregate
Commissioned	205	24	229
Warrant	18	2	20
Enlisted men	3,833	89	3,922
Total			4,171

Composition as follows:

	Officers and warrant officers	Enlisted men, Marine Corps and Navy
Second Brigade and Brigade Headquarters with attached Navy personnel	194	3,371
Aircraft squadrons	16	181
Marine detachments from ships of Special Service Squadron	6	288
Marine Corps personnel serving with National Guard detachments	27	66
Medical personnel serving with National Guard detachments	6	16
Grand aggregate	249	3,922

The disposition of the aircraft is as follows: At Managua, 4 transports, 5–02–U's and 6–F8–C's, and at Puerto Cabezas 5 Loening amphibians.

Aircraft has proved of inestimable value, carrying supplies, transporting sick and wounded, general reconnaissance, maintaining communications, and strafing outlaws located in inaccessible localities.

The activities of the aircraft will from now on be materially reduced, due to the beginning of the rainy season, because of bad visibility and violent thunderstorms which are liable to occur in the afternoons.

FRANCE

A. NAVAL

1. Inspection of Ordnance Activities at Toulon Navy Yard.

By authority of the French Ministry of Marine the assistant naval attaché for ordnance at London and the assistant naval attaché, Paris, visited the Toulon Navy Yard on April 11. Attention was given only to matters relating to ordnance and gunnery. The visit comprised the following points of interest: (1) Gun shops; (2) the new subterranean magazines; (3) the department of pyrotechnics; (4) the battleship *Jean Bart.*

NOTE.—Authority had been granted also to visit one of the late cruisers, but there was none in the harbor at the time of the inspection.

GUN SHOPS.

The visit to the gun shops was curtailed when advised that no new construction was carried out in the Toulon yard, the shops being used solely for repair and upkeep of the material of the fleet.

SUBTERRANEAN SHELL MAGAZINES.

These comprise a system of nine magazines dug out under the hill just back of the upper harbor. The depth of earth overhead varies from 48 to 132 feet. The last magazine was completed only two years ago. The earth removed was carried by overhead trolley to be used in the construction of two large graving docks previously reported upon.

All the projectiles of the French Navy are stowed in these magazines. The accompanying French officer stated that since the explosion on the *Liberté* some years ago the policy had been inaugurated of removing all ammunition from the ships' magazines to shore during times when ships were operating in home waters. No powder is stowed in these subterranean magazines. All powder is stowed in small wooden buildings located about one-fourth mile from the subterranean magazines. The nine magazines are in no way interconnected by subterranean passages. A narrow-gauge surface railroad system, however, interconnects the lot and leads down to the water front, affording the necessary transportation.

The entrance to each magazine is curved to guard against the direct passage of fragments in case of an explosion. The walls of the magazine are made of stone blocks about a foot thick and the magazine proper is surrounded by a clear passage about 4 feet wide between the inner and outer walls. This passage provides the necessary drainage system for water which seeps through.

No special flooding or sprinkling arrangements are provided. There is, however, a water plug provided with hose and nozzle located in the entrance near the magazine door. Overhead tracks and a 3-ton trolley are provided for the handling of shells within the magazine. The magazines are lighted by electricity. All calibers of projectiles, segregated by calibers, are neatly stowed on their sides in each magazine. The accompanying officer stated that it was practice not to concentrate a single caliber in a magazine as a precaution against the loss of an entire supply of that caliber in case of an explosion in a particular magazine.

It was noted that the projectiles were fitted with windshields and from two to four separate rotating bands. These rotating bands were of flat surface and each contained one narrow groove.

THE PYROTECHNIC WORKS.

This department is charged with the assembling of all powder charges for the navy, the filling of projectiles, war heads, depth charges, and mines. No powder, projectiles, or explosives are manufactured here. These, the accompanying officer stated, were procured from commercial sources.

During the war the pyrotechnic works at Toulon were greatly expanded to assemble charges for the army. It was stated that over 10,000 workmen were employed at that time. The buildings cover a large area, but only a relatively small number are in use at the present time. It is contemplated, however, to retain the buildings and a skeleton organization which will always permit of employing these works for the army if the occasion arises. About 1,000 employees are at present engaged. It was estimated that about half this number are women engaged mostly in the assembly of powder charges.

In this department the following were observed: (1) Assembly of powder of various calibers; (2) the charging of an explosive projectile; (3) the charging of a mine; (4) the charging of a war head.

The French powder is manufactured in narrow, thin strips rather than in perforated cylindrical grains as in the case of our own. These strips vary in size and length for the various calibers. For the 12-inch charges the strips are about 18 inches in length. The strips are assembled in a cylindrical former, bound around with string, removed from the former, and placed directly in the powder bag or cartridge case. Powder bags are made of heavy gray serge. An ignition charge of black powder is sewed into the end of the bag which is to be the last bag of a charge. Serge is used for bags in lieu of silk because it is cheaper.

The filling shop for projectiles, war heads, etc., consists of a large stone structure with a main narrow-gauge railway line running from the melting pots at one end through the door at the other end and down to the docks. Within the shop this railway line has many offshoots, and there are numerous cars specially fitted with racks for holding the war heads, projectiles, or mines, as the case may be.

The explosive, toluene, is melted in the melting pots by steam. The car bearing the projectile, war head, etc., is run under the pot and filled and then run onto one of the offshoot sidetracks to cool. In the case of projectiles, only the projectile itself is heated before the warm explosive is poured in. This, the attendant explained, was to prevent shrinkage away from the projectile on cooling. Heating; in the case of war heads, etc., is accomplished by the heated liquid itself, but the projectile being much thicker and the volume of liquid much smaller in comparison, the projectile must be heated in advance of pouring. The shop itself is maintained at a uniform temperature by steam radiators during the cooling process.

Recently filled war heads for 550-mm. (21-inch) torpedoes filled with 250 kilograms (550 pounds) explosive were observed.

THE BATTLESHIP "JEAN BART."

It was not especially desired to visit this ship. Authority to visit the *Provence* had been previously asked, because it was believed the *Provence* had already been fitted with her director-control apparatus, and it was thought a visit to the turrets of one of these ships would permit a check on whether or not the Granat system had been installed. On arriving for the visit the visiting officers were informed by the préfet maritime that the *Provence* and *Paris* were undergoing extensive repairs and that the *Jean Bart* had been designated for the visit in place of the *Provence.* In passing alongside the *Provence* and *Lorraine* it was noted that the masts were surrounded by framing structure. The accompanying officer, asked the question as to what was being done, replied that the new Granat director control was being installed.

Nothing of much interest was seen on the *Jean Bart.* One turret, one broadside battery, and an antiaircraft gun were visited. The turrets have electrical equipment throughout. Director control has not yet been installed, but the turret officer accompanying the visit stated that when the installations on board the *Provence* and *Paris* had been completed the *Jean Bart* and *Lorraine* would be taken next. There having been some indication in the past that the French were considering the installation of a telecommand system instead of a follow-the-pointer system, this officer was asked if there was a possibility of a system of telecommand being installed. He replied that it had been considered but that the idea had been abandoned as being too expensive an experiment and that the Granat follow-the-pointer system was to be installed.

The antiaircraft gun was observed to be equipped with one of the early types of Le Prieur sights and corrector. The Le Prieur antiaircraft sights, correctors, and mounts have been reported upon in numerous reports in the past. No director system for antiaircraft fire was provided.

A fuze-setting device was employed alongside this gun, which was demonstrated as permitting great speed. A fuze setter pulls a small lever up so that a pointer on the lever corresponds to the range as called out. Pulling this lever sets a small lug in place. The first loader plunges the shell nose down into this device, which is shaped like a cup, and gives it a turn until it comes up against a stop. The lug has in the meanwhile engaged the setting device of the fuze and performed the necessary operations to give it the proper range setting. The whole operation requires but a few seconds.

GERMANY

A. NAVAL

1. *Activities of the German Navy.*

After completing her world cruise, the *Emden* arrived in Wilhelmshaven on March 14. On March 15 the last four of the large torpedo boats permitted by the treaty of Versailles were launched in Wilhelmshaven. These were given the names *Tiger*, *Luchs*, *Jaguar*, and *Leopard*. The naval observatory in Wilhelmshaven is engaged more and more in the work of meteorological training, this now being extended to the noncommissioned personnel. In the middle of March there was a course for signal and radio personnel for the purpose of teaching the operation of the instruments, training in weather observation work, etc.

The winter conditioning of the line ships and cruisers was completed when the *Elsass* left the Kiel Arsenal on February 6. The commander in chief of the fleet, Vice Admiral Oldekop, went aboard his flagship *Schleswig-Holstein* on February 8, for the first time since assuming his present duties, and visited the forces in Swinemuende and Kiel. The *Schleswig-Holstein* has been in Wilhelmshaven since February 17. The individual maneuvers of the line ships and cruisers had already begun. Of the torpedo-boat detachments, the Fourth Half Flotilla, with the vessels *Falke*, *Greif*, *Seeadler*, and *Moeve*, left Wilhelmshaven for Kiel on February 21. The First Half Flotilla is lying at the Deutsche Werft in Kiel, and the Third Torpedo Half Flotilla is at the Government dockyard in Wilhelmshaven. The mine-sweeping flotilla has been maneuvering since the beginning of February in the North Sea, basing at Emden.

The new German Navy Directory has recently appeared, showing the following figures: As is well known, the treaty of Versailles allows Germany a navy of 15,000 men and an officer corps of 1,000, which latter figure does not include the higher naval officials. The 1,000 officers are distributed over four corps, as follows: Naval officers, 660; engineer officers, 160; and medical officers and paymasters, each 90. There are at present only 600 naval officers, the remaining quota of 30 first lieutenants and 30 lieutenants not being complete for about three years. Among the naval officers there are 1 admiral as chief of the Navy Department, 3 vice admirals, 7 rear admirals; 148 staff officers, consisting of 34 captains, 25 commanders, and 84 lieutenant commanders, 164 lieutenants, 200 lieutenants (junior grade), and 77 ensigns. The naval officer replacement divided over two years consists of 115 ensigns and 134 midshipmen. The new navy directory shows a new division—the "League of Nations Group, Navy"—consisting of one rear admiral as chief and member of the Permanent Armament Commission of the league, another rear admiral for duties at home, and two staff officers as assistants. During the past year there were a great many changes in the officer corps, especially in the higher ranks; for instance, the commander in chief of the fleet, the commanders in chief of the North Sea and Baltic forces, the chief of the general Navy Department, and the inspectors of the training division and the torpedo division. Changes were also made in the two admirals at the head of the medical and the engineer corps.

The cruises of the school cruisers will be employed when possible for the purpose of nautical tests and observations as well as for the improvement of the admiralty charts. A special nautical program will be drawn up for each individual cruise. The following program for the cruiser *Berlin* is an illustration:

General.—The following program is based on the assumption that the cruise of the cruiser *Berlin* will take her in the proximity of the positions noted. If the commanding officer notes other discrepancies or uncertain positions on the direct course, it is recommended that same be cleared up and the rectifications reported to headquarters to insure the necessary corrections in the admiralty charts.

1. Strong tide rips are shown in chart 400 near the Formosa Banks between 118° and 119° E. and 23° N. Do these actually exist? The latest Japanese surveys no longer mention them.

2. It is highly desirable to re-test the so-called Emden Deep at about 9° 45′ N. and 126° 55′ E. Such an opportunity might be afforded on the outward journey from Cebu, which is about 200 miles from this point, or on the return journey en route from Manila to Menado.

The principal survey work of the navy during the year 1928 will be devoted to the Baltic Sea. The depth data on the German Baltic charts is taken from the Prussian Naval Atlas, dating from the sixties. A new survey was, therefore, highly desirable and has been planned for some time. For political reasons it is impossible to extend such survey to Aland Sea and the Bothnian Gulf, and the work will in general be restricted to German territorial waters and the zone immediately outside.

BRITISH EMPIRE

A. POLITICAL

1. *Anglo-African Relations.*

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

British African colonies are usually divided into three groups, known, respectively, as British West Africa, British East Africa, and the Union of South Africa, which is a British Dominion.

BRITISH WEST AFRICA.

West Africa is the vast western mass of Africa between the Sahara and the Gulf of Guinea. Most of it belongs to France, but four British colonies of varying size stand as enclaves in the French possessions. In order from west to east they are Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria. The British, like other Europeans, became interested originally in West Africa because there they could obtain slaves for the American plantations.

BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

British East Africa may be taken to include the Sudan and, in a lesser sense, Egypt. The Sudan has special problems of its own arising from its historical connection with Egypt, and its special character is very marked, but its future will undoubtedly be enormously affected by the course of developments which is pursued by its southern neighbors. Taken as a whole, British East Africa, including the mandated territory of Tanganyika, will undoubtedly play a most important part in British imperial effort during the twentieth century.

The peoples of East Africa differ widely. There are in Uganda natives with a singularly highly developed tribal life which has been incorporated, like the emirates of northern Nigeria, into the British scheme; and there are tribes alike in Kenya and in northern Rhodesia, which have not only lost any organization they may ever have had, but which plainly never had much to lose. Between these extremes exist millions of natives whose future apparently lies in the hands of the servants of the British Government. With the unexpected discovery in the last century of the pleasant highlands near the Equator where Europeans could live, the problem of the white settler was introduced. The task of government has grown of its own momentum and to-day it is highly complicated. The first stages, to establish order and security and to prevent the more abominable practices of savagery, were much simpler than those that have succeeded. It is a slow operation to rebuild shattered tribal authority or to replace it by new and just forms of government acceptable to the tribes, and many of the tribes of East Africa suffered shocks and changes in the Arab slave-raiding days, in the days of the first groping activities of European powers, and during the disorganization and fighting of the late war, which fatally weakened their corporate bonds. To build up a framework of social life for the African, and to combine this with education that will fit him to play a part in the New World of wider contacts and intercourse, is a task with many ramifications. In its different branches—health, education, administration—it will require more and more of the best men Britain can spare. In education, for example, it is clearly evident that the method of enforcing a western curriculum on non-European people only creates a class for whom there are no adequate positions, but it is easier to realize this than to find a golden mean between the exclusively utilitarian and the mistakenly literary training. The scientifice method in native administration, that of patient research, fitting the form of government to the present development and needs of the people, is one that requires the services of many workers. All these and cognate questions must be settled for a population that already numbers some ten million by men ultimately responsible to public opinion in Great Britain.

While the matters already mentioned are the main burden of British policy in East Africa, it is not less British business to encourage those Europeans who are developing the production of raw materials in the Tropics. It is not only that the industry by which Great Britain lives is itself sustained by a steady flow of raw materials, but that the growth of the African colonies means their growth in purchasing power.

An essential factor in all development in East Africa is, of course, the provision for better transport facilities. More railways, more roads, more bridges, more steamers, improved harbor works, are all required. In this connection the real problem is to be able to judge, by careful scrutiny on the part of all concerned, the relative importance and the right sequence of the many schemes put forward.

These are still early days in East Africa, and though the lines of the future are not quite clear as yet, it is abundantly evident that a great enterprise is afoot and that the unfolding story of the British in East Africa will come to take its rank in the forefront of the British imperial record.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

It was during the wars following the French Revolution that the British first gained a footing in South Africa. They took Cape Colony from the Dutch, who were allies of France.

Few people realize the significance of South Africa in the world. Not only has it been the scene of the long contention between Dutch and British for dominance, but it is bound to take a leading part in dealing with those color problems which seem likely to be the central theme of the international history of the twentieth century.

Politically the leaders of the Union of South Africa are of two minds about East Africa and other neighboring countries, but the two schools of political thought are in practical agreement about the value of East African trade and the advantages of East African friendship. While one school sees the political future in terms of the expansion of the Union northward into a gigantic United States of South and Central Africa, the other school is politically particularistic, and sees the future of the African Continent as a chessboard of separate, though friendly and cooperating, political entities.

The first school is led by General Smuts. His failure a few years ago to bring Southern Rhodesia into the Union has in no way dimmed the vision he still holds steadily before him of the growth of the Union. Whether the movement of growth should begin by the entry of the two Rhodesias into the Union, or whether there should first come into existence a confederation of all the southern and central African British colonies, to be followed subsequently by the coalescence of this confederation and the Union, together with South-West Africa and the various native territories, in either case General Smuts would apply to the African Continent, from the source of the Nile to Cape Point, his philosophy of a United States of Africa. And he would go further than that. The principle of the Monroe doctrine that the United States of America applies to the two American continents, General Smuts would have adopted by the Union in respect of the African Continent. When he was Prime Minister he gave practical expression to the principle of Union paramountcy on the African Continent on more than one occasion.

The other school of political thought, of which General Hertzog is the chief exponent, regards General Smuts's views as a new and dangerous form of imperialism. General Hertzog is content that Union expansion should stop with the eventual inclusion of South-West Africa, Bechuanaland, and Basutoland. Then, with the Union surrounded on three sides by the sea, he would adopt a policy of safe and comfortable political isolations vis-à-vis the rest of the continent. This school has no fears about the presence of foreign powers in the African Continent nor about the pressure that the huge native population of Africa will increasingly exercise on white civilization. If the Union is known to hold steadily to a policy of noninterference outside its borders, it is argued, no one from outside its borders will want to interfere with the Union. This Little Afrikanderism bases its policy on the belief that a stronger and finer national character can be developed in the Union by intensive concentration on domestic matters than by a process of geographical and political expansion which would try to bring together peoples and races too widely separated by conditions, climate, modes of life and thought, and distance. Little Afrikanderism aims at producing in the Union a strongly individual culture in which the Old Dutch elements will predominate. The Dutch are numerically supreme in the Union. In the United States of Africa they would rapidly become an inconsiderable minority; Dutch predominance would be lost; in its stead would rule an amorphous blend of types too disparate in character to be a nation.

Race relations have always been South Africa's primary problem. What it accomplishes or fails to accomplish in this direction can not fail to have far-reaching effects not only on the African territories to the north but on Asia as well, as recent troubles in India have proved. The native through contact with white civilization, missionary activity, the emancipating effect of having money to spend, and education is steadily being transformed from a barbarian into a competent industrial worker. An increasing minority of natives are being drawn away from the old life by the individualism and opportunity and excitement of western industrial civilization as it has been introduced by the white race in the Union. The best of the natives begin to compete with the white man for skilled work, the weaker degenerate into a low-class industrial proletariat. The white man, on the other hand, becomes more and more concerned for the future of his own children. There is no fresh land to be had for the taking. The white youth can not get unskilled employment, for the native does all the unskilled work at wages on which it is impossible for a white man to live. As time goes on increasing numbers of natives begin to trespass upon that field of skilled labor which the white man has regarded as his own preserve and to offer their services at greatly lower wages. That dread phenomen of all mixed communities, the poor white, begins to multiply.

How are the white people of South Africa to solve the problems which have thus arisen? How are they to stop the multiplication of poor whites and find employment for them at a living wage? How are they to check the drain of the native from the reserves into a vast industrial proletariat such as grew up in England after the industrial revolution, only more difficult to deal with because the moral restraints of tribal life are gone and little has been put in their place? How are they to find enough land to meet the increasing needs of the tribal natives and to sell or lease to the emancipated native who wishes to become an individual peasant rather than a wage earner or a mere unit in a primitive and conservative tribal community? What answer can they give to an educated native who demands a voice in the government of a land in which his position has been so completely transformed in a few short years? These are the questions which arise everywhere in the later stages of the contact between black and white in Africa, and it is because they have become so insistent in the Union of South Africa that the native question is rapidly coming to replace the old Anglo-Dutch question as the main topic of political discussion.

RACE RELATIONS.

Of all the imperial burdens which press upon Great Britain none is weightier, more delicate, and more complex than that presented by the relations of the white man and the native in Africa. It assumes different shapes on the West Coast, where the white population consists of a few administrators and traders who can not make their permanent home in the country; in South Africa, where a white population has settled and multiplied for centuries; and in East Africa, where the white population is still relatively small in numbers, and the lines of its future development are not yet fully determined. But it is essentially the same problem—the reconciliation of justice to the natives, with the development of the natural resources of the land, in the interest of a progressive civilization. For centuries after Europeans were trading with Africa and were settling on its soil they held and acted upon the view that the natives had no rights at all. The slave trade was the extreme application of this doctrine. The principle that the white rulers over African possessions are in the first place trustees for the natives has gradually succeeded to it in quite recent years. It has been formally described by the British Government in regard to the African possessions under the British Crown as constituting a responsibility which they can not renounce and which they can not share with other nations. But civilization has its rights as well as its duties. The principle of equal opportunity, or rather of fair opportunity, for both races, like many general principles, is easy to lay down but very difficult to apply. The interests of both races in the long run manifestly concur in many respects. No less manifestly do they differ, and even conflict in many others, if consideration is limited to the present or the near future. All British difficulties in Africa have the same root; they all spring from the difficulty of "accommodating opportunity for native development and for European enterprise."

The British are embarking on tremendously important experiments affecting the relations between black and white in their colonies and protectorates in Africa. These experiments will have far-reaching consequences not only in Africa, but on color-line problems all over the world. The issues at stake are so immense that prejudice and propaganda will make it difficult to see where wisdom and justice lie. But the Home Government seems to feel that the fundamentals are clear. The white man has colonized Africa and will remain there in increasing numbers. For all his mistakes and limitations he has brought development, civilization, and peace to a country which for thousands of years had been hardly scratched by the primitive tribes which inhabited it. But just because he has nine-tenths of the power, he has nine-tenths of the responsibility. He is the trustee for the people who live under his still almost unlimited control. The surest road to the elimination of the poor white would be the economic uplift of the native so that he can earn wages on which the white man can also live, and add to the market in which the products of industry can be sold. Beyond that it is not easy to see. Complete segregation of the two races, which is sometimes advocated, is manifestly impossible, for geography and economics forbid it. In the long run two clear conclusions stand out, one for Africa, the other for Great Britain. The first is that the native African is for good and all the fellow citizen of the white inhabitant, and that Africa can rise only if all its human inhabitants rise together. The white man in Africa has always to remember the truth long vindicated by experience, "The civilized community in contact with a barbarian community either raises the latter to the civilized level or sinks." There seems to be a growing public opinion in Great Britain that it is a mistake for the British in the homeland to be "pro" or "anti" either side, that taking sides in Great Britain only inflames prejudice and silences reason in Africa. The British are now apparently inclined to hold steadfastly to the larger view that black and white must live together in Africa, and that that policy is right which secures justice and opportunity and freedom, not for one race or the other, but for both.

2. *Australian Immigration Policy.*

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

Several recent reports from different Australian States indicate that the kindred questions of unemployment and immigration are likely to become causes of considerable political agitation during the coming years. On March 28 former Prime Minister Hughes, addressing the Nationalist Party conference, protested against the immigration to Australia of large numbers of Italians. On May 7, replying to a delegation urging the relief of unemployment, Mr. Hogan, the premier of the State of Victoria, announced that he had taken steps to arrange a conference of State premiers to discuss unemployment and immigration. He said that at the conference he would urge the discontinuance of immigration in view of the economic situation in Victoria and other States.

Like other countries bordering the Pacific and inhabited by the white race, Australia, in the economic and racial interests of her population, has for many years maintained the policy of restricting—indeed, of suppressing—the immigration of colored laborers and artisans. Applied to an area approximately equal to that of the United States (2,974,581 square miles), by a population of a little over 6,000,000, this restrictive policy calls for an explanation in view of the growing international importance of migration problems.

Criticism of the extension of a policy of exclusion over an area unreasonably large loses most of its force in the light of well-established facts. Vast as the area of Australia is, both her "open spaces" and her "limitless possibilities" shrink greatly when it is realized that of this area not less than 1,000,000 square miles, or 34 per cent, is in the geographer's sense "desert," i. e., "good pastoral lands but useless for agriculture," while the area, fairly suitable, in point of climate, for agriculture is 24 per cent, 716,000 square miles, of which about one-quarter is too rugged for close settlement. The area actually under agriculture, however, is only about 26,000 square miles.

Distinguished geographers have pointed out that relatively to area available for human settlement the present Australian population of just over 6,000,000 does not fall unreasonably short of the maximum which is estimated to be possible without lowering the present standard of living. It is estimated that the Australian maximum is not likely ever to go much beyond 20,000,000 "unless some new and unexpected discoveries are made or the standards of living are materially lowered."

Nevertheless the paucity of population in Australian regions which may be capable of development has a bearing on the future problems of the Pacific. The contrast between the great countries of Asia, on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand on the other, is shown by the following table:

	Density of population per square mile
British India	226
China and dependencies	200
Japan	323
Australia	1.9
New Zealand	12

As to whether or not Asia, awakened and self-consciously powerful, will insist in time on the admission of its nationals to Australian undeveloped lands, it is unnecessary to debate, nor need there be inquired into the equity of Asiatic exclusion from territory which can not be occupied by the white people to any extent for many decades. The one fact which is of supreme importance is that, rightly or wrongly, Australia considers the danger both real and imminent, and to protect herself against Asiatic contact has been prepared, if necessary, to make many sacrifices.

The Government of the Commonwealth, by railroad building, by new land laws, by the exclusion of Asiatics, and, above all, by a system of national defense, is seeking to build up and to strengthen Australian unity.

Imperial complications led in 1897 to the adoption of the "language" test for the exclusion of undesirable immigrants. This was carried out at the suggestion of the imperial authorities. With British India as well as Japan complications had threatened to attend the endeavor of three of the Australian colonies in 1890 to apply to all Asiatics the provisions of Chinese exclusion acts already in force. These complications were avoided by the intervention of

Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, as British Secretary of State for the Colonies, at the colonial conference in London in 1891. He expressed the sympathy of the British Government "with the determination of the white inhabitants of these colonies, who are in comparatively close proximity to millions and hundreds of millions of Asiatics, that there shall not be an influx of people, alien in civilization, alien in religion, in customs—whose influx, moreover, would most seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labor population."

But he invited the colonial premiers to consider whether they could not achieve their purpose by a method less objectionable than the exclusion of immigrants on the ground of color or race. In order to spare the susceptibilities of the 300,000,000 Indian subjects of the Crown, as well as of foreign Asiatics, he urged the premiers to adopt an act which in addition to prohibiting certain specified classes of immigrants (paupers, idiots, diseased persons, and criminals) declared generally that any person who, when asked to do so, failed to write out and sign in a European language an application for admission, on a prescribed form set out in a schedule of the act, was to be deemed a prohibited immigrant.

After the federation of the Australian colonies in 1900 the method of exclusion to be adopted came before the first Federal Parliament, which had approved by a large majority the general principle of Asiatic exclusion. The British Government having renewed its representations, the Parliament, after much controversy, adopted the language test, but in order to avoid the risk of evasion of the test, as, through the production of a forged application, the language test was couched in the form of a dictation test. The Federal immigration restriction act, 1901, accordingly, prohibits the entry into Australia of (inter alios) any person who, when asked to do so, fails to write out on dictation and in the presence of an officer a passage of 50 words in length in a European language.

In view of representation by the Japanese Government that an educational test in any European language was in effect discriminatory against Japanese who were thus placed in a position of inferiority, the act was amended in 1905 to read:

> Any person who fails to pass the dictation test, that is to say, who, when an officer or person duly authorized in writing by an officer, dictates to him not less than fifty words in any prescribed language, fails to write them out in that language in the presence of that officer or authorized person.

No regulation prescribing any language or languages were issued under the amending act and the provisions of the original act remained de facto in force. The reason for nonuse of the new powers appears to have been that the objection of the Japanese Government had been met by an informal arrangement made with the Australian Government in 1904, whereby bona fide students, merchants (engaged in oversea trade), and visitors from Japan were permitted to enter the Commonwealth for a period of 12 months without liability to the dictation test on passports issued by the Japanese authorities and visaed by the British consul at the port of embarkation. Since April, 1919, the permit may be extended beyond 12 months on application for a certificate of exemption. A similar arrangement was made in the same year with the Indian Government permitting Indians of the specified classes to enter and remain indefinitely as long as they retained their original status. Special arrangements made in 1912 and modified in 1920 regulate in the same manner the admission and sojourn of Chinese students, merchants, and tourists. Similar arrangements, moreover, apply to individuals of the specified classes from the British possessions of Ceylon, Burma, Hong Kong, and Straits Settlements, as well as from Annam, Egypt, the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands. Their importance lies, of course, in the fact that though terminable without notice, these arrangements signify the acquiescence, during their continuance, of the foreign governments concerned in the application of the dictation test, to all persons not falling within any of the exempted classes. It may be mentioned here that in the year ending December 31, 1926, the number of persons excluded from Australia under the dictation test was only 34. This number comprised 4 British subjects, 22 Chinese, 7 Papuans, and 1 Hawaiian. The inference is that the test operates as a "stand-off signal" and that occasion for its use is infrequent.

In 1925 an important innovation in the Commonwealth's traditional policy of refraining from specifically excluding individuals of a named race or nationality was unobtrusively made in the immigration (amendment) act 1925. In view of the considerable increase in the number of immigrants from countries in southeastern Europe, which had immediately followed the entry into force of the United States immigration act of July 1, 1924, demand for increased restriction was made in the Australian press and Parliament. The Government was urged to adopt on the United States model a quota system, designed to prevent what was described as the "influx" of undesirables. The Government rejected these proposals on the double ground of the expense involved in establishing an immigration service for the Commonwealth in Europe and of the impolicy of giving possible ground of offense to foreign States. Nevertheless, Parliament in fact adopted three statutory grounds of exclusion, and the amending act of 1925 adds the following provisions to the immigration act 1901–1924:

(1) The Governor General may by proclamation prohibit, either wholly or in excess of specified numerical limits and either permanently or in a specified

period, the immigration into the Commonwealth or the landing at any specified port or place in the Commonwealth of aliens of any specified nationality, race, class, or occupation in any case where he deems it desirable to do so—

(a) On account of the economic, industrial, or other conditions existing in the Commonwealth;

(b) Because the persons specified in the proclamation are, in his opinion, unsuitable for admission in the Commonwealth; or

(c) Because they are deemed unlikely to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Australian citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry.

(2) Any person who enters the Commonwealth in contravention of the prohibition contained.

The powers conferred by this act have not so far been exercised. The three statutory grounds are, of course, additional to the already existing grounds of exclusion, from which they differ in not relating to the personal characteristics or attainments of the individual immigrant. Ground (a) is unobjectionable, relating as it does to the internal conditions of Australia. Grounds (b) and (c), however, may well cause international unpleasantness if cited in their statutory baldness as justifying the exclusion of persons of a specified nationality or race.

Meanwhile, and independently of these statutory powers, the Australian Government, in order to prevent an undue influx of immigrants excluded from the United States by operation of United States immigration act of July 1, 1924, effected, through the British diplomatic agents, arrangements with the Governments of Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and other countries in southeastern Europe for limiting the number of passports to be issued in such countries with visa entitling the holders to travel in Australia. By regulation of December, 1924, the immigration of British subjects who are Maltese is limited to 20 per month for each of the six Australian States, or 1,440 per annum; and of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Albanians to 100 per month for each nationality. The arrangement with the Italian Government is that the latter undertakes not to issue passports with visa for travel to Australia except to migrants who can show that they possess at least £40 or its equivalent, or that some resident in Australia will be responsible for them on arrival. By these means a sensible diminution in alien European immigration to Australia has been effected.

While the reasons advanced for Australian immigration restriction have been varied in form from time to time, there has been no change in the fundamental political reason. Apart from all questions of relative merits of competing civilizations, which are no longer stressed, the political difficulty for a white democracy of accommodating an alien race within its body without damage to democratic institutions has never been absent from Australian political thinking. To Asiatic immigration Australian sentiment may be taken to be irrevocably opposed. And even as regards immigration from Europe, at this early stage of Australian development popular opinion in the Commonwealth undoubtedly favors a policy of selective immigration on the racial theory underlying the United States immigration act of 1924. Popular preference for " Nordics " is very strong in Australia.

B. NAVAL

1. *The Indian Navy.*

Rear Admiral Humphrey T. Walwyn, C. B., D. S. O., has been appointed flag officer commanding and director of the Royal Indian Marine, to date October 5; he will assume command about November 16.

This is the first appointment of the kind since the decision to reconstruct the Royal Indian Marine as a combatant force to enable India to enter upon the first stage of her naval development, with a view ultimately to undertaking her own naval defense. The new organization provides for the command of the force being vested in a flag officer appointed from the Royal Navy for a period of three years, with headquarters at Bombay. Eventually it is hoped that the commanding appointment will be held by an officer of the Royal Indian Navy, as the new force, subject to his Majesty's approval, is to be called. A novel feature in connection with the personnel is that Indians are to be eligible for commissions. In its first stage of development the fleet will include 4 sloops, 2 patrol vessels, 4 trawlers, 2 surveying vessels, and a depot ship. The inauguration of the Indian Navy will be intrusted to the personnel of the existing service, subject to any necessary readjustment of cadres.

Rear Admiral Walwyn is known both as a talented officer and a capable organizer. He first went to sea in H. M. S. *Camperdown* in 1895. In qualifying in gunnery in 1904 he was awarded the Egerton prize for proficiency in that subject, and as gunnery lieutenant of the *Drake*, *Superb*, and *Neptune* he brought the marksmanship of those vessels to a high standard. At Jutland he was commander of the *Warspite*, where he was warmly commended by Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas and was appointed D. S. C. for his services. He was promoted to captain in December, 1916, and after a period at the Admiralty became S. N. O. of the northern patrol in August, 1918. In 1920–1923 he commanded destroyer flotillas in the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets; in 1924–1926 he was director of the gunnery division of the naval staff, and from May, 1926, he commanded H. M. S. *Valiant* in the Mediterranean. He was promoted to flag rank in February at the age of 49, and in the recent birthday honors he was appointed C. B. His experience has included both staff and training appointments and practical command of various types of war vessels.

GREECE

A. NAVAL

1. Submarine for Greek Government Launched at Blainville, Calvados, France.

A submarine known as the *Klafkos*, built by the Chantiers Navals Francais for the Greek Government, was launched on May 19, 1928, at the shipbuilding yard of the constructing company at Blainville, Department of Calvados, France.

This submarine was built from plans of the French naval engineer, Simonot, and has a displacement of 730 tons on the surface and 930 tons submerged. The vessel is 225 feet in length, 17 feet in breadth, and has a draft of 12.5 feet.

The motive power for surface cruising is supplied by Sulzer-Loire motors of 1,420 total horsepower, which give a speed of 14 knots. The motive power when submerged is supplied by electric motors of 1,100 horsepower, which give a speed under water of 9.5 knots.

The armament consists of a cannon of 3.9″, one of 1.5″, and eight torpedo tubes of 21″. The crew numbers 41, including officers and men.

ITALY

A. NAVAL

1. Operations and Activities of the Italian Naval Forces During the Year 1927.

The following is a résumé of the operations and activities of the Italian naval forces prepared in the ministry for use of the minister in presenting the budget before Parliament:

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NAVAL FORCES.

The activity of the fleet, even during the winter while especially busy with its routine work and instructing recruits (in a reduced measure), has been mostly taken up with the transferring of the new units ready for active service, whether they were units assigned to the schools or those on which the training was actually carried out.

The period of fleet organic activity commenced March 1.

The armata presents a notable increase over the preceding year by the addition of the Fourth Flotilla made up of eight destroyers of the *Ricasoli* and *Sauro* classes, which have recently entered the service. In consequence it has been necessary to make up a second division of torpedo craft, assigning two flotillas to each division.

Besides, each division has been assigned to a squadron so as to make it possible—even in the preparatory period, and when the squadrons are stationed in separate localities—for a more complete development of tactical maneuvers with the simultaneous participation of all of the classes of the fleet.

The submarine division has been placed under the direct orders of the commander in chief of the armata and will be a part of the first squadron.

For the first time since the war, in 1927, we have had an advantage in the organization of the ships by holding over the crews for a month after the new recruits are put aboard. These last are embarked after having finished their preliminary schooling ashore, and are therefore in condition to begin the professional marine instruction aboard.

The period of activity has been lengthened by the suppression of their after-maneuvers holiday, increasing instead their Christmas holidays.

TRAINING OF THE ISOLATED UNITS AND THE DIVISIONS.

During the first period of the maneuvers the First Squadron was based in the Upper Tyrrhenian and the Second in the Ionian-Lower Adriatic district. In consideration of the special political conditions then existing at the end of March the First Division of torpedo craft was completed by the transfer from Spezia to Taranto of the First Flotilla and was placed under the command of the Second Squadron, the Second Division of torpedo craft remaining in the north under the First Squadron.

The progressive training carried out under considerable difficulties, due to the numerous missions to be made, allowed almost all of the units to begin normal target practice May 1 after having completed the "reduced" target-practice course.

June 9 the armada assembled at Gaeta and the two torpedo divisions returned to their respective squadrons.

During the permanence of the armada at Gaeta visits to the ships were made by students and officers of the armed forces at the capital. These latter assisted at target practice with the big guns on board one of the capital ships June 18.

ASSEMBLING OF THE ARMADA—STRATEGIC MANEUVERS JUNE 10 TO JULY 5.

The armada was completed by the addition of the destroyers of the Eighth Squadriglia completed about that time, and by several units which were held up on account of small repairs.

The repair ship *Quarnaro* also joined the armada.

The naval judges embarked and the armada left Gaeta June 22, 1927, to take up position previously assigned for the grand maneuvers. Hostilities began at 0.00 of the 27th and ended at 14.00 June

29. The theme, the proceedings and limitations of execution, the forces engaged, ships, underwater and aircraft, the values of the tactical movements, and finally the relations on the development of the maneuvers, were all written up in a special publication.

Four capital ships, 12 scouts, 34 destroyers, 23 submarines, 2 airships, and 68 planes took part.

CRUISES BY SQUADRONS, JULY 5 TO AUGUST 20, 1927.

Returning to Gaeta, general practice maneuvers were resumed, as well as target practice and torpedo practice for the isolated units.

On July 8 the armada anchored at Ostia for the annual visit to Rome. The school-ship division of the Naval Academy also joined the armada there. On account of bad weather, however, the ships returned to Gaeta and came back to Ostia, where they remained from July 15 to 18. July 16 the armada passed in review by the Prime Minister, on board the *Giuliana;* then raised anchor for Livorno, where it remained until 21st; afterwards for Spezia for repairs and scraping the smaller units.

July 30 to August 20, brief cruises. During this time the ships singly and in groups were busy with war and tactical maneuvers and visits to ports.

For the first time the ships were drilled in night firing and torpedo practice, using illuminated projectiles and comet shells.

For the first time we used observation planes at target practice with good results. We have also begun antiaircraft target practice using "maniche" (sleeves) drawn by planes in flight.

Communication service with planes were tried but the results were neither definite nor satisfying.

Destroyer craft were given considerable exercise in exploration work; day and night attacking by sections, squadriglia, and flotilla; towing; fleet evolutions; with aircraft and submarines using smoke screens to advantage. The destroyers were equipped with radiotelephones, which were used with success. The various commands practiced day and night maneuvers and tactics arranged as nearly as possible to actual war conditions.

The units assigned to Tripoli, besides their routine missions, employed considerable time in tactical maneuvers and cruises.

One of the missions of the fleet during its cruising period was to make propaganda demonstrations for the benefit of the Italians who spend their vacations at seaside resorts. It may be safely asserted, in view of the hearty welcome and interest shown by the citizens, that we accomplished our ends and increased the popularity of our navy with the Italian people.

The submarines showed up with great success, and even after the maneuvers and upon returning to port continued experiments with radio and underwater signaling. Great attention has been given to radio communication so that this service will not fail us in war time, even with land stations with their intense traffic, keeping in mind the necessity of secrecy and enemy radio interference.

Special systems and experiments in radio were tried out, and, considering the undeniable advantage of the short wave in naval radio, we have adopted those instruments in a large measure afloat as well as ashore.

During the year the navy has consumed 24 per cent more coal and 10 per cent more gasoline than last year. In target practice 30 per cent more shots were fired than during the preceding year.

SCHOOL FOR NAVAL COMMAND.

This school was opened in September, 1926, to instruct commanders in the use of torpedo craft. This year three sessions were held. The first from February 1 to May 8; the second from May 26 to August 6; the third session of the first course in command attended by 18 commanders. From August 15 to November 27 the first session of the second course was given to 16 lieutenant commanders.

Besides the two flotilla leaders, there were at first 12, and later 20, torpedo boats, class " P. N.," assigned to this service.

INSTRUCTION FOR PERSONNEL.

Many technical professional courses were instituted afloat amongst the officer personnel of the equipage, thus representing a further step on the advancement of the direct organization and preparation of each unit.

PHYSICAL EDUCATION.

This has been the object of constant care and attention. The increase in the number of instructors has been sufficient to assign one to almost every unit, thus enabling us to carry forward our program. The daily work of the crews comprise physical as well as marine exercises. Our football squads have made good headway with the shore squads as well as those of other nations. The games which took place at the end of the maneuvers demonstrated that we are making headway in this most useful form of education. Prizes were distributed to the winners.

SUBMARINES.

Submarine activity has been carried on uninterruptedly during the entire year. The equipage is composed almost entirely of volunteers signed up for long periods, while the regular draft men are used only as ordinary sailors; one gunner for each submarine, and a few firemen.

As the submarine division this year was joined up with the fleet there was more maneuvering and warlike activity. In midwinter (January) submarine attacks were made against the *Quarto* group of scouts. In March maneuvers were carried out with airplanes. The general program was spotting by airplanes and transmitting information to the submarines on probable enemy locations and routes.

These exercises were not very satisfactory owing to the failure of the radiotelegraph instruments on aircrafts.

Considerable development has been made in the hydrophone services in the use of noise detectors and receivers under water.

AERONAUTIC AUXILIARY.

As has already been said, every occasion was taken to work in conjunction with aircraft, airplanes, and dirigibles. Strategic and tactical scouting, firing observation, spotting, convoy protection, and torpedo firing occupied most of the joint maneuvering.

The flying of aerial targets tied to aircraft has given our gunners the most up-to-date and realistic target practice.

MARITIME DEPARTMENTS AND FORTRESSES.

The naval units assigned to these have carried out their periodical exercises which consist mostly in hydrophone vigilance, mine laying, and sweeping, in conjunction with submarines and aircraft.

UNITS ABROAD.

Red Sea.—Flagship *Legnano* with the *Archimede* under the orders of the Governor of Eritrea and have carried out special military-political missions along the coast of the Eritrea and the Yemen.

Indian Ocean.—Flagship *Lussin*, the *Arimondi*, and *Porto Corsini* under the Governor of Somaliland protected the coast guards and radio communications as well as supply depots along the coast which extends for more than 1,000 miles, inhospital, dangerous for navigation. These ships were praised repeatedly by the Governor General for the excellent way in which they carried out their missions.

Libia.—The units located here under the Governors of Tripolitania and Cirenaica, amongst which a destroyer detached from the fleet and stationed at Tripoli, guarded supplies and communications and prevented contraband.

Egeo.—The units made several cruises and missions to the many islands, taking advantage of every opportunity for tactical and strategic exercises.

Extreme Orient.—Flagship *Libia*, the *Caboto*, and *Carlotto* in the beginning of the year were at Shanghai and joined with the other foreign units there for the protection of the concession during the war between the North and the South. The gunboat *Carlotto* protected our nationals at Hankow as well as the missions, and took care of the oversea and river traffic patrol as well as preventing contraband.

During the occupation of Shanghai (March 23) by the southerners the landing parties from the *Libia*, reinforced by personnel from the *Caboto*, and, later, the *Muggia*, were amongst the first, side by side with the English troops under General Duncan, to take up the defense of the inside limits of the concessions. During the calm our units went to sea for maneuvers and target practice.

NAVAL BATTALION AT TIENTSIN.

A battalion of the *San Marco* regiment occupied our concessions at Tientsin and, in turn, the companies were sent to Shanghai-Kuan for exercise. Our squads also took part in the international tournaments there.

B. AERONAUTICAL

1. Air Cruise in the Western Mediterranean.

On the 26th day of May, 60 seaplanes under the command of General de Pinedo left Orbetello for a cruise of the Mediterranean. These 60 seaplanes formed an aerial brigade made up of five squadrons. The machines were of the *S–59* and *S–55* types. The cruise lasted eight days and everything went off according to schedule, no untoward incident occurring.

Great technical importance is attached to this cruise if one takes into consideration the various elements necessary:

(*a*) Efficiency of aircraft employed—machines and engines.

(*b*) Technical efficiency of the navigating personnel—pilots and motorists.

(*c*) Supplies, meteorological service, landing places, etc.

What was particularly remarkable in this flight was the efficiency of the seaplanes and engines and the skill with which the pilots conducted the flight. Out of 60 machines only 1 was forced to land on account of engine trouble, but was able to resume flight after one hour floating in the open sea, during which time the mechanic made the necessary repairs.

Forty-five of the machines were of the *S–59* type equipped with ASSO 500 horsepower engines, and six of the *S–55* type equipped also with the same engine. This particular type of engine has thereby won for itself a prominent position.

The skill of the pilots was particularly demonstrated at the landing at Los Alcazares (Spain), where the weather conditions were very unfavorable with a strong wind and rough sea. No accident occurred, however, thanks to the perfect discipline of the crews. The following is a schedule of the flight:

Date	Lap	Minutes flown
May 26	Orbetello-Cagliari	200
27	Cagliari-Pollenza (Balearic Islands)	220
28	Pollenza-Los Alcazares (Spain)	165
31	Los Alcazares-Porto Alfaques	145
June 1	Porto Alfaques-Berre (France)	200
2	Berre-Orbetello	200
	Total	1,130

On June 3, in the morning, Premier Mussolini flying an *S. 55* seaplane went from Rome to Orbetello to congratulate the crews who took part in this flight.

The object of the air cruise was to demonstrate the efficiency of the machines and motors built in Italy and give individual pilots and commanders of flotillas the opportunity of practice on a large scale. A staff commander of the admiralty accompanied the air fleet part of the way.

According to information received the original itinerary included several ports on the French North African coast. These were omitted, however, when it became apparent that the French authorities viewed with apprehension the presence there of an Italian squadron that could be used as the occasion for pro-Italian demonstrations, especially in Tunis.

C. NAVAL

1. *Italian Building Program Announced.*

The Undersecretary of the Navy announced the following new building program for the year 1928–29:

> As already announced in the House, the new program, which should be considered as completing former programs, comprises two cruisers of 10,000 tons, whose plans have been studied in every particular and the contracts will be given out to private firms in the near future; four destroyers of the *Nembo* class; four submarines similar to those already in construction; two submarines of smaller dimensions.

Then, repeating his statement in the House and adding thereto the two submarines of smaller dimensions stated above and which were not mentioned before, we have the following official statement of the present building program which began in 1926–27 and will make demands on the budget up to and including the budget of 1931–32:

> The building program announced in 1926 and 1927 is proceeding as arranged. Thanks to sums that we have been able to save, together with additional demands made on the Ministry up to and including the 1931 and 1932 budgets, we shall be able to include in the present budget two cruisers of 10,000 tons, four destroyers of the *Nembo* class, four submarines of medium

cruising radius, and two submarines of smaller dimensions. At the end of 1931 when the present program and the construction now announced is ready, the modern arm of our naval force will be made up of—

4 cruisers of 10,000 tons.
4 scouts of 5,000 tons.
12 flotilla leaders of 2,000 tons.
20 destroyers, from 1,200 to 1,400 tons.
27 submarines: 5 of 1,400 tons and 20 of 800 to 850 tons; also 2 of smaller dimensions.

D. POLITICAL

1. Fascistification of the Army.

The secretary general of the Fascist Party, Turati, delivered an address recently before the officers of the military schools of Modena and Parma. Reiterating the concept that " no force, no expression of the national life " can exist outside the state, he spoke of the Fascist method of education which, through the agency of the schools and the Balilla and Avanguardisti organizations, was gradually forging the soul of the people in preparation for the supreme requirements of the Fatherland. Little by little, through patient and constructive labor, a new consciousness is asserting itself throughout the peninsula, and the Italian people are being regenerated by the wave of lofty and healthy ideals inspired by the genius of a single man. " Each one of you," shouted Turati to the officers, " should feel in the bottom of his heart that the great moment will come when the splendid and magnificent army—the army brimming over with hope—will resume its march for the glory of the King, for the victory of the Duce, and for the grandeur of Italy." Turati, furthermore, emphasized, particularly the idea that in the new Italy the army and the people are included in one and the same system of national discipline.

According to reliable information, the Fascist authorities are planning similar addresses in other military centers in order to impress upon the army that it can not escape in any way the spirit of the Fascist revolution. Deputy Amioucci, in the Gazzetta Del Popolo, makes the following statement on this effort to bring about a closer understanding between the people and the army:

> Now that Fascism has become the state, that the revolution has become the régime, and that the opposition has disappeared, political struggles in their former sense no longer exist. Only one battle remains to be fought—that of the grandeur of the Fatherland and of the prosperity of the Italian people. To this end the army has a spiritual mission in the Fascist society, that of educating the people to be ready for any emergency. But the army will never be able to accomplish this duty effectively unless it actually lives the life of the nation, unless it feels deeply the spirit of the new times, and unless

it understands Fascism in all its aspects, in all its realizations, and in all its purposes. By bringing the voice of Fascism to the ears of the young army officers the party has magnificently crowned its vast and profound work of penetration in and fascistification of all the sections of the national life.

JAPAN

AERONAUTICAL

1. *Summary of Japanese Naval Aviation.*

ORGANIZATION.

- A. Minister of Marine.
  - (*a*) Naval Aviation Department (chief).
    - I. General division (director).
      - (1) General aviation matters.
      - (2) Shore stations.
      - (3) Fleet aviation.
    - II. Training division (director).
      - (1) Education and training of aviation personnel.
      - (2) Education and training of ordnance personnel detailed to aviation.
    - III. Technical division (director).
      - (1) Design, inspection, and repair of aircraft and aircraft armaments, ashore and float.
      - (2) Design and inspection of equipment for aircraft factories and aircraft armament factories in naval establishments.

The department chief is a vice admiral and the division directors are rear admirals. Such officers and civilians of lower rank as are needed to carry on the work of the divisions are provided.

Each shore station is under the direct supervision of the commander in chief of the district which includes the nearest large naval station.

Officers.—Japanese officers are efficient, well educated (many speak English), friendly, courteous, interested in their profession, quiet and considerate, and, generally speaking, are good pilots, much better than is supposed. They are overconfident and courageous to a fault. In time of war they would gladly attempt the impossible, with probable disastrous results to their opponents.

Enlisted men.—The enlisted men are healthy, intelligent-looking men, always respectful, sober, industrious, clean, and keep the equipment in good condition. They are quite inferior to officers as pilots.

Pilots.—There are many pilots in Japan now with 1,000 hours or more to their credit. Pilots are getting more experience in bombing, gunnery, and formation work and are becoming more proficient and skillful all the time. Their ability is generally underrated by people who do not actually see them in action. The number of pilots is greatly in excess of the number of planes in commission.

General.—The supply of personnel for aviation is more than adequate and the efficiency of the navy is not reduced by the personnel demands of aviation.

SQUADRONS

The standard strength of a squadron is 16 planes in commission, with 8 more in reserve, except training squadrons, which have 24 planes in commission.

The total number of squadrons at the different aviation stations is 14½ squadrons and 5 squadrons at sea, or a total of 19½ squadrons, with an additional 10 or 12 supernumerary planes on various ships, including the *Notoro*, which can not be identified with any squadron organization. Deducting the 6 training squadrons at Kasumigaura, there are 13½ service squadrons. The supplementary budget recently passed by the Diet provides for the addition of one more service squadron during the current fiscal year. This is in line with the navy plan to have 17 squadrons by April 1, 1930.

SHORE STATIONS

Station	Purpose	Number of squadrons	Number of planes
Kasumigaura	Flight training—training	6	114
Oppama	Pursuit	1	
	Torpedo	1	
	Reconnaissance	1	
	Patrol	1	60
Omura	Torpedo	1	
	Pursuit	1	29
Sasebo	Reconnaissance	1	
	Patrol	1	22
Hiro	Reconnaissance	½	9

Shore stations, in general, are excellent, grounds clean, planes in good condition, buildings clean and free from excess material. Most major buildings are of permanent construction and the stations are well planned. Squadrons are practically up to strength of 16 planes. Shops are adequate. Shore aviation is in excellent condition.

NEW STATIONS

Hachijojima.—An emergency landing field has been prepared on the island of Hachijojima, about 140 miles south of Tokyo Bay. It was stated that there are no hangars nor other facilities there.

Takamatsu.—An emergency landing field has been prepared at Takamatsu, near Kasumigaura. There are no facilities there.

Tateyama.—The newspapers have carried various articles about the establishment of a naval air station at Tateyama, on the opposite side of Tokyo Bay from Yokosuka. Nothing definite has been done, but it is believed that two squadrons will be located here by 1930.

FLEET AVIATION

Fleet aviation is under the command of Rear Admiral S. Takahashi, who corresponds to a commander aircraft squadrons. At present the *Akagi*, *Hosho*, *Notoro*, with the destroyers *Kusunoki* and *Ume*, are operating together as a squadron under this rear admiral.

The following planes are at sea:

Ship	Type	Squadrons		Planes
Akagi	Airplane carrier	Fighting	2	32 (land).
		Reconnaissance	1	16 (land).
		Torpedo	1	16 (land).
Hosho	do	Fighting	1	6 (land).
		Reconnaissance		4 (land).
		Torpedo		4 (land).
Notoro	Tender	Reconnaissance		6 (sea).
Wakamiya	Tender (in reserve)			0.
Mutsu	Battleship			1 (sea).
Hiyei	Battle cruiser			1 (sea).
Nagato	Battleship			1 (sea).
Kako	Cruiser			1 (sea).
Furutaka	do			1 (sea).

Planes are flown off the *Akagi* and *Hosho* and land into an arresting gear of fore and aft and athwartships wire cables; the shock is taken up by air pistons.

Seaplanes carried on the *Notoro*, *Wakamiya*, the battleships and cruisers are lowered over the side. The launching device on the *Furutaka* has not been a success.

Other capital ships and all the 7,100 and 10,000 ton cruisers will be equipped with two seaplanes in the near future.

Fleet aviation is hampered by the lack of a catapult. It has been heard that the Kure Navy Yard is working on a catapult which will be ready for trial some time this summer. It is believed that all ships of 7,000 tons and above will be equipped with catapults as soon as a successful one is developed.

A small biplane seaplane has been manufactured at Yokosuka for submarines. It is planned to equip all future submarines of the *I–58* type with one of these planes.

Fleet aviation is in its infancy and is far inferior to America in numbers and quality.

AIRCRAFT

TOTAL NUMBER IN COMMISSION AND IN RESERVE

The following list shows the total number of planes in commission and the estimated number in reserve (May 1, 1928):

	Commission	Reserve (estimated)	Total
Service planes:			
Mitsubishi No. 1	78	35	113
Mitsubishi No. 2	39	20	59
Mitsubishi No. 4	51	25	76
Type 14	64	40	104
F–5	14	8	22
Total, service planes	246	128	374
Training planes:			
Type 15	9	12	21
Avro	30	[1] 75	105
1925 Navy	30	[1] 40	70
Hansa	18		18
Total, training planes	87	127	214
Total, training and service planes	333	255	588
Aircraft manufactured past 12 months (estimated)			200
Aircraft retired past 12 months (estimated)			140
Net gain			60

[1] Sighted.

From the information obtained on visits last year an allowance of 66 planes on the *Akagi* and 209 in storage was made, which, added to the planes sighted in commission and reserve, gave a total of 664 planes. From more accurate information obtained on the second visit by the same observer a year later it is believed that the allowance of planes in storage was about 140 too high and that a more accurate figure for total planes last year should have been about 520.

It is reasonably certain that most of the output of the past year has been used in equipping airplane carrier squadrons, bringing shore squadrons up to strength, and equipping reconnaissance squadrons with type 14 planes. All the *Hansa's* have been retired except a few at Kasumigaura and are not in sight anywhere; they have probably been sold to civilian companies. This retirement of *Hansa's* accounts for the small net gain in aircraft for the year. Furthermore, there is not much manufacturing of service types in progress at present, except the type 14, and it is not believed that any attempt is being made to store large quantities of Mitsubishi and *F–5* planes, as it is realized that they are obsolete types, and only enough are kept in reserve to keep squadrons up to strength by replacing crashes and worn-out planes.

Experimental.—(1) An all-metal boat is under construction at Kawasaki. This plane is said to have the following characteristics: Span, 30 meters; length, 20 meters; weight, 20 tons; endurance, 30 hours; engines, two B. M. W., 800 horsepower each.

This plane was designed by Lieut. Y. Hashiguchi, I. J. N., and is said to be original. It undoubtedly is a copy of the best features of the *Dornier Wahl* and the *Rohrbach.*

The cost of this plane, which is 400,000 yen, is being paid by the Coast Defense Society and the plane will be presented to the navy.

General.—The navy has been struggling hard for several years to find a suitable scouting plane to replace the *F-5's*, but all their large boats have been unsuccessful.

All of the planes are well made by Japanese workmen from good materials. The woodwork is excellent and the fabric and doping are fair. Generally, the planes are excellent as far as construction is concerned. However, with the exception of the type 14 and type 15 the planes are obsolete types and are several years behind similar types in other countries.

The engines, except Rolls Royce, are manufactured in Japan complete, except carburetors and magnetos. The workmanship and the material is good and the engines give good service.

The Claudel carburetor and Scintilla magneto are used on nearly all the above engines. Both are imported.

The Jupiter VI engine is being manufactured, but has not been tried in any navy planes.

The B. M. W. 600 horsepower engine is becoming popular with the army and is manufactured by Kawasaki. It is not in use in the navy.

Indications are that the young designers are getting interested in the design of engines and several attempts are in progress to design new composite engines, copied after two or three foreign models.

Superchargers are not in use, but the Nakajima Co. has purchased a supercharged Jupiter VII.

The engine supply is adequate for the planes on hand.

Manufacturing facilities.—Generally the factories are producing for the Navy about 25 per cent of their normal capacity with present staffs.

All of them have well-trained corps of workmen, much larger than needed to produce the planes and engines turned out. These factories can all be enlarged as the demand arises.

The products manufactured are good and reliable. The woodwork on planes is especially excellent, because Japanese workmen are skilled with hand tools. Most of the machine tools are of American manufacture.

Manufacturing facilities are more than ample for the needs of the Navy.

DESIGN

The design follows foreign tendencies almost entirely. In general, navy types are copied from British designs, army types from French designs, and commercial types follow German design. Up to the present there has been little interest in American designs, but it is believed that increased interest will be taken in American designs from now on, since the Okura Co. has imported several American engines, and at least one Curtiss pursuit and one Boeing pursuit and at present have Col. Art Goebel and a Fairchild plane here for demonstration purposes. In addition, great interest was shown at most engine factories in various American engines. The Okura Co. now has an option on the manufacturing rights for the Fairchild commercial engine. Neither the army nor the navy has a type which is purely Japanese in design. Certain types are said to be original Japanese designs but these are slightly modified copies of foreign types. In the commercial field Mr. Sekiguchi, of the Kawanishi Co., has actually produced planes of Japanese design, but they have not found great favor. There has been no attempt to design a Japanese engine, although there is reason to believe that at present both Mitsubishi and Nakajima are attempting to make hybrid copies of two or three different engines.

Up until recently the system has been to buy the manufacturing license for an engine or airplane and go ahead producing on this basis, under the supervision of foreign engineers, at least until the factory became familiar with the product. A new system is being tried now, in that single examples are being purchased outright and this sample is then studied carefully for "improvement" by the young group of designers being produced by the Imperial University at Tokyo.

Lieut. Yoshio Hashiguchi, I. J. N., is the leading naval designer.

MATERIALS

Nearly all material for aircraft and engine manufacture is imported, although attempts are being made to use Japanese woods for certain parts not requiring too much strength. Metal is imported generally to conserve the home supply. Materials used are excellent and great stress is placed on the quality of imported material. Suitable tests are continually made on all material entering into construction.

TRAINING

All pilot training is done at Kasumigaura. Students are selected from officers, special and warrant officers, and enlisted men who apply to take the course. At present there is no difficulty in getting enough volunteers to meet requirements.

In addition to the pilot course there are courses for observers and mechanics.

The average number of students engaged at one time is as follows: Officer pilots, 30; enlisted pilots, 60; officer observers, 10; officer engineers, 10; enlisted observers, 20; enlisted mechanics, 200.

The above students are divided into two overlapping classes; the duration of each course is nine months.

The student pilots are divided into two groups, one group receiving instruction in primary land planes, while the other group receives instruction in primary seaplanes. After completing primary instruction these groups advance to reconnaissance planes and finish the course of about 120 hours in this type.

All flying is done in the morning and the afternoons are devoted to ground-school instruction in the following subjects: Aerial gunnery, navigation, strategy, bombing, signals, radio, photography, rigging, engineering, instruments, theory of flight.

Reconnaissance students take the same ground school course, while mechanics take a special course which is principally practical work.

The course is thorough and sufficient time is spent for students to learn the theoretical end of aviation.

The school workshops are well equipped and student mechanics become quite expert in rigging and engine overhaul.

Upon completion of the flight training course pilots are sent to service squadrons, where they learn to fly the service planes, i. e., *F-5*, type 14, Mitsubishi *No. 1* and *No. 4*.

Additional pay for pilots and observers is as follows: Officer pilots, 60 yen monthly; warrant pilots, 40 yen monthly; chief petty officer pilots, 30 yen monthly; other ratings, pilots, 20 yen monthly. Observers receive 50 per cent of the above amount.

PLANE MARKINGS

There are no squadron distinguishing numbers and no individual numbers within the squadrons. All planes have a station distinguishing character with serial number printed on the rudder in accordance with the following table:

Plane	Number	Station
Patrol	0 to 50	Oppama.
Reconnaissance	50 to 200	Kasumigaura.
Fighters	200 to 300	Sasebo.
Torpedo	300 to 400	Omura.
Training	400 to 500	Ship planes, name of ship.

LIGHTER-THAN-AIR

Lighter-than-air suffered a serious setback when the *N-3* was destroyed during fleet maneuvers last fall.

At present there are two S. S. type nonrigid airships, 3,000 cubic meters capacity, 5-passenger, two Benz 130-horsepower engines, in the service.

There are 10 captive balloons, of the French type M, modified type. These balloons were made by the Fujikura Co., of Tokyo. Captive balloons are carried by capital ships and some cruisers.

The school for training dirigible personnel is at Kasumigaura, where there is an excellent dirigible hangar, large enough for two *Los Angeles* type airship. The balloon school is at Oppama.

The Navy Department is considering the construction of a rigid airship three times as large as the *N–3*. Newspaper reports state that a contract was awarded to the Fujikura Co. for the construction of a dirigible similar to the *N–3*.

Lighter-than-air in Japan is almost negligible.

OVERHAUL FACILITIES

Practically all engine overhaul is done by enlisted men at the various stations in small, but well-equipped shops. Some overhaul work of Lorraine engines is done by the factory at Hiro.

Minor overhaul of aircraft is done on the stations, while all major overhaul is done at the repair bases at Sasebo and Yokosuka.

Overhaul facilities are more than adequate.

PROPELLERS

Propellers are all made by hand from imported mahogany. The Aichi Co. uses alternate boards of ash and mahogany. All-wood propellers are beautifully finished and are excellent products.

The Mitsubishi Co. has the license to manufacture a French metal propeller, but none were seen in service.

The Kawanishi Co. is manufacturing a metal propeller which has adjustable blades. The Sumitomo Co. forges the alloy and the Kawanishi Co. twists the blades and does the finishing. This propeller has not been tested. The Nakajima Co. manufactured a split bamboo propeller which was unsuccessful.

PONTOONS

Wood pontoons are good, but heavy. They are made almost entirely now of Japanese birch.

Metal pontoons are made at several places and are excellently made. Operating units complain of excessive corrosion.

PARACHUTES

None are in use. The navy has about six Irving parachutes.

INSTRUMENTS

All instruments are imported.

BOMBING AND GUNNERY

No annual bombing and gunnery exercises are held but training is continuous. All practice bombing is done with 8-pound dummy bombs from 6,000 feet. Machine guns are used on towed sleeves and on ground targets. The following equipment is used:

Bombing.—Wimpers II sight; Goertz optical sight; 8-pound practice bomb; 20-pound service bomb; 220-pound service bomb; 500-pound service bomb.

Gunnery.—Vickers fixed gun; Lewis free gun; Thornton camera gun; Japanese camera gun.

Training is not perfunctory. All indications are that the pilots and observers work daily and naturally take it seriously.

PHOTOGRAPHY

Cameras are imported from America, England, and Germany. Recently 20 type *K–3* Fairchild cameras were purchased. Photography is fair, fulfills requirements, but is far behind other countries.

NAVIGATION

The only navigation instruments in use are the magnetic compass and drift indicator. Little stress is placed on navigation at Kasumigaura and in the squadrons.

FOREIGN INSTRUCTORS

Japanese naval aviation received its start from the original British Mission. Stations were planned by this mission and the system of training inaugurated then is in force to-day and is still good.

Several foreigners are employed by companies making aircraft and engines for the navy.

Newspapers report the arrival of Mr. L. R. Tower, of the Boeing Airplane Co., Seattle, with a Boeing pursuit plane for the navy and that Mr. Tower will instruct Japanese pilots in handling the plane.

COORDINATION

There is no coordination between the army, navy, and the department of communications. The only exception to this is that the first five Jupiter engines manufactured by Nakajima were divided among the three activities for test and study.

STRATEGIC DISPOSITION

Stations are well located to defend the main navy yards and manufacturing centers. Omura is an excellent defense in the west and is possible of indefinite expansion for both land and sea planes. The new station on the eastern share of Tokyo Bay will greatly increase the defenses of Tokyo.

GENERAL

Japanese naval aviation shows improvements over last year in the following ways:

(1) Pilots seem more experienced.
(2) There is more radio, gunnery, and bombing training.
(3) Night flying is done regularly.
(4) Squadrons are practically up to strength.
(5) More formation flying.
(6) More fleet aviation.
(7) Carriers are operating more.
(8) Obsolete Hansa planes have been replaced by type 14.
(9) New reconnaissance training seaplane is in use.
(10) Indications that Japanese designers are trying for themselves in both aircraft and engines.
(11) Several new permanent buildings.
(12) Becoming interested in air-cooled engines.
(13) Fewer casualties.

Japanese aviation is inferior in the following respects:

(1) Lacks catapult for launching aircraft from ships.
(2) Lacks modern patrol, torpedo, heavy bombing, and fighting planes.
(3) Lacks stabilized bomb sight.
(4) Lacks high-power modern engine.
(5) Lacks experienced designers.
(6) Lacks carburetor, magneto, and instrument manufacturing facilities.
(7) Lacks training in modern fighting tactics.

Shore facilities are excellent, major buildings are permanent; manufacturing facilities are more than adequate; personnel is experienced and more than adequate in number. Fleet aviation is in a rudimentary stage, although the airplane carriers *Hosho* and *Akagi* are operating much more than a year ago. Planes and engines are many years behind modern design and Japanese designers are not experienced enough to remedy this situation. Great national pride prevents the purchase outright of modern foreign planes and consequently each year the present service designs become more obsolete while waiting for Japanese designers to produce replacements. However, in the meantime the organization is being built up, morale is high, the pilots are getting experienced, and modern types can be purchased outright abroad at any time.

Except for the obsolete planes in use and lack of designers, the Japanese Naval Air Force is in excellent condition, is more sufficient than generally believed, and should not be underestimated.

TURKEY

A. POLITICAL

1. The Nationalist Movement.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

The first official census of Turkey which was taken October 28, 1927, fixes the population of Turkey at 14,000,000, instead of at 8,000,000 as previously estimated. This surprising increase gives the Turkish nation a more important status in the political and economic world; modern Turkey and its nationalist movement under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal Pasha becomes more than ever a subject of world interest.

In the discussion of present-day Turkey there must be considered the historical background constituting the genesis of the nationalist movement. Preceding the World War the decadence of the Ottoman Empire had engendered a movement of dissatisfaction which developed rapidly as vexations increased. The opposition of the enlightened minds to governmental abuses received the name of the "Young Turk Movement." The policy pursued by the Sultanate was not long in producing disaster, and as a consequence there was born the nationalist movement, which resulted in the formation of the Turkish Republic—the latest stage of the Young Turk movement.

By the autumn of 1918, the most far-seeing of the Turks had realized the utter bankruptcy of the Ottoman war policy. Following the armistice the Sultan-Caliph, Mohamet VI, seemed resolved to profit by circumstances to fortify his position; his concern regarding subsequent events was the well-being of the House of Osman rather than that of Turkey itself. He summoned to power reactionaries imbued with the old Ottoman traditions. Almost simultaneously with this change there arrived in Constantinople from Cilicia an officer—Mustapha Kemal Pasha—known as a competent soldier and thorough patriot. He was moved by a strong desire to strengthen the Turkish influence in the Empire, and to counteract dictation by foreign powers in Turkey's internal affairs. His first project was to reform the Government from within, and accordingly he sought the position of Minister of War; but he quickly found that his plan was infeasible.

In May, 1919, Mustapha Kemal left Constantinople with permission of the allied forces of occupation. He proceeded to the eastern vilayets as army inspector. Coming into contact with a group of men in whom the essentially western idea of nationalism had taken root, he resolved, apart from foreign influences and surrounded only by fellow Turks, to work out some effective form of protest against the humiliation his country was undergoing. Becoming cognizant of his activities, the Turkish Government at Constantinople and the Allies demanded his return. Failing to accept this recall he was outlawed. The break from the old régime started with the revolutionary movements under Kemal—this was the genesis of the nationalist movement. The determination of the Turks under Kemal to fight for what they wanted, and the unwillingness of any European power to assist Greece and oppose Kemal with force of arms, all cooperated to weld together the nationalist movement and permit the establishment of the Angora Government. Not only the antagonism of Turkish and allied forces in Constantinople but centuries of European interference and connivance convinced the nationalists that their movement could not be successful if centered in Constantinople. The choice of Angora as their capital was, therefore, psychologically and politically wise. Hence Constantinople was abandoned as the capital of modern Turkey—recognized and spurned by Kemal as a center of foreign intrigue. For the moment this city of past power has become merely a province of the nationalist government.

On October 29, 1923, Mustapha Kemal Pasha became the first President of Turkey. He declared: "National sovereignty is supreme and without restrictions. Self-government is the basic principle of the administrative system. The Turkish State is a republic." The Turkey of long-entrenched theocracy, of a complicated government with a hierarchy of officials sapping its strength, became almost overnight a republic, governed by one all-powerful assembly.

Nationalization, westernization, and secularization are the principal ideals in all phases of present-day Turkish life. To-day "every Turk is born free and lives free"; and freedom is considered to be every form of activity that does not infringe upon the freedom of others. "Turks are equal before the law," and "every form of caste, class, family, and individual privilege is abolished and forbidden." Personal immunity, religious worship, thought, speech, publication, labor, possession of property, all are sacred rights. The appellation "Turk" is applied to every citizen of the Turkish State, without regard to his race or religion; and no man may be molested on account of his religious belief. The censorship of the press is abolished, and torture, confiscation, and forced labor forbidden. "Life, property, honor, and abode are protected from every sort of assault." These provisions represent the Turks' endeavor to bring their country abreast of modern progress.

With the abolition of the Sultanate, the suppression of the Turkish Caliphate, and the proclamation of the Republic, the first three milestones in the constructive policy of Kemal were passed. With the separation of the church from the state, the courts, schools, and property of the church have been taken over by the state. Affiliation with a particular religion to-day is no longer a condition precedent to civil employment and preferment, it is no longer a sanction for women's inferiority, nor a bar to marriage of a Turkish Moslem woman with a non-Moslem. The veil, the harem, and polygamy are things of the past. Not even the distinctive headdress distinguishes the Turk of to-day from the western people. It was not to satisfy a mere whim that the suppression of the "tarboush," or fez, was decreed, but rather because it was the symbol of a past Turkey. To establish the roots of the social revolution firmly and prevent any reversion to the customs of the old régime, Kemal and the National Assembly are giving their support to the spread of education. The reactionary religious instruction has been suppressed and the modern lay school established.

The modernization or westernization program to which the Turkish Government is now committed is having an important effect upon the minorities in Turkey, of which the Greeks are the most important. As a result of this program and that of Turkish nationalism, the minorities are rapidly disappearing as entities. This problem of the minorities is essentially the latest phase of a conflict between two radically opposed political ideals: Ottomanism or federation of the heterogeneous and Turkish or homogeneous nationalism. The idea of nationalism and the idea of race are the ideas of the Turkey of Mustapha Kemal Pasha—and both these ideas come from the West.

Hand in hand with the westernization program, Turkey has undertaken a thoroughgoing reform of her existing codes. The principal one was the Civil Code of 1869, largely based on the principles of Mohammedan law as laid down in the Koran. This code was not in harmony with modern European conceptions, and its radical reform had been urged for many years. But such a reform could not be carried out as long as the religious and political unity of the Turkish state was even technically maintained. The disappearance of the last vestige of control in the Turkish religious system, brought about by the abolition of the Caliphate and by the consolidation of the Turkish courts, opened the door to this long-delayed task—the Swiss Civil Code was adopted and became effective in October, 1926.

Turkey now possesses as the foundation of her legal system a civil code that can challenge comparison with the most modern European law systems. The application of this code assists in the breaking down of barriers between communities through its marriage laws. Faced by the confusion in their own laws and by the simplicity of a modern European code, the various Christian communities found it to their interest to renounce their rights to use their ancient systems of marriage and divorce and to accept the principles of the new statute. All parties have thus made concessions, but the greater concession has been made by the Mohammedans in accepting the abolition of the Koranic law of marriage and the substitution of a law giving to the women of Turkey a legal status equal to that which women enjoy in the most advanced European countries. Active progress is also being made in the revision of the other organic codes, particularly in the commercial code, which has been influenced largely by the German commercial code, and the penal code, for the modification of which the Italian penal system, perhaps the most advanced and scientific in Europe, is being followed.

In another endeavor to show the outside world that the Turkish Republic is resolutely bent on conforming to western standards, the Angora Government has taken the significant step of dissolving the Tribunals of Independence. These institutions might be compared to the notorious Cheka of Russia; they represented an irregular addition to the judicial system instituted during the war against the Greeks, in order to deal with desertion, treason, and espionage, and were subsequently established to deal with agitators against the Republic.

But the most drastic and startling reform, and an indication of the rapidity with which ideas find expression in the legislation of present-day Turkey, has been the disestablishment of Islamism from Turkey—the removal from the constitution of all references to the Moslem religion. Not content with the repudiation of the Caliphate and the substitution of a civil code for the sacred law,. this action has been taken with the sudden swiftness which characterizes the political offensives of the Turkish dictator. The constitution, but four years old, declared that the Moslem religion was the religion of the Turkish Republic. The words " Moslem " and " Turk," indissolubly linked for many centuries, have been sundered and a truce has been called between the crescent and the cross. The members of the Assembly and the President will henceforth take the oath upon honor and the time-honored formula " by Allah " will be heard no more.

Mustapha Kemal is the chief asset of the Turkish Republic. His prestige is such that he seems able to successfully carry out anything that he attempts. From the beginning, as the president of the National Assembly, he has been able to dominate the policy of the new Government. So long as he is alive and well the Government should continue stable. His death would cause a crisis, the result of which no one can foretell. The power intrusted to Mustapha Kemal to designate his candidates for the National Assembly, and the recent election to the Assembly of these candidates, demonstrates that the authority of the President and his immediate advisers seems still supreme within as without his party. The People's Party alone holds the field. Within that party are conservative and radical groups, differentiated largely by the rapidity with which they wish to adopt political reforms.

The present governing group is faced with problems of almost unprecedented difficulties. The great mass of the people are ignorant and extremely conservative. In spite of surface indications, they have no real desire for modern progress. There is an enormous gulf between them and their ultra-progressive leaders. Their leaders held them in line during the war for independence because the Turk is a natural fighter. But when he is not fighting he wants to follow his old ways and to take things easy. The governing group has many advantages—it has great prestige, and is dealing with a people extremely amenable to the orders of constituted authority, and such public opinion as exists is noncumulative; the acts of to-day are forgotten to-morrow. But to maintain its prestige and its hold on the people it must convert an impoverished country into a fairly prosperous one.

In short, Turkey has accomplished a remarkable feat in national recovery and in political reorganization, the preparation for which has been in continuous process at least since 1876. The character and traditions of her people, her need of foreign economic assistance, and her immediate contact with unstable neighbors, all tend to make still more formidable her very difficult problems in national readjustment. In order to attain a proper position among nations and perhaps indeed, in order to live, Turkey has reached out for western ideas which have become irregularly grafted on an oriental state and people. Turkey can not accept the new order without discarding much of the old. The eventual working out of mixed cultures, civilizations, and ideals presents a most interesting experiment in nationalism and democracy.

Finally, the existence of Turkey, as in the past, hinges in great part upon the international disagreements of other countries. It has for the essence of good government, simplicity and democracy. The old hierarchy of the Ottoman Government, with its opportunity for bribery and corruption, has been swept away and the new Government has cut itself off from the destructive influences of Constantinople. It is ruling over a population which is, comparatively speaking, homogeneous. It has separated itself from the old ideas and has put itself, as far as possible, on an equal basis with the western nations. It has a leader of great strength and vision. The need for wisdom and self-restraint on the part of the few Turks with whom the initiative rests is certainly very great. The great need of a common effort is recognized by Kemal, who realizes that Turkey to become a leading nation must develop the "arts of peace" which the Turk has always so notoriously neglected.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

1. THE REVENGE OF THE CONTINENTS.

(NOTE.—*The following article, written by Mr. Guglielmo Ferrero, an eminent Italian writer, was translated from L'Illustration. It is of interest in showing the trend of thought in Europe on the subject of the functions of navies in conjunction with the freedom of the seas.*)

There exists in the world to-day a state of mind which might be called "oceanic disquietude."

In 1914, when the World War started, there was a German fleet, an Austro-Hungarian fleet, an Italian fleet, a Japanese fleet, and an American fleet. Although the English fleet was the strongest, the secondary fleets nevertheless represented an imposing total. The Paris proclamation in 1856 and the London proclamation in 1909 appeared to have established the rules of naval warfare, reconciling the categorical imperatives of combat and the requirements of humanity.

Four years later the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian fleets had disappeared, and the rules of naval warfare had been replaced by the cruelties of a mortal struggle, on the sea and under the sea, which had horrified the world. For a brief space the English Navy seemed to dominate the seas more than ever, but it was soon equaled by the American Navy, while the Japanese Navy, without attaining the same strength, occupied third place among the navies of the world. To-day the naval supremacy of England has been replaced by a triarchy of preponderant navies, English, American, and Japanese. There no longer exists a balance at sea nor any law limiting the use of force. If Japan, England, and the United States should come to an agreement they would be able to do anything that they might desire.

The existing state of "maritime disquietude" may be comprehended, and this should be particularly acute in weak or unarmed countries which are at the mercy of this dictatorship of three. This is not the case, however. The unarmed or weak countries are tranquil, and it is England and the United States that are anxious. It is beginning to be discussed whether a war between the two masters of the sea would be possible or not; every two or three years a plan for the limitation or armaments is brought forth, and from time to time the question of the freedom of the seas, which played so great a part in the World War, is raised.

Whence comes this uneasiness? What does it signify? In order to understand this it is necessary to go back to one of the most obscure dramas of the Great War. It is not widely known, because it was unrolled in the solitude of the oceans and in the privacy of the departments, while the general attention was fixed on the struggle in the trenches. But what an influence it has exercised on the destiny of Europe!

When the war broke out one idea spread among the masses—exasperated by the invasion of Belgium, maddened by the violence of the German attack—with lightninglike rapidity and unshakable confidence of collective illusions; this was that although Germany might possess the most formidable army in the world, her adversaries dominated the sea, and that since the overpopulated countries of Europe depended on this sea for a part of their subsistence the Central Empires would be blockaded, starved out; it would be made impossible for them to manufacture explosives * * *.

The idea was simple and deceived only the masses, although even the intellectual élite had no doubt at the beginning but that the blockade would strangle the central empires. Apropos of this illusion I may quote a personal experience. At the beginning of November, 1914, when I was in Paris, I was invited one day to a luncheon at which Monsieur Delcassé, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was to be present. He brought a piece of news, which he had learned that morning and which sharpened our appetites. This was that the German Government had just begun to ration bread. The minister even told us the amount of bread a day which each German would henceforth be able to consume, but I have forgotten this detail. We discussed this great news with animation, since it seemed to us to be an indication of the beginning of the end. Suddenly one of the guests asked what represented, in proportion to the amount needed by a normal and healthy man of the people, the rations allowed by the Government to each German. We then discovered that we none of us knew how much bread a man must eat in order to be nourished, and we finally requested one of the servants to go to the pantry and there weigh an amount of bread equal to the German allowance, and to bring the same to us so that we might judge of the seriousness of the German dearth. I can still see the enormous mountain of bread which the servant brought back to us on a plate. Although Germany might already be thinking of preventing a scarcity of bread, capitulation through hunger was far away! The subject was changed.

In reality, as simple a matter as it seemed to the optimism of the masses to starve the central empires, it was an undertaking without precedent in history. The long-range guns, the mines and submarines seriously complicated the blockade of the German coast. The Paris and London proclamations limited the number of commodities which might be seized as contraband of war, and this, combined with the facilities offered by the network of railroads with which Europe is covered, made it an easy matter for the enemy to keep supplied, even with these commodities. Germany needed only to have everything which she required brought on neutral ships to Dutch or Danish ports.

Public opinion in the belligerent countries, however, would not have allowed the Governments, either in England or elsewhere, to hesitate on this point. It was necessary to do everything possible and impossible in order to blockade half of Europe, as formerly a city of 20,000 inhabitants had been blockaded. The heaviest part of this almost superhuman task fell upon England, which country could do nothing less than overthrow the rules of naval warfare by the reprisals order of 1915. Abandoning the Paris and London proclamations, she declared that from March 1, 1915, she would confiscate all merchandise belonging to the enemy, or originating from the enemy, on all neutral ships.

This was inevitable, if it was desired to blockade the central empires. But the application of this reprisals order, so simple in its enunciation, was a terribly difficult and complicated matter. Not only did it shatter an already ancient legal tradition, but it injured interests of great importance, while the adversary retaliated by intensifying his submarine warfare. The neutrals protested, the United States first. There were diplomatic discussions the history of which, unknown to the public, it would be interesting to know, and it was necessary to have recourse to measures which seemed unjust, particularly to the small neutral powers. If sympathy for the Allies, which was so general at the beginning of the war, weakened somewhat towards 1916, especially in the Scandinavian countries, it was largely due to this.

Nevertheless, Admiral Consett, in his book The Triumph of Unarmed Forces, published in 1923, demonstrated that in spite of this revolution in the rules of naval warfare, in spite of these harsh measures, in spite of the enormous effort made by the allied navies, the central empires were able, up to 1916, to keep plentifully supplied through the neutrals. The commercial arteries of the modern world are like great rivers—it is difficult to arrest or deflect them by means of dams. The supplying of the enemy did not begin to decline perceptibly until 1917, after three years of war, when economic exhaustion came to aid the blockade. At the beginning of 1917 the accumulated merchandise, the vouchers and securities, and the precious metals with which the central empires had until then paid for their purchases from other countries, were greatly reduced, and at the same time the possibility of finding credit was diminishing with the prolongation of the war. It was only then that the blockade succeeded in inflicting on the central empires a period of intolerable privation.

This difficulty began to be felt even by the Allies at the end of 1916, although the seas were more open to them. American intervention in 1917 was an extraordinarily fortunate occurrence for the Allies, particularly since it obliged the United States to send us as subsidies the arms and food which until then they had sold to us, and which we were no longer able to buy.

Even though the blockade may have contributed to the defeat of the central empires, it showed itself to be a much less manageable weapon than had been supposed. The lives, the energy, and the money which it cost represented an enormous item, and any results were obtained with extreme slowness.

Must it be concluded that the theories regarding the mastery of the seas, uncontested before the war, were false?

No; not false as regards the wars of the last two centuries, in which the mastery of the sea was a decisive weapon in the hands of England, since her navy was a military weapon rather than a means of economic pressure. In 1914 public opinion confused these two forms of naval action. How did England aim her first serious blow at the Empire of Napoleon when her land forces were so limited? By disembarking contingents on the Spanish Peninsula during the Spanish insurrection. How was she able in the middle of the nineteenth century to strike such a blow at Russia that it took the latter 30 years to recover? By thrusting a pin in the heel of the giant, by attacking Russia with her allies in the Crimea, in a distant meridional appendage of the immense empire. How was she able so many times to force China to yield? By attacking the latter at isolated points on the coast. It was also by bombarding Alexandria that England took possession, in 1882, of the ancient empire of the Pharaohs.

These successes engendered the belief that the land would everywhere and always be the slave of the water, but their cause lay in a situation which has now disappeared, or is on the point of disappearing, throughout the world. Before the railroads, transportation of troops by sea was much more easy and rapid than by land. The power possessing mastery of the seas also possessed, in comparison to the large continental empires, a flexibility and rapidity of movement which might be a decisive factor at certain moments.

This has been seen during the wars of the empire, and it was seen again in the Crimean War. England was able to conquer Russia by besieging Sebastopol and taking it, because, with the lack of railroads, the Russia of Nicholas I was unable to assist the besieged city at so distant a point of the empire. In the same way China, when it was an immense empire still ruled by an absolute monarchy, was unable to resist the attacks from the sea because it was impossible for her to concentrate her soldiers, scattered as they were over an enormous territory, at one point. It was for this reason that Japan was able to conquer China so easily.

The sea, however, has lost this advantage as the continents have become covered with railroads. At the beginning of the World War landings in Germany or Belgium were vaguely spoken of, but these did not take place. In view of the forces and the railroads which Germany had at her disposal any attempt to accomplish again that which Wellington had done in Spain would have been foiled in a few days. Only one landing was attempted during the World War, and that was at Gallipoli in 1915. It failed, and why? Because the reinforcements sent in a few weeks, by railroad, from Turkey, Austria, and Germany saved Constantinople from the fate of Sebastopol. China does not possess one ship, but the naval forces which Europe and America have at their disposal are of no use to us in bringing order from the Chinese chaos. Naval power no longer has any influence on the armies which are contending for and pillaging China.

This is a change in the history of the world which must be taken into account, as it has had, and will have, the most serious consequences. The British thalassocracy, as the monarchical principle, was one of those simple forces which kept order during the nineteenth century. Wherever there was a disturbance the English fleet appeared, alone or with forces drawn from less important navies, and almost always the disturbance subsided more or less quickly. To-day the English Navy is matched by almost as powerful an American Navy. One family of the white race, the Anglo-Saxon, possesses a naval force which should make the world tremble; but half of the world is in a state of revolution and the instrument which was formerly so useful, though not so strong, is now almost useless.

We are witnessing the revenge of the continents. The seas also tend to escape from the simple forces which dominated the world during the nineteenth century, and to acquire an autonomy which starts everywhere by disorder. Will the large navies be able to recover, as a means of exerting economic pressure, some part of the power of which the railroads have deprived them? The experience of the war justifies us in doubting this, and two hypotheses alone will suffice to confirm our doubts.

Let us suppose that war has broken out between the United States and England, and that the two powers are seeking to destroy each other's commerce. It is evident that this war would be waged with an unimaginable ferocity and that it would not only ruin the two belligerents but the whole world. Half of the commerce of the world would be annihilated, and, moreover, the United States, possessing as it does an immense continent, would have a decisive superiority over England in a war of this kind.

Now, let us suppose, on the contrary, that one of the two dominant naval powers—the United States or England—is at war with a great European power, Germany or France. It is evident that if either of these two countries has money or credit it will find in Europe, or in Asia, everything that it may need. We do not see how the power dominating the sea would be able to prevent the railroads of two continents from working for the enemy, unless it were desired to declare war on half the world. The maritime blockade of the central empires succeeded in the long run and after superhuman effort, because these empires were at war in the east with Russia, that is to say, because they were also blockaded on land.

Is it astonishing that under these conditions the question of the freedom of the seas, eliminated by the peace congress, is again being raised? The great navies are organs whose function has changed in one generation. It is beginning to be perceived that they can no longer play the part in the equilibrium of the new world which was theirs during the nineteenth century; but what will be their future rôle is not yet clearly seen, and it is for this reason that the great naval powers are unquiet. They would like to know why they spend so much money and where their efforts will lead, faced by the continents which little by little are regaining their autonomy.

2. PRESENT STATUS IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

[*Source: M. I. D.*]

One of the more significant changes in the international life of the Latin-American Republics resulting from the World War was the establishment of relations with the League of Nations. The present attitude of a certain number of these Republics, however, is so greatly at variance with the enthusiasm which characterized their earlier activity in and cooperation with that body that it is believed a brief review of the more outstanding factors responsible for this condition of affairs will be of general interest.

During the first part of the war when the conflict was still confined to Europe, the Latin-American States remained neutral. the various governments being greatly absorbed in an attempt to alleviate the severe economic and financial crisis which immediately followed the outbreak of hostilities. Their foreign relations in so far as they dealt with the war were confined to measures designed to safeguard neutrality, and, in the case of a number of republics, to vain efforts to secure the adoption of a continental policy for the protection of their rights as neutrals.

But upon the announcement of President Wilson that diplomatic relations had been severed with Germany, accompanied by the expressed hope that remaining neutrals would follow the example of the United States, 13 of the 20 Latin-American powers voiced in some official manner their solidarity with and sympathy for the ideals and purposes of the United States and her allies. Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama declared war on Germany; Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic severed relations with that country. The other seven—Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay—remained neutral. While of the actual belligerents, only Brazil and Cuba may be said to have taken anything like an active part in the conflict, all of the great exporting countries of South America supplied without stint those raw materials of which the Allies stood so sorely in need.

At the close of the war, however, the Latin-American Republics, with few exceptions, were quick to take advantage of the opportunity to become members of the League of Nations, visualizing in that proposed international body the creation of a new and beneficent instrument of peace. Those which had severed relations with or declared war against Germany were entitled to participate in the peace conference; in consequence, 11 of the 13 (omitting Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic) signed the treaty of Versailles, an action subsequently ratified by the governments of all the nations concerned except that of Ecuador. These powers also became members of the league, since the covenant was an integral part of the peace treaty. By the terms of an annex to the covenant, other States were invited to join the league, as a result of which Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Salvador, and Venezuela became members. Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic were later admitted by a unanimous vote of the assembly. With the exception, therefore, of Mexico and Ecuador, all the Latin-American Republics evinced a desire to further the work of the league within the limits of their capacity, demonstrating their regard for things international and their readiness to play their rôle in the activities of this larger body of nations.

Although Argentina took an active interest in the organization of the league and was prepared to enter into its activities with a great deal of zeal—having sent a strong delegation to the first assembly in September, 1920—her actual participation in that body was short-lived. In November, shortly after the opening of the first assembly, the head of the Argentine delegation outlined the following proposals, the adoption of which by the league was regarded as assential by his Government:

1. The admission of all sovereign States to the league.
2. The election of all members of the council by a majority vote of the assembly instead of giving permanent tenure of five places to the great powers.
3. The establishment of a permanent court of international justice with the principle of compulsory arbitration and jurisdiction.

When the assembly adopted a resolution declaring no amendments would be considered during its session, the Argentine delegation withdrew from that body, making the following statement in explanation of their Government's attitude:

> * * * The vote of the assembly has closed the question. The chief aim of the Argentine Government was to cooperate in the work of drawing up, by means of amendments to the covenant, a charter in which it was hoped it would be possible to embody the ideals and principles which Argentina has always upheld in international affairs and from which she will never deviate. When once this aim has disappeared, owing to the postponement of the amendments, the moment has arrived for Argentina's cooperation in the work to cease. * * * For the above reasons, and in accordance with the instructions received from my Government, I have the honor to inform the assembly that the Argentine delegation considers its mission at an end.

The course pursued by Argentina naturally gave rise to many commentaries and it was believed by many that her action was due to the pro-German attitude of President Irigoyen, who was Chief Executive at that time. The fact remains, however, that Argentina has since taken no part in the major activities of the league. She has had observers present and participated in the deliberations of the committee on the composition of the council in 1926 as well as in certain other league conferences, but took occasion in the former to reiterate her stand in favor of the principle of universality and equality in the composition of the council, holding that until this were accomplished the league would continue to be a league of the nations of Europe and not a league of the nations of the world.

As a matter of fact, Argentina's actual status in the league has never been clearly defined, as action on her adhesion to that international body was taken by the Argentine Cabinet during a recess of

Congress, all subsequent efforts on the part of President Alvear to persuade Congress to take some action in order to clarify Argentina's position having failed. So far as league authorities are concerned, Argentina is a member in good standing, although the membership has no legal standing locally.

The experiences of Bolivia and Peru were similar to those of Argentina. In joining the league, both countries had high hopes of removing those causes of friction and ill-feeling growing out of the war of the Pacific with Chile. While actuated by motives of self-interest, perhaps, they were at least legitimate. In Bolivia's case, she desired a revision of her peace treaty of 1904 with Chile whereby she had ceded to that country the Province of Antofagasta in return for certain compensations. Bolivia, however, had never been satisfied with this treaty, which had completely debarred her from access to the sea, and her demands were based on the contention that it had been imposed on her by force, that Chile had failed to carry out its fundamental articles, and that existing conditions constituted a menace of war. At the meeting of the first league assembly, Bolivia requested to have placed upon the agenda of the second assembly her demand for the application of Article XIX of the covenant to the said treaty, this article providing that:

> The assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the league of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

The Chilean delegation was unalterably opposed to the consideration of the Bolivian request by the assembly on the ground that the league was incompetent to revise existing treaties. Although the league entertained Bolivia's request, the decision of the commission of jurists to which the question was finally submitted in September, 1921, was to the effect that Bolivia's demand was inadmissible, as the assembly of the league could not modify of its own accord any treaty, such modification being solely within the competency of the contracting states. Bolivia accepted the decision but reserved the right to bring up the question at some future time. Up to the present, however, she has made no effort to assert this right, and although retaining her membership she has taken no further part in league affairs. As early as July, 1922, Bolivia engaged the services of a German officer as instructor in her army, this incident being the occasion of a strong protest on the part of the French Government as in direct violation of the treaty of Versailles.

Peru on November 1, 1920, requested of the league similar action to that of Bolivia in relation to the treaty of Ancon, with a view to a settlement of the Tacna-Arica controversy with Chile. The reply of the league was to the effect that the request arrived too late for inclusion in the agenda of the assembly of that year, but that it would be communicated to the members of that body. Peru then withdrew her request but reserved the right to make further representations to the league in regard to the matter in case she should so desire. As a result of the decision of the league on the Bolivian demand in 1921, however, and the aggressive opposition developed by Chile in each instance Peru made no further attempt to renew her request. While she has retained her membership in the league, she has attended none of the league's sessions nor taken any part in league affairs since 1920.

Costa Rica was the first Latin-American country officially to withdraw from the league, her membership expiring in January, 1927, two years after her formal notice of withdrawal had been filed. Contrary to the assumption emanating from Geneva that the resignation was the result of criticism of Costa Rica's failure to pay her back dues was the published statement of the Costa Rican minister in Washington that the withdrawal of his country from the league was due to the fact that she had no particular benefit to derive from her association in that body.

Actually, the question of whether Costa Rica should retain her membership came up in 1921 at the time of the Costa Rican-Panaman boundary dispute, which was later settled by the mediation of the United States. It will be remembered that the league offered its services in the solution of this dispute, but when attention was called to the Costa Rican-Panaman arbitration treaty of 1915 providing for the submission of the boundary controversy to the mediation of the United States league officials were only too glad to sanction this solution of the difficulty. President Acosta then recommended his country's resignation, but no action was taken during the remainder of his term on account of a hostile Congress.

It is quite possible that the mediation of the United States in this controversy, and the later arbitration by Chief Justice Taft of the question between Costa Rica and Great Britain in regard to the Amory oil concessions, not only brought Costa Rica to the realization that her membership in the league conferred no particular benefits, but that she could cultivate friendly relations with the United States without detriment to her national prestige, sovereignty, and independence.

The final decision of Brazil, on May 9, not to reconsider her resignation from the league, scheduled to take effect in June of this year, would indicate that during the two-year interval the Government of Rio de Janeiro has discovered nothing in its policy to alter or regret. By reason of the part she played in the World

War Brazil enjoyed very close relations with the league from the first, establishing in Geneva a permanent delegation to better serve in fulfilling the duties undertaken and to strive more efficiently for the ideals of the league. Although one of the four nations to be assigned a nonpermanent seat on the council and successively reelected to such a seat, Brazil desired a permanent place in that body. In furthering her own cause she felt she was championing the cause of all America—asking for the proportional representation among the permanent members of the council to which she believed America was entitled. When refused this demand Brazil not only resigned her nonpermanent seat in that body but severed all connection with the league itself, taking no further part in its activities after June, 1926.

In presenting Brazil's resignation at that time the Brazilian delegate declared that his country's withdrawal was not only a protest against not being given a permanent seat but also a protest against the tendency of the European powers to subordinate the league's affairs to their own ideas and requirements; and that it was futile to expect that the rest of the world should be willing to take their problems to Geneva for solution so long as the final authority there is a body which is almost wholly European in personnel and chosen mainly with regard to the political problems of Europe alone.

The remaining Latin-American countries—with the exception of Mexico and Ecuador, which have never joined the league—are all members in good standing; and Chile, Uruguay, and Cuba have played a very able rôle in both the council and the assembly.

Notwithstanding the Bolivian and Peruvian appeals to the assembly there has been little disposition on the part of the Latin-American Republics to utilize the machinery of the league for the solution of exclusively American problems. Highly significant, on the other hand, is the fact that when Chile and Peru finally agreed to submit their long-standing Tacna-Arica dispute to arbitration they preferred the good offices of the United States to those of the league. And while, in theory at least, the Latin-American Republics may, in certain contingencies, be confronted with the alternative of choosing between the League of Nations and the Monroe doctrine, in practice it seems unlikely that such a dilemma will arise. As already stated, there is a general disposition among the southern republics to exclude purely American problems from the scope of the league, and there appears to be as little inclination on the part of the league itself to assume jurisdiction over such matters.

4. FRANCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS.

"The Mediterranean Navies: France and Italy"—Competition in New Construction.

[By Hector C. Bywater]

There is now developing in the Mediterranean a situation of great interest both to students of strategy and political observers. While it might be an exaggeration to name France and Italy as avowed rivals for the scepter of the Middle Sea, there is unquestionably a strong element of competition in their respective naval policies. Since each has a vital stake in the Mediterranean neither can be indifferent to the balance of power in those waters. Within this strategic zone the commitments of both countries have undergone a drastic change in recent times. France is now painfully conscious of the fact that her military strength must henceforth depend in large measure upon her ability to draw, without interruption or restraint, upon the reservoirs of man power which she controls in northern Africa. Consequently her present naval policy is determined mainly by the necessity of affording the utmost degree of security to her lines of communication with her African territories.

To Italy, also, the experiences of 1915 to 1918 brought a new appreciation of sea power. In her case the assured control of certain sea routes would be indispensable if she found herself at war with a major European state. Notwithstanding the immense strides which have been made in the exploitation of domestic resources, most notably in the development of hydroelectric power as a substitute for coal, she still remains dependent to a marked extent on imports from overseas. Were these cut off, the limit of her endurance in a great war would be measurable by months. The integrity of certain sea routes is, therefore, as much a matter of concern to Italy as to France. To this fact rather than to any spirit of mutual animosity or distrust must be ascribed the strenuous exertions which each country is making to improve its naval status.

British interest in this situation arises from the fact that the Mediterranean is one of the main arteries of our empire. Through it passes a tremendous volume of British trade, any check to which would produce the gravest consequences to this country. Scarcely anything could be more disastrous to our interests than a quarrel between two Mediterranean powers, since the fact of our being neutral would not protect our trade in those waters from serious interruption. No neutral can hope to conduct "business as usual" in a zone of active warfare.

NEW PROGRAMS.

For several years after the war the Italian Navy was superior to the French in modern light craft, which are widely regarded, rightly or wrongly, as the decisive factor in Mediterranean strategy. It was chiefly because of this circumstance that France introduced her great building program of 1921–22, thanks to which she has already restored the balance. In battleships she has the advantage. Not only has she six dreadnoughts to five, but her ships are larger and more modern than those of Italy. In cruisers also France is forging ahead. When the current building program matures she will possess six 10,000-ton and three 8,000-ton cruisers of up-to-date design, besides three or four older vessels. Italy has built two 10.000-ton ships, is building four of 5,000 tons, and has eight older ships of limited value.

It is of interest to notice that the new French and Italian cruisers are the fastest warships which have yet been constructed. They are credited with speeds up to 36 knots, while the latest Italian ships are designed for the phenomenal pace of 37 knots—over 42½ miles an hour. Immense velocity is, indeed, a characteristic of all the latest construction for the two navies, each of which apparently pins its faith to high-speed tactics by light craft in preference to the more ponderous maneuvering of capital ships.

Italy, shortly after the war, began building torpedo craft of exceptional tonnage and armament. France retorted by laying down vessels of even greater size and heavier guns, and has so developed the type that her latest "destroyers" are, in effect, light cruisers nearly 3,000 tons, mounting six 5.5-inch guns. Her program comprises 25 flotilla leaders (the smallest is of 2,360 tons) and 26 big destroyers. Including the older boats, she will eventually have 80 torpedo craft, the majority being of very recent construction. Debarred by financial reasons from competing on a keel-for-keel basis, Italy has begun to build small cruisers, which may be described as "destroyers of destroyers." Displacing only 5,000 tons, they will carry eight 6-inch guns and steam at 37 knots. They are therefore fast enough to run down and powerful enough to overwhelm the latest French torpedo craft, nor do French naval writers conceal their conviction that this is precisely the function for which they are designed.

Apart from these remarkable cruisers, Italy is building 12 big flotilla leaders of 2,000 tons each, and has others in view. Including older boats, her torpedo craft will ultimately number 76, but in aggregate tonnage, gun power, and torpedo armament the French flotilla will retain a very substantial superiority.

SUBMARINE VESSELS.

Both powers are strong in submarines, but the vast program upon which France has been working since 1922 has already given her a margin of supremacy, and it is increasing year by year. According to the latest Admiralty "return," France at the present moment has no less than 46 submarines under construction. Adding to these the 42 boats already completed and 8 new ones projected, a grand total of 96 submarines is reached—about two-thirds of which are of postwar design. Compared with this imposing mass of submarine tonnage, the Italian underwater fleet makes but a modest parade, yet it has over 30 boats completed—some of which are obsolescent—19 on the stocks and others projected.

The magnitude of Franco-Italian naval preparations may be gauged by the following figures of new construction begun or authorized during the last six years:

	France	Italy
Cruisers	10	6
Flotilla leaders	24	15
Destroyers	26	26
Submarines	58	22
	118	69

With few exceptions, all these new vessels are large and powerful specimens of their respective types.

Concurrently with this expansion of naval tonnage, both countries have been steadily augmenting their air fleets. Italy already claims a definite preponderance in aircraft suitable for marine operations. Within the same period progress has been made in the improvement of naval and aircraft bases, particularly on the part of Italy.

As will be seen from this brief survey, the past few years have witnessed an extraordinary development of naval power in the Mediterranean, nor is the process by any means complete. What it may portend and to what extent it is influencing the general balance of power at sea are questions that lie beyond the scope of the present article.

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FOR CONVENIENCE IN ROUTING

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The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between July 1 and August 1, inclusive.

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ARGENTINA

POLITICAL

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA DISTRIBUTED TO "CORNWALL."

On the day before the departure of the British cruiser *Cornwall* from Buenos Aires the ship was flooded with communist literature, which is quoted herewith:

To the sailors of the cruiser "Cornwall":

Comrades: Young communists of the Argentine Republic are sending you their hearty greetings and a welcome to the shores of the Argentine.

We are sure you believe that you are in the navy to defend your country—but the capitalists, the rich, the bloodsuckers think otherwise. They not only demand of you the defense of your country but also the defense of their interests, their fortunes, their money, and that's why at the end of this voyage they are going to send you to China to kill your fellow beings—the workers of China.

Young sailors of *Cornwall:*

Your real enemies, your only enemies, the rich—who are our enemies as well—are going to send you to join the fleet in the Chinese waters, to China, where millions of Chinese workers are fighting for their liberty. The capitalists are not sending you to China to defend your country—your country is not in danger—but to defend their money, to defend the interests of the English imperialism, the interests of the rich men of England.

We, young communists of the Argentine, call upon you to fraternize with the workers and soldiers of China who are struggling for their liberties.

We call upon you to remember that your real interests are the interests of the whole working class and have nothing to do with the interests of the rich, who own enormous concessions in China, for the exploitation of millions of Chinese workers. Help the Chinese workers in their struggle for liberty.

The Communists Youth.

INVITATION TO MEMBERS OF BRITISH PARLIAMENT TO VISIT ARGENTINA.

The Argentine Rural Society has resolved to invite a committee of members of the British Parliament to visit, as its guests, this country during the month of October next. The object of this invitation is stated in the following note presented yesterday to Sir Malcolm Robertson:

To H. E. Sir Malcolm Robertson,
H. B. M. Ambassador.

Sir: The economic relations between Great Britain and Argentina, which for the past century have existed to the mutual advantage of both countries, are to-day threatened by complications.

On one side, British manufactures, without having diminished in prestige, are giving way before competition from other countries, where our agrarian products do not find an equitable demand while, on the other hand, there have arisen recently serious doubts in the minds of British consumers as to the sanitary state of Argentine meat.

We are highly interested that our agrarian workers should promote British enterprise among us, thus fostering the exchange of British manufactures and our meat and grain. We also wish to reestablish confidence in the efficacy of our sanitary control, proving to English consumers that not a solitary diseased animal leaves our ports.

The question of foot-and-mouth disease has been taken up by the British Parliament, and although that body has discussed it with traditional equanimity, relying on the personal observations of Lord Bledisloe, we consider it advisable to offer a further opportunity to members of the British Parliament personally and directly to inspect stock-raising conditions and economic prospects of the Argentine Republic.

To this end we have resolved to invite a group of members of parliament to visit our country during the month of October, as guests of honor of the Argentine Rural Society, and we have the honor to extend this invitation through your excellency, as British Ambassador and one who has done so much toward fostering the culture and business relations between Great Britain and the Argentine Republic.

This note is signed by the president of the society, Ing. Luis Duhau, and secretary, Doctor Carcano.

BELGIUM

POLITICAL

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

THE COUNTRY AS A EUROPEAN FOCUS.

Throughout recorded history Belgium has been a battle ground of rival peoples and nations. As early as the middle of the seventeenth century she had been called " the military arena of Europe " or " Europe's cockpit " and since that time she has continued to aptly deserve such names. The World War saw Belgium affected by only the latest and most grievous of a long succession of servitudes and disasters. Beginning with the Belgae and the Gallia Belgica of the Romans, the use of the adjective to distinguish the inhabitants of the south Netherlands can be traced through all stages of subsequent military history. It was not till 15 years after the Battle of Waterloo, upon the collapse of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, that the occasion presented itself for Belgium to proclaim its own sovereignty. The causes of the revolution of 1830 were both religious and linguistic. The reason for her melancholy history is clear: She stands upon the great world highway that joins central and western Europe. She has suffered, not because of her own ambitions, but because of the ambitions of others who have struggled for supremacy on her soil. While loathing war, she finds herself threatened or actually involved in every major struggle on the Continent. And within Belgium itself all has not been harmony.

A strong Flemish movements has existed for many years, due to the discontent of the Flemish people with the predominating French influence. Belgium has long been bilingual, the two sections of the population in some places being linguistically isolated, in other cases juxtaposed, or even fused. North of the line drawn almost due east from the southwestern corner of West Flanders the popular language is Flemish. South of that line it is French or Walloon—a dialect of French. Roughly, the four northern Provinces are Flemish, the four southern are Walloon, while Brabant is divided between the two. In the capital a great majority of the people speak both languages. As Catholics, the Flemings are opposed to the religious liberalism that the Walloons have imported from France. The Flemings are mainly ruralists, deeply religious and politically conservative. The Walloons are industrial proletarians, not devout in religion, and collectivists in their political faith. The Walloons have had a preponderance of power in the past, though the Flemings in recent years have slowly been gaining a position of their own.

The result of this linguistic division is a conflict, not so much between Flanders and Wallonia as between the French and Flemish in Flanders. While for the Flemish in Flanders it is advantageous to know French, there is no such inducement for the French in Wallonia to learn Flemish. Were it not for immigration from the country districts, Brussels would soon be completely Francophiled—for social and commercial reasons. However, the French gains in the country as a whole are offset by the vigorous Flemish propaganda which is constantly stimulating the loyalty of the Flemish to their ancestral tongue. The " Flamingants," or extreme class of Flemish, go so far as to openly advocate separation and the formation of a separate State.

The Congress of Vienna, which met in 1815, after the fall of Napoleon, to draw a new map of Europe, gave the Belgian Provinces to Holland as an " increase in territory." Thus was set up, at the convergence of the Teutonic and Latin civilizations, a powerful buffer State covering nearly all of the broad plain toward which for centuries the military forces of Europe had been drawn. The new political unit was economically self-contained. It had coal, iron, and all the basic raw materials for mechanical manufacture, besides a rich colonial empire and the substratum of a thrifty and competent agricultural population.

Many prominent Belgians have since 1830 stated their opinion that the revolution was a blunder and a thoughtless attack upon the political equilibrium of Europe. Throughout that insurrection the active hand of French diplomacy was noticeable. It was France's fixed policy to undo the work of the Congress of Vienna. Several of the members of the provisional revolutionary government were Frenchmen by birth. Europe at large grasped the potential danger of the situation, and when the independence of Belgium was finally recognized in 1839 it was only upon the condition that the new State should continue to be guaranteed the inviolability of its territory.

From the very outset of Belgium's autonomous national life French influence became a historical tradition which superimposed itself upon the racial affinity of the Latin element of the population. The Flemish people were drilled, administered, educated, judged, and industrially directed in the French language. However, they withstood the onslaught upon their national characteristics and asserted their cultural autonomy in a literary and artistic renaissance which brought about also a gradual restoration of their linguistic rights. Something like a genuine equality of the two races and their respective languages had been reached shortly before the war.

At its best, Belgium is a political nationality, but not a nation in the historical or ethnographic sense. The border Provinces of France, Germany, and Holland have been shifted from one allegiance to another for a thousand years. As a result of the war, the Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet regions, with an area of 382 square miles and a population of 64,000, were added to continental Belgium; these additions on her eastern frontier were made in order to strengthen Belgium from a military standpoint.

Accidentally, then, its various parts have been united with other territory under a central rule. Whenever it has been tried bilingualism has proved itself both impossible and undesirable. As an educational method the attempt to teach a people two languages at the same time impairs intellectual progress and calls into being a population with a mixture of both and a thorough mastery of neither.

From every point of view the Walloons would be materially benefited by a closer union with France. Their raw materials and their vast industrial enterprises are complementary to the industrial system of France. The main drawbacks are the French protective tariff and the joint water and rail rates offered by the French common carriers to their own national industry. In their struggle for markets the Belgians have become aware of the handicaps of a small country venturing into the international centers of competition against massive national and economic units richly endowed with colonial possessions.

The main question is whether Belgian autonomy is to remain a reality or whether French culture and national economic policy will ultimately absorb the borderland. A century of propaganda, commercial intercourse, and intermarriage have brought the two races into close daily contact. And yet the rock of Teutonic tradition has not been shaken and in the course of a century the linguistic boundary has not moved an inch.

BRAZIL

NAVAL

BRAZIL'S PROPOSED NAVAL FORCES FOR 1929.

The Brazilian Minister of Marine, by direction of the President, made the customary recommendation for the authorized strength of the Brazilian Navy for 1929, which is as follows:

1. Corps of commissioned officers as now constituted (1,147).
2. Corps of petty officers as now constituted (791).
3. 120 cadets in the naval academy.
4. 5,243 sailors for deck service.
5. 265 sailors for detail to aviation service.
6. 2,700 sailors for service in engine room, firemen, etc.
7. 1,570 privates for marine corps.
8. 2,000 students enlisted for training in various naval apprentice schools.

Length of Service.

Length of service for noncommissioned personnel in the Brazilian Navy depends on the classification and manner of entering the service. Brazil has a compulsory military service law by operation of which men are chosen for military service by selective draft during the year in which they become of age (21). A draftee expressing a preference for service in the navy is usually accommodated. Comparatively few express such preference, however, because the period of service in the navy is invariably longer than in the army.

In the proposal just made to Congress by the administration the term of service for the various classes is as follows:

(*a*) Two years, for men taken in by selective draft.
(*b*) Three years for voluntary enlistments and reenlistments.
(*c*) Ten years for students accepted for the naval apprentice schools, counting from the time they enter active service.

Final Action by Congress.

Congress customarily delays final action on the laws fixing the authorized forces for the army and the navy, such legislation being passed, along with the annual appropriation bills, shortly before adjournment December 31. But the national legislature seldom makes a wide divergence from the recommendations of the Executive, and the law eventually to be passed will undoubtedly authorize the enlisted strength as detailed in paragraph 1.

The forces requested by the administration represent no important departure from Brazil's naval strength for the past few years.

CHINA

POLITICAL

GENERAL SITUATION.

Report.

The naval attaché accompanied the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, to Peking May 16, 1928, remained there and at Tientsin for nine days and returned to Tokyo June 2, 1928.

The following report on the present China situation is concerned primarily with Japan's relations thereto and the probable effect of those relations upon our interests and future policies.

Conditions in China.

Japan desires to see peaceful conditions and a stable government in China. Her desires in this regard are the result of necessity, for Japan's economic future depends primarily on her trade with China and upon having access to the raw materials of the Asiatic Continent. The question of an outlet on the continent for her excess population is of comparatively minor importance.

Every other power, with the possible exception of Soviet Russia, is in accord with Japan's desire for a peaceful, well-ordered China. The question at the present time confronting all powers is how China can best be assisted in bringing about that condition and wherein the policies of the different powers toward China during the period of transition from her present chaotic state will affect each others interests and China's ultimate destiny. No attempt will be made in this report to treat the subject from other than the Japanese angle and the effect of the action of the Japanese Government upon our interests and policies.

Japan's Policies.

There exist in Japan two schools of thought regarding the best policy for Japan to pursue in regard to the present China situation. The policy advocated by the first school, and also by Baron Shidehara, late foreign minister under the Kenseikai government which went out of power April 20, 1927, is as follows:

(1) Noninterference in China's internal affairs.

(2) Cultivation of good relations with all factions in China.

(3) Use of military and naval force only to protect lives of nationals, without interference with the operations of organized Chinese military forces.

(4) The avoidance as far as possible of "incidents," the reaction from which would be damaging to Japan's trade with China and to the good will and confidence of the Chinese people toward Japan.

(5) Maintenance of status quo in Manchuria.

The policy advocated by the second school and represented by the so-called "positive policy" of the present Government is as follows:

(1) The use of military force, where considered necessary, to circumscribe the operations of organized Chinese military forces, and the use of military pressure if necessary to shape the course of political events in China.

(2) To increase Japan's economic and military hold on Manchuria and to suppress any military operations by Chinese forces in or near Manchuria.

(3) To protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals "on the spot," irrespective of whether it is done in such a way as to involve danger of clashing with organized armed forces of China.

(4) To forbid the operations of the Chinese armies where tangible Japanese interests exist.

In carrying out its so-called "positive policy" the present government has—

(1) Dispatched 2,000 troops to Tsingtao and thence 140 miles inland to Tsinan in the summer of 1927 to protect Japanese lives and property in face of the advance of the southern armies. When this advance failed to materialize these troops were withdrawn a few months later.

(2) In April, 1928, sent about 2,500 troops to Tsinan and subsequently 3,000 additional troops, which action resulted, in early May of this year, in the now famous "Tsinan incident." The presence of Japanese troops quartered in a congested inland city in the path of an advancing Chinese army whose feelings were probably not friendly toward the Japanese made a clash practically inevitable. As a result the Japanese troops lost 49 killed and about 100 wounded. A considerable number of Japanese civilians were killed. About 3,000 Chinese were killed. The Japanese bombarded and destroyed a part of the walled city. The destruction of property, especially Chinese, was extensive. The advance of Chang Kai-shek's army was delayed to such an extent that Feng Yu-hsiang reached the vicinity of Peking in advance of other southern leaders and displaced Chang Kai-shek as the prospective controlling factor in Peking.

(3) On May 18, 1928, the Japanese Government issued an ultimatum to the northern and southern leaders stating in effect that Japan

would not permit fighting in the Peking-Tientsin area and that northern troops, if retreating in disorder north of the great wall toward Manchuria, would be disarmed. This placed Chang Tso-lin in an untenable position in Peking, for although his armies possessed an actual military superiority over the southern armies, he could not risk a decisive engagement with his only route of retreat cut off by the Japanese. There was nothing left for Chang Tso-lin to do except leave Peking and withdraw his troops while the Japanese would still permit such a withdrawal under arms into Chang Tso-lin's own Province in Manchuria. The train on which he departed was subsequently bombed on June 3 near Mukden while passing under a bridge of the South Manchurian Railway, which was supposed to be guarded by Japanese troops.

(4) On May 23, the commandant of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin proposed a joint ultimatum for the establishment of a neutral zone of about 8 miles radius in Chinese territory around Tientsin and the ejection, by force if necessary, of 8,000 northern troops in that area. The American commandant refused to sign the ultimatum and it was not issued.

(5) About June 5 the railroad between Peking and Tientsin was blocked and the Japanese proposed operating a joint international armed train. The American Legation in Peking appeared to be in no danger or in immediate need of rail communication and the American commandant refused to participate in the operation of this train through a territory occupied by both northern and southern troops. The train was not run.

(6) On June 7 a Japanese military plane was sent from Tientsin to Peking. It was fired at en route and a protest against its operation over Chinese territory was lodged by the Chinese authorities.

(7) The Japanese have increased their garrisons in China until they now have about 15,000 troops in Shantung, about 6,000 in Tientsin, and about 1,500 in Peking, exclusive of troops in Manchuria.

From the above it is evident that Japan's present military policy in China is a direct contradiction to a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of China. Her actions interfered with the northward advance of Chang Kai-shek's army, thus indirectly facilitating Feng Yu-hsiang's accession to power in Peking, made necessary Chang Tso-lin's withdrawal from Peking, denied to Chinese military forces the right to conduct hostilities on Chinese territory.

As regards the propriety of Japan's taking strong military measures ostensibly to bring order out of the situation in north China, there is a wide diversity of opinion. Fully 90 per cent of the members of the diplomatic corps in Peking take the attitude that, if Japan is willing to undertake the job of clearing north China of disorganized or poorly organized armed bodies of Chinese troops and of bringing order out of disorder, the rest of the powers should be glad to have her to do it. This feeling is universal among the diplomatic representatives of the small powers who have no troops in Peking and other parts of China. The comparison is frequently made between our situation in Nicaragua and Japan's relations with China.

There is, on the other hand, another opinion held by some foreign observers and many Japanese that the emergence of order out of chaos is more probable under the normal development of China's settlement of her own affairs than through Japanese intervention. There has been apparent in Tokyo recently a sharp reaction to the present situation of Japan in north China which has resulted from her recent military and political intervention. Many Japanese have begun to say " Now that we are in this far, what next? " and " It is easy enough to get in, but how are we going to get out? "

Public opinion in Japan will undoubtedly support any government in its use of military force to establish zones where lives of Japanese subjects can be protected from disorders in China and in the use of military force for the protection of Japanese property in Japanese concessions. Public opinion generally will also support strong military measures necessary to keep order in Manchuria. There is, however, strong opposition to the policy of placing in China large military contingents and to the manner in which they have been employed recently in Shantung (Tsinan). Japanese business interests are fearful of the growing resentment of the Chinese against this interference in Chinese affairs by military measures.

The Tanaka government, however, has so committed itself to such a military policy that it is improbable there can be any reduction of Japanese forces in China at an early date. It may entail the dispatch of additional forces to China (including Manchuria) at any time. The Diet does not meet until next December, so it is probable that for six months the Government can not be embarrassed seriously by political attacks on its present policy.

United States Policies.

Our interest in Japan's policy is vital in two respects. First, Japan's policy does not accord with our principle of noninterference by the powers in China's settlement of her own trouble. Secondly, the presence in Tientsin of 4,000 American troops, army and marines, places us in a position where there is constant danger of our forces becoming involved in a clash with the Chinese, brought on by Japan's " positive policy." No matter how we may regard the mission of our troops there, the Chinese and the outside world generally look upon the foreign garrisons in Tientsin as an international allied force, our own part of which is occupying entirely Chinese territory since we have no concession to protect. We have no control over any "positive" action taken by the Japanese, although such action might involve our forces in a general engagement between the foreign garrisons and Chinese troops, such as occurred at Tsinan. Tientsin is now an armed camp of foreign troops, each group of which is acting under the policies of its own government, which may separately at any moment create friction with the Chinese, or friction between the foreign forces themselves. Reports of such friction between the commanders of our forces and the Japanese commanders have already received considerable publicity in the Japanese press.

In view of Japan's present military policy toward China, it is believed that the withdrawal of our marine forces from the Tientsin area at the earliest practicable moment is essential to the carrying out of our Government's policy of noninterference in China's international affairs and the proper protection of lives of Americans at a place or places where the chances of inviting trouble with the Chinese by the presence of foreign troops is a minimum.

THE NEW NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'S POLICY.

The following is published in Shanghai, Chinese, and English newspapers:

> The manifesto of the Government Council to the foreign powers drafted by Messrs. Wu Tze-hui, Tsai Yuan-pei, Yu Yi-jen, Chu Chi-ching, and Ting Wei-feng, is now completed. It is as follows:
>
> One of the sole purposes of the national revolution of the Nationalist government being to reconstruct a modern State of China and the military stage of the revolution now being completed, it is the earnest desire of the Nationalist government to embark upon its program of reconstruction which, however, can not be effectively carried out in face of various existing restrictions imposed upon China by the unequal treaties. The Nationalist government recognizes the time for the negotiation of new treaties has arrived and believes that the foreign powers are of the same opinion in view of their repeated declarations, since 1926, in favor of negotiating new treaties. The Nationalist government's declaration that all new treaties must be on the basis of equality and mutual respect must be carried out, for the result of the abolition of a mere part of the obsolete provisions of the old treaties will not be satisfactory to either foreigners or Chinese.
>
> The most effective guaranty for the peace and security of all foreign nationals and their property in China being sincere mutual understanding and friendly relations between Chinese and foreigners, the Nationalist government candidly informs the powers that all foreign troops must be immediately withdrawn from Chinese soil in order to avoid misunderstanding and arouse mutual suspicion. The recent Tsinan incident is one case proving conclusively the futility and extreme danger of despatching troops to Chinese territory. The effect of the powers freely sending their armed forces to whatever Chinese territory their nationals happen to be residing at, will be to compel the Nationalist government to close the interior of China to foreigners.

As regards the responsibility for the Tsinan incident, the Nationalist government adheres to its previously announced proposal of submitting the case to an international commission of inquiry or an international tribunal for final decision.

The Nationalist government recognizes that China can not maintain an isolated position in the family of nations and is prepared to welcome cooperation and assistance from friendly powers. The Nationalist government believes that with all restrictions and international oppressions removed a new era in the history of China's foreign relations will be ushered in and that material assistance will be forthcoming from the friendly powers to enable China to attain the ultimate goal of her revolution.

NATIONALISTS MEET DIFFICULTIES IN CONSOLIDATING NORTH CHINA.

(Source: M. I. D.)

Four of the outstanding leaders in the present Nationalist Party are now in conference at Peking. Their presence there is concrete evidence that the various powerful influences within the Kuomintang are interested in securing some advantage to themselves in any reorganization of the financially and politically important newly acquired areas of north China and that an effort is being made to adjust the various conflicting demands of the participating factions within the party.

The four leaders mentioned above are Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the Military Council of the Nationalist Party and presumably commander in chief of the armies in the field; Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian general," whose personal ambition to control the destinies of north China is believed to be a source of danger to Nationalist unity; Yen Hsi-shan, the "model governor" of the Province of Shansi and concurrently defense commissioner of the Peking-Tientsin area; and a comparatively unknown but nevertheless powerful militarist, General Pei Chung-hsi, a leader of the so-called Kwangsi faction now in control of the Hankow area. Also a fifth militarist, Li Chai-sum, from Canton is en route to Peking to participate in the conference.

The extent to which these leaders can subordinate their personal ambitions and interests will be the measure of success attained in their announced objective of unifying China. Recent developments increasingly disclose a serious lack of unity within the Kuomintang ranks. General Yen has been embarrassed in his administration of the Peking-Tientsin area by conflicting and overlapping appointments to office by the Nanking Government. General Feng Yuhsiang, who has been balked in his desire to control the north China area by the strength of the political combinations against him, is reported as being merely biding his time, and although prevented by the strength of public opinion from forcibly dispossessing Yen, to be doing all he can to throw so many obstacles in the latter's path as to cause his voluntary withdrawal. Negotiations continue with a view to the peaceful absorption of Manchuria. The taking of the Manchurian generals into the Nationalist fold, a step that seems probable and perhaps imminent, might change the present alignment and tend to strengthen Yen Hsi-shan and Chiang Kai-shek vis-à-vis Feng Yu-hsiang. In general the present equilibrium is an unstable one and liable to a sudden upset by some unexpected development.

Nevertheless, the Nationalists are slowly proceeding with the establishment of a federation embracing several regional areas under political councils subordinate to that at Nanking. The events of the past month force one to concede unusual accomplishments to the Nationalists. There is no denying that the Kuomintang Party gives the direction to and hastens the spread of nationalism. This movement will persist in spite of the serious mistakes and often lack of unity of its leaders. The Kuomintang Party, symbolized by Nanking, at present alone expresses the vague desires of the Chinese people everywhere for a freedom from real oppression within and a largely fancied oppression from without. The generality of politically conscious Chinese entertain a sentiment for this group even while for momentary advantages they oppose the consolidation of Nationalist authority in China.

It appears to-day that, whatever temporary setback may develop, the Nationalist cause has enough of reality and persistency ultimately to impose its control over north China, in spite of military leaders who espouse or reject it for opportunist reasons. That setbacks will develop seems inevitable. The temporary association for the purpose of acquiring new territories to rule is a trait that has been characteristic of Chinese militarists since feudal times, and to hope that the present militarists can adjust their difficulties forthwith and desist from the usual intrigue and the resultant resort to force to increase their various interests would be to shut one's eyes to the realities of recent history. The mere presence of from 15 to 20 army corps in the Peking-Tientsin area alone is cause for grave concern. General Chiang Kai-shek is embarrassed by having under him 13 army corps of which only 4 have territories to which they can be returned and be supported. The problem of supporting these 9 "orphan" armies, comprising, possibly, 100,000 men, constitutes a problem of vital importance.

That the Nanking authorities realize the seriousness of the present situation and are attempting to meet it is evidenced by the recent conference on finances and economics at Shanghai. The conferees included prominent Chinese bankers and industrialists, meeting with

Mr. T. V. Soong, Nationalist Finance Minister, as chairman. The conference proposed a domestic rehabilitation loan of 300,000,000 silver dollars (about 150,000,000 United States dollars) in order to provide employment for such troops as were to be disbanded.

Until this disbandment is effected or the situation in north China is clarified foreigners and their property in the commercially important centers of Peking and Tientsin will need the protection at present afforded by the foreign troops garrisoned in these localities. In the meanwhile it is apparent that the Nationalists are proceeding with their announced policy of political and economic reconstruction and are seeking the sympathetic acquiescence of the interested foreign powers.

THE NATIONALIST OUTLOOK IN CHINA.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

The dramatic ceremonies on July 6 at the tomb of Sun Yat-sen in a temple in the western hills near Peking, participated in by the four outstanding Nationalist military leaders, made an appeal to the imagination of Chinese everywhere that is impossible to measure by western standards. When the burly form of the "Christian general," Feng Yu-hsiang, lifted the weeping Chiang Kai-shek from the opened casket containing the body of Sun Yat-sen, their former chief, the act signified to Chinese everywhere a unity of purpose and a devotion to a cause to which individual ambitions must of necessity be subordinated. Unquestionably the most important consideration in the present situation confronting the Nationalists is to maintain an accord within the party in order that the party policies may prevail and that party authority may be consolidated.

The destinies of Nationalist China are in the hands of the leaders now in conference at Peking. Should these leaders subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the party, it is reasonable to assume that Nationalist authority can be extended and consolidated throughout China. That they have succeeded beyond all expectations and predictions is evidence of the seriousness and earnestness of the attempt now being made to adjust the differences of the party leaders and to delegate their authority to the civilian political committees of the Kuomintang at Nanking. They have not succeeded as yet in establishing a modern governmental machine, but the purpose is there and even if the ministries are hampered by an inefficient and confusing committee system, they are showing an inclination to be amenable to group ideas and group control.

In the several regional areas under the nominal control of the Nanking government political councils have been established which are presumably responsible directly to the central committee at Nanking for the administration of their respective areas. There is an earnest effort being made to retain all civil control under the civilian political group at Nanking; nevertheless, military officers are at present acting in purely civilian administrative posts throughout most of the area under Nationalist authority. This is aptly illustrated by the present administration of Shantung Province, which has apparently been allocated to Feng Yu-hsiang. The former local civilian officials have been supplanted by military officers detailed from Feng's armies of occupation. Feng is, to all practical purposes, at present a virtual dictator of Shantung, Honan, and Shensi Provinces through his control of the military organization in occupation of the territory and by virtue of his position as chairman of the political councils for the areas assigned for his administration. This seems a reasonable and possibly a necessary procedure under existing conditions. It can scarcely be expected that anything resembling a purely civilian political control uninfluenced by the numerous militarists can be established within a period of years. Such a government in China has not existed since 1916. It is conceivable, however, that the present Nationalist organization may eventually be perfected and its authority be so administered that it may in fact represent politically articulate China in such manner as to satisfy the conditions imposed by Secretary Kellogg's note of last January regarding negotiations for tariff autonomy.

At the recent financial conferences at Nanking sweeping proposals aimed at achieving governmental and financial unification of China were adopted. Regulations seeking improvement of the country's financial administration, elimination of graft, increased authority of the Finance Ministry, and other regulations looking to the development of China's resources and trade were proposed. An important achievement was the recognition by the provincial delegates of the authority of the Ministry of Finance which, it is hoped, will be permitted to direct provincial fiscal affairs and to which the provincial delegates agreed to remit revenues unfailingly to Nanking.

The Foreign Office is proceeding with the declared policy of the Nationalists regarding treaty revision. As a preliminary to recognition, but of greater importance than even recognition, the Nanking government is endeavoring to secure the consent of the treaty powers to a revision of all treaties now existing in a unilateral form, and they may be expected to denounce such unrevised treaties as they come up for renewal.

FRANCE

NAVAL

THE FRENCH NAVAL MANEUVERS.

(NOTE.—*The following is a translation of an article on the French naval maneuvers, terminated late in June, which appeared over the signature of Commandant A. Thomazi, a retired French naval officer, who has considerable repute as a naval authority and critic. In so far as it touches on the postwar French naval philosophy of the light, swift, fighting unit, and indicates some uncertainty in the minds of naval authorities concerning the possibilities and limitations of the airplane carrier, it may not be without interest.*)

The naval maneuvers of 1928 were terminated by the entry recently at Brest of the united Mediterranean and northern squadrons. For the first squadron of the line, coming from Toulon, they had commenced May 30, the day of departure from port; and if the three weeks have been broken by stops in port, among them a pretty long one at Casablanca, each phase has been utilized for the working out of a strategical or tactical problem elaborated by the general staff of the navy. This period, then, has been very active, and the exercises to which the vessels have proceeded, besides making possible good training for officers and crews, have not failed to lead to some interesting conclusions concerning the use of our naval forces.

The vessels placed under the high command of Vice Admiral Docteur, to the number of about 65, included only 3 battleships (the fourth, the *Bretagne*, delayed at Toulon, joined the squadron only at Quiberon), 4 cruisers, an airplane carrier. All the others were destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines. That is to say, the light craft to which our financial efforts since the war have been devoted almost exclusively, really made up the bulk of the force, and the problems and exercises had to be specially formulated with a view to their employment.

Further, it was necessary, at a time when many ships of new types had just been put into service, that they should be tried under conditions approximating as closely as possible those of real action. The name "torpedo boat" is given now to units larger than the destroyers of other days, and that of "destroyer" to vessels that could almost have been designated cruisers. Besides, all these vessels are possessed of a very great speed, the superiority of which in comparison with that of ships of the line has grown markedly. Their cruising speed, attained without difficulty, is at least equal to the maximum speed that their forerunners could maintain for a short while only. Moreover, their size makes it difficult for them to use the torpedo, at least at close range, and it follows that their handling has to be studied with a view to the limitations resulting from their characteristics.

That is what was done during the passage from Toulon to Casablanca and from Casablanca to the Atlantic ports. In the second phase of the maneuvers the light squadron out of Brest represented an independent force opposed to the first squadron of the line. The attack and defense of a merchant convoy on the high seas were also studied. The united forces carried out an attack on the fortifications of Lorient, with a mock landing. The coastal radio service was brought into play, as well as all the organs of defense, and the surface vessels and submarines had occasion to experiment under very varied conditions with the best means of utilizing their offensive and defensive possibilities.

One of the vessels, the *Bearn*, made its first appearance in the combined exercises. As is known, its transformation into an airplane carrier was ordered in 1922, but that has taken much longer than was anticipated. Hence, the French Navy has been very backward in testing the value of this new craft, already in use in certain foreign navies, especially in (that of) Great Britain, where airplanes on ships have already played for three years a very important rôle in the annual grand maneuvers. Now, if one may theorize in advance on the possibilities of a ship of this kind, the conclusions at which one arrives must necessarily be confirmed by experience, which, alone, gives conclusive knowledge. That which it has been possible to establish certainly is that from the technical standpoint the equipment of the *Bearn* gives entire satisfaction, and that it does great credit to those who have designed it. Airplanes of various types take off and land with perfect regularity at sea and at anchor, giving the impression of a very simple operation, and even leading one to consider quite easy a proposition which is really very hard. This regularity of functioning is highly favorable to the study of questions of operation, which has been pushed further in a little while than there were grounds for supposing possible.

Without wishing to jump to conclusions, which could not, in any case, be confirmed from such short experience, it appears that the practical import of the entry into the line of airplane carriers should not be overestimated. Cases will be numerous in which the employment of their equipment will be not only delicate but impossible, and occasionally the ship itself, owing to the limitations imposed on its use, will be more embarrassing than useful. One sees clearly in the English technical press expressions of reserve which betray a little disappointment following a perhaps excessive enthusiasm. Even if the *Bearn* has, for an airplane carrier, a speed which is a bit too low, the experiments already made and those which are to be made in the squadron will soon furnish the general staff with a basis for the fixation of its view.

In a general way, the maneuvers have made it possible to establish once more the excellent nautical qualities and the ease of handling of our new vessels. But their complexity and the very great number of delicate appliances which they embody require a personnel well prepared for their use and one not subject to too frequent changes. Actually we have made great progress so far as matériel is concerned; there remains to do the same for the personnel.

FLEET NAVAL REVIEW AT LE HAVRE, JULY 3, 1928.

The naval attaché attended the review of the French fleet at Le Havre, July 3, 1928. No opportunity was afforded for inspection, but the vessels which were observed close-to were in a good military condition; they were clean, shipshape, and presented an excellent appearance.

The impression gained from witnessing this review is that the regeneration of the French fleet is in a fair way of being accomplished. This impression is based on appearances, as time did not permit a careful examination of conditions.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS IN FRENCH FLEET.

Vice Admiral Violette, chief of the general staff (naval) at the Ministry of Marine, made the following statement on naval communications:

> From a technical point of view the subject of radio is not one of great difficulty. The operation of radio is another matter. How to arrange matters so the commander in chief can talk to any or all of his individual ships is a difficult question to solve. Each radio operator has need for four ears.

Apparently the French fleet suffers from a lack of or an unsatisfactory operating plan. Their troubles parallel ours to a certain extent. An examination of the fleet organization does not show that there should be difficulties greater than we encounter. They have two light cruiser squadrons and two destroyer flotillas that do not lend themselves, nor do ours, to the classic approach formation or deployment formation in which three squadrons or flotillas would seem preferable. Lack of a submarine tender or suitable submarine flagship would add enormously to the difficulty of communication if, as with us, the submarine force is considered as a separate task force operating directly under the O. T. C. during deployment.

ORGANIZATION OF THE COASTAL DEFENSE.

(Source: M. I. D.)

The defense of seacoasts is vested in the Ministry of Marine, who for that purpose disposes of elements belonging to the army, which are put at the disposal of the navy for this purpose. The coasts of France and north Africa are divided into four great divisions: The Channel, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and north African sectors, each under the command of a vice admiral. The defense of these regions is assured by means of land, sea, and air forces. The responsibility for the defense of the coast is assigned definitely to the navy, but the plans for defense are elaborated by the two ministries working together, and the question of command is settled very clearly and not subordinated to the hazard of circumstances.

Since the seventeenth century the defense of the coast has passed successively from the navy to the army, then back to the navy. The navy had charge of the coast defense before the war, and in fact has had it for a very long time. In France the mission of the navy is largely though not entirely defensive. The need for land troops during all recent years has been so urgent that every available land soldier was required for field service. Originally expediency may thus have been the justification for this French arrangement rather than tactical necessity.

In time of peace the commanders in chief of naval frontiers prepare, in conformity with the directions given by the Minister of Marine, in collaboration with the Minister of War, a defense project which is examined by the two ministers concerned. After the plans have been considered by a board of officers, including representatives from the War and Navy Departments, if this latter course is considered necessary, the ministers decide on the type of organizations to be assigned to the defenses. The commanders in chief of the naval frontiers then prepare, on the basis of the number of men assigned, their defense plans. The final decision as to the number of army forces to be employed with the navy, for coast defense purposes, rests with the Supreme Council of National Defense, composed of certain ministers of France.

The coast fortifications were greatly weakened by the withdrawal during the war of a large number of guns for use on the land front. These guns were not to have been returned to the coast defenses but were to have been retained by the army for use in the field. Hence, at the present time, coast fortifications are in a very deficient state both by reason of lack of material and personnel.

GERMANY

NAVAL

LAUNCHING OF LIGHT CRUISER "KOLN" AT WILHEMSHAVEN.

In connection with the launching of the light cruiser *Koln*, which took place at the Wilhelmshaven Dockyard on May 23, the following data was obtained on a visit subsequent to this date. An invitation to the launching was not extended to the naval attaché, owing, it is understood, to the fact that as the launching took place just before the general elections, it was made something of a political affair, and a great many representatives of the Government were invited, including the minister of defense and important heads of the army and navy.

The launching weight of the *Koln* was said to be approximately 3,300 tons, with boilers and ballast water on board. The launching ways were three in number, a center way under the keel and two side ways. The ways were without camber and said to have an inclination of 1 in 18. The center way had a width of 4½ feet, the side ways being about 10 to 12 feet out and of a width about two-thirds the center way. The calculated pressure on the ways was said to be about 25 tons per square yard and the maximum velocity 16¼ feet per second. It was said that the center way carried the greater part of the weight, the side ways being for the purpose of steadying, and for this reason being well out toward the bilges. The vessel was released by a dog shore tripping arrangement in the center way. In reply to an inquiry as to the reason for the center way in lieu of the conventional arrangement, the reply was made that the structure of the vessel is such that its weight in launching can most logically be taken under the keel. The design of the launching arrangements is understood to have been the work of Constructor Burkhardt, who recently visited the United States.

THE NEW GERMAN DESTROYERS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

Twelve German destroyers are under construction at the dockyard in Wilhelmshaven. The description given in Jane's Fighting Ships, 1927, is quite accurate. On the *Moewe*, the first one completed, it was found necessary to alter the design of the gun mounting of the after gun. This gun mounting on the after-deck house was too high for proper stability of the ship, and the mount has been greatly lowered. The design of the 12 will be modified accordingly.

Officers' quarters on all the new destroyers are aft, the captain having his own cabin and stateroom. There is a separate wardroom, with four officers' staterooms, two of the staterooms being equipped to house two officers each. The crew's quarters are equipped with metal bunks. The general arrangement has the appearance of a number of small compartments on the side of the ship opening inboard, each compartment containing four folding metal bunks, two upper and two lower. In the center of the compartment is a folding table which can be set up for messing, writing, etc. Each compartment has a curtain across the opening so that the four men have practically a private room.

Clothing lockers are installed for all men. Petty officers' berthing places are entirely separate from the berthing places of the enlisted personnel. Crew accommodations exist for 80 men.

REPAIRS TO DESTROYER.

(NOTE.—*In view of the rather drastic limitations placed on the German Navy by the Limitation of Arms Conference Treaty, the following report is of interest:*)

One destroyer was on the ways, supposedly undergoing repairs. Practically nothing of the interior of the hull remained, even the plates and frames being renewed. I was informed that the old machinery and interior compartments would be retained. It is probable that some of the old machinery and some of the better bulkheads will be retained, but most of the interior will be practically new. The officers acting as guides admitted that the overhaul of this destroyer is quite thorough.

HELGOLAND.

At present Helgoland is one of the seaside resorts of northern Germany recommended by physicians to sufferers from hay fever. The population consists of fishermen and people who conduct shops, cafés, and rooming houses for transients. The city is clean and the population seems healthy and thrifty. The population seems to depend on tourists and summer visitors.

The sea wall was destroyed after the war and only part of it remains. Sufficient remains to protect small-boat shipping. A steel and wood pier extends out from shore at the southwest end of the island, the end of the lower level of the island. No steamers go alongside this pier. All traffic between ship and shore is by motor boats. The Hamburg-American Line maintains regular steamer service between Hamburg-Cuxhaven and Helgoland and the North German Lloyd from Bremen to Helgoland. The southwest end of the lower level is a flat on which are a number of buildings that were erected in connection with the naval station before and during the war. These could all be placed in efficient and usable condition in a short time.

The lower level further offers an excellent landing field for planes. Seaplanes could operate easily from waters adjoining the lower level.

The upper level is about 100 feet above the lower and the sides are steep-to all around. The only methods of getting from the lower to the upper level are by a power lift and one concrete and stone stairway. Scaling the cliffs would be impracticable, if not impossible. Numerous concrete emplacements for intermediate guns still remain and could be available for immediate use. No emplacements for heavy guns remain. Underground magazines could be replaced in usable and efficient condition. Rails into the magazines are still in place and in good condition.

Within a week sufficient intermediate-caliber guns could be installed to withstand a minor attack and in a very short time longer heavier guns could be transported to the upper level and Helgoland would be a first-class fortification, capable of resisting any attack. Since the upper level is all rock, bombs from airplanes would not be effective.

Destruction of all fortifications on Helgoland was required by the Versailles treaty, but Helgoland remains a potential fort guarding the entrance to the Elbe and Weser Rivers.

GREAT BRITAIN

NAVAL

THE SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

The floating dock.—The first section of the 50,000-ton floating dock built for the British Admiralty left Newcastle-on-Tyne on its 8,500-mile voyage to Singapore on June 21. The whole dock was constructed in the record time of 10 months, and the towing is being done by tugs furnished and manned by the Dutch firm of L. Smit & Co., international tug service, Rotterdam. The average speed of the tow is to be 3 miles an hour and the dock is expected at the island of Tebran Reach, near Singapore, about November 14, voyaging via Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Aden, and Colombo. The passage through the Suez Canal is expected to take two days. The dock is 178 feet wide, and there will therefore be about 10 feet of clearance on either side as it passes through the narrowest portions of the canal. The complete dock will be able to dock three destroyers abreast and can accommodate the largest warships. According to the latest data available, the cost of the dock has been approximately

£1,250,000. The builders are quoted as saying that it is the largest naval structure of its kind in the world.

Geographical position.—Singapore is an island approximately in latitude 1° north, off the native State of Johore, at the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula. The passage between Johore and the island is less than a mile in width and is crossed by a railway viaduct, while the south side of the island is separated from the Dutch East Indies by the Singapore Strait, 9 miles across. The commercial port is on the south side. The government-owned harbor and naval yard is on the north side, facing Johore and to the east of the viaduct.

Singapore is the halfway point between India and China and the junction of all the routes connecting the Indian Ocean with the China Sea; the only alternative gateway of importance between these two seas is the Strait of Sunda, beyond the Equator, 500 miles to the southward.

One of the most important aspects of the potentialities of Singapore lies in its geographical position with reference to India. An examination of the map will show that there are only four sea routes into the Indian Ocean:

(*a*) From the Atlantic via the Cape of Good Hope;
(*b*) From the Atlantic via the Suez Canal;
(*c*) From the Pacific south of Australia; and
(*d*) From the Pacific via the Straits of Malacca.

The Suez Canal is under guard of British arms, and any power proposing to attack India by that route would first have to overcome the British Navy and drive the British troops from Egypt.

The Straits of Malacca are guarded by Singapore, and so long as Great Britain holds command of the sea this gateway to India is also secure. Routes (*a*) and (*c*) are flanked by British bases and fueling stations and are too long to be practicable for a hostile fleet without intermediate bases. Such a fleet arriving in the Indian Ocean by one of these routes would do so with exhausted bunkers and reduced power due to fouled bottoms.

Commercial importance.—Owing to its situation at one of the important focal points of world-trade routes, Singapore, in the last century, has developed into a port of great commercial importance, clearing annually from its harbor a volume of tonnage equal to one-half of that of Liverpool.

Fueling station.—Fairly extensive arrangements for oil-fuel storage for naval purposes have already been made at Singapore. Regardless of the projected naval base, there are always British war vessels calling there for oil fuel. This establishment and regular requirement, together with the possibility of spending money appropriated under separate headings, have doubtless enabled the Admiralty to proceed so rapidly as practically to have already completed adequate oil-fuel storage. The original installation at Singapore consisted of two tanks at the Admiralty wharf in Keppel Harbor.

Not far from the oil wharf in Keppel Harbor and adjoining Alexandra barracks is a place called Normanton. Here there has been erected a total of 40 large tanks, each understood to be of 12,000 tons capacity. This installation is connected with pipe line to the Keppel Harbor oil wharf. Normanton is practically a part of Singapore city and is reckoned to be about 15 miles from the base site at Seletar.

Crossing the island from Normanton in a northeasterly direction, perhaps 10 miles by direct road, is a native village called Mandai, which is about 5 miles by road from the base reservation. Here there has been completed another group of 38 oil tanks, stated also to be of 12,000 tons capacity each. This installation is connected by pipe line with Normanton and Keppel Harbor and is to be connected with the base.

Between Mandai and Woodlands (the beginning of the Johore Causeway) there are understood to be two underground tanks of 8,000 tons capacity each. Two similar underground tanks are said to be proposed for the base site in addition to 36 proposed tanks above ground there of the same capacity as those at Normanton and Mandai. Two additional tanks are also understood to be proposed for Mandai, bringing the total there to 40. The Keppel, Normanton, and Mandai groups of tanks are all now used for oil storage and probably at present contain a total of close to a million tons of fuel oil. Tankers, mainly those under Admiralty operation, are continuously coming into Singapore delivering fuel oil from Persia or Borneo. Commercial-oil people express the opinion that there are already stored in Singapore, roundly, 5,000,000 barrels, according to American measurements, of fuel oil owned by the British Admiralty.

Flying field.—There is an emergency landing field for commercial planes in Singapore. The Government, anticipating the need for such a field, has allotted a special tract of level land which may be adapted and developed into a suitable aviation field. The field is listed on the new maps of the town of Singapore as the "Aviation Field." This section of land is owned by the Government, the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements (British Empire), and inasmuch as the Government is endeavoring to retain all unleased land on or near the island of Singapore for possible use in connection with the new naval base, it is not likely that this plot will pass into private control. Other than machines connected with the British Government, very few airplanes visit Singapore. The Admiralty has a number of planes in connection with the defense of the naval base, but they are provided with a special landing field near the site of the proposed base. The officers of the Royal Air Force now stationed at Singapore are one senior officer of the works and buildings staff, two assistant civil engineers, one assistant surveyor, and one works accountant.

Regardless of the progress made on the base itself, it would seem there should promptly be some development of air-defense facilities if for no other reason than that such are immediately called for by the already completed fuel-oil tank installations.

Land-defense forces.—The present land defenses at Singapore, staffed by the royal artillery forces of the British Army, are not extensive, the British Army estimates for 1928 providing for a total for Malaya during the year of 1,462, all ranks.

Naval base.—When fully fortified and developed Singapore will fulfill all the conditions necessary for an overseas base, as not only will it be able to defend itself from sea-borne attack but its geographical position and the narrow approaches to it will make any such attack peculiarly hazardous. At the same time the nature of the country to the north and the fact that it stands on an island render it comparatively safe from land attack, while for the same reasons attack by air would either have to be sea borne or based such a distance away as in either case materially to reduce the size of machine employed and the weight of bombs carried.

The original base reservation consists of about 2,500 acres of rubber plantations and mangrove swamp. It occupies much of the coast of the district of Seletar. The shore of the mainland opposite comes as close as a half mile to Singapore Island and recedes about 4 miles as the straits widen out toward the China Sea. The straits are considered to extend about 10 miles from the base to the open sea and about 4 miles in the opposite direction from the base to the Johore Causeway. This causeway was completed two years ago and blocks passage of the straits from east to west, and vice versa, excepting for small native vessels which can work through narrow locks at the Johore end. The entire distance by water from the base at Seletar to Singapore Harbor is about 30 miles.

With the original reservation on Singapore Island and an area of unknown acreage across in Johore, the base is stated to have a frontage of 6 miles on the straits.

Cost.—The annual total appropriation for Singapore in the British naval estimates for 1928 is £216,000.

In a report of the discussion of the naval estimates for the fiscal year which began April 1, 1926, the total cost of the Singapore naval base was estimated at £9,414,500. This estimate did not include the cost of machinery (£1,000,000), navigation aids and seaward defenses (£562,500), minor sums for furniture, etc., the cost of the oil-fuel tanks (£950,000), and the cost of the floating dock. Without going into too detailed discussion of the various items and estimates, it may safely be said that the base alone will cost a total of about £10,000,000, of which no great amount has so far been actually expended.

An appreciable part of this total cost is expected to be met by contributions from the various British colonies and Dominions concerned. So far some of the most important contributions have been from Malaya. The Straits Settlements contributed the acreage for the base, which cost about £146,000. The Federated Malay States have made a contribution of £2,000,000. This sum will not all go to the Admiralty for actual base work. Some of it will go to the Air Ministry and to the army for use in connection with supplementary work for the fortification and protection of the base.

The colony of Hong Kong is recorded as having donated a total of £250,000. Owing to the adverse influence upon its business prosperity caused by disturbed conditions in China, there is small likelihood that this colony will be in a position to make further substantial contributions. There is perhaps further discouragement in the generally understood plan that Singapore, with its naval base, will supersede Hong Kong as the British outpost in naval and other affairs in the Far East.

The various British Dominions, Australia and New Zealand in particular, have been expected to make handsome contributions, and the New Zealand government has announced a donation of £1,000,000.

International aspects.—Weighing all well-reasoned expressions of opinion available, together with considerations of a geographical nature, it would not seem that the British naval base at Singapore is necessarily aimed at Japan. It is important to British interests, of course, that there be some method of influencing Japanese potentialities in the control of the Pacific. The Anglo-Japanese treaty might be considered as having provided such influence for the British, or it might be said to have provided a means whereby Britain could have some advance assurance as to Japanese intentions in possible Far Eastern conflicts regardless of the nations immediately concerned. The abrogation of that treaty, following the Washington conference, leaves something to be desired in the control or assurance indicated, and the base at Singapore might possibly be considered as at least a moral encouragement to Japan to continue the old arrangement of working with rather than against Britain.

All things considered, it would seem more reasonable to advance the opinion that the Singapore naval base is aimed at no one power or international complication in particular. Britain's interests as a whole in the East are too vast to allow them to be jeopardized by neglect.

Recent developments have in a sense challenged and, perhaps, compromised these interests which must have adequate defense possibilities, although, as many think likely, such defense may never be called into physical use. Japan may or may not be a menace. There has been also Russia's aggressiveness in China, which, while it may never permanently affect British interests, will flourish less under the shadow of a Singapore naval base than it would without. The Chinese themselves, in what may for purposes of argument be accepted as legitimate national activities, might be encouraged to proceed further in threatening British interests if there were no adequate defense base in this area. In any event, British naval forces in the East appear to be in the way of permanently increasing, and their need of a first-class base is obvious.

Broadly speaking, the naval strategy of the British Empire may be summed up as consisting in the defense of imperial sea communications.

A modern battleship can carry coal for 10 days' steaming. In the same space she can carry oil for 22 days, or, by utilizing double bottoms and other means, enough for 56 days' steaming.

A glance at a map will show that Singapore may be regarded as the geographical center of the Empire, and that from it a modern capital ship can reach across the Pacific or the Indian Ocean without refueling.

On the other hand, without a first-class naval base at Singapore, the battle fleet of the Empire might be shut out of the Pacific for want of docking and repairing facilities. At the present time the only docks capable of taking a modern battleship or aircraft carrier, i. e., one with a beam of approximately 100 feet, are in the United Kingdom.

It will therefore be seen why the British regard Singapore as a vital necessity to the security of British trade routes and the defense of Australia and New Zealand, as well as other parts of the Empire.

ROYAL INDIAN NAVY.

Ever since a flag officer was appointed to the Royal Indian Navy there has been a good deal of discussion in naval circles concerning the functions which this force would fulfill, for the failure of the first elaborate scheme for the reconstitution of the old Royal Indian Marine left a good many points in the air. The matter has been settled officially, and the Government has announced that the area of the force's operations will be limited to the high seas between the Cape of Good Hope on the west and the Straits of Magellan on the east, with any territorial waters between those limits. On the face of it this appears to include the whole of the Pacific, and it may be taken for granted that it is the intention of the Government that the Indian Navy shall form an integral part of the eastern fleet when it is formed on the outbreak of war by joining up of the China, Australian, New Zealand, East Indian, and Cape squadrons. Just how far the Indian Navy will be able to go is still uncertain, but if any considerable number of sloops and small craft are placed in commission it will form a very useful adjunct to the eastern fleet, whose trouble is bound to be the shortage of small craft. The war proved that the big cruiser transports which had been built for the old Royal Indian Marine were of very little use on actual service, and the reconstituted force certainly will not make it any more fit to take over big ships. But it ought to be able to handle small craft excellently, and there is no doubt that the next emergency will see a very urgent call for their services. If the proposed scope of the new Indian Navy is restricted to its obvious limitations it should prove an exceedingly useful force, particularly to British commerce.

PROMOTION OF OFFICERS IN THE ROYAL NAVY.

Once again the midsummer naval promotions to captain and commander have been announced, and as usual there has been a good deal of heartburning over the list. The well-established zones of promotion prevent a good deal of unnecessary hope, but when one notes that the senior commander promoted to captain was the one hundred and eleventh on the list and the senior lieutenant commander was the two hundred and fourth, one can well understand the disappointments of those above them. The list of lieutenant commanders getting their oak leaves is a particularly restricted one as regards seniority, but both captains' and commanders' lists include some particularly noteworthy officers. At the same time several officers who were regarded as certain for their promotion have been passed over and several of these will be very near the age of the promotion zone before the next list comes out at the end of December.

ROYAL AIR FORCE OPERATING WITH THE ROYAL NAVY.

The difficulties over the naval air arm are not by any means over, and the fleet is still most dissatisfied over the arrangement with the Royal Air Force. Protests have been made in and out of season ever since the air force has been established, but these have always been waved aside and the navy has been told that a separate air force for all purposes is the only way to obtain efficiency. Hitherto practically all the complaints have come from the naval side and have been disregarded, but now the Royal Air Force is taking its part and is protesting strongly against the arrangements for the seniority of officers. When a naval officer is sent flying he retains his naval rank and is very frequently senior to the Royal Air Force officer under whom he is serving. Neither side likes it, but the navy is tired of making complaints and is glad that the sister service is having its turn. The obvious way out of the difficulty, of course, is to give the navy back its own air service and to train officers to fly with a special view to naval service and nothing else, returning them to the line when their flying life is over. This is what the navy has been agitating for ever since the Royal Naval Air Service was abolished during the war and it is most sincerely to be hoped that the complaints of the Royal Air Force will result in a move being made.

INSPECTION OF BRITISH FLOTILLA LEADER "AMBUSCADE."

Flotilla leaders.—The outside appearance of the *Amazon* and the *Ambuscade* is as shown in 1927 Jane, and the data concerning these ships in Jane are correct except as noted below.

The workmanship and the finish outside and inside of these boats are excellent. The general arrangement is the same in both except the dimensions given in Jane are incorrect, as the *Ambuscade* is within a few inches of the same length as the *Amazon*. The space between decks is noticeably high and there is sufficient room in the forecastle for the berthing of the entire crew, the officers' quarters being aft.

Having been escorted around the *Ambuscade* by the captain, who is the senior commanding officer, and not being taken into the crew's quarters, I inquired concerning the latter and was informed that the berthing and messing arrangements are similar to those of other English destroyers. The commanding officers' quarters extend the width of the ship, and are located with the after bulkhead just aft of the forward bulkhead of the after deck house, with the stateroom and bath on the port side. The quarters are spacious. Just abaft of the commanding officer's quarters are quarters for the remainder of the ship's officers with the exception of the doctor. These quarters, including the wardroom, are roomy and comfortable and all have high deck space. The commanding officer messes alone. The stateroom for the doctor is on the forecastle deck underneath the closed navigating bridge. Abaft of the inclosed navigating bridge on the port side is the chart house and on the starboard side is the emergency cabin for the commanding officer.

The built-in furniture in the officers' quarters has metal framing with wooden panels and the staterooms and cabins are lined with fireproof wood.

No arrangement was made originally in the officers' quarters for emergency lighting, and a temporary emergency lighting system has been installed by the ship's company by connecting up to batteries on board.

On the *Ambuscade* every attempt has been made to save weight by the use of aluminum in such places as battle ports, lights, ventilating ducts, etc.

The whole steelwork is particularly good, the galvanizing excellent. There are strong beams in the way of firerooms with outside doubling plates. No welding was noticeable. The water-tight doors are very light, those on the sides of the forward circular bulkhead of the forward deck house being reinforced in the back with crossed **T** irons. Water-tight manholes have only one dog on each. Ladders are all of light construction, with wooden treads on the weather decks.

The inclosed navigating bridge did not give the unobstructed view found in our destroyers. There are installed the usual instruments for communications for handling ship. No unusual installation was noticeable.

The upper bridge has a duralumin metal screen and on this bridge the signal apparatus, gun and torpedo controls, and a range finder are installed.

In the deck house below the inclosed navigating bridge is a fairly large compartment which in ordinary times is used as a crew's recreation room, but a temporary longitudinal bulkhead has been installed and the starboard side used as a crew's canteen. Just aft of this compartment is a compartment which is used as a place for storing small arms and other equipment.

There are two galleys in the ship, that for the crew being amidships under the after end of the forecastle and that for the officers being in the after starboard side of the after deck house. A midday meal was being prepared for the crew and showed a good variety and cooking. General mess system is not used and each mess buys from its allowance what is desired. All ranges in the galleys are coal-burning.

On each side under the after end of the forecastle and outboard are washrooms for the crew, engineers on the port side and deck force on the starboard side. These contain heavy hinged bowls.

The weather decks are singularly free from hamper.

All decks in the living quarters are covered with linoleum, and there are strips of linoleum on the upper decks around the officers' quarters.

There are no nettings fitted outboard on the life lines. Cocoa matting is used in bad weather on the upper decks and is held in place by metal strips similar to those used on our destroyers. Corrugated strips are placed on the galley deck.

Boats carried are all hoisted by hand, the davits being of the Welland type.

Each vessel had the letter D with its number painted across the stern in letters and figures about 6 feet high. These were the only identification marks except for a brass name plate on each side of the after bulkhead of the after deck house.

The ventilation of these ships is excellent. and from the fact that the deck spaces are high it is evident that they were designed for work in the Tropics.

The difference in tonnage between the two ships is in the small difference in tons of oil carried and the saving of weight by the use of light-weight material in the *Ambuscade.* When fully loaded the *Amazon* displaces 1,800 tons and the *Ambuscade* about 1,650.

The commanding officer of the *Ambuscade* stated that he had been in destroyers for 12 years and had never seen a better sea boat than the *Ambuscade;* that she was high enough forward to insure her being dry and that he was told by the builders that 50 tons more could be distributed about on the forecastle without altering the fine seagoing qualities of the ship.

With all due respect to the seagoing qualities and the good construction, a number of rust streaks were noticeable on the forward bulkhead of the forward deck house where fresh paint had not been applied.

Engineering operations.—These vessels are in the steaming competition set down by the Admiralty, and it was stated that they are very economical in their operation. The cruising speed from Portsmouth, England, to Buenos Aires was 12½ knots and was made on the cruising turbines.

The complement of the engineer and fire room personnel is as follows: Engine room, 5 petty officers, 1 junior petty officer, 4 men; boiler rooms, 1 petty officer, 6 water tenders, 18 firemen; total, 35.

Nothing concerning rules for steaming competitions could be ascertained.

Radio.—There is but one radio station on these vessels and that is forward under the bridge. No information could be gained concerning the installation, as the commanding officer stated that before leaving England he was told by the Admiralty to allow no visitors in the radio room or to give any information concerning the radio installation. He did, however, state that they had a small telephone installation on board that they used for short distances and with which they used the usual Morse code. Outside of the radiotelephone installation they had but one receiver and could receive on but one wave length at a time, and that the power gave them a sending radius of about 500 miles. No information could be obtained about procedure. They carry one chief petty officer and three other radio men, all of whom were trained at their radio school. It was stated that they make no attempt to train radio men on board.

There was no auxiliary radio station, and from what could be ascertained no radio compass was installed. It was noticed that aerials and rigging were well insulated.

Visual signals.—Except in thick weather, visual signals are generally used. These consist of flag hoists, the usual blinker at the mast head, a small signal searchlight on each side of the upper bridge, and an old-fashioned semaphore machine, such as we have discarded, on each side on the open deck of the lower bridge. The commanding officer stated that they did not use hand flags.

Navy ordnance, general information.—All ordnance material on board was in a very clean condition and from conversation with the commanding officer and one of the petty officers they considered the material as absolutely reliable, as it had given them no difficulty. No information, however, could be obtained concerning any practices held or any ranges at which the guns had been fired.

Depth charges.—The allowance of depth charges for these ships is 12 for each, carried on deck. Size and weight were not discovered. There are no depth charges on board.

Depth-charge tracks and throwers.—On the port side aft there is installed a depth-charge track, with the usual angle-iron construction. The track on the *Ambuscade* extends out well over the stern, due to the sloping Yarrow stern on that vessel. There are two depth-charge throwers, Vickers type, one on each side outboard just forward of the after deck house. Depth charges can be fired from the throwers either from the control station on the upper bridge or at the throwers themselves, and the depth charges on the tracks can be released hydraulically either from the fire-control station or at the track itself.

Fire control, general.—The fire-control station is on the upper bridge for guns, torpedoes, and depth charges. This bridge is also the battle station of the commanding officer.

Fire control, director.—The fire-control director is inclosed in a light-metal revolving tower on the upper bridge. This tower was closed and locked and the commanding officer stated that he had orders not to allow it to be seen or to give any information concerning the director. He stated, however, that it was a navy design. The instruments at the guns were covered and could not be seen.

Gas, gas screens, gas shells, gas projectors.—In an attempted conversation with the commanding officer concerning gas, its method of use and protection, the subject was imediately changed and no information obtained. It was noticed, however, that no measures had been taken at the outlets of voice tubes for the prevention of intake of gas.

Gas masks.—Gas masks are carried on board, but no information could be obtained as to the type.

Glasses (ordnance).—All ordnance glasses were apparently under lock and key, but on inquiry I was informed that they were the usual prismatic glasses.

Guns, main battery.—The 4.7 guns are short and look to be about .40 caliber in length. They have an elevation, as shown by the elevating arc, of 30°, and I was informed that they have a very long recoil. The guns are of the Vickers type. The guns may be fired together from the director station or by the pointer electrically or by percussion.

Guns, machine.—Two Lewis machine guns are carried and there is a mount on each side of the bridge deck just outside the inclosed navigating bridge.

Guns, antiaircraft.—Antiaircraft guns are of the Vickers machine-gun type, mounted on the platform between the two smokestacks. These guns were said to be unsatisfactory for rapid firing. The ammunition is fed by belt, each belt containing 20 rounds, and they are either filled from the forward magazine or ready-service boxes on the platform. The range of these guns is said to be 4,400 yards.

Guns, small-arms.—Each ship carries 50 rifles of the standard pattern.

Gun mounts, except turret mounts.—Gun mounts are Vickers type.

Listening devices.—No information could be obtained concerning listening devices.

Magazines.—Magazines for 4.7 guns are forward and aft. Ammunition is whipped up by hand. The ammunition for each gun is passed up through separate scuttles.

Powder, projectiles.—The ammunition for the 4.7 guns is separate. No projectiles were seen.

Range finders.—The range finder is mounted on the upper fire-control bridge. It is 3 meters long and is installed so as to give unobstructed use. Due to excessive vibration on the *Ambuscade*, heavy structural doublers and other methods have been used in the way of the range finder and fire-control tower.

Sights.—Not enough time was given to make an inspection of the sights of the guns, but what was seen gave no indication of anything exceptional in the type cross-connecting sight. The dials showed ranges up to 18,000 yards, and on the dial was a second set of ranges for muzzle velocity of 2,600 feet per second, the other scale being for

2,400. The sight setter is stationed on the left of the gun forward of the pointer and operates both range and deflection. A small step-by-step range-receiving instrument was visible; also the loud-speaking telephone. The telephone receiver and transmitter, which were stationary, were inclosed in the same box and the box was secured to the forward plate of the light-gun shield. Telescopes were not mounted, but inboard of the mounting of the telescope was a long open-bar sight.

Smoke bombs.—No smoke bombs or smoke boxes were in evidence and no information could be obtained concerning their use.

Star shells.—No information could be obtained about star shells.

Torpedoes.—No information could be gained concerning the torpedoes except that they are 21-inch and, the commanding officer stated, 45 knots. On inquiry as to what range they were generally fired, especially at their practice laid out for the year, he stated that a great deal depended on the commander of the flotilla, and that they carried out yearly practices as laid down by the Admiralty, but he would not divulge the ranges at which the practices were carried on. The torpedoes are fired either from the torpedo control on the upper bridge or at the tube itself. Apparently most of the firing is done at the tube. Powder impulse is used.

No information could be gained as to what air pressure the torpedo was charged except in the neighborhood of 3,000. All that was seen of the director was a small box with three windows for each nest of tubes, apparently an indicator as to which tubes to fire. They stated that they fired the tubes singly, beginning with the after tube of the after group, and that they did not fire torpedoes from the after and forward groups at the same time, due to the likelihood of their colliding on the run.

Torpedo tubes.—Torpedo tubes are triply mounted in a triangle method, the single tube being at the apex of the triangle. The tubes are trained by hand. From a statement, no trouble has been experienced in firing, such as damaging the torpedoes.

Engineering, general.—On the trials of the *Ambuscade* trouble developed and three shafts on one trial and the fourth on another trial were bent and the experimental Yarrow boiler burned out a number of bricks. It was stated by one of the petty officers that they dared not now run the vessel up to its maximum power. There are 3 periods of very bad vibration, 2 between 20 and 25 knots and 1 about 30 knots. In a conversation with a representative of the Bethlehem Steel Co. concerning the boats he stated that he had seen the engine and the fire rooms and that the designs there were simpler than in our destroyers. The engine room and fireroom were roomy and clean and the installations uncomplicated.

Boilers, including steam piping.—The boilers are easy-steaming boilers. Two boiler rooms with one standard Yarrow boiler in the forward boiler room and one standard and one special Yarrow boiler in the after fireroom. The after end of this special boiler extends into the engine room with a bulkhead built around it. The standard boilers have two water drums, one steam drum, superheater, of the small-tube type and 13 burners each. The special boiler has three water drums; one steam drum is of the small-tube type, induced draft of heated air by motor-driven fans. The number of burners was not ascertained, but there are less than in large boilers. The small boiler gives about 10 per cent better economy when used alone on the cruising turbine than does the standard Yarrow boiler of the *Amazon* in similar use.

It was stated by an engineer petty officer that the firerooms were comfortably cool.

The steam pressure is 300 pounds; at the boiler gauge superheated 200°. The air pressure in the firerooms is said to be 4½ inches. Steam piping is well laid out, but it was noticed that some of it under the engine-room floor plates was not lagged. Aluminum castings are used in all pipe lines in place of brass.

Closed feed-water system with no hot well. The air-pump discharge goes direct to the feed pump and make-up feed from the reserve feed tank is regulated by an automatic valve. There are no steam lines outside of the engine and fire rooms except to the anchor engine and heating coils in fuel-oil tanks.

Officer's and crew's quarters are heated by small coal-burning stoves.

Auxiliary machinery.—The main feed pump, which is turbine-driven, is in the engine room. Two steam-driven Weir-type auxiliary feed pumps are installed in each fireroom, one vertical and one horizontal. There are two vertical turbine-type motor-driven forced-draft fans in each fireroom. The anchor engine is a small steam engine with a capstan on the forecastle deck.

The steering engine is electrical.

There is a vertical steam air compressor with four stages, giving 4,800 pounds pressure. The ships have one evaporator and no distiller. The condensers are underneath the turbines. There is no auxiliary condenser.

Electrical equipment.—There are two electrically driven circulating pumps and two turbo-generators with reduction gear. These turbo-generators are installed one on each side at the after bulkhead of the engine room. The main switchboard is in the after end of the engine room and is inclosed in a glass panel.

All wiring is lead-covered and presents a good appearance.

The telephones about the ship, which are few in number, are used principally for fire control and have their transmitters and receivers inclosed in a weather-proof box.

The main searchlight appears to be a 24-inch searchlight, but power could not be obtained. It is located on an after platform, as shown in Jane, and can be locally controlled or controlled from the fire-control bridge. It has a shutter for signaling. On the forward end of this same platform is the auxiliary steering station. These ships have more electrical equipment than is found on the Argentine leader *Cervantes.*

Ventilation of the ship is by electricity. There are supply and exhaust fans to the engine room and supply fans and natural exhaust to officers' and crew's quarters. There are copper cowl vents on the main deck just aft of the engine room.

It was stated that even with this ventilation the engine room was very hot and that the personnel have recourse to cooling themselves with buckets of water.

Fuel.—The fuel capacity, as shown in Jane, is carried in six inner bottoms and four tanks. Fueling is done through four fueling pipes, two on each side, which connect directly with the tanks from where the oil can be pumped to any other of the oil-carrying tanks. Fueling pipes are flush with the deck. It was stated that these boats could fuel as fast as the oil could be pumped in, but no definite time for fueling was known. Fuel apparently is of good quality, as there were no complaints and no clogging of burners. Apparently no test has been made of the time to bring a cold boiler to the point where it can be cut in with the other steaming boilers.

Microphones.—It was stated that there was no microphone installation.

Radio direction finders.—There was no evidence of a radio direction-finder installation.

Turbines.—There are independent steam lines to the cruising units. The cruising turbines are good for 15 knots, but when used the experimental boiler on the *Ambuscade* is generally used alone, and they consider the safe limit of this boiler 12.5 knots.

I was informed by the commanding officer that they had experienced some difficulty in the forward row of blading in the high-pressure turbines and that they had cut out that entire row, but it did not seem to alter the efficiency of the plant or to throw the turbine out of balance. Also, that instead, as stated in Jane, of the low-pressure turbine being Parsons, all turbines were Brown-Curtis.

There are no sight-feed gauges for the oiling system of the main turbines, so-called twinklers being used, which are red and white markers revolving and inclosed in glass cases near each bearing visible from the operating platforms. When the flow of oil stops the marker stops revolving.

Revolutions at full speed: High-pressure turbine, 2,800; low-pressure turbine, 2,400.

The commanding officer stated that with half load the ship had made a tenth over or a tenth under 38 knots, but with full load she would make about 36½ knots.

Reduction gears.—Reduction gears have the following gear ratios: High-pressure turbine, 7 to 1; low-pressure turbine, 6 to 1.

Propellers.—No information could be gained concerning propellers. At full speed they turn up 400 revolutions. The propeller guards are small, which shows an unusual breadth of beam in the way of propellers.

Fleet.—The organization is by flotillas of two divisions of four boats each and a flotilla leader. The usual method of cruising is the wedge method, with the leading ship of one division on the starboard quarter and the leading ship of the other division on the port quarter of the flotilla leader.

Movements.—The *Amazon* and the *Ambuscade* visited Montevideo and Buenos Aires and left the latter port for the Falkland Islands; thence through the Straits of Magellan to Talcahuano, Valparaiso, Callao, Guayaquil, Balboa, where they will transit the canal; thence to Jamaica, Bermuda, and back to an English port.

GREECE

NAVAL

ORGANIZATION OF NAVY DEPARTMENT.

The Greek Navy Department, or Ministry of Marine, is presided over by the Minister of Marine, who has to assist him a rear admiral, who is known as the Director General of the Ministry of Marine.

The ministry is composed of five branches, or "directions," each under a captain or a commander, and a general staff, which has a rear admiral as chief of the general staff.

The five branches of the ministry and the subsections of each branch are as follows:

(*a*) The administration branch:

- Personnel section.
- Recruiting section.
- Communication section.
- Archives section.
- Sanitary section.

(*b*) The technical services branch:
    Artillery section.
    Torpedo section.
    Aeronautic section.
    Submarine section.
    Naval construction section.
    Engineering section.
    Naval works section.
(*c*) The provisions branch:
    Supply (for personnel) section.
    Matériel section.
(*d*) The hydrographic service branch:
    Geodetic section.
    Navigation section.
    Hydrographic section.
(*e*) Commissariat branch:
    Section for inspection of expenditures for the personnel.
    Section for inspection of general expenditures.
    Section for inspection of matériel.
    Accountability section.

The general staff of the navy, which is a separate establishment within the ministry, has four branches, which are known, respectively, as A, B, C, and D. The duties of these branches are set forth below:

A. Matériel and organization.
B. Plans.
C. Recruiting and training.
D. Intelligence, historical studies, and examinations.

HOLLAND

POLITICAL

AMALGAMATION OF DUTCH DEPARTMENTS OF WAR AND NAVY INTO A SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO TAKE EFFECT SEPTEMBER 1, 1928.

An announcement designating September 1, 1928, as the date for putting into effect the royal order of September 27, 1920 and of the law of February 20, 1928, concerning abolishing of the Departments of Navy and War and the inauguration of a Department of Defense has been made.

There is great activity now in these departments in moving and other preparatory measures in preparation for this measure, which is to go into effect September 1 next.

ITALY

NAVAL

VISIT TO NAVAL PROVING GROUND AT SPEZIA.

It was understood that this was the most important naval proving ground in Italy. It was found, however, that the Spezia proving ground is used exclusively for tests of armor plate and projectiles, while all range firing and tests of antiaircraft guns and fire control are made at the Viareggio proving ground, which is south of Spezia.

Test of armor plate.—The armor plate to be tested is set up inside of tunnels drilled in the side of a mountain. These tunnels are stone lined and of sufficient size to permit the firing of guns of the heaviest calibers. Muzzle velocities are at present measured by means of Boulenger chronographs. During the visit armor plate, made by the Ansaldo Co. of Italy, about 4 inches thick, was being tested by firing with a 155-mm. gun. The plate was set an at angle of 30°.

Solonoid chronograph.—Arrangements were being made to install a solonoid chronograph system which had been purchased from Siemans, of Germany. It was said that with this German system the current flowed continually through the coils, it being unnecessary to magnetize the projectile before firing.

Loose liners for guns.—During the conversation with Commander Martinengo, the officer in charge of tests at Spezia, it was learned that loose liners for guns were being tested. He stated that two systems were under consideration:

(*a*) A loose liner made of low-quality steel, quite thick.

(*b*) A thin liner of high-quality steel.

Up to the present time no decision has been reached as to which type of liner would be adopted.

Antiaircraft fire-control system.—It was learned that the Pittoni antiaircraft fire-control director has been adopted by the Italian Navy. This system was adopted by the Italian Navy after testing the Vickers fire-control system. Commander Martinengo stated that he believed the Vickers system was easier to operate and required less training of personnel. The Pittoni system is said to be more theoretically accurate than the Vickers system. Later, during a visit at the San Giorgio plant at Turin, five Pittoni fire-control directors were observed under manufacture. While no explanation of this apparatus would be given, it could be seen to consist of several revolving drums carrying paper scales. The instrument was mounted on a large metal base about 4 inches long by 3 inches wide. No stabilizing gyroscopes were seen. This passing glance at the Pittoni system gave one the impression that the apparatus was quite crude in construction and doubtless largely manual in its operation.

Ammunition.—It was stated that trouble had been experienced with brass cartridge cases for guns of about 150 mm. caliber when using high-chamber pressures. Experiments are being made in an attempt to develop a cartridge case with a steel base, or steel reinforcement at the base, which would withstand high pressure and could be used more than once without resizing. The Italian Navy uses carton loading for high-explosive shells.

Mechanical fuzes.—The Galileo mechanical fuze is being tested at Spezia.

ITALIAN LIGHT CRUISER " TRIESTE."

The light cruiser *Trieste* which is completing alongside a fitting-out pier was visited. Different estimated dates of completion were given, but it is not believed that this vessel can be commissioned for service before the autumn of this year. The complement of officers has been assigned and are on hand at the dockyard. We were shown about the ship by Captain Aiello, who is assigned as commanding officer, and representatives of the shipyard.

Main Battery Arrangements.

The main battery consists of eight 8″ .50-caliber guns built by Ansaldo, mounted in four turrets. These guns were already mounted. The turret framing is erected, but the plating has not yet been installed. The guns are mounted very close together in a single slide, the distance apart at the breach being about 1 inch and where the guns leave the gun house about 6 inches. The guns are capable of an angle of elevation of 45°, and the captain stated that he expected the rate of fire to be about four rounds per gun per minute. The guns are equipped with hydraulic-pneumatic recoil counterrecoil mechanism, and the breach mechanism is hydraulic-pneumatic with hand auxiliary. The electrically operated ammunition hoists are located directly in the rear of the guns, the shell hoists inboard of the powder hoists. The loading trays were observed to be of the tilting type and housed in a vertical position. The loading position is at 1° elevation. The rammer is electrically operated with hand auxiliary. The powder hoists deliver the powder to the turret in metal containers, one bag in each can, two bags to a charge, and the bags are not removed from these containers until ready for loading. The 5-meter range finder is mounted on the rear side of the ammunition hoist structure. The barbette appeared to be approximately 3 inches thick. The turret arrangements as a whole appeared neat and compact.

Secondary Battery Arrangements.

The secondary battery is not yet installed, but it will consist of sixteen 4″ .50-caliber antiaircraft guns mounted in twin mounts, four mounts on a broadside. The forward mount on each side will be installed in an elevated towerlike structure, giving a clear range ahead. Power (electric) elevating and training, two speeds. Hand-loading. Maximum angle of elevation, 85°.

Torpedo Battery.

The torpedo tubes are now installed and the battery consists of four twin 21-inch above-water tubes. Mounts are staggered fore and aft on the second deck amidships, their position fixed normal to the center line.

Catapult.

The catapult runway is installed on the forecastle amidships, and it was stated that the catapult would be of the air type. Three planes will be carried and stowage space is provided in a specially designed compartment located below decks just forward of No. 1 turret. Power hoists are provided on deck for hoisting and lowering planes through the T-shaped hatch.

Engines and Boilers.

Electric power is to be furnished by three turbo-electric 150-kilowatt dynamos, and for port use two Diesel-driven 150-kilowatt dynamos will be provided. It was stated that the contract called for a speed of 35 knots and 2,500 miles at 25 knots.

Bridge Arrangements.

The navigating bridge is inclosed and surrounds a conning tower the floor of which is slightly elevated above the bridge floor, with the door in the rear. The conning tower armor appeared to be about 3 inches in thickness and is provided with the conventional slits for outside vision. The bridge extends forward of the conning tower and the metal work is of bronze. Small wings, port and starboard, are provided for pelorus stands and space allotted to chart house and emergency cabin.

Fire-Control Arrangements.

No fire-control apparatus is at present installed, but it was stated that the equipment for both 8 inch and 4 inch will be furnished by the Galileo Works, Florence. It was previously understood that the *Trieste* would get the Barr & Stroud system, but it now appears that the equipment manufactured there will be put in the *Trento.* The Galileo system is of the self-synchronous type. Director and control stations are provided in the foremast and mainmast for both the main and secondary batteries. Four group control is provided for the secondary battery. Six 5-meter coincidence type range finders will be provided, one in each of the four turrets and two outside.



MAP SHOWING TRACK OF THE MEDITERRANEAN CRUISE OF THE REGIA AERONAUTICA

AERONAUTICAL

ORGANIZATION AND UNIT TRAINING—THE MEDITERRANEAN CRUISE OF THE "REGIA AERONAUTICA," MAY 26 TO JUNE 3, 1928.

The Undersecretary for Air, General Italo Balbo, made the following statement in the Chamber of Deputies with reference to the Mediterranean cruise:

> I believe that to-day new objectives should be found for our pilots consisting not of individual flights, but, better still, cruises of several squadrons with at least 80 airplanes flying together, in order that our navigating personnel may receive an excellent training in flying in the climates and atmospheric conditions of other countries, together with training in mass formation flying. Pursuit, reconnaissance, and bombardment formations, or massed flights, constitute an excellent training for higher commands, for discipline, and for forming the character of the men.

This speech is the basis upon which the authority for this flight was granted, and, as a consequence, on May 26, 1928, an air brigade of 61 hydroplanes left Orbetello, Italy, on a circuit of the occidental Mediterranean, returning to Orbetello on June 2, with the entire brigade intact, not having lost a man or a plane during the cruise.

The brigade was composed of five hydroplane squadrons, namely, the One hundred and forty-first, One hundred and forty-second, One hundred and forty-fourth, One hundred and eighty-second, and the One hundred and eighty-fourth naval reconnaissance squadrons. These were formed into two wings, the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh. The twenty-sixth wing contained the One hundred and forty-first and the One hundred and forty-fourth, while the twenty-seventh wing consisted of the One hundred and forty-second, the One hundred and eighty-second, and the One hundred and eighty-fourth. All squadrons were equipped with the *S–59* hydroplane, fitted with the Isotta Fraschini 500-horsepower ASSO motor. The total number of planes of this type was 52. In addition there was a provisional squadron of six *S–56* hydroplanes carrying staff officers and newspaper men, the power plant of each plane being the same type as the *S–59*, except two motors are used.

General Balbo and General Armani, the chief of staff of the Regia Aeronautica, were observers on this cruise. Each, with their personal staff, occupied one *S–55*, which did not fly as a part of the formation. The air attachés of the United States, England, the naval attachés of France, and the military attaché of Spain, together with one journalist, were assigned to a " Cantiere 22 " flying boat. This is a three-motored passenger-type boat, manufactured by the Cantiere Navale Tristino Co. of Triest. The cabin is very comfortable and can accommodate nine persons with ease. The pilot was the test pilot of the company and handled the boat with great skill and good judgment. These boats will be used on the Triest-

Genoa Civil Line and are fitted with three "half-ASSO" motors of 250 horsepower each.

The air brigade was commanded by General de Pinedo, whose staff was composed of the two wing commanders, a chief of staff, and a personal aide. The two group commanders reported direct to their respective wing commanders. In the organization of this brigade two group commanders were selected, but carried out their duties only as assistants to the wing commanders.

The itinerary of the cruise was as follows:

	Miles
Orbetello, Italy to Elmas, Cagliari (Sardinia)	243
Elmas to Pollenza (Balearic Islands)	312
Pollenza to Los Alcazares (Cartegena) Spain	249
Los Alcazares to Porto Alfaques (Spain)	293
Porto Alfaques to Berre (Marseille, France)	310
Berre to Orbetello, Italy	329

Stops were made at Los Alcazares and Porto Alfaques, Spain, due to the large well-protected bays at these little towns. At Los Alcazares is situated the combat and observation school of the Spanish Royal Air Force. There are facilities here for both land and water planes, together with a very well-equipped repair shop.

The itinerary as flown was as follows:

	Hrs.	Min.
Orbetello to Elmas, May 26	3	20
Elmas to Pol enza, May 27	3	30
Pollenza to Los Alcazares, May 28	2	45
Los Alcazares to Porto Alfaques, May 31	2	35
Porto Alfaques to Berre, June 1	3	29
Berre to Orbetello, June 2	3	20

The flight delayed two days at Los Alcazares for the purpose of enabling the Undersecretary for Air to visit Madrid and to be received by the Spanish King. Also this time was used to advantage by the brigade, as all planes were carefully inspected and the necessary repairs made. General Balbo flew to Madrid in a three-motored Junker, and, after visiting the Spanish airdrome at Madrid, he joined the flight at Porto Alfaques.

The city of Orbetello, situated on an excellent lagoon on the west coast of Italy, was selected for the assembly point of the cruise. May 24 and 25 were used for checking in the squadrons and personnel. By 5 p. m. May 25 all equipment and personnel was in readiness and final instructions were issued by the commanding general. At 6 a. m. Saturday, May 26, the departure was made, each squadron taking off in V formation.

The Italian Government chartered a steamer to carry the necessary equipment for mooring the hydroplanes and the necessary spare parts to each stopping point. Two spare motors were available at each port and a generous supply of motor spare parts and airplane spare parts were available at Los Alcazares, Spain. Much of the equipment for mooring the planes was obtained from the navy yards in Italy, thus reducing the cost of manufacturing, as everything was made in Italy.

An officer and a detachment of men were sent to each stop for the duty of supervising the laying of the anchors, arranging billets for the personnel, and attending to all the details necessary for a stop of 24 hours. A great deal of thought and time was expended on these duties, for in several places the entire population was not much more than the personnel of the air brigade.

Personnel.—This consisted of officer pilots and mechanics, with the necessary staff for the brigade commander and his wing commanders. Besides the staffs of General Balbo and General Armani there were the air attachés of five foreign countries and ten representatives of leading Italian newspapers. A doctor was carried on the flight, and he had with him the regular kit for emergencies. The Isotta Fraschini Motor Co. sent a civilian motor engineer with the flight for the purpose of motor inspection and to make a report on the performance of the motors under service conditions.

Equipment.—The planes did not carry the full military load such as machine guns, cameras, and bombs or ammunition, but were stripped of practically everything of this nature. Each pilot was furnished with a book of general instructions, containing a map of each leg of the cruise and an aerial photograph of the bay or port where each stop was to be made. On this map was indicated the mooring position of each squadron and the staff planes. The map of each leg of the cruise indicated the compass course, the distance in kilometers, and was so marked as to show the time necessary under favorable conditions. This book also indicated the identification flags used on the planes of the unit commanders.

Anchorage.—The planes of the brigade were moored by squadron and as near as possible in a straight line parallel to the shore. The anchors were blocks of cement weighing about 2,200 pounds. Attached to the block was a rope which was in turn secured to a wooden cross about 1 yard in width. The mooring line was supported by the wooden cross, which also carried the identification flag of the squadron or individual plane. This system of indicating the proper mooring position for each squadron was very satisfactory and enabled a squadron to secure in the shortest possible time. The only trouble experienced was at Los Alcazares, when several of these anchors dragged, resulting in some minor damages to three planes.

Tender service.—At each port a number of small boats were on hand to transport the personnel and haul baggage to and from the wharf. While this service was satisfactory, it was very slow and time consuming. The best service of this kind was at Los Alfaques and at Berre. At these ports large rowboats, capable of holding 40 men, were pulled by motor boats, or enough motor boats alone were furnished. However, such a large number of planes taxed to the limit the available boat transportation at each port.

Safety precautions.—At each port a patrol was maintained either by boat or on the shore, for the purpose of watching the planes during the night. As the planes were not beached but all moored in the bay, a patrol on the beach was not satisfactory. However, this type of patrol was used most of the time. At Orbetello and at Los Alcazares a searchlight mounted on the beach was used. At some of the stops an emergency crew with a boat was on hand. At Los Alcazares during the first day and night the line of planes was under constant observation, both from a motor boat and from the shore. As the weather at all the other ports was practically ideal, the need for a patrol could be considered unnecessary. All planes were equipped with oil parking lights as part of their equipment. These lights were used only one time, as the bays used by the flight were secluded and extremely quiet, no boat traffic, and the bright starlight nights made the use of these lights unnecessary.

Fuel.—Gasoline was issued and transported to the planes in 5 or 15 gallon cans by rowboats or barges. The authorized amount was placed aboard the plane and the plane's mechanic emptied it into the tanks. This method worked quite well on the *S–59* planes, as the fuel tanks are low, but the fueling of the *S–55* planes was difficult, due to the height the gas had to be lifted. This method of fueling was the same at all ports, with the exception of Los Alcazares, where each squadron was furnished a small tank boat equipped with a hand centrifugal pump. The tanks of these boats were filled at the wharf from large 52-gallon drums, towed to the planes, where the servicing was accomplished in a very short time. This was the most efficient system of fueling observed during the cruise. Each plane carried a large funnel, chamois skins, and a small gasoline hand pump. At the other ports the fueling of planes consumed about five to six hours and was accomplished at the expense of much hard labor.

Engineering and supply.—Each squadron carried an engineer officer who acted also as a supply officer. His main duty on the water was to supervise the fueling, inspect the equipment, and to order the necessary repairs. In the air he was the navigating officer of the squadron. Each plane carried a limited number of spare parts for emergency and minor repairs en route. At each station there were two complete motors and a few small parts for the plane. The main supply base was at Los Alcazares, Spain, where every type of equipment was on hand, including spare wings, rudders, elevators, etc.

Here, with the machine-shop facilities, it was possible to make a major overhaul. Engineer officers were assisted in a great many ways by the civilian motor expert of the Isotta Fraschini Co., who was always on hand and accomplished a great deal of work.

Orders.—Instructions and orders were given to the wing and group commanders verbally and in person by the brigade commander, General de Pinedo. There were no written orders or assignments of missions en route. Staff officers personally circulated the necessary information as to time of rising, time of departure from the wharf, and time of departure of the brigade. This system worked quite well, except delays were caused by the slow transportation from the wharf to the planes. Due to these delays, from one to two hours' flying time in the early morning hours was lost. The general orders for the trip were to rise at 3 a. m., report at the wharf at 5 a. m., and to leave the water at 6 a. m. The usual time of the take-off was from 6.30 to 7 a. m. Upon arrival at the port the brigade commander would land first; then, as soon as all squadrons had landed and moored, a conference of wing commanders and group commanders would be held, the group commanders transmitting the necessary orders to their squadron commanders.

Flying.—Independent squadron V formation was the rule. Twice during the cruise a group of two squadrons took off and landed in formation. All formations were very good in general, but the intervals were, on an average, quite large. All squadrons took off in formation and landed in formation. The landing in formation at Los Alcazares in a 50-mile-an-hour gale was excellent work; not only was the wind high and gusty but the waves were well over a motor high.

When each squadron was ready for the air a Very signal was fired by the squadron commander. When the brigade was ready a Very signal was fired from the plane of the chief of staff. The brigade commander would take off with his staff, and when in the air would signal by Very light to the destroyer. This was the signal for the destroyer to fire a gun, which was the take-off signal for the brigade. Squadrons would take the air according to a prearranged schedule. When in the air each squadron would take its place in the provisional group, with a large interval between squadrons, and fly direct to the next port. There were no maneuvers or extra missions en route; nothing except to follow the leader.

The squadron commander flew at the head of the formation, with the engineer officer as a passenger and navigator. The average altitude flown was about 3,300 feet. Navigation was on a compass course, with the help of two destroyers at two points on the course. Squadron planes were echeloned upward from the leader.

Communications.—Radio, signal flags, and Very lights formed the means of communications. In each squadron one plane was radio equipped and flew with that squadron. One radio plane was attached to the staff of the brigade commander; squadron radio planes communicated with the destroyers only in case of emergency or distress. The radio plane of the brigade commander communicated with the squadron radio planes and kept in touch with the destroyers and certain land stations within range. In this way the commander's radio plane could send certain instructions to the squadron radio planes, who were allowed to receive only. Communication between planes of a squadron and their leader was by flags, between wing commanders and group commanders by flags, and the same for group commanders and squadron leaders. Each plane was provided with four flags of four solid colors, namely, white, yellow, red, and blue. There were four messages to be sent and four answers to these messages. This simple system seemed to work very well, as I was told by a squadron commander that it was very satisfactory. In the cockpit of each plane a card was posted with the four flags drawn in color, with the sending message and the answer printed below. This avoided a great deal of confusion, as the pilot had to send a direct answer.

Signals by Very lights were used while the brigade was on the water, although they could be used at other times if ordered. Different colors were assigned to certain signals for use at the port, such as squadron ready, brigade ready, take off, or prepare to land, etc. These signals were found to be very satisfactory and saved much time while on the water at ports.

The destroyers reported that the radio communication with the planes was excellent and no trouble was experienced in getting in touch with them.

Weather.—During the cruise the weather was as near perfect as could be desired. By flying early in the morning the wind was never an element to cause worry. When a wind did come up it was always with the flight and considered a great help. As all flying was over water, the air was very smooth, except when near the land. The windstorm at Los Alcazares was the only bad weather encountered, and this lasted only one day. Outside of a thunderstorm at Los Alfaques at night, no rain interfered with the flight and everything went off on schedule. The meteorological data was received by telegraph, enabling the brigade commander to keep in touch with weather conditions throughout the occidental Mediterranean area.

High winds were expected in the region of the Gulf of Lions, on the southwestern coast of France, but on the day of the flight across this gulf there was no wind, but a fog bank over the water, with a height of 2,000 feet and a width of 5 miles. This was the thickest fog belt I have seen in the Mediterranean and presented a great obstacle to a plane making a forced landing.

Quarters.—At all stations the pilots and mechanics were billeted with families or in small hotels. Staff officers and those of high rank were quartered in hotels, when possible, or in private homes. The foreign attachés were quartered in first-class hotels when possible; villas or private homes otherwise. The accommodations in general were excellent and satisfactory. At Los Alcazares and Los Alfaques, Spain, the quarters were fair, but the best possible to find. Due to the great distance to cities of any size and to the very poor selection of quarters in a small village, it was necessary to accept what was available, notwithstanding that sanitary conditions were far from being good.

Exceptions.—The cruise was a social success, as the brigade was received at each port with great enthusiasm and everything possible was done for the entertainment and comfort of the personnel. Banquets and dinners were given to all; luncheons for staff officers and foreign attachés were given by the officials of the city. Practically every town and city declared a holiday and people for miles around came to see the flight. Speeches of welcome were made and much time and money was spent on decorations. It was interesting to observe how well the Italian and the Spaniard understood each other, each speaking his own language. The impression made by the Italians was excellent and Spanish cooperation was of the highest order. In Marseille the same enthusiasm was shown, and during the 24 hours we were there I observed nothing that could have indicated a cool reception.

Conclusions.

This cruise was without doubt a great success for the Italians, as it demonstrated that—

1. The *S–59* is a well-constructed and efficient hydroplane.
2. The Isotta Fraschini, 500-horsepower ASSO motor, is a well-built, rugged, efficient, and reliable power plant.
3. The Italian pilots are receiving a very well-balanced training.
4. Formation flying has made great progress in the Regia Aeronautica and navigation has been greatly improved.
5. The services of supply and communications functioned well and were adequate for the occasion.
6. That the officers in command of the various units showed excellent judgment in the handling of their commands.
7. That the spirit of the brigade was high and the discipline excellent.
8. That the political situation between Spain and Italy can be said to be excellent, as every speech made referred to the Mediter-

ranean occidental as an Italian-Spanish domain and that it is necessary for the two countries to support each other in this part of the world.

Discipline.—The discipline of the brigade was excellent and worthy of consideration. There was no grumbling or shirking of duties: these were assigned and carried out without any confusion. The officers and men remained well dressed and always presented a good appearance at all times. There were no signs of too much drinking, notwithstanding it was available in large quantities at every port. There was no sickness of any consequence, no accidents or injuries to personnel.

Damages.—During the cruise no motor changes were necessary. Two propellers, one radiator, and several small motor parts were the only changes necessary. As the result of the storm at Los Alcazares, two or three tail surfaces and one wind shield were changed. This was the damage caused by two planes dragging their anchors and coming together. At Cagliari two planes had trouble in getting started, but joined the brigade at Pollenza two hours after the arrival. One plane landed in the sea between Cagliari and Pollenza, but minor repairs were quickly made and it arrived in port a short time after the squadron.

Criticisms.

As a result of my observations the following criticisms are offered. These are the outstanding deficiencies as compared with the way we would handle such a cruise under the same circumstances of weather and equipment:

1. There were no published orders of any kind, except the map book and a few instructions with reference to it.

2. No operations orders or missions. There was time enough to carry out simple missions en route. The weather was ideal and the route near the coast line and the possibility of getting lost negligible. The apparent object and mission was to fly safely from one port to the other.

3. Formation flying was confined to the squadron; only two flights were made with a group of two squadrons. No night formations were tried out; there were six squadrons in the brigade, and with this air force many interesting but simple problems could have been tried out. At no time during the cruise, except in the flight over Rome, did the brigade fly in one formation, as is indicated in the inclosed plan. The weather was excellent, and the bays where the brigade was moored were large and the water smooth. With those excellent conditions the brigade could have accomplished some instructive maneuvers.

4. The full military load was not carried, or the equivalent in dead weight, so the squadrons did not operate under service-load conditions.

5. Lack of proper protection of equipment at ports. The necessity of maintaining patrols day and night to observe the moored planes evidently was not appreciated, as few, if any, patrols were maintained regularly. The fact that the weather was almost perfect saved the situation, as no planes were lost or beached.

Home reception.—The brigade arrived at Orbetello at 3 p. m. Saturday, June 2, and at 8.30 a. m. June 3, Premier Mussolini arrived by plane to review the personnel and to lead the brigade back to Rome. After reviewing the staff officers and the pilots at the wharf, Mussolini gave them a short talk, as follows:

> I have come intentionally to show you my deep gratitude and to express to you my very great praise. I am safe to speak, on this occasion, for the sentiment and admiration of all the Italian people, who have followed your cruise with intense interest, I judge the cruise a perfect work of art, which has had the style of new Italy. You left in mass, and you have returned in mass. The flight has had the regularity of a great test. It has again demonstrated our skillfulness and the excellence of our materiel. I repeat to you my praise and my sympathy. For the cruises of to-day and for those of to-morrow, A NOI (Courage).

After this, the pilots and the mechanics boarded the planes and when the brigade was ready Mussolini reviewed the planes from a motor boat. When he had passed the last plane the first squadron took off, with the mouth of the Tiber River as a rendezvous. Mussolini boarded his *S–55* and joined the brigade at the mouth of the Tiber, leading the formation over the city of Rome at about 3,300 feet. After passing over the city the brigade broke up and each squadron took off for its home station.

This flight of Premier Mussolini is significant of the attitude of the chief of the Government toward aviation. He never loses an opportunity to personally support the Regia Aeronautica and aviation in general. His policy of adequate air defense is constantly before the Parliament and before the people of Italy, and it may be said that the primary reason for this air cruise was to impress the people with the necessity of air defense.

Comment.

The Mediterranean cruise was a tremendous success psychologically and politically. Italy was very much impressed when the air brigade took off, due to the Nobile disaster, and there was tremendous elation throughout Italy when the flight returned without the loss of a plane or man. Although the ostensible purpose of the flight was training, the general opinion is that the flight was primarily political in nature.

Italy wanted to show France in particular and the other powers in general that henceforth Italy is a power to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean. The original scheme for this flight was to start from continental Italy or Sicily, then to fly to Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Gibraltar, returning via Spain and southern France. The French, however, did not look with favor on this proposal. It would mean flying over the French possessions in western Africa and might arouse feelings and raise questions that the French prefer should remain dormant. Italy modified her original plans, and the flight discussed in this report resulted.

FLIGHT OF FOUR ITALIAN PLANES TO MOGADISCIO (ITALIAN SOMALILAND).

(NOTE.—*The following report is of interest to show the aerial activities of the Italian Nation.*)

The arrival is announced at Mogadiscio (Italian Somaliland) of four RO–1 planes which left Rome in the month of April under the command of Major Bitossi. The distance covered is about 6,215 miles.

The planes are destined for colonial service, and this long flight, during which very difficult atmospheric conditions were frequently encountered, proved an excellent training for the pilots, as it enabled them to become acquainted with the climate of the country where they are stationed. The machines reached their destination in a perfect state of efficiency.

The route followed was from Naples, across the Mediterranean Sea to Tripoli; thence eastward along the north coast of Africa to Cairo, then down the Nile to Atbara in the Sudan; thence to Khartum and Mongalla, and on to Mombasa in Kenya; thence north up the coast to Mogadiscio (Italian Somaliland).

JAPAN

POLITICAL

COMMUNISM IN THE ARMY.

As a result of the recent communist raid affair, when many suspected socialists were arrested throughout the country, an investigation was conducted within the army to ascertain whether or not any members of the active army were guilty of communist leanings. The result of this investigation disclosed that there were eight soldiers who could be charged with dangerous thoughts. These men have been arrested and are to be brought to trial before the first division court-martial. The organization to which these accused soldiers belong and their military status are:

One candidate for appointment as reserve second lieutenant serving in the military police section of Tokyo.

One candidate for appointment as reserve second lieutenant serving in a regiment in Kyoto.

One candidate for appointment as reserve second lieutenant in a battalion of infantry in Osaka Prefecture.

One candidate for appointment as reserve second lieutenant in a regiment in Kokura.

One candidate for appointment as reserve second lieutenant in a regiment at Himeji.

One second-class private in an Osaka battalion.

One second-class private in an army arsenal in Tokyo.

One second-class private in a regiment in Tokyo.

As will be noted, the majority of the accused men are candidates for appointment as reserve second lieutenants; in other words, one-year volunteers. The status of these men have made the offense more grave.

Investigation has revealed that all of these accused candidates for reserve second lieutenants were, prior to their entry into the army, connected with one or more of the following socialistic parties:

Honoto (Laborers and Farmers Party).

Hyogikai (Committee of Council).

Zen Nippon Musan Seizen Renmei (All-Japan Proletariat Young Men's League).

All of the above parties have been dissolved by the Government.

The investigation also revealed the fact that secret publications by communists were in the hands of soldiers. The publications were seized by the military authorities.

As a result of this affair, a committee composed of Lieutenant General Hato, Vice Minister of War; General Izome, chairman of Military Investigation Committee; General Abe, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, War Department; General Araki, Chief First Section General Staff; and General Mino, commander of Military Police, has been organized for the purpose of inquiring further into the extent of communism in the army and to devise means to combat its spread therein.

The affair has created considerable comment throughout the country. In order to demonstrate their loyalty and to counteract this unfortunate unfavorable comment, all branches of the Imperial Reservists Association throughout the country on the Emperor's birthday on April 29 met and publicly signed a written oath of fidelity, a translation of which is roughly as follows:

> We swear to vindicate our national constitution.
>
> We swear to reject all extreme thoughts and to help each other to resist them.
>
> We swear to mutually develop the principle of our national foundation.

MILITARY

REPORT OF JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN LANDING TROOPS IN SHANTUNG VIA TSINGTAO, CHINA, PERIOD FROM MAY 6 TO JUNE 5, 1928, INCLUSIVE

All troop ships were met at the dock on arrival at Tsingtao by practically all the Japanese populace and they were given a remarkable welcome by all classes of Japanese. Two bursting rockets fired from signal station at observatory was the signal for all hands to go down to meet the transports.

Men.—All of the men in all branches of the army seemed to be in good physical condition and happy. The relations between officers and men seemed very cordial. Discipline was excellent.

Disembarking and embarking.—The disembarking of the troops and unloading of supplies and horses was done very quietly, systematically, and quickly. The conditions for unloading were ideal.

Equipment.—The equipment was entirely new; all guns, harness, carts, saddles, and uniforms were well made and of substantial material.

Horses.—All horses were in excellent condition and well cared for. The cavalry and artillery horses were large and of Australian extraction. Most of the cart horses were of Mongolian breed, more of a pony than a horse.

Artillery unit.—From observation, a section of artillery consists of one fieldpiece and one ammunition carrier; each fieldpiece is drawn by 6 horses and each carrier or limber is drawn by 6 horses; the 3 left horses are ridden. There is a piece commander mounted on a separate horse to each unit of 6 horses; four men walk behind the pieces, making a total of 16 men and 14 horses to a unit.

Mounted machine guns.—From observation, mounted machine-gun units vary. They usually consist of 1 horse carrying machine gun and 1 or 2 pack horses carrying the ammunition, but the number of men varies from 10 to 20.

Infantry units.—Each infantry company had from 6 to 8 automatic rifles and approximately 110 to 120 men.

Small arms.—The cavalry carbine and infantry rifle differed in length and make—both seemed to be of the same caliber, about .25. The infantry in stacking arms used their ramrods; did not have a stacking swivel. In fixing bayonets all bayonets were under the barrel and did not interfere with the sight. The cavalry did not have bayonets, but had a three-cornered affair which folded down underneath the barrel into the wood of the gun. All officers wore sabers and carried a revolver or pistol of small make and short barrel.

Food and feeding.—I observed the men eating several times on the dock and all they had was cold rice and dried fish and perhaps cold tea in their canteens. During all my observations I did not see a field kitchen; the only thing that I saw was about 20 to 30 15-gallon iron pots.

Marching.—The Japanese soldiers all wear very heavy shoes, hobnailed. In marching they did not present a very good appearance; they could not keep in step or in alignment. They seemed to straggle and did not present a very snappy appearance. This can be accounted for due to the fact that the Japanese are not a shoe-wearing race.

Horsemanship.—The Japanese in handling their horses seemed to be afraid of them.

The first part of the landing of the Japanese in Tsingtao they seemed very friendly toward us and allowed us to take pictures and even posed for us, but on June 1, while taking some pictures, one Japanese officer evidently became excited and had our camera taken. After some talk the camera was returned, but the plates were taken and destroyed.

NAVAL

DESCRIPTION OF THE JAPANESE AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATING WITH JAPANESE FORCES AT TSINGTAO AND HER PLANES.

Type.—Auxiliary; appears to be a converted tanker, probably *Naruto*, stated in 1927 Jane to have been employed as an aircraft tender.

Number of planes carried.—Eight; appears to be three-purpose planes, probably observation, torpedo, bombing, although neither bomb racks nor torpedo slings were noted when flown close aboard. Planes fitted for radiotelegraphy, with trailing wire type of antenna (about 200 feet long) out on all flights observed; small wind-driven generator mounted on top upper plane near leading edge, amidships. Planes were single-engine, tractor-type, two-seater biplanes, with two bay-wing structure; appears to have slight dihedral both wing panels; twin pontoons of conventional design, except rather more flat-bottomed at low end than D–2–T or T–3–M types.

Structural details of tender.—Same in general as cut shown in Jane, 1927, for *Naruto* class; modification appears to consist of construction of two large inclosed hangars, closed at each end, open at each side, and decked over to full beam; one of these in each, forward and after wells; forward hangar extends from break of forecastle to bridge structure; after hangar from after end midships structure to poop; hangars fitted with full-width spray and windbreaks from deck to ceiling at front ends; roof heavily braced.

Handling gear.—Foremast. Located about center of forward hangar, fitted with horizontal crane jib or boom, stayed from masthead, and apparently capable of being swung over either side to handle planes. After hangar fitted with similar jib, supported from a special, centrally located stub mast; jib capable of handling in manner similar to forward unit. Both jibs of girder structure appear to be fitted with a rudder which permits of running planes out at right angles to side until clear, then lowered. Planes appear to be fitted for extremely quick detachment upon becoming water borne. Planes were repeatedly observed to be warming up their engines while being hoisted out and to take off immediately upon dropping into the water. Hoisting gear appears to be of quick-acting type, permitting of almost instantaneous hooking on and hoisting in of planes, which appeared to be placed with great precision by pilots who are apparently drilled in this evolution in order to speed up plane handling under unfavorable weather conditions.

RUSSIA

POLITICAL

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

THE OGPU.

The United State Political Administration (Obyedinennoye Gosoudarstvennoye Polititcheskoye Upravleniye), abbreviated OGPU, is an organization of secret, politico-military police composed largely of communists. It is the successor of the notorious Cheka, which, in turn, succeeded the Czarist Okhrana. Such a political unit, with extensive powers and police or military organization, is a characteristic of Russian government.

The OGPU is often written simply "State Political Administration" or GPU, OGPU being used to designate GPU headquarters at Moscow. The organization is, for certain matters of administration, under the Commissariat of the Interior and, in general, GPU expenses are met in the budget of that commissariat. Its ranks are filled by volunteers who have completed their active military service.

For policy and orders the OGPU is directly subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom); hence its formidable authority, which makes it to all intents an independent executive branch of the Government. The head of the organization is the president of the OGPU collegium. This position is, at present, occupied by Menzhinsky.

There are 13 GPU districts (Okrugs). The chief of each district bears the title "Plenipotentiary Representative" (Upolnomotchenny Predstavitelj). He is appointed by OGPU at Moscow. Subordinate to the GPU's of districts are the GPU's of governments, each with special GPU troops for use wherever required in its area. The government GPU chief is appointed by the district GPU chief.

Independent of district and government GPU's are special GPU detachments, consisting of railway police, river police, and so on—chiefly railway police. While not reporting to a government GPU, a special detachment works in close cooperation with it and is practically a smaller parallel organization. Each town, parish, and group of settlements of sufficient importance to warrant it has local GPU detachments reporting direct to the government GPU chief.

Civil functions of the GPU are the police functions of civil authorities, comparable to police functions in force in most countries, but with special enlargement of authority peculiar to Russia and Russian police methods and tradition, retaining (and in some respects "improving" on) the technique of the Czarist Okhrana. The term "police" as here used refers principally to police for political investigation. Criminal police functions of the GPU are, at least in theory, less extensive than its political police activities. The ordinary policeman on street or station duty is not a member of the GPU, but simply an employee—on a far less exalted status than that of GPU personnel—for the maintenance of order and the arrest of offenders.

Police rights inherent in GPU bodies and officials include the right of search and the preparation of civil charges. In actual fact the GPU works in criminal matters as well, and may intervene in any criminal case. If a simple misdemeanor or a purely criminal felony—without political significance—is at issue, the GPU takes no further interest in it; at important criminal trials, however, a GPU representative is always present and can, if he so desires, take the case away from the court for final GPU disposition. The GPU can void court decisions. In a word, the GPU controls the administration of justice.

Below district, elements of the organization explained above are ordinarily concerned with internal affairs and not with frontier or essentially military matters.

Frontier control is directed by district headquarters through the frontier section (Pogranitchny Otdel) of the district staff. Subordinate to district are provincial branches (administrative offices), and subordinate to branches are the frontier detachments (Otrjad). The service is purely military in organization, though its functions are part military, part police.

GPU troops are of two categories, "frontier" and "internal." Frontier units comprise:

50 frontier sections:

A section (average strength about 600) comprises 2 or 3 companies, each of 3 to 7 platoons. These sections, in effect infantry battalions, control all frontier posts, of which there are something over 600. Detachments at the actual frontier are companies or—more frequently—platoons. The present frontier organization is greatly reduced from that in effect in 1925, when there were about 120 sections.

- Several frontier cavalry squadrons:
  - Stationed in Turkestan.
- Coastal flotillas:
  - Small motor-boat detachments, stationed as follows:
    - 2 in the Baltic (1 for the Estonian coast and 1 for the Finnish coast).
    - 1 (possibly 2 or 3) in the Black Sea.
    - 1 in the Caspian Sea.
    - 1 in the Pacific (at Vladivostok).
- Flotillas on inland waters:
  - 1 is on Lake Peipus (Estonian frontier) and 1 or 2 on the Amur River.
- Internal units comprise:
  - 1 infantry division (OSNAZ).
  - 10 infantry regiments, 3 of which are in the OSNAZ division.
  - 100 infantry groups, 30 of which are in the 10 regimental organizations.
  - 3 cavalry regiments.
  - 5 special groups of armored automobiles.
  - 2 special aviation flights, stationed 1 each at Moscow and Leningrad. Each flight has 6 planes (observation, bi-plane) equipped for bombing, especially for use of gas bombs.
- Railway troops:
  - The division, regiments, independent groups, and independent companies report direct to the chief of the district in which they are stationed Special troops (armored autos and aviation) are GHQ units under direct control of OGPU.

At each military district headquarters there is a small GPU field gendarmerie (Osobenny Otdel), with functions similar to those of our military police. Field gendarmerie detachments are likewise attached to corps and division headquarters.

The personnel of GPU troops is selected from volunteers. This applies both to commanders and men in the ranks. All GPU personnel is considered absolutely "reliable" politically. Though all personnel are not members of the Communist Party, the proportion of party membership is higher than in the army. No statistics as to party membership in GPU are available.

The training of GPU troops is better than that of army troops. Summer training is carried on at special camps, attended only by GPU organizations. Instruction covers general military training and is similar to that of regular army troops, but is in some respects more thorough and devotes special attention to tactics to be used in case of riot and in suppression of counter-revolutions.

The total strength of active GPU troops is believed to be 110,000. There is a considerable GPU reserve whose personnel is even more rigidly selected than that of active GPU troops.

Although the entire OGPU organization may be considered as an organized military force, military functions of GPU troops are limited to maintenance of internal order and to frontier duties, which are purely of concern to the Commissariat of the Interior and not to the army. It is highly improbable that GPU units would be used in conjunction with army troops, or under army command, even in time of war. Quite possibly, however, in the event of mobilization or emergency a competent army officer or army staff might be detailed to OGPU to assist the headquarters staff or even to assume direction of GPU military activities, coordinating them in so far as necessary with army operations.

Under the most unusual circumstances it is not impossible that some extraordinary and temporary employment of GPU troops with army units might be authorized; but this is practically out of the question. GPU strength in units is relatively small, and the 10 infantry and 3 cavalry regiments could not be spared from their regular internal stations; they would be frittered away uselessly if added to army formations.

NAVAL

POLICY.

The Finnish Government considers it unwise to permit the visit of Bolshevik yachts in Helsingfors. The yachts, which came to Helsingfors in the summer of 1927, appeared to be well equipped. They arrived in Helsingfors from Kronstadt, cruising several days in the narrow, circuitous channel which winds through the Finnish Archipelago and through which it is difficult to navigate under sail. The fact that the coast channel was selected by the yachts instead of the open-sea course makes it seem probable that the object of the trip was not merely a pleasure trip and a desire to visit the Helsingfors Workers' Yacht Club. Two of the yachts were large and had a draft of about 13 feet, or the same as the Russian Novik type destroyers. On all the boats soundings were frequently taken. In all probability the yachts were manned by officers of the Red Fleet and the sole object of the visit was to correct the soviet fleet's inaccurate charts of the Finnish coast waters by first-hand observations and soundings.

The supremacy of the soviet fleet in the Baltic waters is unquestionable. It is difficult to obtain reliable information regarding the actual strength of the Red Fleet because the official information given out by the soviet government is intentionally misleading. The publications issued by various nations purporting to give information include in the Red Fleet vessels that exist only on paper or that were scrapped long ago. The custom of the Bolsheviks to change the names of their warships now and then tends to fool even the most careful observer.

A fairly accurate estimate of the strength of the Soviet Russian naval power in the Baltic gives the Red Baltic Fleet 3 battleships. 2 battle cruisers, 2 armored cruisers or gunboats, 16 destroyers, 8 torpedo boats, 12 submarines, and a number of motor torpedo boats and several supply and repair ships. The recently constructed naval port of Luga, which is located about 15 miles east of the Estonian border, has a harbor that can be entered by ships with a 30-foot draft and is strongly fortified. It was constructed to replace the loss of the naval bases in Finland and Estonia. The distance from Luga to Viborg is 68 miles and to Hogland only 46 miles.

On Lake Ladoga Soviet Russia is supreme as regards naval power. In the treaty of Dorpat in 1920 both Finland and Russia agreed not to maintain warships on Lake Ladoga of a tonnage exceeding 100 tons. Last summer the Neva Canal was navigable for vessels with a 13½-foot draft, which means that the Bolsheviks could transport destroyers, submarines, and gunboats from the Gulf of Finland to Ladoga. The guns of the Finnish fortifications on Lake Ladoga are heavier than guns that can be carried by Bolshevik ships, but no actual power balance for Lake Ladoga can be reached until the lake is connected with the Gulf of Finland by a canal in Finland. Even in that case the canal would be within the range of Russian guns.

MANEUVERS.

Extensive naval maneuvers were recently carried out by the Soviet Russian Fleet in the Gulf of Finland. The object of the maneuvers was to find out the general condition of the vessels after the spring overhauling. The main part of the maneuvers, consisting of an attack of the combined forces of the torpedo boats against the battleships and cruisers, took place a few miles south of Hogland. The fleet included 3 battleships, 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 4 submarines. The fleet was then observed south of Aransgrund outside of Helsingfors, and three Finnish Air Force seaplanes were sent out from the Sandhan air station to photograph the Russian warships.

General Tukhacheveky, the recently appointed chief of the Petrograd military district, attended the maneuvers on the battleship *Marat.*

SPECIAL ARTICLES

KELLOGG PACT AND SEA POWER

(Note.—*The translation of an article written by Vice Admiral Hollweg* (*retired*), *German Navy.*)

Garvin, in an issue of the Observer in early May of this year, voiced the undeniable, though possibly to many Englishmen disagreeable, fact that as a result of the World War the command of the seas has shifted, in the following words:

> Due to one of the greatest changes in history, England has lost the command of the sea. In the future the command of the sea will lie between England and the United States, to be exercised as equal partners.

This acknowledgment is from an English source. It expresses a renunciation and at the same time a claim that possibly may not satisfy Americans.

In the Nauticus of 1928 (yearbook of marine interests and world commerce), recently published by E. S. Mittler, I studied the international political changes with reference to the command of the sea critically and determined that from a broad point of view the key point for the future command of the sea lies within the zone of the Panama Canal. Prior to the World War it unquestionably was in the waters about northern Europe and under English control. In fact, to-day there exist two key points: The one, a geometrical point consisting of the long route from England to Singapore, of such tremendous importance to England as her means of communication to the British Indian Ocean and to the Far East, the zone of hot competition. This route is not indisputably under English control. The second strategic point of sea power is the Panama Canal, entirely controlled by the United States and constantly increasing in commercial and strategic importance. Of first importance, therefore, to the sea power of each of these two Anglo-Saxon countries is a large artificial waterway. It is impracticable at this time to discuss the tactical advantages and disadvantages of these two powers at sea, due to geography, commerce, sea strategy, experience of the World War, and technical advance. Assuming an equal armament at sea, the advantages of the concentrated American position is strategically superior for the problems of the future command of the sea, and would be further definitely improved by the building of the Nicaragua Canal.

The ultimate aim of American efforts at the Washington conference was to persuade England to recognize this fact. The United States made greater concessions than England. The latter took advantage of this conference as a strategic help to avoid a competitive armament which it could ill afford, and also through its superior statesmanship, by the so often successful "wait and see policy" to retain as far as possible its old command of the sea. This effort failed definitely at the three-power conference at Geneva. Coolidge's huge naval program definitely showed England America's unalterable attitude on the question of the command of the sea. Paradoxical as the action of the United States may seem in its thorough naval and military as well as industrial and economical preparation for a future war (for example, the establishment of a military school for economy of war, where up to the present 137 officers have been trained) and Kellogg's antiwar pacts, a definite logical connection can be seen by the disinterested between the Washington conference, the naval program and the proscription of war. Doctor Maul, in the May issue of Geopolitik, says the following on this subject:

> It is easy to change the aims for world betterment into actual understandable policy. To understand such a development, it must be noted in the search of international politics and policies for appropriate forms or patterns, a search which has become acute in our time because of the intimate present-day communications. It is not astonishing to note that side by side with modern efforts of understanding in fact antiquated methods appear. The ideas of competitive armament and disarmament alternate, not seldom even with the same person. Thus it is not strange to see the United States' efforts to outlaw war going on at the same time as the United States-English naval question.

The above view is probably correct. It should be pointed out, however, that the so-called "Anglo-Saxon partnership" is a forced partnership in which the United States appears dominant. In his book, History of National Movement in the Orient, recently published by Vowinkel, Hans Kohn mentions this partnership. Kellogg holds in his official hand war or world peace. The aim of the seriously announced intention to enter upon competitive armament is, if necessary, to force the "freedom of the seas" so undesirable to England, if conferences fail to bring about the desired results. The pending antiwar pacts in this sense threaten England and her sea power. The United States wants absolute security for her commerce and her merchant marine in every possible circumstance. Sea power is the first consideration. In an article, "Airplanes and guns," in the Atlantic Monthly of April, the following appears:

> The Navy is truly the first line of defense. Sea power must be our first concern in any sound scheme of national defense.

The same thought is expressed noticeably often in the daily press of the United States. The importance of the peace pact with England overshadows that with all other countries. This was the reason for the intense interest in England's answer to the American proposals. It was also the reason for the unfavorable impression that the English reservations made in the United States.

Certain American circles are very suspicious of English dodges. The test of an honest willingness of European powers, especially of the sea power, England, to enter upon the Kellogg proposals is sought in the readiness to disarm. The Washington Post says:

> If the large powers are ready now to wreck the war machinery of the League of Nations, of the Locarno pact, and the military treaties, then they can enter upon the antiwar pact without reservations. Then they can disarm. Rivalry upon the seas will disappear and the merchant marine need take no further cognizance of war requirements. International cooperation would then be freed of the fear that sociological proposals are simply a mark for political intrigue. Kellogg's chances seem slim.

In another article the same paper dealt with an article by an anonymous English statesman and commented as follows:

> The British objections indicate that England has not the slightest intention of renouncing a navy which is strong enough to destroy the commerce of any country or to enter upon any agreement which would prevent the English Navy from sweeping the seas.

The author of the antiwar pact, which is not only to cancel the experience of the human race for over 5,000 years but also opposes man's wit against certain laws of nature—survival of the fittest—is entitled to be credited with ethical motives. On the other hand, neither can American motives be claimed to be free from self-interest, to which the other powers opposed exceptions for self-interest. The United States, in which government and business is intimately interwoven, requires increasing markets for its constantly increasing export industry, and these markets she desires to secure without war or armament. Without sea power this can not be done unless antiwar pacts bind competitors. The principal competitor is the sea power, England. Next come France and Japan. Japan has in the meantime begun to make effective its " Monroe doctrine " in Manchuria. The " certain regions " in which England proposes to retain absolute commercial control are the regions around the Indian Ocean which can only be attacked by sea or air. The naval demonstration against Egypt was a poor prelude for the antiwar-pact idea. The English exceptions indicate that in London, for the present at least, there is no idea of naval disarmament, even though there is no possible opponent within several thousand miles who could attack her interests with battleships and airplane carriers.

The Kellogg antiwar pacts would be ineffective unless followed by disarmament. Even disarmament itself would not be sufficient to bring about the idealistic peace that Kellogg strives for. Every nation desires to live. The commerce of the world would have to be so conducted, following the recommendations of a world-commercial conference that the tariff walls would be leveled and that free exchange of goods would make possible all nations' desire to live.

Surplus populations must be given room to expand. The antiwar pact can only be the beginning of the long road to a far-distant goal. Will Mr. Kellogg unselfishly undertake the leadership to this goal? Will he find willing, unselfish coworkers for this thorn-strewn road?

STRATEGIC USE OF COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE WORLD WAR

BRITISH CRYPTOGRAPHY AT ITS BEGINNING DURING THE WAR.

Sir Alfred Ewing states that when the war broke out he was a civilian functionnaire of the Admiralty. In 1903 he was a professor at Cambridge, and from this post passed to that of director of naval education. On the declaration of war he was asked to undertake the work of handling enemy cipher. Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, who was at that time Director of the Naval Intelligence Service, knowing that Sir Alfred was interested in methods of ciphering, communicated to him a few intercepted messages, telling him that no section of the Admiralty had ever been charged with this kind of work. And Sir Alfred was thus requested to see what he could do in the matter.

Such was the beginning of what was to become an important organization charged with collecting and deciphering messages of the enemy. Sir Alfred asked a few of his friends to assist him in this work; they worked intensively and succeeded very well. A deciphering section was soon established, forming a separate service from the Admiralty, under the direction of Sir Alfred Ewing. The staff of cryptographers was increased until about 50 persons were employed in this capacity. A great number of listening-in stations were established; they intercepted regularly the signals of the fleet and the other messages of the enemy, the latter being telegraphed to the Admiralty to be deciphered.

The British cryptography services started this way. It appears, therefore, that in time of peace no special section charged with the deciphering of foreign telegrams existed in the counter-espionage services of the Admiralty. Perhaps the Germans were aware of this fact; perhaps their belief—at least their belief at that time—that it is an impossibility to establish, within a very short time, a service no one has ever thought of in time of peace—led them to feel confident in the secrecy of their private telegrams. This turned out to our advantage, for had they known that their enemies also had the means—a simple and convenient means—of finding out their military or political operations, no doubt they would have stopped their wireless communications.

THE SERVICE IN OPERATION.

After the service was well organized often no less than 2,000 messages were received and deciphered inside of 24 hours. In this manner an immediate and constant surveillance was exercised over the German fleet and the information relative to its movements always reached us before these movements were accomplished.

Thus, for example, the British Admiralty knew the day before the battle of Dogger-Bank took place what German ships were to take part in the battle, at what time they were to come out, and in what direction they were going. All this information was obtained by means of intercepted German signals by which the German commander transmitted his orders to the ships concerned. This information was obtained sufficiently in time to enable the British Admiralty to take the necessary measures which were described by Mr. Churchill in his book entitled The World Crisis. On the following morning the battle of the Dogger-Bank began; the personnel of the deciphering section, deciphering every signal, followed all the phases of the battle from the beginning to the end.

Thus we understand to-day what was considered at first a mystery. The Germans themselves had furnished the British the information that enabled the latter to maneuver, and at the moment the group of German scouts reached the Dogger-Bank they came in contact not with innocent trawlers, mine dredgers, or "grand-gardes" from which they had little to fear, but with an important fraction of the home fleet.

Likewise the Battle of Jutland was executed in accordance with German orders transmitted by wireless telegraphy which, after they had been deciphered at Whitehall, gave sufficient indications as to the plan the enemy had decided to carry out.

GERMAN OPERATIONS.

From the month of December, 1914, at a time when the systems used for intercepting and deciphering messages had developed to a satisfactory degree and after the different cipher keys had been discovered, there was not a single movement of the German fleet that remained unknown to the Admiralty—this by means of the information which the German fleet involuntarily gave the Admiralty in its own ciphered signals. This section of the Admiralty which handled all this work was designated under the name of "Room Forty," and the work accomplished there was simply designated under the name of "Work of Room Forty," this to avoid any precision that might have disclosed the secret or excited curiosity. The fact that such a work was being carried out was known by very few persons only. The existence of this section was not even known in official circles or in the fleet. It was a secret, jealously guarded. Had the enemy suspected the existence of the service, disasters would have ensued, for the source of information would then have been exhausted. The secret was kept to the last. From time to time it was feared that the Germans had guessed their plans had been discovered, when, for instance, in one of their raids, they suddenly fell into British ships they were not expecting and which had been sent to meet them. But the supposed stupidity of the British caused them to think they had nothing whatsoever to fear and, apparently, it is only after the war was finished that the Germans learned how their confidential method of communication had been entirely compromised.

Certain of the enemy's codes fell into the hands of the British, very often by a lucky chance and in amusing circumstances. To take advantage of them, however, it was necessary to discover the keys, which were subject to changes, and, in fact, changed frequently. In 1916 the Germans took the habit of changing, every day at midnight, the key of the principal book of naval signals. However, the personnel of the deciphering section of "Room Forty" were then so familiar with their work that such changes did not cause to the night service any serious embarrassment. Messages for which a new key had been used could be deciphered after two or three hours' work.

ZEPPELINS AND SUBMARINES.

The personnel on the Zeppelins were remarkably talkative, particularly when, during their return trip, they gave an account of what they had accomplished. The personnel on the submarines likewise were fond of relating their exploits. In May, 1915, for example, the *U-20* gave, in cipher, an enthusiastic account of the manner in which it had sunk the *Lusitania*. And the fact that "Room Forty" could always be relied upon to report in advance every movement of the German fleet constituted a point of immense strategical importance for the conduct of the war. Besides, it happened that messages which did not seem to present at first any great amount of interest furnished, after a careful comparison with other messages, very valuable information on subjects such as the composition of squadrons and the position of mine fields.

RADIOGONIOMETRY.

Another part of the organization was likewise charged with the surveillance of the enemy's movements. A group of the stations of the eastern coast of England located at Lowestoft, York, Murceer, and Lerwick had been equipped with apparatus enabling them to detect the direction from where any signal came: these radiogoniometric stations were connected by wire to the Admiralty in such a manner that a few minutes after a ship or plane had sent out a signal its position was indicated on one of the charts in "Room Forty," this position being determined by the intersection of the bearings taken from the stations. It was a secret to nobody that the Admiralty was utilizing radiogoniometry for that purpose, and this served very often as a "camouflage" to hide the real source of information. In a general manner it was supposed at the time that certain facts became known by means of radiogoniometry, while they were really obtained through an entirely different means; i. e., the deciphering of the orders and confidential dispatches of the enemy.

THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM.

Apart from the intercepted naval telegrams, the crytographers of "Room Forty" interested themselves in the matter of the political cipher, and in this they were very successful. Germany, in its isolated position, was forced to have recourse to wireless telegraphy and was prevented from frequently changing its codes and confidential means of communication with its foreign correspondents. A big system of correspondence had been established with the Germans residing at Madrid, and there existed also a rather big exchange of correspondence with North America and South America as well as with Athens, Constantinople, and several other towns. A group of ciphered telegrams gave some useful indications, sometimes in advance, on the rebellion of Ireland; another group some enlightenment on the intrigues of the Germans in Persia. Among a great number of political telegrams deciphered by our cryptographers was the famous telegram of Zimmermann, which was intercepted in the manner described in the third volume of the Page Letters. President Wilson was then hesitating to have America enter the war; he clung to the idea of neutrality, which almost seemed to form part of his religion. The message of Zimmermann, disclosing the conditional offer to Mexico of an alliance against the United States, was deciphered in "Room Forty." It was afterwards communicated, in a very confidential manner, by Lord Balfour to Mr. Page, and the latter in his turn transmitted it to President Wilson, who communicated it to the press. The publication of this telegram had a decisive effect—the American public was convinced of the necessity of entering into the war.

BEGINNING OF GERMAN CRYPTOGRAPHY.

Germany has, on its side, given some intimation of the parallel service which was functioning in Germany in a mysterious radio station, surrounded by barbed wire, on a solitary heath near Neumünster. An ex-member of the staff of the station, Lieutenant Commander Kraschutzki, gives interesting details on the functioning of naval cryptography in Germany. The results obtained at Neumünster were really astonishing. However, a long time went by before the Germans extracted out of them conclusions which would permit of a comparison with their own system of ciphers and codes. The British keys in two letters, changed each month, were generally worked out the first night which followed this change. Interesting verifications were made on repeated series of groups of five letters.

Unfortunately, they stayed too long without practical results and the Germans extracted very little profit from these observations. The English system was, moreover, very intricate. It comported a certain number of keys entirely different. On the contrary, the German cipher code was of a remarkable simplicity. Even had the English not obtained a copy book of the German code book right at the beginning of the war they could have worked it out in a much shorter time than the Germans of Neumünster needed to break English ciphering. In reality the German system comported a regular sequence of different sort of groups, and once this group was established the rest deduced itself logically. Besides, the Germans should have considered that with a large number of their submarines sunk, in no great depths, in British waters, their codes would very well fall into English hands. Despite that, the German keys remained without serious modifications during entire months: they were seldom changed, and when by chance the German radio officers had forgotten to take with them the new code it was easy enough for them to reconstitute it from the first signals received.

So it is not astonishing that the English deciphered so easily the German radios. It was only in 1916 that one noticed in Germany that all other stations besides Neumunster could very well decipher any German message in 24 hours, even without the help of the code that a new manual of ciphering was studied. The new system arrived at precluded the errors of the first and the keys were changed daily. Up to 1916 the German call indicators had not even been modified from what they were during peace time. Consequently, they were known to the British authorities who possessed already radiogoniometric stations. They were able to be informed in time of German effectives and plans at Dogger-Bank. It was for the first time, at the Battle of Jutland, that the German naval commander deemed it expedient to change the indicators—he exchanged the call of the German flagship—D. K.—for the one of the Wilhelmshaven station—U. W. From that the English deduced that—D. K.—that is to say, the flagship was still at Wilhelmshaven. During the first part of the battle the English commander believed that his forces were in contact with the Germans, but that the flagship of the fleet of high seas was still in port. The very precise report of the English cruiser *Southampton* was needed to convince the English Admiralty of that error. A similar service existed naturally at the French Navy Department. It worked in the most intimate collaboration with the French War Department and with the British " Room Forty." Its personnel was also mostly recruited among university men and linquists versed in English and German. The immensity of their effort may be realized when it is considered that the force employed numbered less than a tenth of the English cryptographic personnel.

The recent revelations of Sir Alfred Ewing on " Room Forty " have brought forth a certain number of polemics—certain persons have pretended that the Admiralty knew everything before the Battle of Jutland; in reality, what she knew, thanks to the decoding, was the intention of Admiral Hipper to take out his battle squadron. Admiral Beatty took to sea in the hope of intercepting him. Admiral Scheer took care to exchange his call letters for the ones of Wilhelmshaven. As a consequence of this, the British Admiralty sensed that great activities were going on in the " Jade," but no one knew that Admiral Scheer was actually at sea up to the moment when the *Southampton* (Commodore Goodenough) sighted his fleet. *In reality, the meeting of Jutland was due to chance.*

Actually, it is likely that now aerial reconnoitering parties would establish contact much more rapidly between fleets so near one another. Aerial reconnoitering was still in its infancy at the time of Jutland. The airplanes of the *Engadine* and the Zeppelins were of no use. In reality, the use of radio has, maybe, many advantages, but it is not without drawbacks. It offers to the general staff of the navy the easy temptation to interfere in the direction of the battle itself. The Admiralty sent some valuable information to Lord Jellicoe, but at the same time contradictory orders to the forces at Harwich.

THE KINGSFORD-SMITH TRANS-PACIFIC FLIGHT

(By the American Consul at Suva, Fiji)

During the latter part of 1927 Captain Kingsford, an Australian aviator, planned a trans-Pacific flight from San Francisco to Australia in an airplane which he named the *Southern Cross*. After several attempts to take-off in San Francsico he abandoned the flight that year because of the unfavorable weather conditions prevailing over the North Pacific.

Spring 1928 was fixed for another trial at the trans-Pacific flight. In the meantime the Australian Government had withdrawn its support and Captain Kingsford-Smith was in financial difficulties. His navigator and his radio operator were dropped, as there was no money to pay them. A mortgage was on the plane; other creditors were pressing the leader for payment. Just as Captain Kingsford-Smith and Mr. Ulm were about to lose hope Capt. G. Allen Hancock, of Los Angeles, came to the assistance of the expedition and enabled the Australian aviators to carry on with their plans.

THE PLANE.

A Fokker monoplane, American built, with three Wright whirlwind motors, was used for the trans-Pacific flight. It has a wing span of 72 feet and over-all length of 47 feet. Underneath the floor of the cockpit is a 110-gallon fuel tank, and immediately behind the pilot's cockpit are a 800-gallon tank and a 300-gallon tank. These three tanks feed into a 200-gallon gravity tank in one wing.

Fuel is pumped from the three main tanks to the gravity tank by a pump operated from the main engine, and there is an emergency pump capable of pumping 16 gallons to the minute. Each engine has a tank with a capacity of 15 gallons of oil.

The navigator's cabin is situated back of the 300-gallon fuel tank and is fitted with two windows and a trapdoor in the top to enable observations to be made.

The radio equipment is also in the navigator's cabin and consists of a short-wave transmitting set of 33 meters, a 600-meter transmitter, and a receiver. The equipment was made up and installed by a San Francisco radio firm.

THE CREW.

Captain Kingsford-Smith was organizer and leader of the expedition. He saw service in the British Air Force during the war and won the military cross. After the war he continued to interest himself in aviation and served as a commercial pilot in Australia carrying mails.

Mr. C. T. P. Ulm, another Australian, was second pilot, business manager, and attended to the preparation of articles and other material for the press.

Capt. Harry Lyons, American, was the navigator. He attended the United States Naval Academy, class of 1907, and was in the United States Navy during the war. He served a number of years in the merchant service and for four years and a half was master of a vessel in the interisland trade of Hawaii. His island service made him particularly well qualified for the trans-Pacific flight.

Mr. James W. Warner, American, belongs to the United States Naval Reserves and had training as a radio man in the United States Navy. During the war he served with Captain Lyons, and it was through the latter that Captain Kingsford-Smith found his radio operator.

Both of the Americans belong to the United States Naval Reserves and had to obtain permission from the Navy Department for their departure from the United States.

FLIGHT FROM OAKLAND TO HONOLULU.

The *Southern Cross* started from Oakland for Honolulu at 8.53 a. m., May 31, 1928. There were 1,200 gallons of fuel in the tanks for the first 2,100-mile stage of the flight. Press reports conveyed the information that the *Southern Cross* took the air after a run of 5,000 feet.

Twenty-seven hours and twenty-three minutes later the plane landed at Wheeler Field, Honolulu, with 194 gallons of fuel in its tanks. According to press reports, there were 1,160 gallons in the tanks on the departure from Oakland.

SUVA PREPARES TO RECEIVE FLIERS.

The residents of Suva were pessimistic about the outcome of the flight. Captain Kingsford-Smith had been in correspondence with the governor of Fiji and the mayor of Suva over a landing place. Fuel and oil were shipped from San Francisco to await the arrival of the *Southern Cross.* The only open place near Suva was Albert Park, an athletic ground within the municipality of Suva. The aviators thought that if three trees were cut down, the telephone and electric-light poles were removed, and the wires lowered they might be able to land, although there was considerable risk.

Very reluctantly the municipal council decided to make these preparations for the landing. The mayor of Suva in presenting the correspondence to the municipal council said that they should do nothing to encourage Captain Kingsford-Smith to come to Suva, but if he himself decided to come along, then steps would be taken to make the ground much more safe. The council resolved to authorize the necessary steps if the flight were successful as far as Honolulu.

Immediately after the cable announcing the safe arrival of the *Southern Cross* was received the municipal authorities began to prepare Albert Park. The trees along the shore were cut down, three trees in the center of the park were removed, fences and hedges were taken away, and telephone and electric wires were lowered. The foregoing measures gave a gap in the sea side of 225 feet in width and a landing space of 400 yards long and 75 yards wide, with a smooth turf surface. A plane approaching over the sea would need to clear the beach road about 4 feet above the level of Albert Park and would then have a run of 1.200 feet diagonally across the park, with a gently sloping hill at the end of the run.

C. B. Joske, S. H. Ellis, T. H. Lewis, and F. Fleming, ex-Flying Corps officers and veterans of the World War, were constituted a committee to complete arrangements and assist the trans-Pacific fliers.

SECOND STAGE.

At 5.20 a. m. June 3, 1928 (western time), the *Southern Cross* started from Barking Sands, Kauai Island, Hawaii, for Suva, Fiji. Throughout the day radio messages from the *Southern Cross* received at Suva Radio told of the steady flight of the monoplane toward Fiji. The flight committee at Suva commenced to receive reassuring messages throughout the night, and at last the residents of Suva began to believe that Kingsford-Smith might arrive. Then at 8.23 a. m., Suva time, June 5, 1928 (eastern time), 800 miles from Fiji, the airmen reported that they were experiencing bad weather and were short of fuel. Later a more reassuring message came, bringing the news that the *Southern Cross* had seven hours of fuel. The last message was sent at noon, and said:

> *Southern Cross* in sight Fiji Islands now at 12, Greenwich mean time. Best wishes to all you operators. I'll reel in now. Good morning. J. W.

THE LANDING.

Greater crowds than those at Albert Park have never before been seen in the history of Fiji. All around Albert Park, at every advantage, Europeans, Indians, Fijians, Solomon Islanders, Samoans, Chinese, and a half dozen other races jostled for space to see the plane. A cordon of defense force men and Fiji constabulary was thrown around the park and kept the field cleared. Balconies and housetops were crowded with watchers, traffic along the beach road was stopped, and Albert Park was ready for the landing.

The watchers on the roof of the Grand Pacific Hotel were the first to sight the machine. The plane was but a speck in the north over the delta of the Rewa River. Larger and larger it grew as it headed straight for the landing place. The plane swooped down toward the Grand Pacific Hotel and away past the field. Coming around, it passed over the upper end of the park, then turned and flew down over the park and out to sea to lose altitude. Dropping toward the water, the *Southern Cross* headed for the gap on the seaside, cleared the road, landed well in the park, and taxied straight toward the far corner.

Ten thousand people stood horror-stricken as the machine traveled on and on toward the corner and a crash into the fences and the crowd beyond seemed inevitable. But at the foot of the short hill leading to the fence the pilot brought the *Southern Cross* around to the left and pulled up in a short distance near a tree on his left, another on his right, and an iron shed on his right front.

At 2.21 p. m. June 6, 1928 (eastern time at Suva), Captain Kingsford-Smith stopped the *Southern Cross* in Fiji, thus completing the longest flight over water ever made in an airplane. The trans-Pacific fliers completed the second and most difficult stage of the flight with only enough gasoline in their tanks for 1½ hours' flight. The elapsed time was 34 hours and 22 minutes.

According to press reports from Honolulu, the *Southern Cross* left Barking Sands with 1,290 gallons of fuel for the 3,100-mile flight to Suva, so approximately 1,260 gallons of gasoline were consumed on the second stage.

SEARCH FOR SUITABLE FIELD.

The mayor of Suva arranged a civic reception for the fliers, the governor planned a luncheon, teas were prepared, but the next morning Captain Kingsford-Smith informed the committee on arrangements that his first duty was the finding of a suitable field for the departure. He regretted that preparations for the third stage of the flight would compel him to miss most of the entertainment arranged by the committee.

The other airmen were sent to the various receptions planned by residents of Suva and he went to inspect various beaches and level areas suggested.

Naselai Beach, about 25 miles from Suva, was selected. A long, narrow strip of beach between high and low water marks was considered satisfactory for the hop-off.

KINGSFORD-SMITH DECIDES TO TAKE AMERICANS.

According to the original plans of the expedition, Captain Lyons and Mr. Warner, the two Americans, were to be dropped at Suva. The *Southern Cross* was to proceed to Australia without the navigator and the radio man in order to save expense. Captain Kingsford-Smith was heavily in debt and needed every pound he expected to receive in Australia from the Government and from the public to pay his obligations in San Francisco. However, the increasing number of cablegrams calling the Americans to Australia caused him to change his plans. The two Americans decided to hand over their share of any grants or gifts in Australia to Captain Kingsford-Smith.

THE DEPARTURE FOR NASELAI BEACH.

On June 7, 1928, final plans were made for getting away. A supply of oil and gasoline was sent by the Government yacht *Pioneer* and the vessel was ordered to remain at Naselai to maintain radio communication with the outside world. The *Pioneer* anchored just inside the reef, about 2 miles out from Naselai Beach, and the fuel and oil were landed through the surf with considerable difficulty.

At 11.05 a. m. Captain Kingsford-Smith, accompanied by Mr. Ulm, rose from Albert Park in the *Southern Cross* and headed for Naselai Beach. There was a light following wind, and so it was decided to leave Captain Lyons and Mr. Warner to proceed to the beach by boat. The pilot lifted the machine into the air before he had run much more than 200 yards and cleared the roadway at the end of Albert Park with at least 20 feet to spare. Half a mile out he turned and, flying low, circled three times around the ground, then headed for Naselai Beach. But in a short while the *Southern Cross* was back again and flew over the harbor and then straight for Albert Park. It was thought that the plane had failed to land at Naselai, the pilot considering it impossible. Captain Kingsford-Smith had returned to have a radio message sent to the *Pioneer* informing the party on Naselai Beach that he would not land until 12.55 p. m., when the tide was more suitable. He cruised over Suva for some minutes, then made for Naselai again, and landed shortly before the time he fixed.

FUELING DELAYS DEPARTURE.

The drums of gasoline were landed with difficulty through the surf running on the beach at Naselai, and then it was found that the filters retarded the work of fueling. It was nearly 5 o'clock before the last of the 750 gallons of gasoline was in the tanks. Visibility was poor and the pilots were tired from their work in fueling the machine and making arrangements for the departure. They wanted a few hours of daylight to clear the Fiji Islands and set their course, so it was decided to postpone the departure until low tide, about 3 p. m. next day.

The *Southern Cross*, all ready for the flight, was pushed up on the beach among the weeds growing above the high-water mark and left for the night. A police officer, two Fijian police, and Mr. Warner remained on guard and the others returned to the *Pioneer* for the night.

THE TAKE-OFF.

The departure from Naselai Beach was made without difficulty or mishap. The *Southern Cross*, as it started, slowly gained speed and taxied, tail up and nose down, for some 1,100 yards. Then, when a speed of about 80 miles an hour had been reached, the plane rose in the air at 2.52 p. m., June 8, 1928 (Suva time). The *Southern Cross* circled around the beach, climbing gradually, and passed above the reef as the Canadian-Australasian mail boat *Oorangi* passed northward. A last wave of the hand from Mr. Ulm, and the ship bore away to the south, headed for Suva.

At four minutes past 3 the plane was over Suva and swept down comparatively low for the airmen to wave farewell greetings to the residents of Suva. The machine passed over the harbor, bore to the west, and then turned south on its way to Australia.

ARRIVAL AT BRISBANE.

At 10.10 a. m., June 9, 1928, the *Southern Cross* landed at Brisbane, after having experienced boisterous weather in the early morning hours of the same day which blew the craft to the south of Brisbane, out of its course. The last stage of the trans-Pacific flight was made in 21 hours and 18 minutes flying time.

The entire distance from San Francisco to Brisbane, 6,417 miles, was made in 83 hours and 3 minutes flying time. Throughout the trip radio communication was maintained with the *Southern Cross*, and during the entire voyage the exact position of the plane was known to the world.

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, D. C.

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1928

O. N. I. BULLETIN

FOR CONVENIENCE IN ROUTING

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MARINE OFFICER			
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"B" DIVISION OFFICER			
"E" DIVISION OFFICER			
"M" DIVISION OFFICER			
"N" DIVISION OFFICER			
"R" DIVISION OFFICER			
RADIO OFFICER			

The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

NOTICE

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between August 1 and September 1, inclusive.

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CONFIDENTIAL

O. N. I. MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

Vol. XI September, 1928 No. 3

GREAT BRITAIN

POLITICAL

(*Source: State Dept.*)

RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS.

The outstanding event has been the negotiations for the conclusion of the collective treaty to renounce war. Considerable irritation was caused by what the Government's opponents chose to call its dilatory tactics. The opposition never failed to tax Sir Austen Chamberlain with being so shortsighted as to let a great opportunity slip through his fingers to be the first to demonstrate Great Briain's peaceful purposes and by so doing cement Anglo-American friendship. Sir Austen pleaded that consultation with the Dominions was the cause of the delay. The primary cause was, of course, his desire to be the arbiter between the French and American viewpoints, and thus win infinite credit for himself. His failure to do so has, it is believed, shaken his equanimity to no small extent. British acceptance, when it came, was generally heralded with marked enthusiasm.

It has been more than evident that, to the British way of thinking, the pressing question of naval disarmament lies beneath the Kellogg pact. The conservative government has failed dismally to effect economy in the administrative services. While the lack of public-service economy has been heard of much less during the past year than the year before, it nevertheless is a charge against the Government which will undoubtedly be brought up during the next general election campaign. The navy seems to be the only service in which savings are feasible. British endeavors to reopen the capital-ship question at the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference were clearly a part of the Government's plan to save money, without incurring naval risk. The lately announced Anglo-French agreement on naval disarmament for consideration at the preparatory disarmament conference is, of course, a step in this general direction.

There is a story being passed about that Sir Austen Chamberlain, very much annoyed by his exclusion from the antiwar treaty negotiations—credit for the successful conclusion of which now goes elsewhere—is hoping to present the first fruits of that treaty to the British people in the shape of a naval agreement, and, failing that, to give them the impression at least that the conservative government was not to blame if the pact had not led to some concrete, money-saving form of disarmament. The story continues that the British are endeavoring to gain French support against the United States, whenever the next naval-limitation conference takes place, for the limitation of surface vessels of 10,000 tons or more and for the reduction in the size of capital ships.

Unfortunately, the Government's reluctance to publish the agreement has given scaremongers the opportunity for some rather hair-raising articles. The agreement's chief purpose would seem merely to be to break the deadlock between the British and French on the subject of limitation by category versus global limitation which has existed ever since the preparatory disarmament commission first met at Geneva.

The Foreign Secretary was suddenly taken ill with bronchial pneumonia and will be absent from the Foreign Office for several months, and Lord Cushendun will be deputized to fill his place during the interim.

The Foreign Secretary has constantly given expression to his strong French predilections. His foreign policy seems to center around France and European complications and to diminish the importance, both to Great Britain and the Empire, of the United States and the Dominions. His critics never tire of pointing out that in any diplomatic enterprise with France he invariably sacrifices British interests. They often state that he is so anxious to be crowned with laurels by the French that he seems unaware of the fact that they are dragging him about in a triumphal chariot in whatever direction they choose. As one commentator has remarked, "Sir Austen's monocle was made in Paris. Gazing complacently through it, he mistakes every French wasp for a butterfly."

NAVAL

INSPECTION OF BRITISH CRUISER "CORNWALL."

The workmanship throughout is not up to our standard, in that the shell riveting is poorly done, the finish rough; teak-deck planking poorly laid; metal sheathing overhead and at sides roughly installed with cast metal corner pieces where side and top sheathing meet and in the way of deck beams. The corticine covering laid on the decks in the living quarters has brass binding strips throughout, which are held down by one row of screws.

There was no marked attempt to save weight, and the full-load displacement was said to be 14,000 tons. The draft on arrival was 18 feet forward and 21 feet 6 inches aft. There was a noticeable absence of portable gear about the decks; even the mushroom vent cowls on the main deck in way of the 8-inch turrets seemed to be permanent.

The ventilation was said to be and appeared to be excellent throughout, and with her high deck spaces would make her a comfortable ship in the Tropics. The crew spaces were commodious and comfortable, the crew having metal lockers, kept bright for stowage of clothing. The crew of the ship presented a clean and neat appearance, but the way lines were handled and the handling of boats in running lines on the ship's arrival indicated that the crew was inexperienced.

The ship apparently is not as good a sea boat as expected. On the trip from Rio de Janeiro to Montevideo they had to slow down from 18 to 10 knots, due to the heavy racing of screws in a moderate sea. I overheard the executive officer tell the British ambassador that in any sort of a seaway the stern of the ship had a bad whip.

The captain of the ship, Captain Levenson-Gower, said that this type of ship, owing to the unsatisfactory quarters of the commanding officer, was not popular with the older captains and that, due to this, he undoubtedly had been assigned to the ship, as he was young in grade for the command.

The ship is fitted with side bulges which were noticeable and which extend above the deep-load line. They are estimated to be a little over one-half the ship's length along the vital parts of the ship.

Engineering.

In conversation with the chief engineer, it was stated that little was known concerning the actual steaming qualities of the ship, that they were experimenting with her, and so far have concluded that 18 knots is her economical speed. This is the speed at which they generally cruise. The ship is in a steaming competition, but so far little attention has been paid to the competition.

Radio.

The radio room was closed, and upon inquiring about radio installation I was informed that they were not permitted to divulge anything concerning installations or their procedure.

The local Marconi agent, who is an ex-English naval officer, informed me that they would not permit him to visit the radio room, nor would they give him any information concerning the installation.

Boilers.

There are two firerooms, each containing 4 small-tube Yarrow boilers of 10 burners each. The firerooms are well ventilated, and there are four motor-driven intake blowers on deck directly above each fireroom. The intakes are not individually trunked in, but the blowers draw from one large trunk, at the base of which they are installed. The highest temperature said to be recorded was 108° on the fireroom floor while passing through the Tropics, but it was stated that a temperature of 180° was noted at the back under the boilers.

The statement was made that the pressure carried at the boilers was 250 pounds, but it was noticed that a gauge was registering 285 pounds. Steam is superheated to 200°. The drums are lagged with some new mixture of asbestos colored blue and covered with a coarse mesh canvas. The ship can make 20 knots with two boilers and is said to be a very easy steamer, as coming out of Bahia under three boilers, they ran from 20 up to 23 knots in seven minutes; 4½-inch air pressure is carried in the fireroom at full power.

The piping is lagged with the new asbestos mixture covered with very coarse mesh canvas, with no designating color on the pipes. There are no mechanical telegraphs in the firerooms.

There is a main and a secondary fire-control station, the main being above the bridge and the secondary aft on the after fire-control platform.

Gas Masks.

All officers and men in the British service are put through gas tanks and receive gas instructions, and all are fitted with gas masks, which they keep and for which they are responsible. The British naval attaché informed me that he had his gas mask with him in Argentina, so that in case he should be ordered to a ship from his present assignment he would have his gas mask with him.

Guns, Main Battery.

The main battery guns are installed as shown in *Jane*. The elevation was said to be 55°, and from general appearances of the gun ports this seemed about correct. Access to the turrets was not granted, but I was informed that there was no fore and aft bulkhead in the turrets. From the appearance through an open hatch turrets appeared to be roomy. They are operated electrically.

Listening Devices.

No information could be obtained concerning listening devices, but from conversation I doubt if any are installed.

Powder and Projectiles.

No information could be obtained concerning powder or projectiles for either main or secondary batteries. The ammunition hoists for the secondary battery are electrical and only hoist as far as the second deck. It was stated that the ammunition could be supplied to the guns very rapidly.

Torpedoes.

The torpedoes, which appeared to be Whitehead 21-inch, were stowed in the torpedo storeroom and workshop on the upper deck amidships and slightly abaft the torpedo tubes. The workshop door was open and it was seen that the torpedoes were carried in brackets on the outboard bulkheads. There is plenty of room in the workshop for the overhauling of torpedoes, and at the time of the inspection the torpedo crew was engaged in overhauling one of the torpedoes. When I was observed looking toward the torpedo workshop, the door was immediately closed.

Engineering, General.

This ship has never been standardized, and it was stated that her maximum speed and shaft horsepower are not actually known.

Auxiliary Machinery.

All pumps are of the Weir type and all auxiliaries are steam driven.

Electric Equipment.

There are two Brotherhood turbogenerators installed in the forward engine room and two in the dynamo room forward of this, each with its own condensing plant.

Two 36-inch searchlights are installed on the after fire-control platform, with two 18-inch on the navigating bridge and one small 12-inch, which can be moved from side to side and used exclusively for signaling, on the signaling bridge. The ship is well lighted throughout and has emergency oil lamps in the engine and fire rooms and also in other parts about the ship.

Fuel.

Fuel capacity is 3,400 tons. It was stated that the ordinary precautions were observed in fueling; that the fuel supplied has been of good quality, with no undue trouble with clogging of burners. The rate of fueling has never been determined, nor has any attempt been made or definite time set to bring a coal boiler up to the point where it can be cut in with other steaming boilers.

Radio Direction Finders.

No information could be obtained concerning radio direction finders, but they stated that one had been installed.

Turbines.

The turbines are Parsons, installed in two engine rooms, the two forward being the turbines for the outboard shafts and the two aft for the inboard shafts. The engine rooms are roomy and well ventilated, 100° being the maximum temperature recorded while passing through the Tropics. The installation is simple, and there seem to be fewer gadgets than found in the engine rooms of our ships.

The high-pressure turbines are outboard of the low-pressure turbines. There are no cruising turbines, and the reverse turbines are installed in the after ends of the low-pressure casings. Condensers are below the low-pressure turbines and secured to the low-pressure turbine casing. During the trials, bearings on the low-pressure turbine ran hot and there was blade interference. This was found to be due to the turbine casing being bowed out of line, due to the unsupported weight of the condenser. This was corrected, and no further trouble has developed. There is no auxiliary condenser. It was claimed that the consumption of oil was nine-tenths pound per shaft horsepower per hour at full power. The stop valves to the reverse turbines have horizontal ratchet-lever handles.

Reduction Gears.

The revolution of the screws at full speed is said to be 310; the gear ratio, 10 to 1.

FRANCE

NAVAL

TESTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY CANDIDATES FOR THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE.

1. Results obtained in the last few sessions of the Naval War College lead to the greatest hopes for the future of the corps of line officers.

2. The present results must be kept up and bettered, if possible.

3. With this idea in mind, it has been decided that candidates for the Naval War College, besides the tests outlined previously, shall take a probationary examination on certain subjects clearly defined in the program, whereas now officers whose work has been brought to the attention of the board simply develop orally the ideas they may have on their particular work.

4. The measures envisaged answer the following ends:

(*a*) Simplify the selection of candidates.

(*b*) Demand of our future line officers a more detailed preparation, permitting them to give all of their time, after their arrival at the War College, to the special studies that can not be undertaken elsewhere.

5. The examination foreseen in paragraph 3 above will be put into effect progressively. It will include the following subjects:

(1) *General instructions in the Tactical Signal Book.*—Candidates will be called upon to comment on the articles in these general instructions and to show that they understand how to carry out and interpret the signals.

(2) *Decrees and general orders on service afloat.*—Candidates will be called upon to comment on such rules.

(3) *General Regulations.*—Candidates must know these regulations.

(4) *French naval history.*—Candidates must give proof of a general knowledge of this history. Their studies in this domain must be along the line of a critical analysis of naval warfare and the events developing from these wars. Each year there will be published a circular letter indicating the period of French naval history that will be covered in the examination.

6. The other conditions for admission to the Naval War College are, in general, those fixed for 1924 by the circular letters of January 14 and February 5, 1924.

7. To permit officer aviators who are students at the Naval War College to retain their skill as aviators and hence, on completion of the course, continue their service as pilots in the active squadrons of the navy, these officers will continue in a " flying status " while at the school and will train themselves in piloting land and sea planes under the same conditions as officer aviators on service at the Navy Department in Paris.

This aviation training is in addition to their work at the War College.

SECTION I

Admission to the War College.

ARTICLE 1. Lieutenants who are candidates for admission to the Naval War College—

(1) Must have at least two years' service at sea in the rank of lieutenant on October 1 of the year in which they apply for admission to the college.

(2) Must be among the senior 175 lieutenants on October 1 of the year preceding the year they enter the War College.

ART. 2. The written request and the thesis prescribed in articles 6 and 7 of the decree must reach the examining board via official channels before July 1. The thesis must be addressed to the commandant of the War College.

ART. 3. The examining board forwards the requests and theses of the officers it recommends for the course to the commandant of the Naval War College. This list must reach the War College by

August 1. The candidates are listed in order of preference, taking account of their general culture, their technical knowledge, their service record, and their aptitude for the naval service.

Art. 4. The board mentioned in article 7 of the decree is under the presidence of the commandant of the War College. It meets in Paris during the latter half of September for the oral examination of the candidates recommended for the course.

On October 1 this board forwards to the Chief of Naval Operations a final list of candidates recommended for the course, with the reasons for selecting each candidate attached to the list.

Art. 5. Assuming they have the required rank and amount of sea service—

(*a*) Officers failing to be selected may renew their requests each year.

(*b*) Officers whose theses were returned, those whose theses were retained, but who were not considered qualified for admission, and those who, having been found qualified, were not admitted can apply for admission two more times. In the first case a new thesis is required; in the second and third cases they need simply appear for the oral examination.

(*c*) Any officer who is refused admission three times is no longer eligible for the course.

Art. 6. The names of officers qualified for admission and those admitted are published in an alphabetical list in the Official Journal.

Art. 7. For the courses of 1921 and 1922 the regulations set forth in article 10 of the decree of May 2, 1921, and in articles 1, 2, and 3 of this decree are replaced by temporary rules set forth in circular letters. (Note.—These temporary rules are not included in the translations. They are no longer in effect.)

Section II

Courses at the War College.

Art. 8. The courses given at the War College are:

Principal courses covering special studies of the art of naval warfare and the practical conduct of naval operations. These courses are given by instructors common to both War College and the Center of Advanced Naval Studies.

Secondary courses covering technical subjects and general knowledge necessary to officers in command of ships or to staff officers in the performance of their duties. The lectures are given by officers or civilians not permanently attached to the college, but who are merely called in to give the lectures.

Art. 9. The principal course includes lectures and practical exercises in—

Naval strategy and tactics.

Tactics of surface forces.

Tactics of submarine forces.

Tactics of air forces.

Lectures and practical work on line duties.

Practical exercises must be given particular attention.

Art. 10. Secondary courses include naval history, foreign navies, international law, interior organization of ships, gunnery, torpedoes, marine engines, naval construction, aeronautics, mines, mine laying, mine sweeping, submarine detection, communications, intelligence service, cryptography, instruction training and discipline on board ship, military forces, merchant marine, political geography, French colonial empire, etc.

In addition there are courses in English and German. The students may elect either or both courses.

There are lectures on various subjects. Questions that have actually arisen are introduced each year in the program. Officers may attend lectures or take courses at other schools, in particular the Army War College.

Art. 11. The general outline of the courses, with the number of lectures to be attended, is established by the commandant of the War College with the approval of the C. N. O.

The actual programs are so arranged that during the courses given any three consecutive years an officer will get all the instruction necessary to fit him for any duty that may devolve upon a staff officer.

To this end officers take on one hand all the courses required for the year they actually pass at the school, and on the other hand the courses of the preceding and following years that are not included in the current year's work.

Art. 12. The general program established, the commandant issues instructions covering the courses and lectures to be given by each instructor.

The instructors then make the detailed plans for their courses and submit them to the commandant, who, after final conferences, approves a definite program.

Art. 13. Necessary trips made in accordance with article 11 of the decree shall, if possible, be made during the first semester.

Each trip shall be the subject of a written report by the officer making the trip.

When officer students attend naval maneuvers they shall submit a written critique of the maneuvers.

Art. 14. In addition to the reports required by the previous article, officer students shall prepare the following theses:

First semester.—Two theses on the Navy, one on a period preceding 1914 and the other on the period 1914–1918. These theses, different for each student, are selected by the commandant.

Second semester.—The solution of a war problem, including all orders covering the operation. The problem is the same for all students and is prepared by the commandant and approved by the C. N. O.

Section III

Final Examinations.

Art. 15. The board conducting the final examinations is composed of—

(1) A vice admiral nominated by the Secretary of the Navy.

(2) The commandant of the War College.

(3) The head of the course of conduct and command of naval forces at the center of advanced naval instruction.

(4) The head of the department of strategy and tactics at the Naval War College.

(5) and (6) Two senior officers nominated by the Secretary of the Navy.

Art. 16. *Written examinations.*—The written examinations include three subjects:

First. The critical reports mentioned in article 13 of this decree.

Second. The historical works mentioned in paragraph 1 of article 14 of this decree.

Third. The work on strategy and tactics covered in paragraph 2 of article 14 of this decree.

Art. 17. *Oral examinations.*—The oral examinations, three in number, consist in maintaining before the examining board the ideas set forth in the three written tests above mentioned.

Art. 18. Each member of the examining board gives to each candidate and for each test, written or oral, a mark in the scale 0 to 20.

The mark made for a test is the average of the six marks given by the members of the board.

Art. 19. Student officers are chosen from among captains, young in age, and commanders who by their service reputation and susceptibility to future development appear to be best fitted for the courses of study.

Art. 20. Each year, at the proper time, commanders in chief, and other authorities qualified to do so, make their recommendations for admission of officers to the advanced school.

On receipt of these recommendations the Secretary of the Navy will publish a list of officers to take the course.

Art. 21. The board, combining the marks made on the different tests, draws up a report of the examination, including in this report, for each officer, a general appreciation, which will be entered in the officer's service record.

Officers having passed a particularly brilliant examination receive, at the suggestion of the board, a letter of commendation from the Secretary of the Navy and a brevet bearing the note, " Breveted with special mention."

Officers failing to pass the final examinations are ordered to general service.

Section IV

Art. 22. Officers breveted are carried, in order of rank, on a special list kept in Paris, in view of their designation for staff work, following the rules set forth for the composition of the staffs of the various naval forces in the decree covering service aboard naval ships, and for staff duty ashore following the rules contained in article 24 of this decree.

These designations are made by the Secretary of the Navy at the request of the Bureau of Navigation and on the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The officers found on this list may be ordered to command.

Art. 23. In general, officers breveted who, on graduation from the college, are not immediately ordered to employment on sea or on land are given temporary duty with the General Staff or are sent on special missions.

Art. 24. Employments on staffs either at sea or ashore are generally reserved to breveted officers.

This rule is not broken except, in special cases, by the Chief of Naval Operations, with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy.

Art. 25. Officers breveted, in service at some port, must not, except in a case of absolute necessity, be otherwise employed than on staff duty.

Art. 26. Breveted officers will wear the insignia determined by the Secretary of the Navy.

Section V

Admission to the Center of Advanced Naval Studies.

Art. 27. Commanders who are candidates for admission to the Center of Advanced Naval Studies must have filled in their grade the conditions necessary for promotion to the grade of captain.

Art. 28. Each year the commander in chief and others clothed with the proper authority nominate candidates for admission to the Center of Advanced Naval Studies from amongst the captains and commanders who seem to fulfill best the qualities set forth in article 19 of the decree of May 2, 1921.

The recommendations are in the form of a list in order of preference, in which captains and commanders are listed regardless of their rank.

The order of preference is expressed in the form of a fraction, the numerator indicating the preference and the denominator the number of officers proposed. Each list is accompanied by letters of recommendation setting forth the value of the officer and his aptitude for service and for the exercise of high command.

ART. 32. The list of officers admitted to the Center of Advanced Naval Studies is published in the Official Journal in alphabetical order.

ART. 33. Foreign officers are not admissible to this center.

SECTION VI

General Program of Studies, Lectures, and Exercises at the Center of Advanced Naval Studies.

ART. 34. The program includes—

A course in the organization, conduct, and command of naval forces.

A course on naval strategy and tactics and conferences on—

Naval policy.

Political geography.

Naval history.

General administration of the Navy and its budget.

Conduct of land warfare.

Student officers assist besides, either at the War College or at the Center of Advanced Naval Studies, at common conferences and take part in common strategical and tactical exercises.

They are authorized, besides, to follow such courses and conferences as they wish at the Naval War College.

ART. 35. The general program of courses and conferences is established each year by the commandant of the Center of Advanced Naval Studies and submitted for approval to C. N. O.

This program is so conceived as to take cognizance of the progressive changes and improvements in naval tactics and strategy.

Courses and conferences thus have an essential part common to each session and other parts which are special for each session.

ART. 36. The regulations set forth in articles 12 and 13 of this decree are applicable to students at the Center of Advanced Naval Studies.

Art. 37. During the session officer students must furnish theses covering two assigned war problems, the first including purely naval operations; the second, combined naval and military operations.

Art. 38. In order to disseminate in the service the ideas of the Center of Advanced Naval Studies, officer students may, on finishing the courses, be sent on short missions to give lectures and direct practical exercises of the seagoing squadrons and the regional commands.

Section VII

Art. 39. The staff common to both War College and Center of Advanced Naval Studies includes—

1. The staff:
    - The commandant.
    - The commandant aide.
2. The teaching corps:
    - Two captain professors, the first being the head of the Center of Advanced Naval Studies and in charge of the course covering organization, conduct, and command of naval forces; the second, head of the War College and in charge of the courses including strategy and tactics.
    - Four senior officers, assistant professors charged with giving courses and practical exercises on—
        - Tactics of surface vessels.
        - Tactics of submarines.
        - Tactics of air forces.
        - Staff duties.

Art. 40. (*a*) Officers ordered as professors are preferably chosen from graduates of the War College. They are designated for the duty, when possible, six months in advance of reporting, to give them time to prepare their courses. If they are not assistant professors they must finish during the six months a preparation of which the duration must not exceed three months. (During this three months they are apparently excused from other duty.—Translator.)

(*b*) *Assistant professors.*—Officers ordered to duty as assistant professors, preferably chosen from graduates of the War College, are ordered three months in advance, in view of the preparation necessary to prepare for their courses.

Art. 41. The normal tour of duty is one year for assistants and two years for professors. These tours may be prolonged a year at the request of the commandant. In no case shall an officer remain on this duty more than three consecutive years.

Art. 42. Lecturers are chosen in accordance with article 17 of the decree of May 2, 1921. Articles 40 and 41 above are not applicable to them.

ART. 43. Conferences of the faculties of the Center of Advanced Naval Studies and the War College will be held presided over by the commandant.

The object of these conferences is to coordinate the work of the two organizations to assure unity of method and the preaching of a common doctrine in all branches of study. This conference is furnished with a permanent secretary by the commandant. It is held at least once a month to fix the details of employment for the succeeding month.

CRUISER "EDGAR QUINET" TO REPLACE "JEANNE D'ARC" AS CADET SHIP

The cruiser *Edgar Quinet*, 14,000 tons, and launched in 1917, is to replace the cruiser *Jeanne D'Arc* on practice cruises for cadets. It is proposed to have the *Edgar Quinet* make the practice cruises in 1928, 1929, and 1930 and to have the new school ship ready to make the 1931 cruise.

The order for the new cadet school ship has been placed with the Chantiers de Penhoet, St. Nazaire.

ITALY

POLITICAL

GENERAL NOBILE'S EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH POLE.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

As General Nobile's expedition to the North Pole will probably be a lively topic for discussion for years to come, the following information in connection therewith may be of interest. Had everything gone well with Nobile, the objections which it seems were raised when the expedition was suggested would never have come to the surface. Human nature, however, being what it is, there is now a great deal of talk going the rounds, both as regards the organization of the flight and the investigation that Mussolini promises will follow Nobile's return.

This office is reliably informed that General Balbo, the Undersecretary of State for Air, opposed the flight from the beginning. Admiral Siriannò, the Undersecretary of State for the Navy, favored the flight and offered Nobile every possible assistance. Whether Balbo's objection was based on his well-known opposition to dirigibles in general is not known, but it is certain that he would not allow any of the Regia Aeronautica's matériel or personnel to participate in the flight. At this stage General Nobile requested a personal interview with Mussolini, which was granted. Reports vary as to what happened at this interview. One version, and the one that I am inclined to accept, is that Mussolini agreed with Balbo in expressing strong disapproval of the flight and declined to order any government funds to be used for the expedition.

On General Nobile's stating that government aid was not necessary, since the city of Milan would defray all expenses, Mussolini yielded to the point of not openly opposing the flight. General Nobile's friends, on the contrary, state that Mussolini raised no objection, and cite in proof of their contention the publicly expressed satisfaction of Mussolini on more than one occasion prior to the wrecking of the *Italia*. There is no room for dispute regarding how Mussolini feels at the present time. I understand he will not allow anyone to mention the flight to him, and last week he sent Nobile orders to stop all talking and to return to Italy at once. It is rumored Nobile will be court-martialed on two counts—wrecking the dirigible and abandoning his men on the ice. The more conservative believe that there will be an investigation—nothing more. The papers recently have contained some ugly rumors regarding the death of Malmgren, and there has even been talk of Sweden's insisting on an investigation by the League of Nations. This doubtless was intended to force the hand of Italy, and it certainly had that effect, because Mussolini promptly retorted that Italy could conduct an investigation, but would not tolerate any outside interference whatsoever. The charges in connection with Malmgren's death is believed to be the crowning blow to Italy's hopes of coming out of this affair without tremendous loss of prestige. It seems that the Russian aviator who discovered the Mariano group state that two men were standing up and the body of a third man was lying on the ice. Yesterday the Russian aviator reiterated this statement, according to the press, and stated photographs were taken which prove their contention. Mariano and Zappi state that Malmgren died 40 days before they were sighted by the Russian airplane. Malmgren's body has not been found, nor have any of the scientific records he is said to have kept been located. The doctors of the *Krassin* reported Mariano and Zappi in fairly good condition when rescued, although they both contend that they were without food for 13 days. The Swedish press has been especially bitter, and it is highly probable that if the Italian investigation is not sufficiently thorough public opinion in Sweden will demand the whole matter be aired before the League of Nations.

While much of the above is necessarily hearsay, certain facts are matters of records. For instance, although the press, and many public officials, including Mussolini, expressed great satisfaction prior to the loss of the *Italia*, General Balbo stuck to his guns and issued no communique of any kind regarding the flight. Also after the loss of the *Italia*, on May 25, while the navy was taking measures to render prompt assistance, the Regia Aeronautica continued to ignore the expedition. It was not until Norway, Sweden, and Russia had taken official steps to organize assistance did the Air Ministry decide to send Commander Maddaleen with a *S–55* seaplane to assist in the search. A few days later the Dornier Wal *Marvic* seaplane was ordered to proceed to Spitzbergen, Commander Pense taking command. The Air Ministry would have preferred to have washed its hands of the whole matter, leaving the navy alone to continue its support of Nobile, but evidently Mussolini stepped in and ordered otherwise. There can be no question that Italy lost valuable time by not promptly sending assistance and by not coordinating the various relief expeditions after they were sent. As showing how little Italy appreciated the difficulties of the far north, Mussolini's reply to Norway's offer of assistance was couched in phrases so vague that Norway at first interpreted it as meaning that her assistance was not desired.

It has been estimated that the Nobile flight will cost the Italian Government not less than 100,000,000 lire before all claims are settled. Only the initial expenditures of approximately 12,000,000 lire will be paid by the city of Milan; the remainder, it is understood, will come from the navy and the Regia Aeronautica. As the budget for the latter has already been approved and will not be increased because of financial conditions in Italy, it has been given out that there will be no air maneuvers in Italy this year and that the replacement of machines will be limited to a minimum. The monetary loss, however, is negligible compared to Italy's loss of prestige, and if an impartial thoroughgoing investigation of all phases of this flight is ever made I believe Italy's loss of prestige will be immeasurably greater. In any event, the ghost of the Nobile ill-fated expedition will rise to haunt Italy for years to come.

NAVAL

ACCOUNT OF SINKING OF ITALIAN SUBMARINE "F. 14."

1. The following report is made of the loss and salvage of the Italian submarine *F. 14*, in which 27 officers and men lost their lives. The facts were gathered from the press and from talking with officers in the ministry. The official investigation of the accident has not yet been made.

2. The *F. 14* was built by Fiat–San Giorgio Co. at Spezia, being launched in 1917. Surface displacement, 251 tons, and about 318 when submerged; dimensions, 149½ by 13¾ by 10½ feet; guns,

one 3-inch 30-caliber; two 18-inch bow torpedo tubes; speed, 13.5 knots on surface and 7.5 when submerged; ordinary complement, 22.

3. On Monday, August 6, 1928, the *F. 14*, together with the *F. 15*, was ordered to repulse an attack against Pola by the *Brindisi*, flagship of Admiral Faschini, and eight destroyers that were proceeding from Ancona to Venice and which for these maneuvers were to simulate an attack against Pola.

4. When the submarine *F. 14* sighted the attacking force, apparently the commander, Lieutenant Commander Wiel, decided to attack the flagship *Brindisi* by a sumberged approach, with the intention of coming up close aboard. This was done, and the submarine came up directly in the path of the *Brindisi*, but barely missing the *Abba*, the leading escort destroyer of two which immediately preceded the *Brindisi* in close column formation. The submarine was sighted close aboard and ahead by the destroyer *Missori*, which followed the *Abba* and an attempt was made by the *Missori* to avoid the collision by backing the engines and use of the rudder. However, it could not be done, and the *Missori* cut into the stern of the *F. 14*, which was pointed in the same general direction. The bow of the submarine came out of the water and she sank immediately, stern first, in, as it was afterwards ascertained, 42 meters of depth, the stern sticking in a soft, muddy bottom. Thus the vessel remained in a nearly vertical position. The *Missori* dropped a marker buoy as quickly as possible, and search was immediately begun to locate the sunken vessel.

5. The *F. 15* was used to get in touch with the *F. 14*, which was able to communicate with her, and ascertained approximately her position. The *F. 14* reported that 4 men in the aft compartment were drowned and the rest, 23 in number, were in the forward compartments. A "bora" was blowing and the rough sea made diving operations difficult. Otherwise the day was bright and clear and the weather and water warm. The *Brindisi* and the eight destroyers anchored in a close circle around the supposed position of the sunken vessel in order to dampen the effects of the waves for diving operations.

6. Two large floating cranes were brought out from the naval base (old Austrian) of Pola, 15 miles away, together with barges. Six divers were available. They made fruitless search for the *F–14* all the morning and afternoon. Apparently there was considerable current caused by the wind, which gave them some trouble. In the afternoon an attempt was made to locate the sunken vessel by a seaplane, and finally the submarine was seen by her from an altitude of 1,500 meters and her position signaled to the flagship. Still the divers could not find her.

7. About 6.30 p. m. the *F–14* signaled "We feel a heavy object against the hull," and she was instructed to let out some oil. This

was soon done, and it was thus found that the anchor chain of the *Aquila* was rubbing against her; in fact, was afoul of the hull. This was found by sending a diver down the chain of the *Aquila*. A barge was then anchored directly over the *F–14*, and as that vessel had reported the presence of gas, it was decided to attach a fresh-air tube to the hull of the submarine. This was stated to have been accomplished in six minutes after the diver reached the hull. At this juncture the sunken boat signaled "Work fast: the gas is increasing." The sea was still high and night was falling, to add to their troubles. Searchlights were turned on the water by all ships.

8. In the meantime the divers were attempting to get chains around the after part of the hull. The divers and wrecked crew exchanged signals through the hull. About 11 p. m. the *F–14* signaled "We are dying," and all signals ceased very shortly, which was about 15 hours after the collision. Soon afterwards salvage operations were suspended for the night owing to rough seas, darkness, and need of rest for divers.

9. At daybreak operations were resumed, and about midday the submarine was nearly raised by use of chains and two large floating cranes. However, the fouled chain of the *Aquila* caused the chains to slip off and the submarine again went to the bottom. The work of lifting had to be done again. Finally, about 8 p. m. (Tuesday, August 7), the turret began to emerge from the surface, and at 8.40 the crew of the *F–15* opened the hatch. A medical officer descended with gas mask, but had to be helped out immediately, saying that the fumes were too strong and that all were dead. Soon one victim was brought out, but was found to have been dead for hours. The admiral then ordered that the two barges with the *F–14* be towed into Pola.

10. Later all bodies were removed dead—2 officers, 19 crew, and 6 motorists under instruction; 4 of them had been drowned at the time of the collision. In the notebook in the pocket of the commanding officer was the following short description of the accident: "We were about to ascend when from the periscope I saw very near astern the form of a ship, and a few instants after came the collision. The wounded submarine went down in over 40 meters of water." Then followed hopes of being saved and messages to his family. The deaths of the asphyxiated were found to have been caused by chlorine gas, formed from contact of sea water with the batteries.

The press had nothing but praise for all concerned.

Remarks.—The only adverse criticism of the salvage operations that could possibly be made was the slowness of locating definitely the hull of the sunken vessel. This took 10 hours, when time was a precious factor. The *F. 14's* position was almost definitely fixed by her being able to communicate by radio and by the marker buoy dropped by the *Missori*—in fact, so definitely fixed that the searching vessels were able to anchor in a circle about her soon after the collision. As she was standing on end like a tower, with the bow fairly close to the surface, and the searchers knew of this fact, it would appear that dragging operations would have definitely disclosed her whereabouts or that the expedient of letting out oil—which was finally done and which resulted in locating the vessel—was not resorted to sooner to locate her.

This accident and other similar ones stress the fact that when a submarine is sunk the first requisite is for the submarine to carry some means of showing its position definitely to the rescuers.

ITALIAN TORPEDOES.

The Italian Navy Department has developed a depth-control device for torpedoes by which a torpedo can be made to take a deep run at any predetermined distance, in order to get under a torpedo net. After the deep run it resumes its normal depth.

GERMANY

AVIATION

TRAINING OF AIRPLANE PILOTS IN GERMANY.

There are many small aviation schools in Germany where pilots are trained merely to fly airplanes. These pilots are given a class A certificate, and under the law are not permitted to carry passengers for money.

The one and only well-known school, under strict Government supervision, where pilots are trained for employment by the Luft Hansa, is known as the Verkehrsfliegerschule G. m. b. H. (commercial airplane pilots school). This school also furnishes pilots for the German air-traffic companies in Bolivia and Colombia, South America, and also the Junkers Air Lines in Persia.

The course at the Commercial Airplane Pilots School is of four years' duration, and a very limited number of students between the ages of 18 and 22 years are taken in each year. They must have at least a high-school diploma, have earned the German medal for sport, and be able to pay a fee of 5,000 marks in installments for the course of four years.

Applicants must be between 5 feet 7 inches and 6 feet 7 inches in height and at their own expense must have passed a satisfactory physical examination before the one recognized flight surgeon of Berlin, Doctor Koschal. This surgeon is one who made extensive experiments on flying personnel during the war at the German Experimental Institute for Aviation at Adlershof, Berlin, and with two others, I am told, are the only existing medical men in Germany who have any great knowledge of aviation medicine. Luft Hansa pilots, as well as the students at the flying school, are required to pass a physical examination before Doctor Koschal once every six months. A flight surgeon is not present on the airdrome at any time, nor does he make flights with the personnel. In case of accidents to flyers, an ambulance, with a first-aid attendant, removes the injured to a near-by hospital. A recent graduate of the school informed me that about 85 per cent of the accidents were due to pilots, and most such accidents can be classified as minor, as last year's records show that only two students were killed, and they were men who at the time of death were endeavoring to pass the required tests for their class B certificates.

The flying-school course, as stated above, is of four years' duration, and the certificates issued by the Government are of class A, permitting the pilot to fly alone or with a single passenger but not a pay load, class B permitting the pilot to fly single-engined airplanes on short cross-country trips with pay load, and class C permitting the holder to fly multiengined airplanes on long cross-country trips under the operation of the Luft Hansa.

Students when first entering the flying school are sent to Munich, where they receive dual instruction, pass through the first solo and acrobatic stages, and after 50 hours of flying receive their class A certificate. They then go to the seaplane school at Warnemuende, where instruction in piloting seaplanes is given. After becoming proficient in operating several types of seaplanes they are taught sea navigation on sailboats and power boats (these craft were turned over to the school by the navy). Captain Becker, who is in charge of the sea-flying school, has stated that students sailed boats on trips as far as Stockholm and Oslo without instructors being aboard.

Upon successfully completing the course at Warnemuende the students are sent to Staaken, near Berlin, where they receive instruction on many different types of single-engined machines, and upon passing the required government tests before a board, composed of air police, they are presented with class B certificate. Rated class B pilots are then taken over by the chief pilot of the Luft Hansa and assigned as second pilots and mechanics on the regular traffic service. In this stage of training they get experience in landing multiengined airplanes of several types under the immediate control of an experienced pilot of long service. They are checked frequently by pilot inspectors, and when pronounced proficient for advancement they are returned to the school at Staaken, where more flying hours are given in multiengined machines, such as the Focke Wolfe, Junkers, and Rohrbach. A class C certificate, the highest in Germany, is awarded after completing tests before an air-police board. This certificate will allow holders to fly any type of airplane on any cross-country route carrying passengers for money. The school graduates about 25 class C pilots each year, and they are usually employed immediately by the Luft Hansa or as test pilots for the several airplane companies (manufacturers) in Germany.

There is complete cooperation between the flight surgeon and the executive branch. A flying certificate can not be issued or renewed without a flight surgeon's approved "Medical certificate regarding physical qualifications for an aeronautical pilot."

AUSTRIA

POLITICAL

THE "ANSCHLUSS" AND THE TENTH GERMAN SAENGERBUNDFEST.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

The Tenth German Saengerbundfest was held in Vienna from July 19 to 22, inclusive, in honor of Franz Schubert, whose death occurred 100 years ago. The Federal and municipal governments cooperated with the Saengerbundfest committee to the fullest extent in so far as transport, housing, and police regulations were concerned; and as a result the 300,000 visitors from all over the world, including 2,000 German-Americans, were well taken care of. An enormous wooden auditorium, seating 100,000 people, was erected in the Prater, and the building was arranged so that 45,000 singers could be seated at one end for mass singing.

The festival was opened on the night of July 19 by Chancellor Seipel, who welcomed the guests as the representatives of the mutual cultural qualities of Germany and Austria. The Austrian Minister of Public Instruction Schmitz, Mayor Seitz, and the German minister, Count Lerchenfeld, were also speakers of the evening. The songfest on July 20 was normal enough, but on Saturday, July 21, at the midday concert, 220,000 people packed into the hall, as the word had been passed around that this meeting would be a great demonstration for the "Anschluss" ("union"), and it was. Doctor Severing, the German Minister of the Interior; Doctor Loebe, the president of the German Reichstag; Mayor Seitz, and, of course, Count Lerchenfeld were present, but no members of the Austrian Federal Government. This meeting was opened by an address by

Doctor Friedrich List, of Berlin, president of the German Singers' League, who said, in part, that "Germans in Austria and Germany are in reality one, and naturally it is their fervent wish to be outwardly united. German singers must strive for the union as an ultimate goal, no matter how many obstacles have to be overcome." This speech aroused considerable enthusiasm, and was punctuated by numerous "Heils." It was followed by the whole assemblage singing "Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles" to the accompanyment of two orchestras; the whole meeting thereupon reached a high degree of intensity.

The parade on the Ring, on Sunday, July 22, was a masterpiece of staff work, as well as beauty. It lasted eight hours, went without a hitch, and it is estimated that 150,000 marchers were present and about 1,000,000 spectators. The parade, which was reviewed by President Hainisch, Chancellor Seipel, and the foreign ministers, was lead by Los Angeles, New Orleans, and New York delegations, who were followed by Brazilian and Chilean Germans, and then the 4 Riga Societies, 19 from East Silesia, 29 from Poland, 28 from Rumania, 8 from Yugoslavia, and the same number from Hungary. After these came the thousands from all parts of Germany and Austria, and at the last, one lone man carrying a single banner, "South Tirol."

The feat of the Austrian railways in handling this enormous crowd was amazing; it was so smoothly and easily handled. One-hundred forty-seven special trains alone ran from all parts of Germany to Vienna, and the trains were made up of three-fourths German passenger cars, which fact alone is a striking feature of the close liaison between the respective railway's administrations. One-half of the German cars had to be withdrawn immediately on arrival at Vienna as they were required for the festival at Cologne, which is going on simultaneously with the Vienna show; but notwithstanding this handicap the crowd melted away from Vienna overnight at the end of the festival.

Although officially designated as a "saengerfest," it was in reality a striking and effective publicity show for the "Anschluss." No opportunity was lost by the unofficial Austrians and by some German officials to capitalize and propagate the idea, and a large number of Germans will go home from their first visit to Vienna full of "Anschluss," new wine and beer, Wiener schnitzels, and other Viennese delicacies, while new enthusiasm has been created from the union among the Austrians, as they have seen the Germans' prosperity and willingness to spend money freely on their pleasure, both of which have a strong natural appeal to the Austrians. The local banks alone during the two weeks just preceding the festival changed $10,000,000 from German marks into Austrian schillings, and it is estimated that the Germans alone spent over $15.000,000 here during the festival, which is a pretty good argument from an Austrian standpoint for hooking up with her richer brother.

Another statement of Doctor List's, that "Our soul is longing for this greater Germany, but our common sense tells us we may not enforce it now, but can only do the preparatory work, which we will do with all our power and enthusiasm," summarizes the reason for the festival, and the progress of the "Anschluss."

ARGENTINA

POLITICAL

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

Extracts from the presidential message on the opening of the sixty-seventh session of Congress on June 28, 1928:

> During a session of the Committee of Security and Arbitration of the Commission of Preparation for the Disarmament Conference, on touching the point relative to the interpretation of article 21 of the League of Nations' Pact, the Argentine representative, having been previously instructed in the event of this matter's being discussed, stated that the Argentine Government did not consider the Monroe doctrine as a regional pact, as they define it, and gave as an example that the cited article is simply a one-sided political declaration of the United States which has not been approved explicitly by any other American country.
>
> In accordance with sentiments of international respect and consideration, the Argentine delegation to the Sixth Pan American Conference at Habana, interpreting the instructions opportunely transmitted, expressed in that assembly that the Republic continued maintaining the sound doctrine of respect for the sovereignty of States and their independence, considering that this mutual respect is imprescindible, so that young American nations may pass through the transformations of self-governing experiences, and eventually, through the trials of political institutions which their peoples want without tutelage and without foreign intervention, reach the full maturity of democracy which must rule their destinies by internal peace and international concord.

(Article 21 of the League of Nations' Pact: Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.)

ARGENTINA'S VIGILANCE OF TERRITORIAL WATERS.

The jealousy with which Argentina guards her territorial waters, especially those of the River Plate, is shown by the following incident:

The Italian steamer *Anna C.*, bound from Buenos Aires heavily loaded, grounded in the Punta Indio Channel near buoy No. 10, which is about 30 miles from the nearest Uruguayan coast and 10 miles from the Argentine coast. On receiving the message of her grounding, a Uruguayan firm sent out two tugs and lighters to assist in lightening the ship, and they arrived prior to the arrival of any Argentine assistance and began work. Shortly after starting the operations, an Argentine Coast Guard ship appeared on the scene and informed the Uruguayan ships that they were operating in Argentine waters, which would not be allowed. The Uruguayans were compelled to cease operations and later Argentine destroyers were sent to keep guard over the *Anna C.* until such time as the Argentinians could commence lightening the ship.

REPORT OF CHIEF OF ARGENTINE NAVAL COMMISSION IN EUROPE.

The following is the translation of a report by Rear Admiral Ismael Galindez, chief of the naval commission in Europe, published in a magazine issued exclusively to officers in the Argentine Navy. The ships in question are two light cruisers, 6,800 tons displacement, being built in Italy for the Argentine Government:

> It is known that these ships are derived from the type of the *Trento*, which, with its twin ship, the *Trieste*, constitute the two first units that the Italian Navy is constructing in compliance with the Washington agreements.
>
> We have therefore been lucky to have been able to take advantage of the experience acquired in the construction of those ships, it being a happy coincidence that the shipyards which received our order are those that won the competition for the construction of the Italian boats and are on the point of delivering, already finished, the first of the cruisers mentioned.
>
> In accordance with the contract, in a trial load and with a displacement of 6,800 tons, our ship must give 32 miles per hour, developing 75,000 horsepower. It is evident that, as this power is distributed only over two axles, each turbine with reduction gear will have to develop 37,500 horsepower on each axle; they will therefore be the most powerful turbines mounted in any ship to-day, and if any other guaranty should be necessary aside from the good reputation and seriousness of the Orlando shipyards in order to discount beforehand the success in the realization of such a powerful machine, it may be added that the drawings and part of its construction are in the hands of the firm of Parsons. Here we must recall that the American naval constructor who represented the Bethlehem Steel Co. of that country maintained that it was impossible to distribute in only two axles so much engine power (75,000 horsepower).
>
> In the Froude pool (model basin) at Vienna, which is considered the best in Europe, experiments were made recently with the model of the ship in order to determine the power of the engine in relation to its speed and other data that could be obtained by such experiments, the most convenient drawing of the propeller being also determined at the same time with the most sa isfactory result which can be seen futher on.
>
> Since the first towing experiments the excellent lines of the hull were evidenced, having obtained values very much lower than those foreseen for resistance to towing. Photographs of the model were taken at a speed corresponding to 32 knots in the contract, the behaviour of the bottom, as longi-

tudinal seat, being exceedingly good, and, above all, a perfect regularity of the wave profiles. The numerical data obtained from the series of experiments carried out confirm the small percentage of the resistance of the wave in relation to the total resistance to towing and amply justify the results obtained in the towing trial, which surpassed those foreseen.

The towing trials being completed, those of the bottom and its propeller were started. With the first model of propeller tried, very high values were obtained for the total coefficient of propulsion, but the number of revolutions of the propeller were so much less than foreseen that they could not be accepted; the very difficult problem therefore arose of increasing the number of revolutions until reaching that established in the project (290), and this without altering the required power of the engines and consequently the total yield of propulsion. After many tests with various types of propellers, one was found which gave the exact number of revolutions and an engine power equal to that found with the first propeller of slow speed.

From an examination of the data thus obtained and of that of the corresponding diagrams, the following characteristics result regarding the speed required by the contract:

Engine power, shaft horsepower, 56,000; revolutions per minute, 277; apparent efficiency, 66 per cent.

Applying to these results the coefficients of reduction of the engine power and revolutions, the following data for the ship can be foreseen:

Engine power, shaft horsepower, 62,000; revolutions per minute, 292; from which—

Propulsive efficiency with reference to the bottom, 46 per cent; efficiency with appendage, 52 per cent.

Although the project of the engine contemplates a normal maximum power of 75,000 horsepower at 292 revolutions, 85,000 horsepower can be developed with 304 revolutions, and there remains available an ample margin of power beyond the necessary in order to satisfy the speed of the contract. By examining the diagrams and applying the coefficients of the case in order to correct the strength of the engine and the revolutions of the propeller, we arrive at—

Engine power at sea, horsepower, 85,000; engine power in the pool, horsepower, 76,000; revolutions at sea, 312; revolutions in the pool, 298; speed, 33.9 knots.

Having used coefficients that still leave a prudent margin, in conference with the results of the tests in the pool, it may be assured that the ship with the normal displacement of 6,800 tons will easily surpass 34 miles.

The Vienna pool, as said at the beginning, is considered the first among the most reputed, on account of its installations and elements for study, as well as for the exactness of the observations made therein; this makes it so that its services are continually solicited for studies of hulls, and although these are so many and so varied, none have given such complete satisfaction as those carried out in connection with our cruisers.

At present other tests are being carried out in order to determine the elements corresponding to the economical speed, which, if they correspond to those obtained for navigation at maximum speed, will greatly increase the radius of action foreseen by the contract.

If to the brilliant results of the experiments in the pool, which give us the fundamental hope that the same results will be obtained in practice, is added that the armament of our ships is superior to any other of its displacement on account of the number of big guns and their essential characteristics, we must be very well satisfied to have chosen the most powerful element of war of its kind.

(Information has been received that the statement made in regard to the Bethlehem Steel Co. is incorrect. That company merely advised against placing so much horsepower on one shaft.)

BRAZIL

NAVAL

TRIALS OF BRAZILIAN SUBMARINE "HUMAYTÀ," BEING BUILT IN ITALY.

1. The following is an account of recent trials of the Brazilian submarine which is being constructed in Italy. It is of the Italian *Balilla* type.

> On the 12th of July at Spezia the Brazilian submarine *Humayta*, built at the Ansaldo Works, underwent various speed and depth tests.
>
> This submarine is of the Italian *Balilia* type. During the tests it reached a depth of 344 feet, and is now being prepared to cross the Atlantic on its way to Brazil.
>
> To put it more accurately, the depth reached was 344 feet at the center and 357 feet at the bow, thus beating the depth record previously held by a submarine of the same type, i. e., the *Millelire*.

CHILE

POLITICAL

LETTER FROM CHILEAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO CHILEAN MINISTER IN PARIS.

The following is an extract from a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, Señor Rios Gallardo, to Señor Quezada Acharán, former Chilean minister in Paris:

> But nevertheless I prefer the Yankee system of education to that of the French, and my convictions in the matter grow stronger when I apply the Biblical phrase: "By their fruits ye shall know them." When in the modest, colonial streets of Santiago you see a damsel-like youth, with a bob, using rouge and hair oil and who is addicted to stimulating drugs, you can be sure he comes from Paris. On the other hand, when you see a robust youngster, without a vest, who keeps his trousers up with a coarse belt, is fond of sports, and can give a punch that would make a hole in the Moneda, you know, without fear of mistake, that he comes from Yankeeland. And in this connection I recall a story I read some time ago, to the effect that when a Latin visited Niagara Falls he dedicated to them the most lyric and vibrating poem, whereas a Saxon, another visitor to the Falls, invented a dynamo to profit by their motive force.

CHINA

POLITICAL

FENG YU-HSIANG AND HIS ADMINISTRATION OF HONAN.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

Feng Yu-hsiang is to-day the outstanding figure in political and military affairs in China. The few military successes in the last anti-Northern drive which resulted in the capture of Peking were due almost entirely to his troops. Chinese as well as foreigners admit that he is the most able organizer and administrator of all the factional leaders and the best disciplinarian. At the same time, on account of his perfidies in the past, he is the most widely distrusted man in political life in China to-day. At Nanking and Hankow, in Chinese official circles, it is not considered a possibility but a certainty that he will break with the Nanking Government as soon as the opportune moment arrives. Feng's own subordinates state that he will never be content to remain " No. 2 " in Nationalist China.

Marshal Feng has definitely abandoned Christianity, which he professed for so many years. He is now the adherent to a modified form of communism, which does not include communism of property. It is generally believed by people near to him that he is using communism in the present emergency as a means to an end, and that he will discard it as he discarded Christianity. It has been repeatedly reported that Feng at present is surrounded by Russian advisers. I do not believe that this is the case. There are only about a dozen foreigners in Kaifeng and less than that number of Chengchow. If a foreigner arrives in that part of the country, foreigners and Chinese know about him almost at once. I am assured by reliable men that at present Feng has only one foreigner on his staff, a Mr. Sperling, who was formerly a noncommissioned officer in the German Legation Guard.

Arriving in Honan, the Province under the administration of Marshal Feng, from the Yangtze Valley under the Nationalist régime, I was struck by the order and peaceful conditions prevailing in the Province, which before the capture by Feng Yu-hsiang, less than a year ago, was a bandit-ridden, war-devastated, and poverty-stricken country. The traveler notices the cleanliness of trains and stations on the Lunghai Railway, the absence of loitering soldiers and beggers at the stations, the courtesy of the railway officials, and that the trains are on time.

Everywhere one sees young willow trees which were planted this spring as part of Feng's reforestation scheme. At Kaifeng alone over 130,000 were planted this spring. I was told that Feng issued orders that every landowning family must plant 14 a year for five years for every member of the family. He expects in that way to reforest Honan in five years.

In the principal cities, such as Kaifeng and Chengchow, the streets have been repaired and in some cases even widened. They are cleaned and swept every morning at dawn, and dumping of refuse in thoroughfares or alleys is punished severely. The shop fronts in the cities have all been painted the blue color of the Nationalist flag, with decorative effects in red and inscriptions in white. The red-light districts have been turned into respectable quarters, and gambling and opium smoking is punished by imprisonment. There are no beggars on the streets. The poor and aged have been placed in asylums supported by the Government.

On prominent walls of public buildings large colorful pictures are painted depicting busy street scenes teeming with automobiles and well-dressed people, from which the rickshas and burden-bearing coolies are noticeably absent. Other pictures depict children's playgrouunds, or football fields and tennis courts, with old and young people, men and women, playing games. There are also propaganda posts directed against the northern militarists, and such slogans as "Down with imperialism," "Abolish unequal treaties," etc. Feng's "twelve commandments" are painted in prominent places of the towns in large red characters against a background of blue. These enjoin strict morality, economy, and obedience, and order all people "to be industrious and to rise early." Policemen enforce the last order by making the rounds of all houses at 6.30 a. m. and admonishing the people to get up and go to work.

All temples have been taken over by Feng and converted into schools, markets, and public recreation grounds. The Buddhas have been taken out and pictures of Sun Yat-sen and Feng substituted for them. Vacant lots in the cities have been turned into playgrounds with usual apparatuses or into public parks with colorful pagodas and tea houses. Courteous attendants at the parks and recreation grounds meet the visitors—foreign as well as Chinese—conduct him over the grounds, and point out to him with great pride the benefits of Feng's administration. These attendants always refused my tips, stating that they were paid by the Government.

The Province of Honan and, I am told, also Sheasi and Kansu are governed by councils. The officials, such as the chairman of the provincial executive council, the commissioner of foreign affairs, the chairman of the district council or magistrate, are all paid $20 Mex. a month. The provincial commissioner of foreign affairs told me that he had to give lectures in the college two or three times a week in order to be able to live at all. I have been assured by Chinese and foreigners that the officials in Honan, in spite of the low salaries, are honest. The offering or accepting of bribes is punishable by death only. Only a decision of the assembled officials of the department or district concerned, at which the accused is present, is necessary to cause the summary execution of a dishonest official. Such executions are quite frequent occurrences. No official is allowed to employ in his department or office a member of his family or even a distant relative. Silk clothing is prohibited for all people, and officials of all classes are prohibited from wearing the long gown, but must wear a prescribed uniform. Civilians who wish to see officials must first discard their long gowns. In Kaifeng there is a school for the training of civil officials with about 150 students.

The troops of Marshal Feng are without doubt the best disciplined in China. Although the soldiers have not been paid for years, the morale is excellent. Feng tells his soldiers that he is too poor to pay them, and they believe him. He and all his officers wear the same kind of uniform, costing $2 Mex., and the same kind of straw hat, costing a few coppers, as the soldiers. They have no rank insignia except the Sam Browne belt and a label on the left breast pocket with their rank inscribed. The officers eat the same kind of food as the soldiers. No man in military uniform, whether a general or a private, is allowed to ride in a ricksha. This would be degrading humanity. Smoking, drinking, and gambling in the Army are punished by imprisonment. The troops are drilled from dawn to dark, until they literally drop in their tracks, Feng's idea being a man physically exhausted prefers sleep at night to doing mischief. "Passes" for soldiers are almost unknown, and soldiers, except those on duty, are never met with on the streets after dark.

While at Kaifeng I had occasion to talk to Mr. Hu, the assistant surgeon general of Feng with the rank of major general, who is a Harvard graduate and formerly a well-known surgeon in Shanghai. He has been with Feng's army for about two years. He is paid $12 Mex. a month, issued a $2 cotton uniform, and given two meals a day. He is in charge of the Military Medical School in Kaifeng, with about 120 students, and does surgical work in four hospitals. He is the real organizer of Feng's medical service, and I was told by a foreign surgeon that he was really most successful under very trying conditions. Although Doctor Hu is slightly lame in one leg, he is not permitted to use a ricksha since he is a military man, but walks every day several miles between the various hospitals. He was the first man who furnished a Chinese army with properly sterilized first-aid packages, when two months ago he prepared and sent to the army at the front 40,000 packages. He informed me that the so-called heavy casualties in all of Feng's forces during the fighting in April and May this year amounted to only 8,000 wounded and 1,000 sick. He did not know how many were killed. He told me that the wounded when admitted to the hospitals are given a bonus ranging from $4 Mex. to a private to $1,000 Mex. to a general; that Feng has established between Sianfu in Shensi and Kaifeng 10 homes for disabled soldiers in which they are taught a trade and paid $20 a month while in the homes. These moneys are used to establish them in business when they are released from the institution. The families of soldiers and officers are taken care of by public societies, which are subsidized by the Government.

Doctor Hu maintains, although he admits all faults and shortcomings of Marshal Feng, that Feng is the only hope of China in the present chaos. When after talking to Doctor Hu for over four hours I asked him why he slaved for $12 Mex. a month like a coolie, while his family was starving, instead of sitting in a comfortable office in Shanghai, he said with a wry smile: "The reason is, Feng inspired patriotism." Foreigner and Chinese alike assured me that Feng is surrounded by men like Doctor Hu and that Feng's successes are due entirely to his ability to inspire men with a self-sacrificing, patriotic spirit.

ECONOMIC

THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON TRADE.

The more one studies the economics of China the more is he impressed by the preponderant importance of political conditions as a factor in economic life of the Chinese people. Civil war in China has meant not only the destruction of life and property, the spoliation of crops, the commandeering of produce, livestock, and means of transport, the removal from agriculture and other productive pursuits of able-bodied men through recruiting and impressment of labor, and the interruption of transport facilities and markets, but it has meant the imposition of taxes, the making of forced levies on banks, chambers of commerce, and cities, and the issuance of worthless paper currency to pay the cost of war, all of which has resulted in driving a large percentage of the people into abject poverty. This, in turn, has resulted in furnishing more recruits for more armies, both regular and irregular, and the abandonment of farms and other forms of business by persons so destitute as to be forced to emigrate elsewhere.

It may be well at this point to quote from a generally reliable and well-informed Chinese business man, as follows:

> * * * There is, however, one thing worth mentioning, and that is that Shantung has a good harvest this year. But most of the Shantung farming people suffered both by the bandits and the heavy levies on land and contributions to the provincial government, amounting to $5,000,000 or more. These made the farmers homeless and foodless. Most of them have to sell their land and houses. It is reported that about one-third of such homeless people have emigrated to Manchuria. * * *

This statement is a bit broad, as it is known that very considerable areas in Shantung have no crops at all, but it is nevertheless interesting as showing the point of view of a responsible Chinese. And it is literally true that Goldsmith's Deserted Village can be duplicated hundreds of times in Shantung.

Beginning practically with the first week of January, the entry of Nationalist armies into southern Shantung brought civil war again to this district. From then on the tide of war, with it concomitant deplorable results, swept northward. The climax was reached when, after capturing Tsinan city and driving the Northern forces across the Yellow River, the Nationalist forces came in conflict with the Japanese troops sent to that city to protect Japanese life and property. The political result of this conflict was the retirement of all Chinese troops from Tsinan and from an area approximately 7 English miles each side of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway from Tsinan to the seaboard at Tsingtao.

From an economic viewpoint the result of the conflict was to create an artificial and largely isolated zone, comprising the heart and principal commercial artery between central Shantung and the outside world. Fortunately, thus far the creation and continuance of this abnormal situation occurred during the period of the year when there is normally least movement of either produce or import, so its effect has not as yet proved disastrous. Unfortunately, however, it coincided with the breakdown of the other main artery of trade, the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, through traffic over which was stopped as a result of the blowing up, by one of the retreating armies, of a section of the important Yellow River Bridge.

Hence, except for such cargo as is produced or consumed within the occupied zone or percolates from and to the occupied zone and the interior, or could be carried by boat up the Grand Canal to Tientsin, trade could not move.

As giving some indication of the state of affairs in Tsinan city itself, a state of affairs in this instance resulting almost entirely from that conflict, the following estimate of the condition of various industries is given:

Dry goods stores, 5 per cent of normal.
Cotton cloth and miscellaneous foreign goods, 10 per cent of normal.
Jewelry trade, 4 to 5 per cent of normal.
Tea, 50 to 60 per cent of normal.
Cereals and grains, 40 to 50 per cent of normal.
Hardware, 1 to 15 per cent of normal.
Rikisha business, 20 per cent of normal.
Hotels (Chinese), 6 to 8 per cent of normal.
Restaurants, 5 per cent of normal.
Clocks and watches, 30 to 35 per cent of normal.
Coal business, 20 to 30 per cent of normal.
Tobacco, 40 per cent of normal.
Timber and lumber, 10 to 20 per cent of normal.
Banks and exchange shop, 19 to 20 per cent of normal.
Barbers, 20 per cent of normal.

The same source of information states that it is estimated that the actual population is only about 50 per cent of that of normal times, the balance having left for other places.

MEXICO

POLITICAL

GENERAL JOAQUIN AMARO, SECRETARY OF WAR AND MARINE, ADDRESSED TO THE NATIONAL ARMY AND NAVY THE FOLLOWING MANIFESTO.

To the National Army and Navy:

The recent declarations of the President of the Republic in connection with the assassination of Gen. Alvaro Obregon being widely known to all the social classes of the country, it becomes my duty as Secretary of the War and Marine to address all the members of the national army and navy to recommend that they be supported in every respect, since, in the present case, we should consider them as our own.

The degree of morality and discipline which, to our credit and satisfaction, has been attained in recent times by our military institution guarantees to the nation the tranquillity which it demands, blindly trusting in the loyal and patriotic attitude of the generals upon whom the command has been conferred of troops charged exclusively with safeguarding the interests of the nation.

Now, more than ever, is the time for us to continue with greater firmness upon the road of work and order which we have outlined for ourselves, because it is precisely in circumstances such as those now obtaining that the military element should assume the worthy attitude which characterizes it, since to it directly corresponds the defense of the national interests.

That exemplary conduct which has caused the immediate failure of any revolutionary movement arising within the last five years speaks very highly in favor of the armed institution, because it reveals clearly that all its members have made a cult of their duty and that above any personalistic view is their inviolate military honor.

With those antecedents, with that frankly progressive spirit which inspires generals, field officers, and soldiers to exalt the army, adding to the prestige which it justly enjoys at present, it is reasonable to expect that, far from relaxing in the present circumstances, it will the more zealously and strictly adhere to its duty, in spite of the machinations which the enemies of the revolution frequently employ to cause us to fail.

The frank cooperation with the civil authorities, the inalterable harmony which the army has been endeavoring to maintain with the rest of the great Mexican family, should be sought with increasing earnestness, because this mutual help and understanding involve a high regard and profound respect, which are bound to destroy old prejudices in order to prove the positive moral values existing among us.

Faithfully interpreting the sentiment of our Chief Magistrate, I cordially invite you to demonstrate to him once more that you are worthy of the confidence which he has placed in you, assuring him that you will never betray the hope which the Mexican people place in your loyalty as soldiers and virtue as citizens, because with the death of the principal leader of our great social movement at the hands of a blind instrument of the Catholic clergy, all the components of the armed institution who receive as our inheritance his exemplary life as a statesman, his military talents of notable strategy shown in his long career of triumphs, his integrity as a public official, his proven capacity as an organizer, feel ourselves, in these moments of national mourning, more closely united by the common ideal of progress and work, more solidly grouped, more closely united to form one solid and vigorous front, possessed of an earnest desire to participate in all the patriotic activities of reconstruction, that the name of the illustrious dead may become the bright symbol of our future struggles.

I trust, therefore, that all the elements of the national army and navy will know how to respond to this high aim, filled as they are with a deep sense of their duties toward the country, the established institutions, and posterity.

DENMARK

NAVAL

REPORT OF ACCIDENT ON BOARD DANISH SUBMARINE.

A violent explosion occurred Saturday morning on board the submarine *Flora* in the harbor of Hundested. The explosion occurred in the accumulator battery and took place just as the *Flora*, together with the rest of the submarine squadron, was leaving the harbor in order to make a series of recoil-gun exercises upon the surface.

The explosion occurred in the charging room, which is situated amidship under the crew's room. By the explosion a lid was hurled with great force at the 22-year-old radiotelegraphist, the conscript, Poul la Cour Olsen, who at the same time was thrown up against the ceiling of the cabin, sustaining serious gashes in the head and several very complicated fractures on both legs.

At the moment of the accident the chief, Lieut. Capt. Nyholm, and Lieut. Poulsen were on the bridge. He at once stopped the ship and ordered Lieut. Poulsen to go down to the crew's room and ascertain what had happened. The radiotelegraphist was found lying upon the floor and was immediately carried up on deck, as well as Torpedo Machinist Olsen, who had been completely paralyzed by a shock.

The whole crew were then called up on deck in order to combat the fire which had broken out in the crew's premises. All shutters, etc., to the room, from which a suffocating, poisonous smoke was belching forth, were closed; but when three hours after the explosion the shutters were opened, in order to penetrate to the source of the fire, the smoke was still so close that it was necessary to use gas masks. Finally, it was decided to flood the room with water, as there was danger of the wires leading to the torpedoes, which were packed away under the berths of the crew, exploding. The fire was not completely extinguished before late at night.

With regard to the cause of the explosion, the chief of the squadron, Capt. Wolfhagen, states that it must be due to the development of explosive gas in the accumulators. This danger is always present on board submarines, and as a precaution against it the premises are ventilated one hour after each charging of the accumulators. This was last done Friday evening after charging, but it is now believed that there must have been a slight leak in the ventilator system, with the result that some of the explosive gas collected under the deck in the crew's room, and as the accumulators were then connected with the electromotors when the ship was to sail a defective connection between the cells of the accumulator battery had probably produced a spark which called forth the explosion.

POLAND

POLITICAL

PILSUDSKI'S OUTBURST, INCLUDING HIS CANDID VIEW ON THE DIET.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

Marshal Pilsudski's newspaper article, Why I Ceased to Head the Government, his first public pronouncement on current domestic affairs since the month of his coup d'état in 1926, has made its appearance. The marshal agreed to write it on condition that it was not expurgated.

> Those who think that my resignation of the premiership was caused by ill health are grievously mistaken. I could have retained all my offices at the cost of straining a constitution which, for the matter of that, I have strained all my life long. I could also, subject to the consent of the President and my ministers, who hold me, as I believe, in deep affection, have taken long leave in

order that I might set my constitution at rights, to be strained once more when I returned. I chose a different course and resigned the premiership from motives of another kind.

My first reason was that the duties of a prime minister, as our constitution lays them down, filled me with inner disgust. To make my point clear, I shall draw a contrast between the offices of Prime Minister and President, always present to me while I was holding the former.

To be President is to be put in the most impossible situation that any human could well have conceived. Although he is the representative head of the Polish State at all times and in all places, he has no liberty for himself, his thoughts, or his actions. He has not even the right to appoint his personal staff, be they lackeys or serving maids, without consulting somebody else, who may disagree with his choice and impose unwanted persons upon him. The nation's treatment of its President is viler and baser than any man's treatment of his mistress or bondslave. I am still pained by the memory of my own experience as Chief of the State when a war had been won through me, and after much hesitation I had decided that I must undertake nothing further and leave Poland to her own devices. My hesitation then arose because I was faced by the question whether I should dissolve the Seym, that we called sovereign, that house of courtesans, or whether I was to choose, as I did choose, to leave Poland to her own devices. Perhaps if I had chosen differently the nation might have been spared the May revolution.

The object of the constitution which the house of courtesans voted was that the Presidency should not fall to the man who, to an extraordinary degree, had won the confidence of his fellow countrymen, who had never soiled his hands with tainted money, and who by his victorious conduct of the war and innate strength of character had brought Poland out of chaos and gained the wider frontiers before denied her. They wished to thrust the man who might use their sovereignty in a corner and there bespatter him with mire. I spoiled their plan by quietly withdrawing.

The Prime Minister in our constitution appears almighty. I once made this manifest to the former Seym by cutting off their salaries. But omnipotence has its dark side as well. "Everything" in human labor means "nothing." I told the Cabinet last week that the burden of the premiership lay in having the fixed occupation of a nurse of foundling babies, the loved and caressed, the dirty and unloved, which my dear colleagues of ministers were always placing on me, because they were obstacles to their work, or they wanted to bring off some stunt, or were quarreling among themselves in the true Polish fashion. The ridiculous passion for centralization which afflicts the Polish nation causes three-quarters of the agenda at every Cabinet meeting to be occupied with ludicrous trifles.

The doctors told me that my one salvation was to avoid having to master my instincts. When I heard that verdict my mind was instantly made up to hand my resignation to the President. The Prime Minister's duty is a stern fight for self-control, and that was what the doctors forbade me. He is under the painful necessity of collaborating also with the Seym. If I was not fighting that stern battle with myself I should be spending my days in smacking and kicking Polish Deputies. Their methods of work are such that they are deprived from the outset of any chance of doing productive work. The idea that a man's labors can consist in the delivery of speeches is one of the most abominable ever conceived. I can find a level of oratory and keep an audience spellbound. But if I was ordered to speak daily for a couple of weeks I should consider myself a public nuisance.

In the Seym they go on talking for months.

> Only look at that chamber and see how the Deputies behave, as if they were in a common alehouse. When one is delivering a speech, 15 are walking about in pursuit of private transactions, 40 are talking aloud with their backs to the tribune, and a hundred are telling indecent stories. Ministers who get paid a petty farthing for gigantic amounts of work are obliged to preserve an outward respect for that chamber. The dullness of the Deputies' utterances, in language and composition, is enough to give anyone the stomach ache. The flies in the roof get so weary of those speeches that they cease from disporting themselves.
>
> When I was dictator of Poland, after the Bolshevist War, I could have crushed the house of courtesans like a worm, but I did not. All the time that I have been Prime Minister I have been more constitutional than the Seym, and no one can say that I have been wanting in democratic convictions. I wish our Deputies would not identify their methods of work with democracy; they do democracy no honor. When the third (the present) Seym of the Republic started work and I saw the old habits renewing their triumphs, I decided that I again had the choice either to cease collaborating with the Seym and offer my services to the President to impose new institutions or else to retire from the post in which that collaboration was necessary.
>
> I chose the second alternative, and that is why I ceased to head the Government. I added that in any grave crisis I would be at the President's disposal as a Prime Minister who would take entire responsibility for all necessary decisions and accept their consequences not less boldly. With the consent of the President and M. Bartel, the general guidance of foreign policy, customarily exercised by the Prime Minister, remains in my hands as heretofore.

It must be understood that the things Pilsudski often says are not fit to print, and this translation has been reduced to reasonable limits. Some European press comments state that the marshal is crazy—he is no more crazy to-day than he was two years ago. A resident of Warsaw, who is a Slav, told me this evening that this speech is a free outpouring of Polish mentality.

NICARAGUA

POLITICAL

TRIP OF SANDINO FOLLOWER TO MEXICO.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

Gustavo Machado, claiming to be delegate to Sandino of the "Central Committee of a United Front—Hands off Nicaragua," recently passed through Salvador and Guatemala on his way to Mexico. He claimed as the purpose of his trip the necessity of rendering a full report to the headquarters of the organization in Mexico City regarding what is taking place in Nicaragua.

Both in Salvador and Guatemala, Machado made extensive anti-American statements in the press. A translation of one of these statements follows. Most likely the object of Machado's trip to Mexico is to obtain aid for Sandino.

Translation of Article by Machado in Diario Latino of San Salvador—"The Ferocious War of Agression."

The Marine Corps of the United States, formed by the social scum of that country, does not go to any trouble in carrying out the mission conferred upon it by the Department of State—the disarmament and capture of General Sandino and preparation for the coming presidential elections. The Marines do not do anything but assassinate in a cold-blooded, cowardly, and systematic manner the defenseless inhabitants, set fire to their abodes and crops, kill their cattle, rob their fruit, and finally, flee terrorized before the Sandino forces. It is Sandino who persecutes the invaders, and when some fight takes place, it is because Sandino catches them by surprise. They keep their good mounts at a discreet distance from the Nicaraguan patriots.

This ferocious war, this war without quarter against the defenseless population of a country, has no antecedent in history. The cruelest wars of imperialistic nations always had as their primordial end, as their principal object, the destruction of the army of the adversary. In Nicaragua the entire population of the regions where the liberating army passes has been declared "beyond the law" (fuert de la ley). During holy week and the week thereafter more than 70 hamlets in the Department of Nueva Segovia were set fire to. Why? Because General Sandino had abandoned the Segovias by his expedition to the Atlantic coast, which the public already knows about. The proof? I have enormous lists of the inhabitants assassinated and the names of the places. The Honduran frontier furnishes an eloquent proof of the "civilizing" procedure of the United States bankers. In Danli and Paraiso (Honduras) hundreds of women and children, many of them wounded by explosive bullets, are dying from hunger. Their abodes were burned and their husbands either killed by machine-gun fire or else are in the ranks of the liberating army. Gen. R. Mondragon, commander of the Honduran garrison which guards the frontier, is an assassin in the pay of the Yankees; the .45 pistol which he uses is a present from the commanding officer of the Marine detachment at Jalapa, Nicaragua. This wretch captures and assassinates those who endeavor to cross the frontier to join the Sandino forces and abuses the poor fugitive families which seek hospitality in the sister Republic. The ladies of Tegucigalpa, moved by so much suffering, have organized assistance for these Nicaraguan families.

The Anti-Imperialist Latin American Army.

In the army of the defender of the national sovereignty of Nicaragua there does not exist the least vestige of frontier grudges. The majority of the Latin American nations are represented. The ideal of unification and fraternity of our people is realized and practiced in the Nicaraguan camps. The Sandino boys know definitely that the Nicaraguan problem can not be solved in an isolated manner; that Nicaragua defends the sovereignty of all Latin American countries violated or threatened by American capitalism. The situation of the anti-imperialist struggle is perfectly known and discussed there. General Sandino and his army are not a group of Quijotes; optimism, unbreakable faith in triumph, is the product of the experience of more than a year of strife, during which the group of 30 which refused the ratification of the treasonable Stimson-Moncada pact has converted itself into an army well equipped with all classes of arms, good mounts and riding equipment, and sufficient ammunition to sustain the struggle till the final triumph. All the equipment, absolutely everything, has been captured from the invading troops. The Sandino uniform is the same as that of the marine, the only difference being the red and black ornament on the collar and hat. And even this difference does not exist because the "machos" (an insulting name for foreigners), when they try to surprise some hamlet, use the Sandino insignia so they will not be discovered from a distance. The most powerful imperialistic nation in the world has been beaten and humiliated in more than 25 combats, arms and ammunition, provisions, medical kits, photographic apparatus, and various flags having been captured from them. The Stars and Stripes have been abandoned various times on the battle field. And the Marines sent to the battle field are still being fooled by being told in Managua that "they are to go and disarm a badly armed group of bandits." We are fighting in Nicaragua to triumph, and it has been shown that, militarily speaking, we are invincible before the invading forces.

It is the duty of the laborers of Latin America, in whatever country they may be, to comply with the urgent duty of contributing their contingent in confronting the common enemy. One can be a Sandino soldier outside of Nicaragua and can be so even more useful and more efficient than with a rifle in the Segovias. In these moments of confusion and danger for Central America there are three men in Nicaragua who are a symbol and who mark the path of duty to the inhabitants of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. These three fighters are Gen. Manual Maria Giron Ruano, Guatemalan; Gen. Simon Montoya, Honduran; and Col. Jose Leon Diaz, Salvadorean, chiefs of the first and second companies and the Somoto zone.

The immediate and principal problem of these three countries is not found on the banks of the Motagua nor in the exaltation of nationalism against the Central American Union; these are meneuvers of imperialistic interests. The real problem, vital to Central America, is in Nicaragua. We all should endeavor to see that the popular and genuine enthusiasm which is manifested in the three countries materializes in effective help. The army defending the sovereignty of Nicaragua does not require anything. The marines have everything which they need. But the army has to relieve the defenseless victims, has to assist the families interned in the mountains, has to nurse those wounded by machine guns and airplane bombs, and all should contribute their alms to prevent the defenseless population, victim of the systematic ferocity of the Marine Corps of the United States, from perishing.

The urgency of my return to Mexico, proceeding from the headquarters of the liberating army of Nicaragua, prevents me from complying with the express recommendation of Gen. A. C. Sandino to visit the important newspapers of this city. General Sandino knows of the energetic and valiant manner with which the Salvadorean press has defended the sovereignty of Latin America, militarily concreted in the bloody strife against the Yankee filibusterers in Nicaragua. I desire, therefore, in the name of Gen. A. C. Sandino and in the name of his illustrious general representative in Latin America, to present to the Salvadorean people, through the press of the capital, a fraternal greeting and an expression of absolute faith in triumph.

At the same time I wish to state along general lines the impression which I bring from Nicaragua and clear up some important points. The complete and detailed report which I will present in Mexico to the Central Committee of United Front- Hands off Nicaragua will be sent in the near future to the entire press of the continent.

GUSTAVO MACHADO.

Carded
- S. W

RUSSIA

NAVAL

NAVAL ESTIMATE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

ORGANIZATION

(*a*) *Coordination of National Defense.*

The armed forces of Soviet Russia are combined into a department known as the Commissariat of Army and Navy. This department is headed by a commissar, who is appointed by, and is directly responsible to the central executive committee, which committee is in reality the supreme organ of government of the Soviet Union.

Following out the Soviet plan, we must never lose sight of the fact that the system of rule is by means of committees. Within the Commissariat of Army and Navy there is what is termed the Revvoensoviet, which is a committee, and it is this committee, at whose head sits the commissar, that constitutes the highest military organ in the Government.

Among the members of this committee are found the heads of the army, navy, and air force, and its chairman (the head of the committee) is commander in chief of all the armed forces.

There is in addition what is known as the Council of Labor and Defense, and this council is charged with the work of coordinating and developing all the departments of state in the interest of its defense and economic reconstruction.

(*b*) *The Navy Department.*

The navy is headed by an official known as the Assistant Commander in Chief for Naval Affiairs. This official is a member of and responsible to the Revvoensoviet. To assist him he has a chief of staff and two assistant chiefs of staff.

The navy department is for purposes of administration divided into six directorates. They are as follows:

1. Naval staff.
2. Supreme naval technical-economic administration.
3. Administration for navy educational institutions.
4. Supreme hydrographic division.
5. Editing and publishing division.
6. Scientific technical committee.

Naval staff.—Its main subdivisions are: General administration, operations, and personnel.

Supreme naval technical economic administration.—Would seem to combine the functions of our Bureaus of Supplies and Accounts and Construction and Repair in that this directorate carries out the construction and repair of ships, furnishes military supplies to the fleet and its line units, distributes all kinds of stores, foodstuffs, and equipment to the naval ships and naval store institutions, besides handling the finances of the entire naval establishment.

Administration for naval educational institutions.—Has under its cognizance the training and education, both physical and mental, of the navy. In this regard it would seem to embrace some of the functions of our Bureau of Navigation.

Supreme hydrographic division.—Is in general charged with securing the safety of navigation on all seas of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the direction of scientific investigation, and hydrographic work.

Editing and publishing division.—Edits, publishes, and distributes naval literature, has charge of the navy publishing office in Leningrad and the bookstore.

Scientific technical committee.—Is occupied with the question of naval tactics and technique and would appear to correspond to our own Division of Fleet Training.

(*c*) *Fleets.*

There are in Soviet Russia four principal groups:

The Baltic Fleet.
The Black Sea Fleet.
The Caspian and Volga Flotilla.
The Amur Flotilla.

We have seen that the navy department in its administration of the entire navy is divided into directorates. There is also a directorate of the naval forces of the seas. At the head of this directorate stands the commander in chief of the particular fleet and the revolutionary military committee of that fleet. The commander in chief is responsible to the Revvoensoviet (the supreme military organ of the Government) through the assistant commander in chief for naval affairs (the head of the navy), and his directorate is made up as follows:

1. Staff of the naval forces.
2. Directorate for the safeguarding of navigation within his particular waters.
3. Political naval directorate.
4. Coastal defense.
5. Vessel unit commanders.
6. Commanders of naval ports.
7. Naval air forces.
8. Training section.
9. Observation and liaison service.
10. Medical service.

The naval command, and by this is meant the fleet alone, is headed by the commander in chief. The following is a diagram of Russian naval command, and, although not mentioned, it undoubtedly portrays the Baltic Fleet:



The composition and distribution of the Soviet naval forces are as follows:

Baltic Fleet.—4 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 aircraft tender, 13 destroyers, 8 submarines, 1 armored gunboat, 1 gunboat, 1 repair ship, 3 submarine depot ships, 3 mine layers, 20 mine sweepers, 6 dispatch vessels, 2 armed yachts, 6 training and school ships, 1 transport.

Estimated strength: 697 officers, 12,600 enlisted men.

Black Sea Fleet.—2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 3 torpedo boats, 4 submarines, 1 gunboat, 1 mine layer, 1 repair ship, and a number of other ships such as sloops and dispatch vessels, which are also in commission in Black Sea ports, though they are of no fighting value.

Estimated strength: 141 officers, 2,360 enlisted men.

The Caspian and Volga Flotilla.—4 destroyers, 2 gunboats, 2 dispatch vessels.

Estimated strength: 30 officers, 260 enlisted men.

The Amur Flotilla.—4 gunboats.

Estimated strength: 12 officers, 260 enlisted men.

(*d*) *Political.*

We have seen the extent of committee rule in the Soviet Navy, but the picture would not be complete without a mention of that powerful organization known as the P.U.R. Its full title is "The Political Administration of the Workers and Peasants Red Army and Navy."

The P.U.R. is a part of the Commissariat of the Army and Navy, occupying as important a position in the scheme of things as does the Revvoensoviet, which, if we remember, is the supreme military committee of the Commissariat of Army and Navy and the final word in all military activities.

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[1] It would appear that this section controls all vessels operating in connection with aviation service.

Among the various directorates of the P.U.R. is the navy division. Its tentacles extend on through the navy department and into the fleet, where it carries on its political educational work, and directs the activities of the clubs of the fleet.

These agents of the P.U.R., or commissars, have also disciplinary authority equal to the commanders of the units with which they may be attached, punishments being awarded either by the unit commander or by the commissar; and in certain specific cases they have more authority, namely: "During combat the chief should take all means (even to the extent of employing arms, if the commissar permits) to force his subordinates, if they do not submit to his requirements, to carry out his orders. Commanders may not award solitary confinement without authorization of the commissar." It is understood, however, that the tendency is to do away, in so far as possible, with this dual control, to replace a commander and commissar by a politically sound commander, who will combine the functions of both.

When we consider that the Government is run for the Communist Party, that the armed forces are in reality the armed forces of that party, and that the spread of communistic doctrine is a vital necessity to its growth and well-being, it can readily be seen what a tremendous power this organization wields.

(e) *Naval Districts.*

There is no information that the Soviet Government has any naval districts, other than those comprising areas controlled by the above fleets. There would seem to be a district of the Baltic where are located the principal bases of Leningrad and Kronstadt, also a Black Sea district, which would embrace the ports of Odessa and Sevastopol. Other than this, little is known.

MATÉRIEL

(a) *Budget.*

Information relative to the amount that Soviet Russia is actually spending on her military forces is most conflicting and in the main most unreliable. There appear to be plenty of paper plans, but realization is another matter.

For 1928–29 the budget is reported to be as follows:

	Naval proposal	Budget directorate recommendations
Ordinary	82, 326, 451	72, 517, 888
Extraordinary	14, 197, 732	12, 160, 000
Total	96, 524, 183 ($48, 262, 092)	84, 678, 578 ($42, 329, 289)

Aside from the reconditioning of old ships, which has been going on now for some years, and the possible building of a few smaller-type vessels, there is little evidence to show that much is being done, other than to attempt to reorganize a demoralized navy under a money stringency which would seem to preclude the realization of any ambitious projects.

Naval Bases.

Leningrad.—Is a first-class base for ships of every kind. For naval construction there are five yards—the Baltic, Bolshevik, Zenith, Torpedo, and International.

Kronstadt.—First-class base. Temporary repairs to ships of every class. Full repairs to submarines only. A seaplane base, and repairs to both planes and motors made here.

Luga.—This is due south of the Finnish island, Seskar, and located at the mouth of the Luga River. Work is slowly progressing on a projected submarine and naval air base.

Sevastopol.—Repairs to ships of all classes. Submarine and destroyer base. Repair shops which are in a position to repair electromotors. Airplane base.

Nicolaiev.—Shipbuilding and engineering works, submarine construction.

Vladivostok.—Engineering and repairing yards for ships. One slipway and a yard for the construction and repair of wooden vessels.

Reported bases on Turkish coast.—Various unconfirmed reports have been received regarding the establishment of bases on the Turkish coast. One is that a base for submarines is to be erected on the Turkish coast not far from the Bosporus. Another is that Turkey is said to have placed two points at the disposition of the Soviet Government as auxiliary bases:

1. On the Anatolian coast, in the neighborhood of Kowak.
2. On the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier.

Projected plans for series of minor bases.—It was reported early in 1926 that there was under project a scheme of small coastal bases for the Black Sea for submarines, torpedo boats, and hydroplanes. These were to be located at Odessa, Tarkhankut, Yalta, Feodosia, Novorossisk, Gagri, and Batum. No information has come to hand as to the materialization of this plan, with the exception that auxiliary bases seem to have been established at Odessa and Batum.

(*d*) *Building and Repair Facilities.*

1. *For naval vessels.*—The principal shipbuilding ports are Leningrad and Nicolaiev. Repairs can be made at Kronstadt, Odessa, Sevastopol, and Vladivostok.

2. *For merchant ships.*—Building facilities at Leningrad, Odessa, Nicolaiev, and Rostov on Don. Repairs at Archangel, Kronstadt, Novorossisk, Sevastopol, Mariupol, Murmansk, and Vladivostok.

3. *For aircraft.*—There have recently been definitely identified 16 airplane factories in Soviet Russia. Nos. 1 and 2 are located in Moscow for Nieuport planes and various types of engines. No. 3 is at Petrograd for hydroplanes. Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are in the vicinity of Moscow and are for miscellaneous planes and for repairs. No. 8 is located at Penza, No. 9 at Moscow, No. 10 at Alexandrovsk, No. 11 at Taganrog, No. 12 at Odessa, No. 13 at Kieff, No. 1 at Omsk, No. 15 at Zaporojie, and No. 16 at Moscow. Three further factories are to be organized. There are also undoubtedly repair facilities at all of the aviation bases mentioned later.

The output of these factories is not known, but it was estimated two years ago that Russia could not produce more than 16 airplanes per month, complete with engines; however, in addition Russian factories could take care of all the necessary repairs to the air fleet. The reason given for this low rate was the poor economic system and lack of skilled engineers, and also that many of these factories were more for repair work than for new production. It is significant that to-day Russia's addition to her air fleet is largely by foreign purchase. The importation of trained mechanics and a better economic basis would alter the situation, and it is for this reason that Soviet Russia must be regarded as a potential air power.

(e) *Fueling Stations.*

FUEL OIL

Odessa.—Capacity 1,484,000 barrels; pipe line to docks.

Okha (Sakhalin).—45,300 barrels; pipe line to shore.

Touapse.—Terminus of pipe line from Maikop oil fields, sea loading port.

Astrakhan.—Not a sea loading port; products shipped to interior.

Baku.—Fuel port for Caspian Sea only; large refineries; product shipped to Batum or Astrakhan.

Batum.—Capacity 8,000,000 barrels; very poor facilities.

Novorossisk.—Capacity 7,000,000 barrels; pipe line to docks.

COAL

Coal in varying amounts and quality may be procured at Nicolaiev, Odessa, Kronstadt, Leningrad, Poti (Georgia), and Vladivostok.

(g) *Aviation.*

AIRCRAFT

The Soviets have a unified air service, seaplanes being set aside for naval use.

The latest British report on Russian aviation strength gives the total number of landplanes as 1,194 (December, 1927) and seaplanes as 528 (January, 1928), making a total of 1,722, exclusive of the strategic reserve, whose exact number is unknown, but may possibly be about 200 planes. Of this total, 528, being seaplanes, may be called naval aviation.

At present the Black Sea is an important center, and there are reported in the neighborhood of 264 seaplanes located there, exclusive of the landplanes of the neighboring military garrisons. Assuming these reports to be true, there would remain about 264 seaplanes to be distributed in the White Sea, the Baltic, the Caspian, and the Far East.

NAVAL AVIATION BASES

Russian naval aviation bases appear to be located as follows: On the White Sea at Archangel; on the Baltic at Leningrad, Kronstadt, Oranienbaum, Peterhof, and Luga (which is slowly under construction); on the Black Sea at Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossisk, Batum, Nicolaiev, and Otschakow; on the Caspian at Baku; in the Far East at Vladivostok.

AIR STATIONS AND LANDING FIELDS

It is estimated that there are in Russia at present between 40 and 50 airdromes. As to their equipment or organization little is known. Russia has gone in more extensively for aviation lately, and in the absence of any reports to the contrary it would appear that any improvement in aviation has also manifested itself in increased facilities in this branch also.

PERSONNEL

(*a*) *Method of Recruitment.*

Conscript and volunteer service form the sources of supply for the man power of the Russian Navy. During the ages of 19 and 20 there is what is known as preconscript training. This is for a month a year. Having had two months of this training and upon entering his twenty-first year the service is then for five years in the case of the navy, four years' active service and one year on furlough. After five years of service with the navy the individual then passes into the reserve. This is from the age of 26 to 40, inclusive. During these years there is, however, not more than a total of three months' training, and the maximum of one month in any year. This is for the conscript class.

For those that have a better education there is provided a year's volunteer service. Men between the ages of 18 and 34 may be enlisted as volunteers. Those accepted for volunteer service remain in the active service for one year, and it is from this class of volunteers and from the old Czarist officers that the officer body is formed. After a year's service, partially ashore and afloat, the volunteer, if he so desires, may take an examination for entrance to the preparatory school. From thence, if suitable, he passes to the Naval School and the Naval Engineer School. This period is for three years. After this come the higher courses, and finally the Naval Academy. For every year spent at certain schools the officer is required to spend an additional time in active service.

The paper program of the Soviet military educational system is quite comprehensive, but, like everything else with the Soviets, it is better on paper than in practice.

(*b*) *Strength.*

OFFICER AND ENLISTED

Estimates of total personnel, officers and men, vary between 25,000 to 40,000. This office estimates that it will require about 15,000 men and 900 officers to man the serviceable ships of the Russian Navy. Assuming that about 50 per cent of the total enlisted personnel are at sea, it seems probable that the total Russian enlisted personnel can not exceed 30,000, and that the officer personnel probably numbers about 2,000.

RESERVE

Based on an estimate of 30,000 men for the Soviet Navy, it seems likely that about 7,500 of these pass per year into the reserve class. These men are either on furlough during the last year of their service or are in actual reserve.

The first years of the Soviet régime were most disorganized; but considering that the flow into the reserve has been going on for about seven years, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, in the event of trouble, out of Russia's total of 1,000,000 organized reserves there can be found between 40,000 and 50,000 who have had previous naval training.

(*c*) *Training.*

INDIVIDUAL

The preconscript training centers are located on the seacoast or rivers. In the fall of the year the recruit enters the service; fall, winter, and spring are spent in preliminary courses, and in the summer begins his service with the fleet. To obtain the various naval ratings, there is the Naval Technical Institute, the Artillery School, the Submarine School, and general evening classes.

Officers are trained in the various schools and in the fleet.

It is reported that the Soviets are deficient in their knowledge of navigation, gunnery, and engineering. Every effort has been made to get back old Czarist officers, no other than Stalin himself remarking recently that he would rather have an out-and-out monarchist, for at least such an officer would attend to his work and not be concerned in politics.

COLLECTIVE

There are fleet maneuvers and target practice, mine laying, mine trawling, operations in conjunction with the army, the coast defenses. and employment of the air arm with the fleets.

(*d*) *Morale.*

According to our measure the morale is not good. In the first place, the Russians are not a seafaring race, and to a lower educational standard is added a political control which does not go hand in hand with military discipline. Frequently responsible positions have been given to those entirely unfitted, either because of their influence in the party or because they were good workers for the cause. Due to this ascendancy of the political over the military, there is lacking that respect to command which is so fundamental a part of all military life.

The Soviet Government was born of the October revolution of 1917, not so long ago, as we reckon time, and the fear of a counter-revolution is ever present. It is believed, however, that the morale is slowly improving, but there is yet a long way to go.

NAVAL POLICY AND STRATEGY

In studying the policy of Russia, or, as it should properly be called, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics, one is immediately conscious of the fact that with a country so constituted you have no precedent.

In area occupying about one-seventh of the world's surface, her territory extends from the White Sea and Arctic Ocean on the north to the Black Sea in the south, from the Baltic in the west to Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan. With this enormous territory, very largely agricultural, demanding an outlet to the sea for her export, she is practically shut in. In the north the barrier is ice. In the west, what few miles of seacoast she has on the Gulf of Finland is blocked by Denmark, which bottles up the Baltic and occupies a most strategic position at the eastern end of the Kiel Canal, the only other outlet. In the south the Dardanelles closes her exit from the Black Sea, and even after that Great Britain blocks her way from the Mediterranean with Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. In the east Vladivostok is completely encircled by Japan, whose islands ring Peter the Great Bay, extending south to the Straits of Korea, with that country holding both sides of the straits.

It is necessary to vision her geographic position because it explains her natural urge for an ice-free port, for uncontrolled commerce with the outer world, and explains why, blocked in the north, south, and west, she, following the old Czarist aim, is pushing to the east and trying to break the bonds that encircle her.

Everyone is familiar with the revolution of 1917, when this small group of idealistic and fanatical followers of Karl Marx seized the ruins of a decadent and tottering monarchy. Followed a revolution which for its breadth and magnitude, its total upheaval of all social conditions, has no parallel in world's history, beside which the French Revolution was as an infant to a grown man.

Contrary to expectation, the soviets have muddled through and seem as fairly entrenched to-day as ever. The country in itself is badly off economically. Foreign capital is not attracted in any appreciable degree, due to the fundamental ideas of the soviets themselves, who, while seeking capital, also seek to destroy the capitalistic countries. The fact that they have repudiated their debts has made their victims wary of venturing again.

The 143,000,000 who go to make up Russia, while gaining certain rights not granted under the monarchy, have with respect to government merely changed masters. They are ruled by the Communist Party, in number about a million. The Communist Party itself is in the hands of a group of men you could count on your fingers, and this group is dominated by Stalin.

When the Soviets overthrew the monarchy they took over the Czarist Navy, what was left of it, many of the ships' neglected hulks, some beyond repair, and others capable of being renovated. Building costs money, and the Soviets have none to spare. So these old vessels are gradually being put into shape, and new construction confined to the smaller types, as submarines and destroyers.

It is believed that Russia's needs for a navy are in the main as follows:

1. For the defense of her maritime borders.

2. A powerful fleet would strengthen politically Soviet world influence.

3. With a strong Baltic Fleet, Russia would be strategically prominent in northern Europe, while strength in the Black Sea would give her prestige in the Near East.

4. The former Russian border States would be provided with an illustration of Soviet might and the Russian people with an example of the power and efficiency of their rulers.

The political leaders of the U. S. S. R. are firmly convinced of the inevitable struggle against their western neighbors with the simultaneous blockade of the Russian coast by the fleets of the great powers. With regard to Great Britain, the relationship which the MacDonald government temporarily mended culminated last year in the open break attendant upon the search of the Soviet trade delegation quarters in London and the discovery of a nest of intrigue and propaganda in the heart of the Empire. Great Britain less than any country has cause to love the Soviets. Coal strikes, food strikes, trouble in China, agitation in India—is it to be wondered that the Soviets are ever visioning a British fleet in the Gulf of Finland?

The Soviets clamor for recognition. They realize the prestige that an adequate navy will bring and they feel the need of such to back their demands when the time may come. It is not reasonable to suppose that Russia will forever remain content with her present boundaries in the Baltic. She needs these waters for her political safety and her economic welfare, and it is these needs that explain her historic fight for its control.

With her economic reconstruction, which sooner or later is bound to come, there will, it is believed, be an absorption of the Baltic States, with the possible exception of Finland, which the czars had practically lost before the revolution and the control of which was never a success.

She needs her fleet in the Black Sea to defend her coast line. Her oil fields and rich agricultural sections skirt its shores.

With Rumania her bone of contention is Bessarabia, over which trouble is sooner or later liable to occur.

IN THE EVENT OF WAR

If at war with any one of the large naval powers, Russia would take the defensive, and in this connection the following excerpt from the recent maneuvers in the Black Sea is most pertinent:

> The Red command is devoting the greatest attention to hydroaviation, submarine and night mine laying, as well as to the maneuvering of ships being pursued, i. e., battles at stern course angles, as the Red fleet on being sighted by the ships of the blockading fleet would be compelled to retreat to their bases; they also devote great attention to the coast defenses and batteries.

Against the smaller States she would take the aggressive. In the Baltic her fleet would be used to isolate the Baltic States, to cut off their supplies, and to operate in conjunction with the land forces.

It is also expected that her navy would play a very important rôle at the outbreak of any proletarian revolution within these States by gaining contact with the local communistic groups.

CONCLUSIONS

I. That Russia does not want war at present and will avoid it if possible.

II. That to conquer her would require all of the resources of any one of the major powers, that such a war would be settled by land forces, and might, after all, result in a draw which would be equivalent to a victory for Russia.

III. That her fleet, run down, obsolete, and lacking in trained personnel, is no match for any except the smaller powers.

IV. That lack of money, trained mechanics, and limited shipbuilding facilities, together with the long cold winters, are the deterring factors toward the realization of an ambitious fleet project.

V. That if forced into a conflict with any major power she will take the defensive and that there will be no major fleet action, reliance rather being placed on destroyers, submarines, aviation, mines, and coast defenses.

VI. That because of her economic need for the Baltic, in time, and in some form or another, will come an absorption of the Baltic States, with the possible exception of Finland, this either peaceably or through Russian aggression.

VII. That sooner or later economic recovery will take place, and with it the possibility of a powerful Russian Navy; that there will come a change in the present form of government (probably from within); and that the struggle for a warm salt-water outlet will be the motive underlying her national policy.

VISIT OF U. S. S. R. CRUISER "AURORA" TO COPENHAGEN.

(*Source: State Department*)

The U. S. S. R. cruiser *Aurora*, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Jori Ralj, arrived in the harbor of Copenhagen early on the 6th instant and left on the 8th instant. The *Aurora's* visit is the second visit here of a Soviet warship, the first having been that of a small cadet ship in 1921. The *Aurora* is well known as having had two serious mutinies on board, one during the Russian revolutionary movement of 1905 and the other at the very beginning of the 1917 revolution. She may accordingly be considered by the Soviet Government as particularly fitted for ceremonial visits to "capitalistic" governments. As a fighting unit, however, she is practically of no value.

During the short visit of the *Aurora* she was anchored in the harbor and not moored alongside the jetty, as is the case with most visiting foreign men-of-war. Upon her arrival the usual salutes and visits were exchanged, and Rear Admiral Ralj, who was formerly an officer of the Imperial Russian Navy, with the commander of the ship, Capt. Alexander Leer, and some of the higher officers, were given a dinner by Rear Admiral Rechnitzer, Chief of the Danish Naval

Department. Rear Admiral Ralj returned this dinner by inviting Rear Admiral Rechnitzer and some of the higher Danish naval officers to a dinner on board the *Aurora*. This concluded the official entertainments. The King and Queen having returned to their palace at Marselisberg, near Aarhus, on the day preceding the arrival of the Soviet ship, no question of the reception of her officers by the sovereigns appears to have arisen.

During the two afternoons of her visit the *Aurora* was open to the inspection of the public. As her arrival had aroused considerable curiosity, several thousand people, of all classes, visited her. Opinions which I have heard as to the ship vary, some declaring that she was extremely dirty and without discipline and others stating that she was relatively clean and that the crew was very orderly. A Danish friend informs me that he saw numerous posters aboard giving statistical and geographical information, evidently for the education of the crew. During all the time that the ship was in port large numbers of her sailors were ashore. I personally saw several hundred of them, all of whom were excellent and evidently in new uniforms and had a smart appearance. Their uniforms were similar to those worn by the British Navy. I saw only a few officers, and these wore uniforms not unlike those of other navies, but had a distinctly less smart appearance than the men.

It is generally stated that the soviet officers and men behaved well on shore and caused no incidents. Danish officials, however, criticize the soviet admiral for having come ashore the first time after his arrival wearing civilian clothes and a straw hat and for an interview which he gave to a local newspaper declaring that he and not the commissars on board was in actual command of the ship. I inclose a copy of this interview. Several acquaintances have also told me that they had seen numerous soviet sailors talking to young boys, and evidently endeavoring to give them Bolshevist ideas. Others have told me that they had seen numbers of sailors going into a ready-made clothing establishment and later reappearing in civilian clothing "in order the better to make Bolshevist propaganda." Still others have observed that the sailors were always accompanied by commissars. I place little credence in any of these reports, and, regarding that of the accompanying commissars, I myself saw numerous soviet sailors walking alone or in pairs.

The local press has published no comment upon the *Aurora's* visit. It appears to have passed off without incident, possibly because the soviet crew were under orders to make a good impression upon the extremely order-loving population of Copenhagen.

It is reported in the press that the Soviet Baltic Squadron are now holding maneuvers in the Cattegat and off the Swedish coast, where the Swedish fleet are now also holding maneuvers. It is also reported that Soviet submarines are closely observing the Swedish maneuvers.

TRANSLATION OF INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL RALJ, CHIEF OF THE "AURORA."

Are there many of your old officer comrades in the Soviet Navy?

Not so many; but there are some from the same year class as myself.

Is the discipline good on board?

I think that most people outside of Soviet Russia are laboring under a complete misapprehension on this point, and I can assure you that there exists on our fleet the same strict discipline as in any other navy.

Is there not something in the way of a sailors' soviet on board?

Absolutely not. I am absolutely the supreme authority, whom all must obey as long as we are at sea.

What rôle do the commissars play on board? Do they not exercise a certain control over the officers in their relations with the crew?

No; they have only to do with politico-cultural matters and have no commanding authority. I am in every respect quite independent in my actions.

Do the common sailors address their officers with the term "comrade"?

Yes; but when addressing their superiors they add their title. To me, for instance, they say, "Tavarisch (comrade) Admiral," and to a commander "Tavarisch Commander," etc. It is about equivalent to Mr. in other countries.

SPAIN

NAVAL

SPANISH NAVAL PROGRESS.

Modernized, the Fleet Becomes a Power to Be Reckoned With.

A few weeks ago, at Ferrol, the ceremony of the launching of the Spanish 8,000-ton cruiser *Miguel Cervantes* took place. The press did not fail, as is the custom in all countries, to give prominence to this event. The Infanta Isabella, representing her father, Alphonso XIII, as well as many Spanish nobles, were present at the ceremony.

The last of the 1915 program, and bearing the illustrious name of *Miguel Cervantes*, symbolizes the naval renaissance desired by the entire nation.

This, certainly, is a big change in events beyond the Pyrenees. For a long time the Spanish Navy was hardly mentioned. After the war with the United States, even though the courageous voyage of Admiral Cervera, so unfavorably terminated, saved the honor of Spain, the Spanish Navy was completely neglected. Other worries besides the rebuilding of the navy held the interests of the Spanish people.

Little by little, however, a change of thought and opinion set in. It was understood that all countries having a coastline, and who desired to hold their place among the nations, should maintain a navy, in default of which the nations who shouted the loudest at international conferences were to be always in the right and to have their own way. And why hide the fact that the best propagandist of the new ideas was Alphonso XIII himself? The King manifested on all occasions his interest in maritime affairs.

That the King of Spain is a good "sailor" we have every reason to believe. In 1926 at Malaga, on board the cruiser *Strasbourg*, King Alphonso inspected the ship and crew in a manner to call forth the admiration of everyone on board. He made a similar inspection of the cruiser *La Motte Piquet* at Bizerte. Recently, at Santander, he made a thorough inspection of the 13-inch turrets on board the battleship *Provence.*

The Spanish Navy may consider itself in a very favorable position. It is at present carrying out two programs—the 1915, which is almost completed, and the realization of the 1926 program is well underway.

To the 4 cruisers, 5 destroyers (3 being the Barcaiztequi type), and 17 submarines will be added the 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 12 submarines of the second program.

The Spaniards possess a well-trained personnel of 14,000 men and 2,000 officers.

Spanish naval aviation is also undergoing great progress.

A naval war college, somewhat similar to the French, exists and is giving an excellent training to officers.

At the end of this month (August) big maneuvers are to be held (consisting of over 20 ships) in the vicinity of the Balearic Islands.

It is not, therefore, out of place to affirm that the Spanish Fleet is becoming, in the south of Europe, a force to be reckoned with, and one capable of disrupting the traditional balance of power in the Mediterranean.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEA

By Admiral von Scheer.

In view of the long interval of time which has elapsed since the events of the Great War, we feel justified in setting aside any discussion of the reasons for the military failure, and instead will consider, in a general manner, the causes and effects of this world crisis. It may be said, briefly, that before the war the struggle for maritime power was impressed upon the political subconsciousness of the nations as a basis for the bursting forth of imperialistic interests into conflict, and that also in the near future this struggle will have a decisive influence, if in no other way, because there is to-day no longer one individual power which may reserve to itself an uncontested supremacy on the sea.

Naval supremacy, gained through the Battle of Trafalgar, gave England complete liberty of decision when opposed by the combinations of the other powers. She was thus able to exercise her diplomatic wiles in insuring the stable equilibrium of Europe, deriving for herself, thanks to her favorable geographic position, a privileged situation, while the continental European powers aimed with their methods of alliance for the same objective, namely, to prevent one power from acquiring a predominant position. These States, however, were faced with the double task of conciliating an international policy, imposed by the necessity of acquiring territory in proportion to the needs created by the great increase in population, with the safety of European possessions.

Of course, the pressure back of this tendency assumed very different aspects in different countries. In Russia it was the desire to obtain egress to the sea in the Far East or Constantinople; in France, the acquisition of a vast colonial empire was to compensate for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, a secondary object being to have colored troops available to take the place of her own inhabitants, whose number showed a great decrease as compared with Germany. In the latter country this pressure was the constantly greater change in industrial conditions, which rendered the dependence of the countries beyond the seas on an outlet for raw materials and the sale of manufactured articles, a matter of great importance.

The United States of America still seemed to be excluded from this conflicting play of forces. There was an impression that they wished to remain isolated in the New World, and this was justified by the plain statement of "hands off" which was made to Europe by the proclamation of their Monroe doctrine.

All of these aspirations found their origin in the necessity for maritime power, which was felt still more acutely in consequence of the progress made in technical matters, and hence the increase in traffic, which was constantly bringing the countries closer together. All the more vigilant was the care with which England, absorbed in safeguarding her own position, tried to keep her supremacy in the commerce of the world and to use her own merchant fleet for the exchange of merchandise across the sea; thanks to which there flowed into her coffers the enormous riches which made it possible for her to dominate the financial market, and thus to acquire new possibilities of making advantageous use of her capital in foreign countries. In this manner England drew into the circle of international economy a constantly increasing number of overseas countries, but she failed to take into acconut that this fecundation of distant lands must logically lead these latter to a greater autonomy, and that there was already being created an international economic interdependence of so close a nature that, given the expansive force of economic necessity, these countries would one day break the circle which the English Fleet had drawn around the world, even though England might be egotistically opposed to such expansion.

British supremacy on the sea would have remained intact if England had realized that the principal task of her navy should be that of insuring the cohesion of the vast British Empire. Since the Dominions were unable to provide a military force capable of defending them from attack, to the British Fleet was confided the task of opposing any attempts on the part of the enemy to land and of transporting her expeditionary forces. The fleet constituted the long arm of British military power, and was placed at the service of the latter. Under these conditions England could have developed her fleet as she saw fit, and no other country would have raised any objections. Instead of this, it being evident that the English Fleet constituted a menace to the overseas commerce of other countries, and British intolerance toward the competition of other countries being clearly manifested in this struggle, the fleet acquired a significance which was not in conformity with the spirit of the times, since it tended to restrict the just right of all maritime nations to the freedom of the seas. The simple fact that in more recent times the expression "freedom of the seas," in correlation with the old legal principle of "mare liberum," has again come into use is proof of the feeling of oppression produced by the tyranny exercised by Great Britain on the seas.

The discovery of the New World and of maritime routes through the East Indies gave a great impulse to maritime trade, and the latter, owing to the types of merchant ships and their precious cargoes, formed a magnificent objective for naval warfare, an objective which England, with her spirit of initiative, did not allow to escape without adding to her riches. From that time enemy maritime commerce became the principal object of attack in naval warfare; and the conception of the protection of private property at sea could not triumph in international law, as was the case on land, because of the difficulties raised by the English.

The idea that it was solely in the interest of maintaining the equilibrium of Europe that England always sought to destroy by political means the supremacy of that power which for the time being happened to be strongest on the continent will cease to be regarded as correct when it is realized that the aforesaid powers became the victims of attack simply because they appeared to be a menace to the world-wide dominion exercised by England and because they were gaining strength at sea and competing with her commercial monopoly. The power of Spain under Philip II was shattered with the aid of Holland. Dutch maritime commerce, which developed rapidly and in the first half of the seventeenth century exceeded in quantity that of all other maritime countries taken together, was suppressed by England in the second half of the same century with the aid of France. The naval power of Louis XIV, through which the extensive French colonial possessions in North America were founded, was the principal reason for the wars waged in the seventeenth century by England against France, which latter country, at the conclusion of peace in 1763, was forced, thanks to the assistance furnished to the English by Frederick the Great, to yield to her rival the greater part of these possessions. Then when England, during the war against Napoleon I, succeeded with German assistance in also being the victor here, she showed no recognition in any form of the sacrifices made by Prussia in the war of independence. It must not be marveled at, therefore, if the untrustworthiness of England as an ally has become proverbial in the well-known expression, "perfidious Albion." As a matter of fact, from her point of view England had acted logically, and from the beginning of the nineteenth century she was the uncontested mistress of the seas, which, in view of her insular position, gives her the advantage of a "splendid isolation." In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the progress made in the technical sciences led to the building of new naval and merchant fleets, so that the advantage of her isolation appeared to become more and more dubious, and she began to view with a benevolent eye the idea of approaching the central European powers.

In view of these historical precedents, it may be understood why Germany, which was ready to become independent of world politics, should view these attempts at approach with a considerable amount of skepticism. It is characteristic that the first signs of the possibility of an alliance being made between Germany and England should have come from the English Colonial Minister (Chamberlain), who was the minister most concerned with future difficulties in the countries under the sovereignty of the Empire. He even went so far as to mention (in his speech of November 30, 1899) the cooperation of England with the "great German Empire" as one of the natural objectives of British policy, and recommended "a triple alliance between the Teutonic races and the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race." The political situation in the world to-day, 30 years after this significant speech by the British statesman, shows how broad and farsighted his political views were. The fact that a program was drawn up which was directly opposed to that advocated by him increased the difficulties which he saw arising on the horizon, instead of eliminating them. It changed fundamentally the conditions of power in the British Empire and put an end to its "supremacy at sea." The two great nations, which in the interest of England the minister recommended to his country as allies, were instead her adversaries.

The fundamental reasons for this evolution lie, on the one hand, in the feeling, constantly more openly shown, of commercial rivalry entertained by England toward Germany, and which in the end culminated violently in the World War, and, on the other hand, in the methods used by England in the conduct of naval warfare. Instead of assigning to her fleet offensive strategic objectives, England urged it to take possession everywhere, in the most brutal manner, of the private property of the enemy, and, contrary to the rules of international law, to establish a hunger blockade, which extended the evils of war to the civilian population and thus provoked the severe reprisal of a submarine war on commerce.

Whereas the war on land was fought in zones which were inaccessible to neutrals, war at sea was waged over the vast surface of the oceans, which is also the great artery for neutral navigation. Thus the routes employed by neutrals carried them even into the more restricted sphere of actual war operations whenever their coasts, as happened almost without exception in the waters surrounding Europe, were contiguous to the theater of war. The possibility that the neutrals might carry supplies and merchandise from the countries beyond the seas to the belligerents led to the latter being conceded the right of inspection in order to ascertain whether the ships contained contraband cargo which might be of use to the enemy.

The freedom of the seas, however, should be assured to neutral navigation even in time of war, unless this is used in the service of the belligerents. The proclamation of Paris (1856) contained provisions relating to this, but which left every door open to arbitration—particularly as the definition of "contraband" was somewhat elastic and was thus left to the will of the belligerents—so that the possibility for a neutral to yield or not to acts of oppression became a problem of force. This is one of the reasons why every maritime State has sought to defend its maritime power by means of an adequate naval force, and to build up a fleet in proportion to its needs. The example of the attitude assumed by America in the World War, like the attitude of submission of the smaller maritime nations to the naval supremacy of England, is an excellent illustration of these circumstances, which may supply a neutral with a pretext to intervene. In the conferences on naval disarmament held after the war nothing has so far been said regarding the abolition of the right of seizure at sea. In her guise as a neutral, America knew so well how to safeguard her own right to the freedom of the seas that in 1922, at Washington, she succeeded in obtaining, in the determination of the proportion of the forces of the principal naval powers, equality of her own fleet with that of the British. During the unfruitful naval conference held at Geneva last year, America allowed no doubts to be entertained as to her intention of adhering firmly to the principle of equality.

In view of the results so far obtained by the League of Nations, it seems more than doubtful if it will be able to impart sufficient confidence to warrant this question being attacked, although it is of the utmost importance to the successful diminishing of the dangers of naval warfare. Even assuming that a maritime law conforming to present-day ideas should be evolved to safeguard private property at sea and the rights of neutrals, the purely military tasks assigned to the navy will still be so numerous that this body will always play the principal part in future complications, which will not fail to arise. Clear indications of this were supplied by the World War. For instance, the offensive strategic operations of the English Navy might have been directed toward preventing the isolation of Russia from her allies by entering the Baltic or forcing the Dardanelles. But in spite of the fact that the first of these operations was earnestly advocated by certain English admirals, it was not carried out, because to do this it would first have been necessary to destroy the German Fleet. The second operation failed, for the reason that it was undertaken with inadequate means and without energy; and this may be considered as being due in a certain measure to the German Navy, since it was owing to the latter that it was not dared to withdraw any forces from the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, it being feared that by doing so the country might no longer be secure from the dangers of an invasion.

Maritime power is synonymous with the desire to expand, a characteristic of all nations which are in a stage of development. Among these may be enumerated, besides Germany, Japan and Italy. The former, with her chain of islands, faces a backward country, the colonization of which can not be of any great advantage to her. She also dominates the entrance to the mouth of the Yang-tze, the principal door into China, in whose opening, which will undoubtedly be affected on a vast scale in spite of the agitations now raging there, every civilized country will take a lively interest. The maritime power of Japan was accurately estimated at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, and it was found that the life and death of a nation already numbering more than 70,000,000 inhabitants were involved. It is the same with Italy, whose maritime power should be able to afford her the possibility of expanding in the Mediterranean, while France, in her turn will make use of her navy, to insure communication with her possessions in Africa in order to utilize the population living there. Thus we have here a conflict of interests which must be decided in the Mediterranean.

The struggle for the dominion of the seas—which is as old as the history of civilized nations and which always has the power to arouse them—was neither adjusted nor decided by the results of the World War. On the contrary, it has entered an extremely critical phase, equal as regards latent conflict to the 10 years immediately preceding the war, and the solution of which will exercise a decisive influence on the configuration of the world, as has always been the case in the past.

It was written in the destiny of Germany that social environment and national character, and the difficult formation of the German Empire, based on the aforesaid two elements, should obstruct our vision of the lands beyond the seas and darken our comprehension of the great phenomena of correlation, the more so as our rapid evolution had thrust us into the center of the world politics of the continents while we still believed that we could cope with them by using the means offered by European continental politics.

Even the founder of the Empire had felt a conflict between his work and his ideas, and had undertaken the acquisition of colonies only unwillingly, since he was rightly preoccupied with the problem of the stability of the frontiers. The basis of his political activity was the guaranteeing of the safety of the frontiers by a system of alliances, balanced in a masterly manner. However, these problems having been overcome, the way was suddenly opened to wider horizons, with the result of unavoidable difficulties and conflicts, while the understanding of world politics by the Germans failed to progress at the same pace as did the desire for conquest, and thus our impetuous enthusiasm was fatal to us, even causing the gravest of all dangers—that of the rejection of the Government by certain elements of our own people. One of the chief reasons for this must be sought in the fact that we failed to rectify the deficient political sense of the German people in such measure as to make them recognize in time the decisive importance of the politics and interests beyond the seas, and in consequence to induce them to provide for the means of power, newly made necessary, with the same energy and decision which was met with in England and France.

The building up of our Navy, made possible by a splendid work of elucidation and propaganda, became from that moment the chief preoccupation of all those who had at heart, above all else, the unity of the Empire within and without, and was the natural consequence of the restricted space possessed by "saturated" Germany. But the comprehension of the exceptional importance of the sea and of being able to strengthen our position on the sea with a view to a possible war was not sufficiently widespread for the Navy to be considered as in the same rank with the Army—that is, as a means having absolutely the same value in strengthening our power. The dynastic-continental structure of Germany also contributed to conceal the fatal importance of maritime military problems, and thus it came about that the uncertain situation of the Navy deprived it of the possibility of utilizing favorable opportunities, and that at the end of the war we had an army which had fought to the limit and a fleet which was still intact.

This war, whose roots must be sought outside of Europe, might have been decided in our favor, owing to the strengthening of our position in Europe, only if we had succeeded in gaining for Germany the liberty of disposing of her maritime power. We lost through our own fault. The fruits of the successes of our arms fell into the laps of others: America gathered them in at Washington. England must now wear the yoke of a naval agreement which means the end of her position of supremacy on the sea.

A new era of maritime power and maritime law is arising which will illuminate all of the extensive and multiple relations of the nations. Upon the background of the changes taking place in the relative importance of the oceans the outlines of new and magnificent figures are being traced. Future new poles of the world are coming into being—more important than all others, America and Russia. Beside them, Europe appears like a single organism, and as such must labor to prevent the energies of the ancient civilized peoples from being submerged and scattered. Perhaps the economic alliance of the most important industries of France and Germany, in which England has already partially joined, represents only the beginning of this process of unification. In any case, a *united* Europe should be created, commencing from the center, and this could not be done without Germany, nor without the participation of Great Britain, which, in the interest of its evident problems across the sea, should not ignore the new hour of destiny of Europe.

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"N" DIVISION OFFICER			
"R" DIVISION OFFICER			
RADIO OFFICER			

The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

"The idea that 'intelligence' consists in the collection of a mass of fact which other countries desire to keep secret is not the case. A great proportion of the intelligence required for a modern war plan is public property in the country of its origin. It only requires collecting and sifting."

—(*Imperial Defense, by S. King-Hall.*)

NOTICE

In anticipation of the proposed visit of the fleet to South America during the spring of 1929, the December issue of the MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN will be a special number covering the west coast of South America, and especially on Chile and Peru.

It is the desire of the Office of Naval Intelligence to furnish up-to-date information to the personnel of the fleet, so that the political, economic, naval, and military situations in these countries can be readily understood and intelligently discussed.

The December number will be issued prior to the departure of the fleet from the United States.

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between September 1 and October 1, inclusive.

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GREAT BRITAIN

NAVAL

H. M. S. "HERMES."

The *Hermes* has four screws and makes about 25 knots maximum speed. She draws 22 feet of water, has torpedo bulges extending well forward and aft, and carries armor about 1½ to 2 inches thick outboard of machinery spaces. She handles very easily; officers have little difficulty getting used to the location of the bridge on one side. She turns quickly, being well cutaway in the after underwater body. Her quarter-deck is very low and wet at sea. Officers' quarters are below the hanger deck. Air ports of officers' quarters are very low and are required to be closed at sea and at night even in port. This makes officers' rooms generally uncomfortable. Rooms are small and not well arranged. The wardroom extends across the ship, and on the port side is a smoking room, divided off from the mess room by a partition. The mess room is cut up by trunks and is low and stuffy. The officers are seated at four tables. The captain's and executive officer's quarters are in the stern, below the hanger deck.

Included in the armament are two AA guns, one located on the starboard side of the superstructure and one in a well abaft island. They appear to be about 3″/23-cal. and were stated to be this size by a *Hermes* enlisted man. They are automatic, belt-fed guns.

Six boats are stowed in compartments aft, three on each side, open to the air. They are hoisted on falls and trolleyed into positions inside the hull. Numerous life rafts, apparently in excellent condition, are suspended about the ship in positions where they will drop directly into the water when released; several are along the island, and four aft suspended close under the flight deck. In these positions they are entirely out of the way and take up no deck space.

The quarter-deck is on the hangar deck at the stern; a large part of the floor is formed by the after plane elevator which is habitually kept in the lowered position. From the quarter-deck little can be seen of any other part of the ship.

The ship is exceptionally clean and well kept; officers, crew, and boats are very smart in appearance.

The flight deck is flush except at the stern, where there is a gradual rise of about 8 inches to a level platform around the elevator; from there aft the deck slopes downward. The purpose of this raised portion is not known. The deck forward is not square, but conforms to the shape of the bow. Along the port side are refuge positions for flight deck personnel, and a high wire rope protective fence, with structural steel posts, outboard, and extending the full length of the island. Across the ship, set down into recesses in the deck, are the members of an athwartship wind fence; it is about 10 feet high and is thought to be raised and lowered by machinery. On the starboard side a fixed wire fence about 8 feet high extends from the athwartship fence to midway of the island.

There is no arresting gear on the flight deck, so far as could be seen. It was stated that flying off and landing on the deck is not done unless the ship is steaming into the wind at high speed, and unless at least one destroyer is present as plane guard. Even in this case the operation is highly dangerous, as, in the case of the observation planes, there is only an 8-foot clearance at the ends of the wings, because of the island and the longitudinal protective fence. The statement that no arresting gear is installed was not believed at first, but all information that could be gathered led finally to that conclusion.

The crane used for hoisting planes out and in is of structural steel with a span of about 40 feet and clears the side by about 25 feet at the deck and 40 feet at the water line. It is supported by the after end of the island, is electrically operated, and has a steel wire single whip with a wide range of speed control. For hoisting out, engines of planes are started on deck and tested, then lifted out with engine running, being kept straight by wing and tail lines. As soon as water borne the plane is released from deck by a detaching line and the plane pulls clear. The hoisting sling is left rigged on the plane. The span is such that the wing tips never come near enough the side to foul it. When a plane is to be hoisted it taxies up parallel to the ship directly under the hook; a man in a boatswain's chair, about 8 feet above, hooks on the plane sling before the engine is stopped; as soon as hooked the motor is stopped and the plane hoisted clear of the water. Steadying lines are then attached and the plane hoisted aboard. The operation of hoisting out or in is done very quickly, and is admirably adapted for use in rough weather or in a strong current.

There are two plane elevators from the hangar to the flight deck. They are believed to be electrically operated. Neither is long enough to take the observation planes level; these must be nosed over while hoisting. Planes are habitually kept on the hangar deck, and can be taken up to the flight deck or struck below very quickly.

The flight deck is frequently used for infantry drill of the *Hermes'* crew. An awning is habitually kept spread forward. A stub radio mast that can be unrigged is intalled about 100 feet from the stern.

The hangar deck is of steel, about 50 feet wide and extends from the forward end of the forward elevator to the stern. On each side are bulkheads, shutting off longitudinal compartments. The hangar deck is about 12 feet above the water line, and abaft the after elevator drops down another 2 feet to the quarter-deck, from which lead access hatches to the officers' quarters. From just under the flight deck an I beam extends out until its end is about 12 feet aft of the stern of the flight deck; this beam is fitted with a trolley and hoisting arrangements. Planes can be lifted over the stern and taken forward until landed on the hangar deck.

Shops are located on the hangar deck. The repair officer, an engineer officer of the Royal Air Force, stated the shops are very complete and allow repairs of all ordinary kinds to be made on board. Crashed planes, however, are sent back to England for major overhaul, because the repair force allowed can only keep up with the usual work. It was gathered that major overhauls to planes and engines are made on the *Hermes.* There are ample overhead electric and hand trolleys above the hangar deck.

The *Hermes* is due to return home in the fall of 1929, and will be replaced by the *Eagle.*

Aircraft.

The *Hermes* carries about 6 observation planes and 18 fighters. This number just about fills the hangar deck. No larger planes can be carried except as seaplanes permanently located on the flight deck.

The observation planes are new Fairey III–F.'s. The pontoons are all metal and have rudders controlled by the pilot. They maneuver well on the water. No cradles are used for these planes. On the outboard sides of the two pontoons, just abaft the forward strut, is a transverse socket and latching gear. When hoisted in, the plane may be set on deck on the pontoon bottoms. Then a wheel mounted on a bracket has a projecting tang inserted into the pontoon socket and locked; a 4-foot handle mounted eccentrically to the tang, when lifted up, lifts the pontoon off the deck and the plane may then be moved as desired. The after ends of the pontoons appear to drag on the deck. The after struts are fitted with hydraulic shock absorbers (oleogear). These planes take-off and climb well. Most of the pilots seem to land "hot," though one or two always made stall landings. They have flotation chambers in the fuselage.

Two fixed Browning 1923 machine guns are carried in the after cockpit but are fired by the pilot in the front cockpit, the bullets firing through the propeller by way of a long tube. The after cockpit also carries a free 1923 Browning machine gun which is operated by the radio operator. The engine is a water-cooled type with two radiators which can be drawn up into the fuselage forward of the pilot by means of a wheel on the left side of the pilot's cockpit. This is done to decrease the resistance in case an emergency increase of speed for a short time is desired.

The fighters are Fairey "Flycatchers". Their pontoons look much like those on the Fairey III *D*, except that all have hydraulic shock absorbers in the after strut. These planes are not very well liked by the pilots. Shortly after leaving Chefo a wing came off one when pulling out of a dive and the pilot was killed. Due to the flat bottom they do not land or take-off well in choppy water, but are said to make about 10 miles per hour greater speed fitted as seaplanes than as land planes. They carry two Browning 1923 machine guns mounted outside the fuselage at the pilot's side; jams can not be cleared without landing.

Personnel.

There are six or seven Royal Air Force officers on board, four of whom do chiefly administrative work. There are 12 or 14 "N. O." (naval officer) pilots and several naval officer observers.

The cooperation between the Royal Air Force and the naval officers is not good. The Royal Air Force officers freely expressed the view that they are greatly handicapped on board ship due to the ignorance of the regular line officers (not pilots) respecting flying and operating conditions. The captain and executive officer look on pilots more or less as they would chauffeurs, and feel that the observer is the all-important man in the plane. They believe that in naval missions a line officer without flying experience is competent to direct all necessary plane operations. The naval officer pilots say the Royal Air Force pilots do not attempt to study naval operation of planes and believe that efficiency will be greatly improved when the Admiralty finally gets full control of naval planes; they believe the United States Navy is far ahead of the British Navy as regards the efficiency of naval aircraft. There is an ever present feeling of hostility between the two classes of officers: Royal Air Force pilots, almost without exception, greatly prefer duty ashore.

Radio.

The U. S. S. *Jason* listened in on British observation seaplanes operating from the *Hermes* at anchor in Chefoo. Only two British observation planes flew at any one time while the *Hermes* and *Jason* were in Chefoo together. They always carried radio equipment; sometimes both planes operated nearly continuously; at other times one plane operated regularly and the other acted as a stand-by radio plane. A frequency of 240 kcs. was used by both planes and the *Hermes* at all times. ACW. transmitters were used by both planes and *Hermes*. The power could not be judged, but the British planes had much difficulty in reading *Hermes* at over 10 miles distance. The operators in the planes were poor, being unable to read the *Hermes* except at slow speed, and their sending was very unsteady. They were probably officers or inexperienced enlisted men. The radio work consisted almost entirely of conversation regarding difficulties of communication, their distance, engine noises, etc. The planes were fitted with wing aerials as well as main trailing antennæ. Difficulty was experienced in communication when one plane had cut a sleeve-towing wire.

It is believed that the British observation planes were using transmitters of not over 10 watts and that their radiating system was very inefficient. No radio generators could be seen at any time, and it is possible that they were using a battery-driven or engine-driven generator.

H. M. A. S. "AUSTRALIA."

H. M. A. S. *Australia* is one of the 10,000-ton treaty cruisers. On leaving England, she is reported to have displaced 14,500 tons. Length, 630 feet. Beam, 62 feet 10 inches. Draft, approximately 16 feet aft, 15 feet 9 inches forward.

She is flush deck, the freeboard being 28 feet. She is reported to be exceptionally steady and dry at sea and practically vibrationless.

She is of 80,000 horsepower. A speed of from 32.6 to 34.8 knots was reported.

The masts are single pole, completely separate from the superstructure, used only for the support of the radio antennæ and for signaling purposes.

The funnels were originally lower, having been heightened 18 feet to avoid smoke and gas interference with conning and fire control.

In the forward superstructure are the forward fire-control station, wheelhouse, chart room, and admiral's, captain's, navigator's, and signals boatswain's sea cabins, and a flag plot.

The after superstructure contains the after fire-control station. A round structure about 15 feet in diameter for catapult is just forward of after control.

The upper decks are covered with 5-inch pine (Australian equivalent) planks instead of teak, a reported saving in weight of 75 tons.

The lower decks are roomy, light, and well ventilated. Bags have been done away with and light metal lockers, unpainted, have been installed for the crew instead. They are a little larger as a rule than the lockers installed on United States ships. The lower decks are covered with a light-brown linoleum, clear of shellac or paint. Throughout the ship 16-inch ports are fitted. All the battle ports are of an aluminum alloy, probably duralumin. For saving of weight, all the furniture, bookcases, settees, etc., were of latticework or slats, of a thin, hard wood. The chairs and other furniture were of the same wood. Trimmings, instead of brass, were of aluminum or duralumin. There is a recreation room for the crew forward on main deck, fitted with settees, tables, desks, etc.; very attractive and comfortable.

There is a forced-draft ventilation similar to ours. All intakes or exhausts are fitted with gas-proof shutters, operated from both inside and outside. What this shutter consists of could not be learned.

There is a magnetic compass situated on the navigational bridge. The navigator stated that it was not the original intention to install one but that he had insisted on it. It is believed from conversation that the Royal Navy cruisers and future construction will have no magnetic compasses. The steering gear is electric, hydraulic. The steersman is in the wheelhouse by himself, all the conning being done from the navigating bridge through a voice tube leading directly down to the wheelhouse. The ship has a sonic depth finder, what type not ascertained, though it was referred to as the "echo type." The navigator stated he used it constantly approaching the St. Lawrence and from Halifax to Boston with excellent results.

On the navigating bridge was the searchlight control, Evershed; and what was evidently the torpedo control, also Evershed. There were also instruments for integrating range-finder readings, Evershed, giving at all times a mean range-finder range. The navigator was growling about the numerous controls that had encroached on his domain, stating that, when the constructors could not find any place to put the various new devices that had come up, they put them on the navigating bridge, with the result that there is too much noise and confusion when he is trying to con the ship in maneuvers.

All the voice tubing was of an aluminum alloy. The navigator stated that he did not like them and that they were beginning to go already, especially where exposed. He stated that he had stripped one of the Australian cruisers scrapped of all her brass tubing, and expected to replace the aluminum-alloy tubes with this old brass tubing.

There are eight 8-inch in four turrets in the main battery. There is a range finder in each turret. There are three exposed range finders, 12-foot, Barr & Stroud; one on top of after control and one on each wing of the bridge, fitted with enemy-bearing transmitters. Considerable importance seems to be attached to the range finders. The turret guns are said to have an elevation of 30°, but from the looks of the gun openings it is thought that the angle of elevation may be higher, probably forty. The initial muzzle velocity was said to be 2,950 foot-seconds. The loading positions for the turret guns is from zero to 7°. The projectile weighs 248 pounds. The powder charge is in two sections, each section weighing 50 pounds. The charge was said to be "tolene." The two high turrets are evidently fitted with directors. There are no spotting positions on the masts, spotting being done from forward control, which looks low for its purpose. Mounted on top of forward and aft control stations are inclosed mounts which are presumed to be main battery directors.

There are four 4-inch semiautomatic antiaircraft guns and four 3-pounder pom-pom antiaircraft guns. There is no director system for the 4-inch, pointer fire being used. The weight of the 4-inch projectile is 31 pounds.

There is a plate attached to the sights which is apparently used in connection with fuze setting. The plate is marked "Mark III Fuse T. and P. No. 82." Through the center of the plate is a shaft connected to a pointer. The plate has a number of irregular lines extending from the center outward, each line marked with a figure which is apparently fuze setting. The edge of the plate is marked with a scale, apparently in yards. No information as to the method of using this scale could be obtained. It is believed that the setting of the outer scale to the range in yards moves the pointer to a position which indicates the proper fuze setting to be used.

The 8-inch guns are elevated and trained hydraulically. Our variable-speed gear has been discarded. The system they use consists of a pump driven by a constant-speed motor, which delivers a certain volume of oil into an accumulator tank; the pressure in this tank, rising and falling automatically, operates an electric switch which starts and stops the constant-speed motor driving the pump. The various speeds are controlled by the volume of oil released. The ordnance gunner stated that they had discarded our system due to a heat factor in the "B2" end, and because they had more casualties under like conditions than they do with the system now in use.

There are four torpedo tubes mounted on each side. They are mounted in a quadruple mount, very low, close to the deck. No torpedo stowage was seen.

The torpedoes have a range of 14,000 yards. There were four paravanes, Burney gear, on the deck, abaft No. 2 turret, and four others, PVs, or listening devices, of a type similar to the Burney gear.

There is a small depth-charge rack on the after end of the quarter-deck which would hold about six depth charges.

The antenna leads indicate a primary and a secondary transmitting station; the primary station well aft, while the secondary one appeared to be just abaft the foremast, probably in the lower part of the forward superstructure. Cage-type antennæ are still in use for the main transmitter. The antennæ are not as high as ours, indicating that they are depending on high frequency more than we do. It was stated that they were highly successful with their high frequency, being in daily communication with Australia ever since they left England. They have a daily schedule with Australia and maintained it while here.

There is a radio compass installed abaft the after superstructure. The navigator stated that, due to lack of time for proper calibration, he did not consider it accurate to within 5° a side, but expected to bring it down to within the customary 2°.

The sick bay was large and the operating room appeared to be excellent. The sick quarters were said to be especially designed for work in the Tropics. The most striking note was the color scheme, everything being in tan and fawn colors, which made the sick bay very restful to the eye and most attractive. A dental surgeon is carried, which is a new departure in the Royal Navy.

The stand for a catapult is mounted on the center line just forward of the after control station. A large model of the ship showed one large seaplane of the Fairey type, with folding wings, was to be carried. A light skeleton crane for hoisting the plane is on board, and is to be installed on the starboard side just forward of the mainmast. There is no aviation personnel attached to the ship at present.

Little engineering information was obtained. Yarrow boilers are installed. Engines are said to be "Improved Parsons" (Brown-Parsons), with reduction gear. Boiler and engine rooms are completely subdivided, and reported gas tight. She is said to be a very good steamer, even in a seaway, and has had no difficulty in making her designed speed.

JAPAN

POLITICAL

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

PRESENT STATUS OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

As one observer has expressed it, it is an unusual period when Japan is not in a "state of mind" concerning the Chinese situation, and the present is no exception to the rule. There is a slight lessening of the tension of the past few weeks, it is true; but the questions at issue between the two countries are so many and so vital, and the cleavage in Japanese public opinion with respect to some of them is so deep, as to render impossible more than a political breathing spell.

Practically all questions involved in Sino-Japanese relations are interrelated, and many have ramifications going back many years; but the chief problems now confronting Japanese diplomacy in China are (1) the Chinese abrogation of the Sino-Japanese commercial treaty of 1896; (2) the unification of the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) with Nationalist China proper; (3) settlement of the Nanking incident of March, 1927; and (4) the Japanese military occupation of the railway zone of Shantung Province. The first two are closely related and are the direct cause of the recent tension.

The treaty of 1896 contains a clause whereby a revision may be demanded by either signatory at the end of 10 years from date of ratification; "but if no such demand be made on either side and no such revision be effected within six months after the end of the first 10 years, then the treaty and tariffs, in their present form, shall remain in force for 10 years more * * * and so shall it be at the end of each successive period of 10 years." At the close of one of these 10-year periods, in 1926, the then Peking Government demanded a revision of the treaty, meanwhile granting an extension. Desultory negotiations were conducted at different times, and further extensions were granted to Japan. One of these came to an end after the Nationalists had assumed control at Peking, and the Nanking Government seized the opportunity to abrogate the treaty, partly in pursuance of the Nationalist program for the abolishment of all the so-called "unequal" treaties, and partly as a trump card in the adjustment of other problems with Japan.

Japanese public opinion is more often than not divided on the subject of its Government's Chinese policy; but Tokyo's firm note to the Chinese Government, refusing to accept the abrogation of the 1896 treaty and hinting at suitable measures to safeguard Japanese rights and interests in China, should the proposed interim regulations, unilaterally drawn up, be put into effect, has been approved by the nation at large. This is explained chiefly by the fact that any summary disturbance of the commercial relations of the two countries is not an academic question, but a matter of vital concern to Japanese business men and their thousands, even millions, of employees.

The part played by the Tanaka Government in the recent suspension of negotiations for the unification of Manchuria with the rest of China, which had been going on between the Nanking Government and young Chang Hsueh-liang, dictator of the Three Eastern Provinces in succession to his father, Chang Tso-lin, did not meet with the same general approval in Japan. It has been denominated by the opposition parties as a flagrant and unmistakable case of interference in China's internal affairs. The Government has chosen to characterize its action as "advice" for which young Chang asked; but this explanation loses force when Japan's great interest in Manchuria, politically and economically, is considered, and when it is remembered that notable progress toward agreement on unification had been made by the Manchurian and Nanking negotiators, partly because of young Chang's known sympathy for the Nationalist cause. Nor should Japan's need for additional pressure on the Nanking Government just at the time be overlooked. Indeed, the Tanaka Government professes to believe that the Nationalists' precipitate action in cancelling the treaty might be exended to the Japanese rights and privileges in Manchuria in case that region was brought within the Nationalist fold. The division in Japanese public opinion, and particularly the Government's precarious position in the Diet, have perhaps impelled Premier Tanaka, who is also Foreign Minister, to be more diplomatic in handling the Manchurian question than he otherwise would have been; nevertheless, it is not doubted that Japanese pressure of one kind or another has succeeded in keeping Nationalist China within the Great Wall.

Further interest is lent to the situation by an announcement that Chang Hsueh-liang has requested a loan of 60,000,000 yen (about $30,000,000) from Japan for replenishment of his military equipment. This is given more credence by a press report later that the Finance Ministry at Tokyo was preparing to issue such a loan, the proceeds to go to the Mukden (Manchuria) Government for industrial and railway development. Whether the occasion was seized by young Chang to drive a shrewd bargain in the manner of his father, or whether the offer of the loan was part of the Japanese "advice," perhaps never will be known. In any case it adds another strand to the complicated Sino-Japanese relations.

Disregarding the widely held belief that Tokyo's strong policy now and in former years is preparatory to annexation of Manchuria, we find some justificataion for the Japanese desire for order and tranquility in that area. The exact extent of Japanese investments in the Three Eastern Provinces is not known, but $1,000,000,000 is a fair estimate, and this is no inconsiderable sum in view of Japan's limited national wealth. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Japan has a limited area and few natural resources, and is therefore dependent upon the raw materials of the Asiatic mainland for the industrialization which is not proceeding rapidly enough to care for an increasing population. Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan succeeded in tapping the rich resources of Manchuria and the streams therefrom have veritably become the nation's economic lifeblood. Were they to be shut off, or even disrupted, there would be widespread suffering in Japan.

The item of soya beans alone illustrates Japan's dependence upon Manchuria. The beans are one of the chief components of the Japanese diet; their oil has many essential uses; and more important than all, the residue left after the oil has been expressed is a cheap fertilizer upon which the Japanese farmer is greatly dependent. Should the supply of Manchurian beans be cut off, the Japanese economic system would be seriously affected.

The combination of the Manchurian and treaty abrogation questions produced a not unexpected crisis in Sino-Japanese affairs; but following the delivery a few days since of the Nanking Government's reply to the Japanese note there is an apparent lessening of the tension. The reply remains unpublished, but it at least must have satisfied the Tanaka Government with respect to the postponement of the proposed interim regulations. Tokyo has expressed willingness to begin negotiations for the revision of the treaty of 1896, but has demanded withdrawal of the abrogation as an indispensable prerequisite. The situation is not clear on this point; but since China desires treaty revision above all else, even this demand may be met.

Japan also appears to hold control in the Manchurian situation. The young dictator, Chang, is declared to be an amiable person of liberal views, but without the strength of character which his father had. Just how long he can satisfy Japanese requirements without severing all connection with Nationalist China it is impossible to foresee.

The third and fourth problems mentioned at the beginning of this article, namely, settlement of the Nanking incident of March, 1927, and the Japanese military occupation of Shantung, are less urgent than the other two only because they have lapsed into what might be called the chronic stage. The settlement of the Nanking incident might logically be expected to precede the revision of the commercial treaty, particularly since the United States and, more recently, Great Britain have signed agreements on the subject with the Nanking Government. Japan affects, however, not to be influenced by the latter.

The Japanese military occupation of the Shantung railway zone is closely linked with the settlement of the Tsinan incident of last May. Japanese public opinion was sharply divided in regard to sending troops to Tsinan and, despite the grief occasioned by the regrettable consequences, there has been no widespread feeling against the Chinese. Chinese opinion, on the contrary, has been too bitter to even consider the Tanaka Government's requirements for a settlement. The number of Japanese troops in China has been considerably reduced recently, but approximately 5,800 will remain in the Shantung railway zone perhaps indefinitely. Even should a settlement of the Tsinan incident be effected, the present Japanese Government might continue the occupation on the plea of the instability of the Nationalist régime and the consequent menace to Japanese interests in China; or it might believe it advisable to have another good bargaining point for the further protection of its interests in Manchuria.

NAVAL

ITINERARY OF JAPANESE TRAINING SQUADRON, 1929.

The following is the tentative itinerary of the Japanese training squadron (Iwate, Asama) for 1929:

Leave:	Days' stop
Yokosuka.	
Unalaska (Dutch Harbor)	2
Victoria	2
Seattle	4
San Francisco	4
San Pedro	2
Guayaquil	4
Callao	3
Valparaiso	3
Port Stanley	1
Buenos Aires	4
Leave—Continued.	
Montevideo	2
Santos	2
Rio de Janeiro	7
Para	2
Colon	1
Balboa	4
Acapulco	2
Honolulu	3
Arrive:	
Yokosuka.	

The training squadron will leave from Yokosuka the early part of July, 1929, and return to Yokosuka about January 20, 1930.

OLD DESTROYER "HATSUHARU" SUNK BY AIRPLANE BOMBS.

The old destroyer *Hatsuharu* was sunk by airplane bombs in the open sea off Tokyo Bay, August 13, 1928. The destroyer was towed during the exercises by the cruiser *Naka*.

Planes from the Akagi, Hosho, Notoro, and Oppama Air Stations participated in the bombing. Bombs were first dropped from an altitude varying between 1,000 and 3,000 meters. It was necessary for the planes to fly at a lower altitude before the vessel was finally sunk.

The combined fleet was assembled to witness the bombing. The Minister of the Navy and many high ranking naval officers attended.

(NOTE.—The destroyer *Hatsuharu* was sunk by gunfire and bombs in Bungo Channel, August 5, 1927, salvaged and repaired.)

REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN JAPAN.

The Japanese Navy Department has stated that there are no separate regulations governing only this subject; the principal and important ones are included in the following ordinances:

(1) Department of Communications ordinance No. 8, dated May 5, 1927.

(2) Aviation ordinance No. 54, dated April 8, 1921.

The following is a translation of all sections which apply to the employment of alien aircraft in Japan:

> Aircraft other than Japanese can not be used for aviation without obtaining official consent from the proper administrative office.
>
> Aircraft starting from a foreign territory and flying to Japan, or flying from Japan to a foreign territory, or starting from a foreign territory flying across Japan without landing on Japanese territory, shall fly according to an air route as designated by an administrative office.
>
> Aircraft starting from a foreign territory flying to Japan, or from Japanese territory to foreign territory, shall land or leave from the flying ground designated by an administrative office with the exception when the operator is forced to land in order to obtain permission from such an office.
>
> An aircraft other than Japanese is not allowed to engage in transportation of passengers or freight in Japan for compensation. This does not apply when permission has been obtained from an administrative office.
>
> The customs regulations governing "ships," "masters," "ship's supplies," "marine transportation," investigation and punishment for violating the above, apply equally to the corresponding items in aviation.
>
> The "open port" mentioned in the customs regulations corresponds to "flying ground" mentioned in clause 34.
>
> When an aircraft mentioned in clause 33 has landed on a field other than the landing field stipulated, due to trouble, or for taking refuge, or for any other unavoidable cause, a report of the fact shall be made to the customs officials without delay, reporting to the police when customs officials are not stationed there.
>
> The aircraft above mentioned is not allowed to leave the field upon which it has landed, without the consent of an administrative office.
>
> Aircraft flying from a foreign territory to Japan will be subjected to quarantine. The regulations covering this quarantine will be issued separately.

Definition of Japanese Aircraft Mentioned Above.

Aircraft falling under one of the conditions mentioned below is termed "Japanese aircraft."

(1) When it is owned by the Japanese Government, or by a Japanese public organization.

(2) Owned by a Japanese subject.

(3) When owned by a company organized under the Japanese laws, the condition must be thus: In case of an unlimited partnership company, all members must be Japanese subjects; in case of a limited partnership company or joint stock partnership company, all members with unlimited responsibility must be Japanese; in case of a stock company, all of the directors must be Japanese.

(4) Owned by public institutions other than above mentioned whose official representatives are all Japanese subjects.

FRANCE

NAVAL

PROPOSED NAVAL BUDGET FOR 1929.

(Submitted by Minister of Marine to the Chamber of Deputies)

The amount of the naval budget for 1929 is $7,400,000.

The credits voted in 1928 were $6,127,000.

The 1929 budget is an increase of $1,273,000 over that of 1928. This increase is divided, to wit, $437,000 for the expenses of general administration and maintenance of the fleet (this includes $115,000 increase for the maintenance of aviation material), and $707,500 for new construction and the purchase of war stocks. In this increase of $707,500, new ships and coast-defense submarine construction accounts for $260,000, new aircraft construction for $157,500, and other construction, including fuel storage, for $105,000.

All ships authorized in 1922 and 1924 and a part of those authorized in 1925 will have in 1929 finished their trials. The construction of ships authorized under the laws of August 4, 1926, and of December 26, 1927, progresses normally. To the above-mentioned program must be added the coast defense submarines whose construction was authorized by the laws of June 30, 1923, April 29, 1926, December 19, 1926, and December 27, 1927.

A summary of the building program mentioned above appears below:

Destroyer leaders	18	Surface aircraft carriers	1
Destroyers	26	Aircraft tender	1
10,000-ton cruisers	5	Submarine mother ship	1
8,000-ton cruisers	3	Tankers	3
Cruising submarines	1	School ship	1
Fleet submarines	28	Seagoing dispatch boats	2
Coast-defense submarines	24	River gunboat	1
Submarine mine layers	4		
Surface mine layers	1	Total	120

The budget of 1929 includes, in addition, credits necessary to start work on the following units:

Cruiser	1	Tankers	2
Destroyer leaders	6	Coast-defense submarines	4
Seagoing submarines	6		
Submarine mine layer	1	Total	22
Seagoing dispatch boats	2		

Due to the delays in new construction, a number of old ships have had to be maintained in the fleet beyond their age limit. As has been done previously, the navy department is proceeding with the disarmament and condemnation of ships as fast as is warranted by the entry into the service of the new vessels. However, the new ships are still in too small a number to make it possible to respect exactly the specific age limit. Furthermore, for certain classes of ships absolutely necessary to the fleet, such as mine sweepers, no new vessels are being constructed. Those that the navy possesses, therefore, must be maintained in the active fleet.

In 1926, 16 ships were condemned; in 1927, 13. In 1928, in all probability, the following will be removed from the navy list: 1 battleship (used as a school ship); 1 cruiser; 2 destroyers of 400 tons; 2 submarines.

It is foreseen that in 1929, 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers and 4 submarines will be stricken from the navy list.

The French Navy, not having undertaken the construction of any new battleships, must of necessity increase as much as possible the effectiveness of the only relatively modern battleships that it has. The refit of battleships 23,000 tons, started in 1922, continued in 1926, 1927, and 1928, will be completed in 1929 by the execution of certain work on the two last ships remaining to be modernized.

The progressive reorganization of the coast defense batteries and antiaircraft defenses, which was started in 1923, must be continued in 1929.

The principal projects foreseen are: Improvement of materials now installed (increase of range); maintenance; purchase of fire-control instruments; organization of a system of watches to prevent air attacks; installation of 75-mm. (2.95-inch) antiaircraft guns and machine guns.

The money asked for in 1929 for coast defense artillery is to carry out a well-defined program. It is just sufficient to cover urgent needs and is limited to the Mediterranean coast.

Also money has been asked for the lighting of the coast in time of war and for an increase in the stocks of mines used for coast defense.

In 1928, the appropriation for naval aviation was $498,000. For 1929 the Navy Department has asked $797,000, an increase of $299,000.

This increase is justified by the following considerations:

1. The law dealing with naval aviation, proposed the constitution of 50 squadrons to be in commission by 1938. There was in commission January 1, 1928, but 18 squadrons. The annual increase, if the proposed program is to be realized, is therefore about three

squadrons per year. In 1928 lack of money prevented adding more than one squadron. Consequently, to overcome the lag, there has been asked for funds for four squadrons in 1929.

2. The cost of aircraft material is increasing due to increase in power.

3. It does not suffice to build planes and engines; they must be maintained and repaired. For this reason, general and regional depots and aviation fields must be supplied with spare parts to make all repairs. The budget for this purpose was $10,000 in 1928. This year there is asked for $42,500.

4. The Chamber approved in 1928 the purchase of war stocks in the amount of $37,500. This year $50,000 have been asked for the same purpose.

5. So far as air bases and repair shops are concerned, the Navy Department studied, in 1927, the program necessary to give to the squadrons, proposed by the budget, the bases needed to keep them always in an efficient condition. This study has been completed and the detail of what is needed can now be stated.

The total estimates amount to $1,125,000 divided approximately as follows:

Purchase of land, installation and protection of airdomes	$225,000
Hangars	400,000
Storehouses, shops, magazines	175,000
Offices and barracks	175,000
Quarters	50,000
Incidentals	100,000

This brief résumé shows that the program can not be completed in 1935 unless annual appropriations of from $225,000 to $250,000 are given each year (1929–1934).

So far as the credit asked for maintenance of bases is concerned, the request for 1929 is only slightly above that granted for 1928 ($26,000 as against $22,000). This is a very small increase if consideration is given to the very important new construction that is being pushed actively in the current year.

In order to limit in every way possible the money needed by the navy, the maximum number of men remains the same as in 1928—that is, 57,500 men—in spite of the commissioning of many new ships. This figure will permit the maintenance in commission of the ships necessary for training and will assure the maintenance of the units recently put in a reserve status.

As in 1928, the active forces of the first line are divided into two squadrons:

The first squadron, stationed in the Mediterranean, is composed of the six best battleships of the French Navy, with one light squadron and a group of flotillas.

The second squadron, stationed in the North, is composed only of light craft and submarines.

The school ships assembled at Toulon will constitute, as in 1928, the third squadron. The three battleships of the *Voltaire* type will continue to be a part of this third squadron.

The composition of the coast defense flotillas will not be changed in 1929.

The troubled situation in China demands the maintenance there of the forces that are now in the extreme Orient. The *Jules Michelet* will be replaced in the course of the first half year. The other units—five dispatch boats and six river gunboats—will remain on the station, except that the dispatch boat now in the Indian Ocean will be sent to the zone of action when circumstances permit.

The number of dispatch boats stationed in Morocco and in the Levant will be the same as in 1928.

The Atlantic station will be increased by one dispatch boat.

No modification in the composition of the vessels attached to the hydrographic service is foreseen.

Comparison between the distribution of personnel in 1929 and that of 1928 appears in the table below:

Designation	1928		1929	
		Per cent		*Per cent*
Personnel at sea	40,000	69.6	40,100	69.8
Personnel ashore	11,500	20.0	11,100	19.3
Flying personnel	6,000	10.4	6,300	10.9
Total	57,500		57,500	

AVIATION

REPORT OF VISIT TO THE FRENCH NAVAL AIR STATION AT ST. RAPHAEL.

Recently the assistant naval attaché for aviation visited the French naval air station at St. Raphael, on the Mediterranean. This station has not been visited by an American attaché since 1923. In fact, the French authorities denied the request to visit it in February of this year, but later granted permission when pressed by the naval attaché, Paris.

At the time of this visit the station had approximately 300 men and 11 officers, of whom 7 were pilots.

The chief function of the station is the test of naval and water-type commercial aircraft. There was very little experimental work in progress and no new types of interest to be seen other than the new giant trimotored Paulhan-Pillard monoplane flying boat. The engines are of the Bristol "Jupiter" type and are so installed that access to carburetors and accessories is had through the wing. The wing is readily entered to the rear of the center engine and there is ample space to permit free movement within. The plane is of all-metal construction with built-up steel wing spars. The hull and the two large balancing floats are also of metal. Approximate dimensions and characteristics are as follows: Span, 98 feet; chord, 18 feet; length, 60 feet; duration, 7½ hours at 110 miles per hour; crew, 2 pilots, 1 radio operator, and 3 gunners. No tests had been carried out at the time of visit, but as a result of the first trial flight it is understood that those concerned were quite favorably impressed. The plane is for patrol work.

CRASH OF AIRPLANE "ARC-EN-CIEL."

The "aerodynamic" phenomenon, said by experts to have caused the fatal crash of the airplane *Arc-en-Ciel*, and the subsequent death of its pilot and mechanic, was partially explained by the engineer, Gianolli, after he regained consciousness.

An accident is a terrible thing. At the same time, there is some consolation in knowing that certain accidents afford information, which, if taken into account, may be of service to the progress of aviation. This seems to be the case with the distressing accident at Orly. Mr. Maurice Victor gives below a thesis based upon facts which render his article of real interest:

> The terrible accident to the *Arc-en-Ciel* brings to the front the problem of present-day technique concerning wing vibration.
>
> By examining the last moments preceding the accident, it is possible to reconstitute various phases and endeavor to draw lessons therefrom.
>
> As one knows, the Couzinet monoplane was fitted in the first instance with three 180-horsepower Hispano engines, and under these conditions flew for about 5 hours 30 minutes.

Previous Tests.

> With the object of diminishing the weight per horsepower by raising the power, to increase security by allowing flight with the central engine alone, and also with the idea of facilitating taking-off when departing for America, the central 180-horsepower engine was replaced by another engine of the same make, but of 500 horsepower. After this modification the *Arc-en-Ciel* carried out tests during a total period of 6 hours 30 minutes.
>
> These tests proved very satisfactory, for, although carrying a load of 6 tons, the plane took off after about a 175-foot run.
>
> A program of tests was mapped out covering handling trials, consumption, and speed tests, as well as a long flight of about 10 hours and a climb to 5,000 feet.
>
> The handling trials were most satisfactory, Drouhin being able to take his hands off the controls with the three engines throttled at 1,600 revolutions. In addition, by checking either of the lateral engines, Drouhin was able to abandon the rudder bar and swing the plane with ease either to the right or left.
>
> Speed tests, carried out over a 2-mile course gave an approximate speed of 135 to 145 miles per hour. Evidently these figures are not as exact as those

obtained with the Dumanois-Ceccaldi automatic speedometer, but the constructors of the Couzinet machine, which was a purely private plane, had to be content with these rough calculations.

Following the two speed tests on August 6, a bad leak in the left radiator had to be repaired.

The Last Flight.

Tests were recommenced on Wednesday, August 8, and the crew of the *Arc-en-Ciel* decided upon a climbing trial to 5,000 feet.

Drouhin took a registering barograph with him; Gianolli, Lanet, and Manuel got on board. Couzinet stayed on the ground with a deputation of the ex-students of Arts and Crafts Society, who had come to watch the flight; Le Brix, who arrived late missed the departure.

After a perfect take-off Drouhin made several turns in order to demonstrate the easy handling of the machine, and, after turning over the airship hangar, went off in a direction parallel with the Paris main road. The machine was then at about 300 feet altitude.

Drouhin opened out all three engines, and the machine gathered speed while dropping slightly and arrived in front of the S. N. Ae hangars—used for planes calling at Orly—at a speed of 150 to 160 miles an hour and an altitude of about 1,000 feet. This estimate of the speed is the rough guess of witnesses and has only comparative value. Nevertheless, all those who saw the plane agree concerning the very great speed attained.

At this moment the accident commenced, and the following is an account given by Drouhin the same night, as soon as he had strength enough to speak, on his deathbed:

> A few seconds after passing over the airport offices the left aileron began to vibrate. Seeing the danger, Drouhin closed the throttles and tilted up the plane slightly in order to brake. The vibrations then became general throughout the machine, being as much as 5 feet at the extremities of the wings. The body of the machine vibrated with extreme rapidity, and the trepidation affected the controls to such an extent that Drouhin was no longer master of the plane. No longer able to hold the wheel, Drouhin found the machine developing a very great speed, which went into a vertical spin with such a noise—caused by the vibrations—that the roar of the throttled engines was completely drowned.
>
> The plane stood up to this and nothing gave way. At the height of its spin it got on to an even keel at about 200 feet height. After hesitating a fraction of a second, the *Arc-en-Ciel* made a nose dive and dropped, regaining speed at an angle of 40° to 50°. Drouhin having once more obtained control, endeavored to correct the descent of the machine—which was falling toward the point where the Fontainebleau and Orly roads cross—in order to avoid a group of people and cars that had gathered at that spot. The controls answering to his movements, Drouhin swung to the right and endeavored to flatten out at an angle of 20°. Unfortunately, the machine was too low and the right wing struck the ground during the turn. Then followed the catastrophe.

The Vibration Problem.

The first cause of the accident must be sought in the vibration of the wings which Drouhin tried to check by throttling down and rising slightly. The accident was caused by loss of flying speed.

Numerous hypotheses have been put forth, among them being the following, which may be immediately refuted—that the machine was constructed of "odds and ends." No, the machine was very well constructed and very solid, even more so than revealed by calculations. Proof of this is shown by the wonderful way in which the wing fabric held up under the strain of such terrific vibrations, calling for enormous structural resistance.

Destruction by loss of speed is unhappily too well known, and its cause is known. In order to avoid this it is absolutely necessary to face the question of efficient control at low speeds.

In this connection one might indicate the great profit to be obtained by the study of a force independent of the speed in order to "trim" a machine in danger. Rockets, arranged at the extremities of the wings and fired by a simple electric contact, reacting with the entire leverage of the wing fabric, might provide a means of saving life in extremis.

There remains the question of vibrations of the wings. According to what is already known of this aerodynamic phenomenon, it appears that at a certain speed, always greater than the normal speed of the machine, the ailerons take on an oscillatory movement which spreads to the wing fabric, but becoming much greater, and continuing until either a breakage takes place or speed is reduced to diminish the movement.

Following on five accidents that occurred to British machines through nose dives at 260 kilometers an hour, a commission of inquiry went into this question of vibration.

It was ascertained that, at the above-mentioned speed, violent vibrations—from 800 to 1,000 per minute—occurred at the extremities of the wings. The examination of the machines revealed broken struts, aileron control levers torn out, considerable disorder of the interior stay wires, and the beginnings of breakage of longitudinal parts.

Other English accidents have shown that vibrations may begin in the body of the plane, and also, in one case, in the rudder.

In France two other examples are furnished by Albert monoplanes which took part in an economical plane contest at Orly, piloted by Descamps and Thoret. The wings of these machines began to vibrate violently during the speed test, but the matter was not treated as of great importance, for the pilots stopped these oscillations by throttling down.

What is the cause of these wing vibrations? The following is an hypothesis taken from No. 13 of Le Document Aéronautique, put forward by Mr. Sayers, the technical collaborator of our London confrère, The Aeroplane.

The Cause of Vibrations.

A wing is composed of a fixed part containing the resisting structure, and a movable part the aileron. If this wing, either by a puff of wind or by the control, is animated with an upward movement, the aileron will be obliged to follow this movement. However, in view of the position of its center of gravity behind the hinge and the play existing in the controls, this aileron, by inertia, will follow the general movement of the wing with a certain delay, being projected downward with regard to the wing, and the incidence of the wing fabric will increase, augmenting still further the sustentation.

The upward movement will stop as soon as the elastic forces of the structure observe this passing effort, but the aileron, always late through its inertia, will pass this position, rise with regard to the wing, while considerably diminishing the sustentation of the wing fabric. This reversing of efforts joined to the energy stored up in the structure will project the whole wing downward again, the ailerons being always late, and an oscillatory movement will have set in.

It must be admitted that this movement may also be caused by whirlwinds set up by the rush of air at high speeds. The shallow ailerons are in this instance the center of these whirlwinds which bring about vibratory movements by a process analogous to that described above. Once the wing starts to vibrate, it is very difficult to know what may follow, on the one hand from the inertia of the structure, and on the other from the inertia of the aileron.

In some cases, resonance phenomena become evident and amplify the vibrations until there is a complete breakage, no matter what may be the coefficient of the strength of the wing fabric. In others, on the contrary, a slowing down is possible and vibrations may take place without damage.

The Remedy for Vibrations.

From the foregoing, it is quite evident that in order to overcome vibrations of the wing fabric it is first necessary to deal with the aileron by diminishing its weight, and consequently its inertia; by eliminating its disturbing tendency by coinciding the center of gravity with the hinge; by increasing the rigidity of the controls so as to keep it in a fixed position with regard to the wing. It appears to be certain that the latter operation should be very effective in eliminating wing-fabric vibrations. This was the means adopted in order to correct this annoying tendency in the Albert monoplanes. One must also admit that warping movements either by pulling or compressing on the wires or tubes transmits displacements to the ailerons owing to the deformity of the wing fabric—and hence the vibration—and that a twisting control, at the end of the aileron, will do away with this risk.

On the other hand, it is possible to increase the rigidity of the wings, particularly at the extremities, so as to act at the moment of inertia and the period of vibration.

The question must be looked at from yet another angle, viz, the resistance to vibrations offered by monoplanes and biplanes either with indirectly supported or wire-rigged wings.

An indirectly supported wing submitted to vibrations behaves like a leaf spring and bends through a considerable arc without breaking. The example offered by the Couzinet and Albert planes in this connection is striking. Their two wooden wings have stood up well to vibrations.

Does metallic construction, also for indirectly supported wings, offer the same advantages? It would be presumptuous to reply in the affirmative without backing up the statement by figures. A careful study of the question would be necessary in order to elucidate this important point. However, it appears that metallic construction does not allow great flexes and offers more rigidity. It does not permit the ailerons to take on large movements and should lead to the suppression of vibrations. This is only a simple opinion and is given under all reserve.

The wire-rigged wing, at first sight, would seem to resist vibrations better, but is this not a deceptive appearance, and ought not we to put down to vibrations started by the ailerons such resounding accidents as those of Latapie and Brager? If one admits that vibratory movements can start, that resonance phenomena can exist, there is no doubt that, when these vibrations become evident during a flight and the pilot will not reduce speed in order to overcome them, some part of the machine is bound to break, no matter how solid it may be.

The mast attachment seems to be the part to give way. This declaration is in no way a criticism of a whole family of good machines, but an argument backing up an hypothesis that, in the domain of electricity, led to the coming of wireless.

Other examples might be quoted. Why, in certain biplanes, do the rigging wires break in the region of the ailerons? Vibration and resonance! In spite of replacing cable axes by swivel articulations, breakage still occurs just so often as the period of vibration of the wing fabric is not in resonance with that of the ailerons. In wire-rigged machines—biplanes or monoplanes—the vibrations have less amplitude and are of less importance than those occurring on unwired wings. Nevertheless, they still exist and are none the less dangerous, but rather to the contrary.

It is very easy to criticize the resistance of materials for strains for which they have not been designed. It is also most convenient to place at the door of metallurgy and thermic treatment the unexplained breakages. The truth is at the side, in the vibrations.

In September, 1927, a Dornier-Markur of the *Lufthansa*, with the German ambassador on board, lost a wing in the air, breakage of the iron mast fitting by vibration. Other machines of the same type have flown for a long time without any accident. Why? Without doubt because the warping control has had a certain amount of play and the flappings of the ailerons have encountered resonance.

The problem is important and difficult to study, because there are no precise data for these complex calculations. It may perhaps be possible to carry out tests with models in the wind tunnel, the models being fitted with wings of which the moments of inertia will be the function of the coefficient of reduction.

Whatever may be the principle of the test adopted, it is evident that we must go into this question in real earnest if we do not wish to have a recurrence of accidents before which, too often, technicians avow themselves to be powerless.

Statement of Engineer Gianolli relative to the catastrophe to the airplane "Arc-en-Ciel."

Engineer Gianolli, one of the two men saved from the catastrophe of the *Arc-en-Ciel*, being now in a state of convalescence, has been visited in hospital by the persons who are carrying out the inquiry regarding this accident. The following thrilling account of the disaster has been given to these persons by Mr. Gianolli:

At the time of our last test flight, when we were to have climbed to a height of 5,000 feet, I was installed in the pilot's cabin on the seat of the mechanic, Lanet, at the side of Drouhin.

As soon as we had taken off our mechanic disappeared into the left-hand tunnel in order to watch one of the lateral engines. We had made a wide sweep over the areodrome, when Drouhin opened the throttles and the plane gained great speed. We were skimming over the tree tops at about 155 miles an hour.

I then noticed that the control wheel was vibrating in Drouhin's hands, when he shouted to me, "Get back and hold tight!"

I called to Lanet, but he had left the left-hand engine and gone to the right-hand one, and didn't hear me. I went quickly to the rear of the machine and doubled myself up, facing forward.

I could see Drouhin all the time and not one of his movements escaped my notice. It was such a tense moment for me that, even if I live to be a hundred, I shall always be able to see his movements before my eyes as clearly as they were then.

> Drouhin throttled down his engine and started to climb slightly so as to brake on the air. The prow of the plane shook terribly, the wings wobbled, and the control wheel shook so violently that Drouhin could hardly hold it. We were climbing in a spiral and I thought my last moment had come.
>
> At last the machine got on an even keel, the vibrations stopped, everything was holding all right, and the descent commenced.
>
> Drouhin stuck tight to the controls, operated them to their fullest extent, and they responded accordingly. We were then above the main road to Paris, coming straight down on to the cars and the terrified people.
>
> Drouhin maneuvered the rudder and elevator by means of the rudder bar and control wheel, and we swung to the right, avoiding the road. The plane began to straighten out and I thought we were safe, when there was a frightful crash. I felt as if all my limps were being forced into my body, and knew nothing more until I woke up in the hospital.
>
> The fact that Manuel and I are still alive is due to the plane itself. If, as in so many previous accidents, the machine had collapsed in the air, we should all have been killed. In the present instance, when the machine had hit the ground its design and method of construction saved our lives. Actually, in spite of the terrible crash, the landing wheels did not give way.
>
> In addition, the system of multiple independent rubber rings fitted to the undercarriage served as a shock absorber of incredible strength. Lastly, the thick wing placed under the fuselage took up the greater part of the shock by collapsing on itself in hitting the ground. With any other machine we should all have been dead.

"What about the vibrations?" Mr. Gianolli admitted that, for the moment, he was unable to give a scientific explanation of this aerodynamic phenomenon, which is a problem that aeronautical engineers are striving to solve.

In this connection, a mechanic who helped to prepare the plane and saw the accident, expressed his opinion as follows:

> The wings of the *Arc-en-Ciel* might be compared to a drum. These wings were intended to serve as reservoirs containing the 1,600 gallons of petrol required for the flight.
>
> Actually, at the time of the accident these reservoirs were practically empty. Tap on a drum and it vibrates; fill it with water and the vibration ceases. By opening the throttles on the plane to their fullest extent with the wings almost empty, it seems most probable that a similar phenomenon of resonance took place.

DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF SEPARATE AIR MINISTRY.

(*NOTE.—In view of the fact that the decision to form a separate air ministry was reached before its duties and functions were outlined, it appears that the move was one with political significance only. The following articles give an outline of the discussions and the decision.*—Ed.)

A recurrence of discussion of the establishment of an air ministry was noticed in the press the early part of last month. A leading article headed Too Many Heroes Sacrificed cited the names of six pilots all of whom perished in crashes within the space of a few days.

A phrase familiar to those who have followed the subject in our own country was the following: "Aviation has taken on such importance that it can no longer be controlled by bureaus connected with other departments." This article was commented upon to the effect that the partisans of an air ministry blame every casualty which happens, and the loss of every world's record, on the absence of a ministry. Later, a writer who is considered well informed wrote as follows:

> We all desire a ministry of the air. But which ministry of the air? The ministry of the air of some people is not the ministry of the air of others.
>
> The conception of the ministry of the air, which we will call ministry of the whole air, would have all aeronautic material and personnel concentrated under a single ministry; that is, the aviation units now attached to the ministry of war and the ministry of the navy, as well as commercial aviation, would be directly under the proposed ministry of the air.
>
> Recently a military officer of the first rank, General Nudant, wrote as follows: "If we are going to have an air ministry it will be absolutely inacceptable to attach to it the administration of the tactical personnel, as well as the employment of that personnel and its war material."
>
> This short phrase sums up all the hostility manifest since the war by the general staffs of the army and of the navy against the proposition of a ministry of the whole air, which would include material and personnel; that is to say, the strategic and tactical employment of the fifth arm in case of war.
>
> This hostility is profound, not momentary; it will not disappear even if other persons in authority in the military and naval services replace the present ones. For 10 years numerous chiefs have succeeded to the staffs of the army and navy and the point of view has not changed. Take first Mr. Paul Painlevé, Minister of War, who once considered the possibility of a ministry of the whole air; he has been convinced by the arguments of his general staff (although one would not say that Mr. Painlevé is not in favor of some reorganization of aviation), and one can say that the Minister of War believes as General Nudant has stated above.
>
> It is well known that Mr. Leygues, Minister of Marine, is thoroughly hostile to all proposals for a ministry of the whole air; he was prepared to make it a question of confidence in the council of state if the subject had been proposed. Mr. Poincaré, the president of the council, prefers to put off the solution of the problem.
>
> Mr. Poincaré has his reasons. But putting it off will not suppress, and the question of a ministry of the air in France must be submitted again to public opinion. What sort of ministry will be proposed?

In the latter part of August, Louis Bleriot published an article in which he warned that, if France did not wish to lose the fruits of her 20 years of effort in aviation, they would have to see that their organization and material did not fall behind those of other countries. He urged the necessity of creating a "formidable supermarine, far stronger than the navy of the sea," which was an essential condition in the economic development of modern nations. He concludes that an air ministry is necessary, to coordinate the 31 aviation firms of France.

The opinion of 25 Paris newspapers, with respect to aviation, were analyzed from statements printed immediately subsequent to the crash which killed the Minister of Commerce on September 2, 1928. If any felt satisfied with the present situation it was not expressed. Twelve papers were outspoken in advocating the creation of an air ministry, but only two, L'Avenir and Liberté, defined this to mean a department which would include civil, military, and naval aviation. Le Temps and L'Auto, in advocating an air ministry, excepted military and naval aviation from inclusion in it. The eight other papers advocating an air ministry were not specific in their statements. Le Temps said:

> Public opinion certainly demands a head, a brain, a single point of impulse. It remains for the Government to decide for or against it, but to our mind the new department could constitute a fusion of the services of study, of technical projects, of construction of aircraft, of control of safety measures, and of general coordination. The war and navy departments would remain empowerd to order the apparatus which they desire, and keep entire disposition of military (and naval) personnel in matters of discipline, promotion, inspection, etc.

The control of construction of all aircraft is now vested in the ministry of commerce, as well as control of civil aviation. It is not seen, therefore, that the proposal would do more than raise the functions of the office directly charged with this duty to the status of an independent ministry. It will be recalled that there was formerly an under secretariat which handled aviation, which gave way to the present arrangement.

At the meeting of the council of state, which took place the day before his death, the Minister of Commerce laid before his colleagues the question of reorganization of commercial aviation lines.

After attending the funeral of the Minister of Commerce, the members of the cabinet met in council, and at the adjournment it was announced that it had been decided to form an air ministry. In commenting on this action, a well-informed writer remarked that the country should not expect the new department to work magic. "It will not remedy all the faults any more than a ministry of medicine would cure by enchantment all our ills." He warned that this was not the time to weigh the preferences of political groups in the scales of parties. A ministry of the air like England's is not conceivable; if it should absorb military and naval aviation the result would be as strange as an independent ministry of artillery or of submarines. The air ministry will render valuable service if it will concentrate everything pertaining to the relations with the industry, with commercial aviation, and the meteorological service.

It is expected that the next announcement on this subject will be made after the meeting of the council, which is scheduled for an early date. In the meantime, Mr. Leygues, the Minister of Marine, has taken over the direction of aviation.

Comment by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

On September 5 at a special meeting of the French cabinet it had been decided to establish a department of air ministry. This office has not yet been informed whether this means an independent air service similar to the British or simply a separate department of civil aviation.

It appears that the press is divided on the question as to whether a new ministry should be a "ministry of the whole air," controlling all aeronautical material and personnel, army, navy, and commercial, or whether the functions of the new ministry should concentrate on the relations with the airplane industries, with commercial aviation, and the meteorological service.

From reliable sources of information both the general staffs of the army and navy are against the air ministry, including army and navy aeronautical material and personnel, and its strategic and tactical employment in war. It appears probable that naval and military aviation will remain separate organizations.

The naval attaché at Paris will notify the department when a decision is reached.

Ministry of Air Definitely Decided Upon.

The ministry of air has been definitely decided upon and the following is an official announcement defining the function of the new Minister of the Air in the French cabinet: The Minister of the Air will henceforth have the totality of credit relative to aviation now divided between the Ministers of Marine, War, and Colonies. After advice of the Ministers of Marine, War, and Colonies have been received relative to their requirements, the Minister of the Air will prepare the budget. The Minister of the Air will pass on orders and purchases.

The Minister of the Air will have authority over naval and military personnel, but he will be bound to put at the permanent disposition of the Ministers of Marine, War, and Colonies the necessary formations for their tactical utilization in cooperating the army and the navy.

Details of the relations between the ministers will be decided at a further conference.

ITALY

NAVAL

ITALIAN NAVAL POLICY, 1928.

In considering Italy from the naval point of view, the underlying position of the country must always be borne in mind. Italy is an almost insular country, with a large and rapidly growing population. She is far from rich in agricultural resources and has almost no mineral resources. Her greatest wealth is in her man power, of which heretofore the surplus has gone abroad for employment. To use her man power in industry, where the surplus must go if it does not emigrate, Italy must import raw materials. As her land frontiers are principally mountainous and so do not lend themselves to extensive economical railway transportation, the great bulk of Italian commerce is carried by sea. To reach Italy such sea-borne commerce must traverse the Mediterranean, and if originating outside of that sea must enter it by one of three gates—the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, or the Dardanelles. Great Britain controls the first two and Turkey the third. France has lines of communication stretching across the Mediterranean from southern France to Tunisia and Algeria in northern Africa, which lie athwart the Italian lines to Gibraltar. Italy has considerable territory separated from her mainland by water—Sardinia; Libya, in northern Africa; the Dodecanese Islands, in the Aegian Sea; and Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, in West Africa. Unfortunately, none of the Italian colonies are of such a character as to afford much of an outlet for Italian surplus population. Libya, which is made up of the Provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripoli, has not the fertility of the French North Africa possessions to the westward. As a consequence, there are more Italians resident in Tunisia, which is a French protectorate, than there are Frenchmen.

The chief Italian policies which may influence future Italian naval programs appear to be the following:

(*a*) *The strengthening of Italian influence in the Balkans.*—Italy has treaties with Albania, Rumania, and Hungary, which tend to fortify her position against the opposition of Yugoslavia. The treaty with Albania gives her almost a paramount interest in Albania and is really a treaty of alliance against aggression in Albania. This treaty of alliance is further safeguarded and made permanent by the accession of the former President Ahmud Zogu, a great friend of Italy's, as King on September 1, 1928, as Zogu 1.

The opposition of Yugoslavia to Italy is somewhat abated by the recent approval of the Nettuno pact with Italy by the Yugoslav rump parliament in which the Croats and Slovenes withdrew and did not participate.

(*b*) *The strengthening of Italian influence in the Red Sea.*—Italy has made a commercial treaty with the Yemen (Arabia), following which the second son of the King of the Yemen came with a mission to Italy. The Duke of the Abruzzi headed an Italian mission to Abyssinia, which helped to spread Italian influence in that country. Also a treaty of friendship and arbitration with Abyssinia signed on August 2, 1928, which gave Italy a new outlet and free port of Assab. The Italian colony of Eritrea is well situated at the southern end of the Red Sea to serve as a base for commercial penetration of the Yemen and Abyssinia.

(*c*) *The Italianization of the German population in the Trentino.*—On May 26, 1927, Mussolini told the Chamber of Deputies, "Even though the Alto Adige (Trento) were 100 per cent German, the Brenner Pass is sacred and inviolable."

(*d*) *Development of aviation.*—For commercial aviation alone the appropriation for subsidies and help has increased from 1,000,000 lire in 1923–24 to 35,830,000 lire in 1927–28 and 50,830,000 lire in 1928–29. Italian air lines have taken over all services in Albania from the German Luft Hansa and are now operating a line from Brindisi to Athens and Constantinople. Other projected lines outside of the peninsula are one between Genoa, Barcelona, Palma (Majorca Island), and Rome, and one between Rome, Syracuse, Tripoli, and Bengasi. Military aviation has grown in a similar manner.

On the subject of national defense, Mussolini on May 26, 1927, told the deputies:

> How is it the duty, precise, fundamental, and forewarned, of the Fascist Italy to arm itself by land and sea and in the air? It is necessary at a given moment to be able to mobilize and arm 5,000,000 men; and to strengthen our navy, and that it is necessary that our aviation should be so numerous and so powerful that the rumble of its motors should drown every other sound in the peninsula and that the spread of its wings darken the sun of our land.

In his annual speech delivered before the Senate on June 5, 1928, the chief of government said:

> Italy desires peace but should not neglect the arms which are necessary to maintain her unity, independence, and safety.

(*e*) *Development of a large merchant marine.*—The assistance given by the Government takes the form of subsidies to shipping lines; of aids to shipbuilding through remission of import duties on materials used and through subsidies to ship and engine builders; and of exemption from income tax for five years of the earnings of vessels constructed. Subsidies to navigation companies alone of a total of 3,356,214,500 lire have been authorized to run until 1947. The aids to shipbuilding, which are in addition to this, operate until 1938. The Italian merchant marine has advanced from eighth place before the war to fourth place now, following Great Britain, United States, and Japan. To receive subsidies, plans for ships must be approved by the navy department and ships must be able to mount 6-inch guns. The following table shows the growth of Italian shipbuilding since 1919:

Steel self-propelled vessels launched

Year	Steam		Diesel		Total		World position
	Number	Gross tonnage	Number	Gross tonnage	Number	Gross tonnage	
1919	15	77, 125	------	----------	15	77, 125	5
1920	19	105, 372	4	6, 278	23	111, 650	5
1921	33	137, 427	5	13, 561	38	150, 988	6
1922	19	86, 836	3	9, 500	22	96, 336	5
1923	13	58, 786	2	6, 888	15	65, 674	6
1924	10	52, 139	4	27, 368	14	79, 507	4
1925	12	39, 767	15	101, 299	27	141, 066	3
1926	9	66, 380	17	153, 121	26	219, 501	2
1927	9	52, 967	10	38, 500	19	91, 467	2
Under construction Apr. 1, 1928	6	29, 550	21	62, 725	27	92, 275	--------

(*f*) *An increase in man power, through the increase in population in Italy, the restriction of emigration, the retention of a hold on Italians resident abroad, and a demand for further colonies suitable for Italian settlement.*—In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on May 26, 1927, Mussolini said, in part:

> The destiny of the nation is linked with its man power. Italy must not have less than 60,000,000 inhabitants in the second half of this century.

Subsequently, in a circular to the prefects, Mussolini elaborated on his Government's policy on emigration:

> In the first part of my speech in the Chamber of Deputies on May 26 last I enunciated the principles for the defense of the country's population. But it is not enough to care for the physical health of the race and to encourage an increase in the birth rate and a reduction in the number of deaths; in addition, we must not permit the emigration and expatriation of the strongest and most productive elements to weaken quantitatively and qualitatively the compactness of the nation. With the suppression of the commissariat general of emigration and the institution in its place of the direction general for Italians abroad at the ministry of foreign affairs I have traced the new program to be followed in this field. In return for the small amount of gold which the permanent emigrant sends home from abroad the country loses economically all that which it has spent to feed him, to educate him, and to place him in a position to produce; militarily it loses a soldier and demographically a young and powerful element which will fertilize and populate foreign lands.
>
> I invite the prefects of the Kingdom to keep strict watch over all the organizations within their jurisdiction which have to do in any way with emigration. In the meantime the royal questuras must exercise the greatest severity in issuing passports to emigrants. Steamship agents must be closely watched. Severe public warning must be given to all those who take an exaggerated interest, legal or illegal, in maintaining the flow of emigration. All priests, teach-

> ers, communal and other similar employees who unduly interest themselves for the sake of personal gain in helping their compatriots to emigrate must be invited to refrain from such activities. Clandestine agents of all kinds must be prosecuted untiringly. Too many people are living and speculating on emigration and are artificially and unnecessarily stimulating it.
>
> Above all, it should be the desire of the prefects, podestas, fasci, syndical organizations, each within the limits of its competence and jurisdiction, to promote local enterprise, to stimulate production, and to intensify their efforts to supply all citizens with profitable work and sufficient means of livelihood, so that those citizens may not be compelled to go abroad. The prefects should make the dependent hierarchies understand that their success in keeping the workers at home for the progress and defense of the country will merit them the undying recognition of the fatherland.

On September 7, 1927, the Minister of Colonies, Federzoni, at the conference of Italian geographers in Milan said:

> When the time comes to discuss the revision of colonial possessions, there is no chance whatever that Italy's right to claim an absolute priority in this connection will be ignored.

Except for a few ships of little or no military value stationed in China and the Italian colonies, the entire Italian Navy is kept in home waters. Its strength is about equal to the French naval strength in the Mediterranean, but inferior to that of the British fleet based on Malta. With Italian imports, largely sea borne, essential to her existence, and with the British controlling two of the three entrances to the Mediterranean, at Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, and having a superior fleet operating from Malta, Italy must remain on friendly terms with Great Britain. The friendship between Italy and Great Britain has never been broken.

As the financial resources of neither Italy nor France permit them the hope of rivaling Great Britain in battleship strength, Italy uses her available means to strengthen her fleet in light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, and to build up her air force, and is content to maintain an approximate equality with France in capital ships built before the war.

The Italian naval appropriations are as follows:

Year	Lire	Change from preceding year (lire)
1924-25	925, 046, 030	
1925-26	1, 030, 678, 030	+105, 632, 000
1926-27	1, 209, 595, 130	+178, 917, 100
1927-28	1, 218, 970, 630	+9, 375, 500
1928-29	1, 151, 762, 030	−67, 188, 600

The undersecretary said that the above " reduction was made almost exclusively by the withdrawal of the high cost of living extras and the reduction in the cost of material and benefits derived from the revaluation of the lira." The figures for 1928-29 include the sum of 183,000,000 lire for new construction which is 18,000,000 lire more than carried last year. Money for naval aviation is carried by the appropriation for the Department of Aeronautics, which has military, naval, and civil aviation. The Italian colonies are of such small commercial importance at present that they are unable to make any contributions toward the upkeep of the navy.

At present there are under construction or on order the following combatant ships:

Type	Number	Unit tonnage	Total tonnage
Light cruisers	4	10,000	40,000
Do	4	5,000	20,000
Destroyer leaders	12	2,000	24,000
Destroyers	4	1,334	5,336
Submarines	2	1,280	3,560
Do	21	792	16,632
Do	2	600	1,200
Total	49		110,728
1927–28 building program			
Light cruisers	4	5,000	20,000
Destroyer leaders	12	2,000	24,000
Submarines	1	1,280	1,280
Do	8	792	6,336
1928–29 building program (amended)			
Light cruisers	2	10,000	20,000
Destroyers	4	1,334	5,336
Submarines	4	792	3,168
Do	2	(?) 600	(?) 1,200

All work at Italian navy yards and stations has been reduced to a minimum for the past few years, except at Spezia and Taranto. The concentration of repair and supply at these two bases permits great economies to be effected in the shore establishment. All new construction is done at private yards, except for one 5,000-ton light cruiser and three small auxiliary vessels, which have been given to the Royal Shipbuilding yard at Castellamare di Stabia, near Naples The former great Austrian naval base at Pola is used as a center for training schools for enlisted men.

In its enlisted personnel, the Italian Navy is handicapped, as are other countries operating their military systems on a similar basis—on the short term of compulsory service, which for the navy is two years. Efforts are being made to increase the term of service of part of the enlisted personnel by enlisting volunteers for four years, and by having men enroll voluntarily one or two years before they are normally called up for service, so that, with the compulsory two years, they will serve three or four years. The number of four-year volunteers permitted is being increased. In 1926 it was 1,000, in 1927 it was 2,150, and in 1928 this number was increased to 3,000, for which it was stated there were 9,000 applicants. The inducements offered to men to anticipate their compulsory training are special training and cash prizes on discharge. A further element of stability in the enlisted personnel of the Italian Navy is the Corpo Reali Equipaggi Marittimi, which comprises the petty officers and specially skilled ratings. This corps has its own promotion to commissioned rank, the duties corresponding to those of our warrant officers. Of a total enlisted personnel of about 43.000, one-third are made up of the various classes of volunteers and two-thirds are composed of the two-year conscripts.

Very little change has taken place in the officer personnel. The amalgamation of naval constructors and the engineers has been completed, and they are all now known as "Corpo del Genio Navale," i. e., Corps of Naval Engineers.

During the past year the fleet and shore establishments have been reorganized and are now organized very similar to our in both cases.

REGULATIONS OF CORRESPONDING RANKS AS BETWEEN FLAG OFFICERS OF THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH NAVIES AND HONORS DUE.

The following is a translation of the new regulations showing the corresponding ranks as between flag officers of the Italian and French Navies and the honors due to each:

Ranks of Italian Navy	Corresponding ranks in French Navy	Salutes exchanged
Grand admiral Admiral	Admiral of France	19 guns.
Admiral of the fleet	Vice admiral with commission of commander in chief of naval forces (vice admiral—chief of staff and vice admirals, inspectors general of naval forces).	17 guns.
Admiral of squadron	Vice admiral	15 guns.
Admiral of division	Rear admiral	15 guns for Italian admiral of division and 13 guns for French rear admiral.
Rear admiral	do	13 guns.

These regulations became effective on June 1, 1928.

In relation to Article 3 of order sheet it was established that the date of promotion to rank of rear admiral is that which determines seniority between the rank of French rear admiral and the two corresponding ranks of the Italian Navy (admiral of division and rear admiral).

GALILEO WORKS, FLORENCE.

The works are employing at present about 750 men, and are engaged in the manufacture of optical and fire-control instruments, gyrocompasses, searchlights, and various types of electric apparatus including bridge telegraphs, etc. This plant does not make its own optical glasses but obtains the rough glass from Germany and France and does its own grinding and polishing. All range finders in process of manufacture were coincidence Barr and Stroud type. It was stated, however, that they expected shortly to take up the manufacture of the stereoscopic type.

The most interesting apparatus seen was the new type fire-control gear for the *Trieste*, and the similar small type for destroyers, a general description of which is given below.

Installation of Central Director Fire for Fire Control.

The principle of depending upon a single director-fire apparatus for all kinds of artillery fire is now being adopted by all the navies of the world. These apparatus installed on an elevated position for reason of good visability, collects and transmits all firing data pertinent to the pointing of the ship's guns.

In regard to the better fire control that may be obtained by the use of this apparatus, it has been furthermore deemed opportune to submit to a continual and systematic study all the various elements available which may have bearing upon artillery fire so as to effect uninterrupted corrections; correcttions which will be transferred to the aiming of the guns both for elevation as well as horizontal rotation.

We shall not try to cover in detail all reasons leading to the use of this central director fire, but we shall rather confine ourselves to a summary and brief description of our system.

The following are the various operations concerning the central director-fire control, each of which require a special set of apparatus:

(1) Observation and calculation of data concerning the target and director fire.

(2) Deductions for data of fire (prediction and correction).

(3) Transmission of pointing data to the guns.

The first group of apparatus supplies two series of data: Actual aiming data, that is to say, target coordinates with respect to the aiming apparatus (bearing and elevation), and also data for prediction and correction (distance, position, the true north, eventual bearing of the enemy and errors observed).

On the basis of this second series of data and of any other data indirectly obtained, another group of apparatus which constitutes the real "central," permits the uninterrupted ascertainment of sight and rotation and transmission to the guns. Moreover, the guns directly receive all the justly corrected data on bearing and elevation for the different positions of the guns in respect to the sight telescope.

We shall certainly not describe the telemeters which form a group independent of the central director fire system, but since the latter must be connected to the telemeters the telemeters must be of a uniform scale type in order that they may transmit the distance automatically and electrically. We perform the said transmission with apparatus based on the N. U. K. principle, which has been conveniently modified—the modification consisting in a device which forcibly reduces the pressure.

The true north indicator is joined with the pointing apparatus and we shall mention it when describing the latter. Needless to say, the true north indicator is furnished with an electrical appliance which permits the transmission of the computed angle.

The functioning of "central" is as follows: A prediction table "T. P." automatically registers all the range-finder readings. Due to an ingenious switching system, one sole receiver passes successively over all the various range finders.

If the range-finder operator in finding himself collimating with the receiver has timely pressed a key, the reading is registered even in case it has already occurred several seconds before. Readings are registered in different colors for each range finder. Our normal sized table can be used with as many as six range finders and can from time to time be adjusted to serve any number of range finders from one to six, according to requirements.

In order to reduce the size of the table without reducing the size of the scale, which is normally 1:10,000, distances are automatically reduced to less than the constant 3,000 meters (=30 c. m.), while the total width of the table being 40 c. m. corresponds to 4,000 meters. Hence, when on account of the increase of distance, the group of telemetric curves (whose movement is in relation with time) are on the verge of going beyond the paper carpet which covers the prediction table, another group of telemetric curves is already being marked on the opposite side of the table, thus permitting the continuation of the operation after the passage of the curves from one side of the table to the other. The registration of the various points takes place under the paper carpet, as in case of ordinary registering instruments. On the paper itself a glass disk determines with its center the average of telemetric curves, and the same disk determines with its diameter the estimated tangent to said average curve.

After this a differential gear (collector I′), our special patented type with electromagnetic adhesion run by electricity, effects the forward movement of the chassis which carries the glass disk. This forward movement corresponds to the inclination of the geometric target in respect to the estimated average curve. In due time an automatic control of said inclination is obtained by the keeping of the glass-disk center in correspondence with the estimated telemetric average.

In this way may be determined with continuity and regularity and also, to a certain extent, with reciprocal control, both the distance as well as the speed of approachment. The above result is obtained by taking into account also the functions and derivations, the speed of approachment being composed according to the charts of fire of relative velocity.

On the other hand, the true north finding, transmitted from the pointer apparatus, is compared with a fixed direction obtained by a gyroscopic apparatus (C. R.)—of our own make—(when there is not already on board a gyrocompass adapted to such use, as, for instance, our gyrocompass "Florentia"), in such a way as to obtain uninterruptedly the polar finding. It is true that this polar finding is only absolute with respect to an arbitrary direction, but it is also true that this arbitrary direction is constant and the polar finding is always given with a fixed approximation.

Although it is not so necessary to know the absolute polar finding, it is imperative to know the variation speed of the polar finding—i. e., to say, its variation of "time unit"—the comparison is performed by canceling continually (by means of a collector Ir) the difference which might occur between an indicator governed by the polar finder and another indicator representing the constant direction.

The position to be given to the differential gear of the collector, in order to maintain coincident the two indicators as above, gives us the velocity of variation of time of finding; that is to say, the angular velocity of the motion of one ship in respect to the other. This angular velocity multiplied by the distance existing between the two ships gives us evidently the component which is normal to the plane of fire of relative velocity. Now, the above-mentioned result is automatically and continually obtained by means of a multiplying apparatus, M, which, though based on the intuitive geometric precedure of equal triangles, in virtue of the special electrical distribution with which it is furnished, has been reduced to a rather small size. The smallness of the apparatus in no way affects the maximum of precision.

At this point we dispose with all necessary elements for forecasting, but we make use of these elements above all to deduct other elements more convenient for sure control. Knowing in fact the elements of one's proper velocity—that is to say, accordingly and normally to the plane of fire, from the knowledge of these elements of relative velocity, obtained by an algebraic addition—we find the components of the velocity of the enemy according to the same planes of fire; and hence it is possible for us to deduct the vector representing the enemy's velocity. This vector must remain for long periods of time constant both as to length and absolute direction (relative direction in respect to one's own ship, providing the ship is not maneuvering), and therefore the constancy of this element which can be deducted from the obtained elements is a sure indication of the correctness of the data used.

In order to control the said constancy more easily, a hand-regulated counter indicator is used. This indicator is joined by light friction with the comparative true north indicator (gyroscopic apparatus) so as to maintain it fixed in respect to the absolute constant finding. Initially or whenever required, the extremity of this indicator will be carried by hand in correspondence with the extremity of the enemy's velocity vector.

To effect this control, therefore, the data of relative motion is introduced into appropriate correctors, G, while other correctors receive the indication pertinent to the components of the wind, the factor of velocity, and any other necessary corrections, or particularly desired corrections in special cases.

All the indicators are then regulated in order to bring about a timely function of the distance in correspondence to the firing tables. This function may be established, for instance, for two tables of fire (first and second loading). The corrections thus automatically obtained are summed up respectively, viz, those relative to the distance and those relative to rotation. The errors transmitted by the director of the fire are added respectively; the corrections in distance are added to the average telemetric distance, thus obtaining the ballistic distance which may, if so desired, be transmitted outright; this, however, being not often done because the ballistic distance is instead generally reduced into angles of site and as such transmitted to the pieces or to the central director fire. The total rotation is transmitted in a similar manner. Hand maneuvering can substitute the normal automatic maneuvering of the most important organs. This is done by means of special contrivances whose actioning do not entail any special operation, four men being able to handle all the most important instruments.

The central director fire apparatus, which must be installed on an elevated position for reason of good visibility, is composed of a group of four periscopic telescopes. Two of these (binoculars) are to be used by the bearing and elevation pointers who maneuver the entire block of telescopes. Of the other two telescopes one is employed by the polar finder, and his entire work consists in the continual rectification of the pointing in respect to the bearing exclusively

The other telescope is to be used by the director of fire for controlling, when ever he wishes, the work of the pointers, or avail himself of a telescope already pointed toward the target.

The lower part of the apparatus contains all the geometric correctors; that is to say, destined to effect a series of corrections which become necessary, owing to the fact that the pointing telescope is situated at a different position from that of the guns, and this is conducive to a parallelism of the axles of motion and also to a parallax.

The lower part of the apparatus also contains all the bearing and elevation transmitters.

Usually, on the transmitters are also added the elevation and the horizontal rotation received either from the "central" or determined by the director of fire with some other summary procedure in case, should the necessity arise, that the operation of determining the elevation and the horizontal rotation be effected without the help of said "central."

The actual transmission is effected by various types of apparatus varying slightly between themselves, according to the purpose in view. All these apparatus are subject to a *univocal* principle: that is to say, all the receivers have one and only one position of equilibrium for each position of the transmitter. In practice this gives the certainty that the apparatus are all registered, providing there be an electric current in the circuit. Should a temporary interruption of the current occur and the transmitters still be maneuvered, they will be out of register in respect to the receivers, which remain motionless, but as soon as the electric current is on again the receiving apparatus will automatically register with the actual position of the transmitter.

This makes possible the exchange or substitution of one transmitter for another—for example, for several groups of guns—and this operation does not require any preliminary registering of parts.

The data transmitted, which must afterwards be introduced as they are, in some other further apparatus, must be usually introduced according to the methods called *counter indicator* or with return index to zero. This second method is preferable whenever it is a question of data that vary very rapidly; for instance, the pointing data. In fact, with this method, by means of a differential, we have the index impelled as much by the transmitter apparatus as by the controlled apparatus, and the fact that the index is at zero indicates equality of movement transmitted and of movement effected.

The counter-index method (in which opposite to the index impelled by the transmitter there is a second index impelled by the controlled apparatus, and the execution of the order is shown by the coincidence of said two indexes) lends itself well for varying data which vary more slowly and regularly, as, for instance, the data referring to the sight and rotation.

Evidently it is less fatiguing to follow one sole index (which is impelled only by a differential movement, and hence less rapid and which is always more or less near a fixed position) than to follow two indexes which follow one another all around the dial.

In some cases it is deemed more opportune to read directly on a dial or meter the value of the data transmitted and to move the relative organ until the same data is read on a dial separated from this organ. For instance, this will be the case when it is desired to transmit the sight elevation under form of distance, and to transpose by means of a classic "sight line disk" the distance into angle of elevation according to the tables of fire.

A certain number of switchboards for commutators and switches complete the group of apparatus. Each complete set of apparatus must, of course, be adapted to the equipment of the vessel on which the apparatus are to be installed.

For instance, for installation for large calibers, there could be two "director-fire" stations, each of which could serve a certain number of turrets.

The above demonstrates the necessity of each director-fire station to function also independently from the "prediction" central.

For installation on destroyers there should be as many complete installations of director-fire apparatus as there are sectors of fire, with the possibility, however, of grouping together totally or partially under a single direction the contiguous sectors of fire.

The installations described herein are made complete by other apparatus constructed by our plant. These additional apparatus, however, could also be purchased elsewhere, since the functioning of the organs is not strictly dependent upon the accessorial apparatus, such as telemeters (which must, however, be adapted to our system of transmission), the error indicators for measuring errors of direction and of distance, variometer, anemometers. The Galilèo Works can furnish a complete installation of all director-fire apparatus, also with so-called complementary instruments, such as sights for guns to be kept in reserve in case of eventual need. These sights, however, on account of being connected with indicator transmitters, must naturally fit with the whole installation.

Points of similarity were noticed between this apparatus and the Barr & Stroud apparatus under construction for Italy, with the essential difference that it is a self-synchronous system, whereas the Barr & Stroud system is step by step. The self-synchronous motors used are almost identical with the Siemens & Halske (German).

From statements made it would appear that the Italians are not yet ready to adopt a system of central control. They believe it could be practicable for smaller calibers, but that it presents great difficulties with the larger caliber guns. They are very favorably inclined to the stereoscopic range finder, particularly in view of the advantages given in spotting against aircraft.

GERMANY

AVIATION

DESCRIPTION OF TRIAL FLIGHTS OF NEW ROHRBACH FLYING BOAT "ROMAR."

The first of the three large flying boats of the Romar type ordered from the Rohrbach Airplane Co. by the German Luft Hansa, completed its trial flights at Travemuende on August 7. The dimensions are as follows:

Length	feet	72. 16
Height with running propeller	do	27. 88
Draft at normal flying weight	do	4. 26
Span	do	121. 03
Wing area	square feet	2, 339. 20

Motors: Type 3 BMW–VI (Bavarian Motor Works).

Performance: 3 x 500/720 horsepower.

Weather conditions: Wind, west 2 to 3 m./sec.; barometer, 763; temperature, 16° C.; visibility, 3 km.; seaway, 0; sky, cloudy.

First flight: 5.57 to 6.14.

Total weight: 12.6 tons.

Crew: Chief pilot, Steindorf, first pilot; engineer, Tank, second pilot; Lucas, mechanic.

Took off from Poetenitzer Wiek in 14.6 seconds.

Steindorf first flew a left curve, followed by a right curve, and then two large left curves.

Second flight: 3.15 to 4.08 p. m.

Total weight: 14.4 tons.

Crew: Chief pilot, Steindorf, first pilot; engineer, Tank, second pilot; Lucas, mechanic.

Guest passengers: Doctor Merkel, of the Luft Hansa; Mrs. Rohrbach; Herr von Buddenbrock, Kondor Syndikat; Herr Kackel, Berlin.

From the Rohrbach Airplane Co.: Dr. Rohrbach, Director Staiger, Engineer Wittstock, Engineer Frydag.

German Aeronautical Experimental Station: Controller Naunapper.

Bavarian Motor Works: Mechanic Hasenmueller.

Took off from Poetenitzer Wiek in 30 seconds with a flying weight of 14.4 tons. Since a take-off in 40 seconds is guaranteed for a flying weight of 13.8 tons, this was far exceeded.

The flying boat flew out over Luebeck Bay in the direction of Dameshoeft and made several straightaway flights along the coast of Holstein which were interspersed with large curves. The passengers were extremely pleased with the flight. All the press correspondents and the numerous visitors in Travekuende who had opportunity to witness the start and landing as well as the greater part of the flight were very greatly impressed by the imposing sight of the great plane in flight.

The general result of the first two flights was entirely satisfactory. Admirable take-off (14.6 seconds with 12.6 tons) (30 seconds with 14.4 tons) with very slight swells, good climbing property. Boat responded especially light to rudder and elevator.

Landing.—Soft, with very slight waves, showing that the great efforts expended in evolving the proper bottom formation were not in vain. The admirable results achieved are due to no little extent to the courtesy of the Hamburg Experimental Tank.

The high motor struts which had been viewed with considerable skepticism proved " iron " and evidenced no vibration whatever.

The motors ran very well but the difficulty incident to too high oil temperature is yet to be eliminated.

At present the airplane company is engaged in evaluating all the experiences of these first two flights and making the necessary improvements and changes which the flights showed to be advisable. This work will be finished in from three to four weeks and the test flights then resumed.

In conclusion it might be stated that the flying boat satisfactorily fulfilled the expectations of the constructors. The very sharp acceptance conditions of the Luft Hansa will be fulfilled if not exceeded.

NETHERLANDS

POLITICAL

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

DUTCH POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

Baron Krayenhof, of the Dutch Government, who has charge of the railway transport ministry in Holland, made the following statements of the conditions which exist in Holland. It appears that Baron Krayenhof is well acquainted with the royal family, visits them frequently, and is apparently consulted on various subjects by the cabinet and the Queen. The following is an excerpt from the conversations during the day:

The Queen Wilhelmina is a very sober, strict, serious, careful, independent woman, without much love of pleasure: interested in national policy and foreign policy; positive and sure in her decisions. The Queen has a wonderfully clear voice, with a very positive tone. She speaks excellent Dutch and is impressive to Conservatives, Socialists, and Communists alike. She has often said that she did not expect the monarchy to continue many years on account of the success of democratic republics and the rise of democratic organizations. Recently she has expressed a desire to visit the Dutch East Indies, but she means so much to the country that the Government is afraid of accident to her. It appreciates, however, that she would make an excellent impression on the natives.

It has been proposed to send her daughter Juliana to make this visit, but Juliana is a very affable, pleasant type of woman, who loves fun, and might not make the proper impression on the natives. It is considered important that the visit to the East Indies, if it be made, should be done with much pomp, ceremony, and fine dress. The daughter spends much of her time with her grandmother and is very fond of her father, the Prince Consort.

The Prince Consort is an affable fellow, of German type, who prefers to speak German. He had a high command in the army and navy up to the time of the World War, but at that time, on account of his German relationships, the Queen appointed a general officer over him. During the war he expressed a desire to cross the border and visit his army friends or to call on them at the Dutch-German border. He was forbidden to do so by the Queen, through the obergeneral in command of the Dutch Army. He belongs to a good German family whom he keeps on his Holland allowances. It was feared that his sympathy would get Holland into difficulties during the war and he was carefully watched on this account. Recently the Crown Prince desired to call on the Kaiser at his Holland home, but was not allowed to do so except in the presence of the Prime Minister of Holland.

Holland was somewhat embarrassed by the visit of the German Kaiser at the end of the war. Baron Krayenhof stated that he was with the party who wakened up the Queen at 2 o'clock in the morning to make a decision when the guards reported that Emperor Wilhelm was requesting admission to Holland. She promptly decided to receive him under guard, with all his movements restricted, as well as those of his staff, until further settlement of the case, and that he was to be received only as a refugee king. The Queen has maintained this position throughout the stay of the ex-Kaiser. It was said that the decision was made personally, without any prompting, in very clear Dutch, and was received by the general in charge and carried out exactly in accordance with the Queen's command.

The ex Kaiser had much money in the Amsterdam banks before he crossed the border and is now well provided for by his personal funds in Holland. He holds court as he did previously at Berlin; has a court chamberlain; and is always addressed as "Emperor" by his visitors. He always withdraws before the guests: no one is allowed to leave the room before the ex-Kaiser does so. He is very pompous and in many ways silly on the subject of pomp. Baron Krayenhof has attended the ex-Kaiser's court. The ex-Kaiser frequently inquires about conditions in Germany and confidently expects to return at the proper time as a savior and leader of the German people.

The baron stated that living was very expensive in Holland during the war, on account of the high prices paid by Germany for all Holland's products; that many of the Dutch people had to eat inferior bread and purchase butter, cheese, and milk at extreme prices.

A very complete plan had been worked out to halt any German invasion of Holland and the Dutch intended to carry out the plan in case of attempted invasion. He believed, however, that there was little danger as Holland was a fertile source of supply to the Germans and was likely to be more valuable as a supply country under its own Government.

Holland is very fearful that in any campaign the enemy would attempt to break the dikes by airplane bombs and flood a large part of the country; that a scheme of defense of the dikes and a method of their repair was being worked out in case of such an emergency. It was apparent that all possible men in Holland would be required for defense and none could be spared for the manufacture of munitions which must be provided by friends who could be enlisted after the war began.

Holland is prospering a considerable amount at the present time on account of the fact that the allied firms, since the war, did not like to buy directly from Germany, and that many allied firms had intermediaries located in Amsterdam to buy and sell German products. Whether the allied firms received them as Dutch products or German products was of no particular concern to the Amsterdam intermediaries. He suspected that many of them were sold to the trade as Dutch products rather than German. In Amsterdam, also, there were a number of British intermediaries who sold British and French goods to Germany in a similar manner. He had personally seen in England a large number of women's straw hats sold as British goods, which were stamped, after a long storage in British ports.

He stated that the commerce of Germany, through Holland, had been increased since the war at a remarkable rate and that the Dutch had to be very careful how they handled this commerce. The position of Holland astride the mouth of the Rhine was always dangerous.

The baron expressed considerable concern about the Dutch East Indies and he believed that the Queen considered their present condition the most serious problem facing the Government in Holland at the present time. He said that the secret service had discovered a large number of Russian cells formed by Bolshevist agents all over Java, Sumatra, and Celebes. Many of these cells had wireless receiving apparatus and received broadcast information from Russian stations constantly in language which they could understand. The natives did not understand what it was all about, but generally believed what they were told and were very much inclined to believe anything against the Government, which he considered to be a characteristic human trait. All this information is now intercepted and was well known but that its dissemination often puzzled the police, for it apparently was received in all parts of the islands and much discussed by the native element. The Government considered it highly necessary to keep a well-equipped Dutch force in the East Indies ready to handle a situation which might at any time become serious. On this account the East India Office was often given preferential treatment in its selection of equipment for the local conditions.

It was noted that Baron Krayenhof had a pass on the Dutch as well as the German railways and was met by friends at the railway station at Cologne, Coblenz, and Wiesbaden, where he stayed. He spoke German fluently and discussed with his friends at Cologne the preparations for the opening of the present fair at that place, where he expected to attend a banquet a few days later.

TRANSFER OF ARMY AND NAVY PERSONNEL TO THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND SUBDIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTO DIVISIONS.

Recently the Minister of Defense, in presence of the Secretary General, installed in the newly established department of defense, the officers and officials of the land and sea forces formerly attached to the suppressed departments of war and marine and now transferred to the department of defense, and he announced that the latter department (defense) is constituted by royal decree as follows:

I. Section: Juridical division.
II. Section (A): Naval staff.
Section (B): General staff.
III. Section (A): Naval personnel.
Section (B): Army personnel.
IV. Section (A): Matériel, navy.
Section (B): Artillery (ordnance), army.
V. Section: Engineers ("Genie").
VI. Section (A): Supply department, navy.
Section (B): Supply department, army.
VII. Section: Conscripts.
VIII. Section: Accounting.
IX. Section: Pilotage service.
X. Section: Hydrography.
XI. Section: Secretariat, files, and archives.
XII. Section: Commissariat or commissary department and (apart from the above-mentioned services) an office of the Secretary General.

NAVAL

SPECIFICATIONS FOR NEW SUBMARINES.

There follows the general specifications for three new submarines to be constructed for service in the Dutch East Indies colonies. It is understood the names of these boats will be *K–14*, *K–15*, and *K–16*.

(1) They must be fit for service in the Dutch East Indies.

(2) It must be possible for them to remain during four weeks without interruption away from a base.

(3) They may not be larger than is necessary for the requirements fixed.

(4) The maximum speed on the surface must be at least 16 knots, which speed must be maintained, without overcharging the engines, for at least four consecutive hours. During this trial the vessel must be in the condition "ready for quick diving." In that same condition it must be possible to maintain for an unlimited period, and with one engine, a speed of 12 knots.

(5) The radius of action on the surface, with a speed of at least 10 knots, must be 3,000 miles, without using the ballast tanks as fuel tanks.

(6) The maximum speed, submerged, must be 9 knots, which speed must be maintained for at least one and one-half hours. The antimine gear must be in place, all railings removed, and the 3.4″ L/45 gun either stored, or not on board.

(7) The maximum depth is 80 meters (262.4 feet). The water-tight bulkheads must withstand at least three atmospheres; for the bulkheads which close the forward and after torpedo compartments it is desired to withstand a higher pressure.

(8) The battery cells must be of the latest Tropic type with the dimensions of 950 by 568 by 373 m/m. (37 by 22 by 14 inches).

(9) The cubic space for the wireless room must be at least 8.5 cubic yards, with a floor space of at least 4 square meters (234 square feet and 43 square feet, respectively).

(10) The armament will be:

(*a*) Four bow torpedo tubes; two stern torpedo tubes; two deck torpedo tubes.

The tubes must be for the launching of torpedoes of a length of 6.84 meters (22 feet) plus 0.0006 meter (0.23 inch)÷length indicator—133 m/m.—a diameter of 0.5334 meter (5.2 inches and 21 inches, respectively), and a weight of 1.525 kilograms (3,362 pounds). The number of torpedoes to be carried is 14.

(*b*) Two heavy machine guns of at least 40 m/m. (1.5 inches), which will be installed high and water-tight upon the bridge. Total ammunition, 1,200 rounds.

(*c*) Forward a gun of 8..8 c/m. L/45 (3.4 inches.) The number of rounds to be 120.

(11) There must be three periscopes, of which two for attack and one for night work. It is desired that the eyepieces of these three periscopes be placed in the tower.

(12) The main tanks must be filled in 30 seconds.

A plan of the submarines is being developed at my department, while you will have the opportunity to quote for the construction of these boats in the beginning of 1929.

After the budget for 1929 has been voted, I would desire to make, as soon as possible, a contract for the construction of these boats, and in no case later than May, 1929.

I also wish to give you the opportunity, if you so desire, to quote for your own design, or for a design made in a combination with constructors in the country, or outside the country, who have experience in submarines.

Such design must fulfill the same conditions as stipulated above, and must, as far as the interior arrangement is concerned (accumulator batteries, Diesel engines, air, water, and electrical installation, and such like), be similar if possible in system and execution to the customary installations on the latest Dutch submarines, unless you can propose considerable improvements in this connection.

In case the project as proposed by you should appear to me also in respect to the price, to be better than the navy design or that which may be proposed by other shipbuilders, then I would desire to have you build the three submarines according to your design, instead of the navy design, and in that case to make the contract for the construction as soon as possible after the naval budget for 1929 has been voted.

In view of the making of the choice and of the preparation for the making of the contract, I request you, in case you wish to quote for an own design (either not in combination with constructors in or inside the country), to send your proposals to my department at the latest on October 1, 1928. I would then also like to be informed on how far the project must be modified in order to increase the surface speed to 17 knots.

I suppose that it will be difficult for you to give a binding price on October 1, 1928, as in case of acceptance of your design, different desiderata from my side will too much influence that price. Therefore, if my choice after reception on October 1, 1928, should fall on your design, then the binding quotation would only have to be made after complete accord has been arrived at as to the project as a whole and as to the requirements stipulated in the specifications and the contract.

The binding price can be given by you at the same time as the written quotation on the three submarines which will be held for the submarines of the navy design.

In case you should require further details of a technical nature, then you are requested to address the chief of the bureau of material at my department.

RUSSIA

NAVAL

RAISING THE BRITISH SUBMARINE " L–55."

Grtat interest was displayed in naval circles in the raising of the British submarine *L–55*, sunk in 1919 by a Soviet torpedo boat in the Finnish Gulf. The submarine was raised by the Soviet salvage ship *Commona.*

The chief of the naval forces and member of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Union Socialistic Soviet Republics, Mukliević, stated that the submarine *L–55* was sunk by the torpedo boat *Azard* in the battle of June 4, 1919, in Kapora Bay, near Cronstadt. At 5.37 p. m. of that day the submarine attacked the Soviet torpedo boats *Gavril* and *Azard*, but the three torpedoes shot by the submarine missed the Soviet ships. After that the submarine came to the surface and as soon as its bridge appeared on the water the torpedo boat *Azard* opened artillery fire with plunging shells. One of those shells hit the boat at the lower edge of the bridge. A strong explosion followed and the submarine went down immediately with the whole crew.

The submarine *L–55* was commissioned in the spring of 1919 and belonged to the most perfect and modern class of the British submarines. Its displacement on the surface was 960 tons and when submerged, 1,150 tons. Its armament consisted of six torpedo apparatus of 21-inch caliber and two 4-inch guns. The number of the crew was 40. The *L–55* belonged to the British squadron of ships acting in the Finnish Gulf under the command of Rear Admiral Walter Cowen, who carried his flag on the H. M. S. *Shakespeare.*

The task of that squadron was to take Cronstadt, to destroy the Soviet battleships, and by so doing to assist the white troops to capture Petrograd. The British fleet tried several times to accomplish this task but all its attempts ended in failure. In the battles of that period, i. e., from December, 1918, to August, 1919, the British lost the light cruiser *Cassandra*, the torpedo boats *Victoria* and *Verulan*, the mine sweepers *Gentian* and *Myrtle*, seven torpedo motor boats, and the submarine *L–55.*

The work in connection with the raising of the submarine *L–55* was begun in the spring of the current year. It was impossible to begin the work before because Kapora Bay was not yet clear of mines. The submarine was raised by a salvaging enterprise which had done successful work in the Black Sea and in the Azov Sea. The submarine was raised from a depth of 15 fathoms and under most unfavorable weather conditions (storms and cold). In spite of the damages received, the hull and the mechanism are in good shape.

The torpedo boat *Azard* (now renamed into *Zinoviev*) was under the command of Comrade Nesvitsky, who is at present in command of the cruiser *Chervonna Ukraine.* Torpedo boat *Gavrel* was under the command of Comrade Sevastianov, who perished together with his boat. Comrade Nesvitsky did not let the submarine use its powerful mine apparatus a second time and the other three mine tubes were found loaded and ready for discharge in the sunken boat.

The British attacked the Soviets without warning and sunk the Soviet ships—cruiser *Oleg*, the school ship *Pamiat Azova*, and three torpedo boats *Konstantin*, *Svoboda*, and *Gavrel.* The British monitor *Erebus* fired with her 15-inch guns at the Krasnaya Gorka Fort.

The bodies of the crew were found in the sunken boat.

"These men were our foes, but the Red seamen do not cherish any hostile feelings toward them. The British sailors fulfilled the will of those who sent them and paid with their lives. We shall take into consideration the wishes of the British Government concerning the funeral ceremonies and the personal effects of the dead. In any case their remains will be buried with appropriate military honors."

SPECIAL ARTICLES

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

NINTH ORDINARY SESSION.

The ninth ordinary session of the assembly of the League of Nations (the tenth actual session if the extraordinary meeting called in March, 1926, to debate the admission of Germany is included) opened at Geneva on September 3 and is still in session.

Five prime ministers and 20 foreign ministers are among the delegates. Great importance attaches to the presence of Premier Hermann Mueller of Germany, who came in person to raise the issue of evacuation of the Rhineland. The other premiers are Mackenzie King of Canada, Venizelos of Greece, Seipel of Austria, and Mowinckel of Norway. Of the foreign ministers present, Briand of France, Hymans of Belgium, and Benes of Czechoslovakia are the most noted.

Costa Rica's Appeal.

One of the questions much discussed prior to this meeting of the assembly was the appeal of Costa Rica to the league council to define the Monroe doctrine, particularly with reference to the League of Nations. Reports regarding this matter indicate that Costa Rica has made her proposed return to the league contingent upon the definition of the Monroe doctrine given by the council.

In this connection it may be well to recall that Costa Rica was admitted to membership in the League of Nations on December 16, 1920. On August 31, 1924, she was in arrears with respect to her quotas under the budget for the years 1922, 1923, and 1924 to the total amount of $18,667.87. On December 24, 1924, the Minister of Costa Rica at Paris forwarded the amount due and notified the secretary-general of the league that in conformity with Article I of the covenant the Republic of Costa Rica would withdraw from the league, the notification to have effect as from January 1, 1925, so that Costa Rica finally ceased to be a member of the league on January 1, 1927.

The league council met in secret session at 4 p. m. on September 1; one hour sufficed, and before 5.30 the council's reply was on the cables to the Central American State.

Important details of the debate which have been published in reports from Geneva indicate that Señor Restrepo, the delegate from Colombia, made a long and lucid argument. He is a former Colombian senator, a lawyer, a poet, and student of American history. He is said to have traced the history of the Monroe doctrine from its inception, speaking particularly of its application during the Maximilian régime in Mexico. He called attention to the fact that in this epoch of 1866 the Monroe doctrine had been beneficial and protective to South America. But, he said, things have changed and the Monroe doctrine has now become an arbitrary policy which each succeeding President of the United States can interpret as he deems wise. The Colombian delegate gave it as his conviction that each Latin-American country should be left free to accept or reject the doctrine as it wills. Concluding his eloquent address he reiterated his belief that the countries affected by the doctrine should have some voice in its application. His last words were "not even with a flower would I wish to attack the United States of America."

Press reports from Paris indicate that for some time France has felt that the American Republics were torn in their allegiance between the league and the pan American Union. In French eyes that is essentially a conflict between the relative attractions of Europe and the United States. For the sake of drawing Latin America closer to Europe, these reports indicate, France would have liked the league council to give Costa Rica the definition she requested. The Paris Revue des Deux Mondes appeared on August 31 with an article by Jules Cambon on the Monroe doctrine in which he spoke of the difficulty of making a "distinction between protection and a protectorate." The writer spoke of the League of Nations and the Pan American Union as the two most powerful contemporary institutions, and said, with reference to Great Britain's action in regard to the Kellogg treaty, "the policy of Monroe has ended in dividing the world into compartments where certain powers wish to be sole masters: it is a policy of reserved hunting grounds."

The Italian delegate who was present at the meeting of the league council on September 1 is said to have declared that the best way to get an interpretation of the Monroe doctrine was to ask Washington for it, and that, after all, it was not the league's business, as the United States probably knew more about the Monroe doctrine and could tell Costa Rica more clearly than the Council of the League of Nations could.

The cardinal point in the reply sent by the council of the league indicated that the Latin-American States must themselves decide the real meaning of the American Monroe doctrine, though the council did not hypothetically deny its ability to interpret the doctrine should the occasion arise.

South American representatives at present in Geneva are said to be well pleased with the reply and believe it will result in the reaffiliation of Costa Rica as well as (that of) Argentina with the league.

Disarmament.

The general pact for the renunciation of war signed in Paris on August 27 could not be directly brought up at this meeting of the assembly, since the League of Nations was not a party to it. But the subject of disarament and peaceful adjustment of quarrels leading toward war can not be isolated, and the assembly had already placed itself on record by a resolution last September declaring that " all wars of aggression " shall be prohibited.

In this connection the debate in the British House of Commons on July 30 can not be overlooked. Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, speaking of the British attitude toward this general pact, said:

> These were important proposals, very important proposals, and the Government were entitled and bound to consider the new proposition made in its bearing on their general position in the world and their general policy, and particularly in its bearing on the obligations which they had already undertaken. We, ourselves, had two classes of obligations—the obligations which we undertook when we signed the covenant of the League of Nations. I would like to recall to the memory of the committee article 20 of the covenant, which gets, sometimes, less attention than it deserves:
>
> " The members of the league severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof."
>
> It was, therefore, an obligation—a binding obligation—to see that the new treaty that we were asked to sign was not inconsistent with the terms of the covenant. We satisfied ourselves that it was not. * * * Some honorable gentlemen have been troubled about the reservation, that British doctrine which is equivalent to the American, the Monroe doctrine of the United States. * * * Does anybody suppose that the American Government in proposing this treaty mean to abolish or to change their policy with regard to the Monroe doctrine? Clearly not. Why, in every treaty of arbitration which the Government of the United States have signed they expressly reserve all questions relating to the Monroe doctrine. Why need the honorable gentleman talk as if this country was doing something that may wreck the whole scheme; that this country was doing something wrong and unreasonable if it suggests that there were certain parts of the world in which we too have a Monroe doctrine, because the integrity and security of these countries are part of the defenses of the British Empire? I venture to think that it does no good to put about those exaggerated suspicions, and that it will be much more helpful to say, what is the fact, that our doctrine is exactly comparable to that of the American Government; that it is not a doctrine of aggression; that it is not a desire for territorial expansion; but a pure measure in self-defense, necessitated by the geographical position of the Empire. * * * I do not think that we can, any of us, say exactly what importance this treaty will have in the

> future. It may mean much, very much, for the peace of the world. It may mean not much, even very little. * * * If American opinion ranges itself behind its own treaty, then, indeed, the signature of this treaty will be an additional and most formidable deterrent of war, and it will be an additional and most valuable security for peace. That is what His Majesty's Government holds it will be, and it is in that spirit that we are glad to cooperate with the United States Government in bringing that proposal to fruition.

On the same day Sir Austen Chamberlain said in the House of Commons:

> There is one other question that was raised in connection with the American treaty on the renunciation of war which I would rather deal with apart. It is the question of disarmament. * * * Whether that treaty was to have been proposed or not, we should still have been struggling to forward the limitation of armaments. The right honorable gentleman asked me what was going on in the preparatory commission. At the moment the preparatory commission on disarmament is not in session, but as has been publicly announced, conversations have been proceeding between ourselves and the French with the hope of reducing the difference between us, indeed, in the hope of finding some compromise upon which we could both agree, and which we might then submit to other powers and, perhaps, by our proposals, facilitate progress in the committee. These conversations have been successful between the French and ourselves, and I am about to communicate to the other principal naval powers the compromise at which we have arrived, with the hope that it may be acceptable to them also, and that thus a great obstacle to progress will have been removed and a step made in advance. Until these proposals have been communicated to the other Governments I do not like to say more about them. I imagine the first serious discussion on them will probably take place in the disarmament committee itself.

The significance of the Anglo-French naval accord, thus announced by Sir Austen Chamberlain, widely heralded and freely interpreted in press dispatches, can not be judged on the meager information available. The terms have not been made public, and until they are known speculation will not be profitable. It is possible, however, to segregate facts from conjecture.

This may be said with some assurance of accuracy:

1. The agreement does not provide for specific limitation.
2. It deals with the broad principle of naval disarmament.
3. It presumably offers a basis for further discussion at the next meeting of the league preparatory commission at Geneva.

The following is mere conjecture, based on information which may or may not be true:

1. France has agreed to abandon her fight for limitation by global tonnage (i. e., that each country should be allowed to build whatever type of ship it desires within a total tonnage limit agreed upon), and has accepted the American thesis that ships should be limited by categories, or classes.

2. Both countries are prepared to consider limitation on the basis of four categories—capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface vessels of less than 10,000 tons, and submarines over 600 tons.

3. Great Britain has agreed to let France build an unlimited number of submarines under 600 tons.

4. France has agreed to support Great Britain in grouping destroyers and cruisers in one category.

This is historical fact:

1. At the Washington conference capital ships and aircraft carriers were limited on the basis of a 5–5–3 ratio. Submarines and cruisers were not limited, France refusing to limit the former and Great Britain, in consequence, refusing to curtail the latter.

2. At the past meetings of the preparatory commission, which is preparing the way for a world-wide disarmament conference, France and Italy have insisted on limitation by global tonnage, while Great Britain and the United States have advocated reduction by categories.

3. At the Coolidge conference at Geneva last summer Great Britain and the United States were unable to agree on limitation of cruisers. Great Britain demanded a large number of small cruisers with 6-inch guns. The United States insisted on a number of large 10,000-ton cruisers and the right to mount all cruisers with 8-inch guns. During the conference the United States agreed, tentatively, to discuss cruisers and destroyers as one category, which discussion was ended without results by the termination of the conference.

This much may reasonably be concluded:

1. The preparatory commission, which has been virtually deadlocked on the basic principle of disarmament, may be able to proceed with its work.

2. The United States will be represented at the November meeting.

3. The United States is interested primarily in cruisers. While there is nothing to indicate that the United States would refuse to consider cruisers and destroyers in one category, there is every reason to believe that she will insist on a certain number of large cruisers, as she did at Geneva, and the right to arm all cruisers with 8-inch guns.

Unless Great Britain and the United States can find a basis for agreement in this category, general naval disarmament can not proceed very far.

Although international reports for several days past have been concerned mainly with the League of Nations and the attitude of its members, severally and collectively, to important questions now at issue, it is as yet too early to sum up the work of the ninth ordinary assembly. Many words have been added in the past month to all that had already been said in attempting to define the scope and purposes of the league. Wang Ching-chi, spokesman for Nationalist China, summed it up in three, when, at the meeting of the assembly on September 3, he said that the league is "a shock absorber." This phrase immediately made Wang a celebrity for it has been repeated on all sides in League of Nations circles because it is held to embody succinctly the mission of the league to stave off war by receiving itself the first clash of national interests.

LETTER PROVING SECRET NAVY PACT DISCOVERED

(Source: Press)

TEXT SENT AMBASSADORS IGNORES WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS.

PARIS, September 20.—Herewith is presented exclusively the authenticated text of a letter recently distributed by the French Foreign Office to French ambassadors in the principal countries revealing a secret agenda agreed upon by England and France for any new disarmament discussions.

The importance of this document is that it shows the British and French foreign offices have agreed to disregard the contention of the United States, set forth at the abortive Geneva naval conference last year, for a limitation of auxiliary cruisers.

Basis is revealed.—It reveals also the basis of the mystifying conversations over a secret agreement between England and France about which practically the entire world has been speculating for several months.

The French ministry's letter is as follows:

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
DIRECTION OF POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS.
Paris, August 3, 1928.

Minister of Foreign Affairs to ———:

In keeping you informed of the negotiations of the fifth session of the preparatory commission on disarmament, I advised you in my collective dispatch of March 29 last that in the event of a technical misunderstanding between the French, American, and Japanese Navies the British Admiralty was not disposed for a general conversation between the five signatory powers of the treaty of Washington regarding the naval problem which for more than a year has been keeping in suspense the work of the League of Nations for a conference for the limitation and reduction of armaments.

The British Government manifested none the less a great desire to bring this about, and its insistence in this respect has increased ever since. Naturally the British Government could but expect a favorable reception from us, since the difficult discussions of the last session of the commission only strengthened our apprehension of the dangers of reuniting without a preliminary agreement between the great naval powers to permit us to go into a second reading of the convention for arms limitation.

NEW BRITISH PROPOSAL

The technical conversations, undertaken by the French and British naval experts on the basis of the proposition of Sir Austen Chamberlain aforementioned, finally resulted in a new British proposition.

After deliberation of the French superior council of nation defense, and by means of certain precisions, the following has served as the basis of an entente between the French and British Governments which become concrete in the following formula, which is further explained by a new projected plan for the limitation of naval material.

[The following is taken textually from the Franco-British agreement:]

" Limitation for which a conference for disarmament will sit will deal with the following four classes of naval units:

" 1. Capital ships, that is to say, ships of more than 10,000 tons, or armed with guns of more than 8 inches caliber.

" 2. Airplane carriers of more than 10,000 tons.

" 3. Surface ships of 10,000 tons or less, armed with guns of caliber higher than 6 inches and up to 8 inches.

" 4. Deep-water submarines, that is to say, more than 600 tons."

The treaty of Washington regulated limitation in classes 1 and 2, and the disarmament conference will only have to examine the method of extending this limitation to the nonsignatory powers of this treaty.

WILL FIX MAXIMUM

With regard to classes 3 and 4, the final disarmament conference will fix the maximum tonnage applicable to all powers which no power will be authorized to exceed for the total number of ships in each respective category during the period covered by this convention.

Within this maximum limit, each power will indicate to the final conference for each of these categories the tonnage she proposes to reach and which she proposes not to exceed during the period of time covered by the convention.

As long as our maritime interests for defense purposes were properly guarded, the principal task of the government of the Republic has been to bring about in the course of negotiations with England and the possibility of adherence of other navies to the solution in view, and above all that of the United States, whose aspirations you were informed by my communication of September 4, 1927, have clashed with the vital interests of the British Empire since the unfruitful conference between England, America, and Japan last year.

The exclusion of small cruisers from all limitation seemed to us to be the only solution of the problem in hand between England and the United States, raised by the insistence of the British Admiralty in placing cruisers in two categories.

As you know, in fact, at the tripartite naval conference, while agreement between England and the United States was nearly reached so far as concerned the special limitation of larger cruisers, by the same token the demand of England, in so far as it concerned the characteristics of total tonnage of smaller cruisers, provoked the rupture of the Anglo-American technical conversations and the definite break-up of the conference.

The principal reason was that the caliber of 6 inches demanded by the British Admiralty for the artillery of smaller cruisers was also the same caliber authorized in the Washington treaty for commercial ships transformed into auxiliary cruisers.

AID TO BRITAIN

It would follow, then, that even though the United States did possess the same number of smaller cruisers as England, the strength of the British fleet as to the number of ships of this type could be considerably increased as soon as hostilities opened, due to the considerable number of auxiliary cruisers Great Britain possesses in her commercial fleet and which the United States does not.

But in a conversation with M. Paul Boncour during the session of the League of Nations last June, Sir Austin Chamberlain clearly stated the impossibility for his Government to accept any system whatsoever of naval limitation that did not at the same time carry the special limitation of larger cruisers.

In view of this, and in view of the successive technical concessions which the Admiralty had made since the naval conference, it was clear that they attach capital interest only to this particular point. It was then that in order to reduce the number of categories they demanded in the first place—the proposition made by Sir Austin Chamberlain in March maintained a category of large cruisers, but at the same time did not even distinguish small cruisers from torpedo boats.

We were thus led to consider that the only method of removing the difficulty was to accord to the Admiralty a special limitation of larger cruisers, but to exclude any limitations for smaller cruisers.

Doubtless this leaves the door open for a naval armaments race, but the moment one distinguishes between two types of cruisers one must recognize the impossibility of an equitable limitation of the smaller type if one does not take into account, as the United States desires, the auxiliary cruisers.

NO MORE EQUITABLE

Commercial ships, no matter what their military value in strength, are no more limitable in our opinion, as well as in the opinion of the preparatory commission, and especially of the American delegation, than all the elements that enter into what is called " war strength."

Exclusion of all limitation of submarines for coastal defense solved at the same time the problem which the insistence of the British Admiralty had raised in obtaining strict limitation of submarines with great radius of action. Under this guise the new solution would satisfy not only our navy, but also the navy of Japan, whose representatives had demanded with insistence this exclusion during the preparatory naval conference.

This exclusion necessarily forced us to abandon the traditional French policy of limitation of naval units of figure of global tonnage comprehending all warships of whatsoever type, each power remaining more or less free to divide this tonnage between types most appropriate for special necessities, or even momentary interests of its defense at sea.

In order to permit an agreement between the great naval powers, France has finally aligned herself to the thesis of limitation by categories, but it is necessary to remark that the liberty of construction which our navy sought in limitation of global tonnage was found in the exclusion of all limitation of units of character so defensive as small cruisers and submarines for coast defense.

In this way the interests of defense of small naval countries was entirely protected, especially those naval powers who have no program of distinctive naval construction, and who were counted since the beginning of preparatory work for disarmament among the most devoted partisans of our naval thesis.

COMPENSATIONS FOR ITALY

Besides, Italy could logically find therein her compensations for abandonment of the thesis of global tonnage, which she had always up to this time almost integrally maintained without even allying herself to the transactional propositions that M. Paul Boncour had made to the great naval powers in March, 1927, and which are related in my communication of September 4 last year.

Finally, the new Franco-English formula of naval limitations justifies the distinction that the French Navy, ever since the beginning of preparatory work for disarmament, has continued to make between the extent of limitation which should correspond theoretically for each navy with a guaranty of security of national interests, and figures which in practice would not exceed the naval program of construction or replacement.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS

British.

The Atlantic and the Mediterranean are the two principal fleets, the bulk of the rest of the vessels in full commission being attached to the America and West Indies, the China, the East Indies, and the Africa stations. There are also special forces, such as the auxiliary patrol, antisubmarine force, and submarine flotillas not regularly attached to the Atlantic Fleet, which are in most respects separate commands. The reserve fleet comprises all vessels in reduced commission that are kept in a certain degree of readiness for service.

ATLANTIC FLEET

- Second Battle Squadron:
  - Nelson (flag, Atlantic Fleet).
  - Rodney.
- Battle Cruiser Squadron:
  - Hood (flag).
  - Repulse.
  - Renown.
- Aircraft carriers:
  - Furious.
  - Argus.
- Third Battle Squadron:
  - Benbow (flag).
  - Marlborough.
  - Emperor of India.
- Second Cruiser Squadron:
  - Vindictive.
  - Cambrain.
  - Canterbury.
  - Comus.
  - Minelayer.
  - Adventure.

DESTROYER FORCE

Centaur (Commodore)
2 D. D.

- Fifth Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Wallace (D. L.).
  - 8 D. D.
- Sixth Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Campbell (D. L.).
  - 8 D. D.

Also a fleet target service, attached auxiliaries, and drifters.

MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

First Battle Squadron

Queen Elizabeth (fleet flagship)

- Warspite (flag, second in command).
- Valaint.
- Barham.
- First Cruiser Squadron:
  - Frobisher (flag).
  - Danae.
  - Dragon.
  - Delhi.
- Aircraft carrier:
  - Courageous.
  - Eagle.
- Royal Oak (flag).
- Royal Sovereign.
- Ramillies.
- Resolution.
- Third Cruiser Squadron:
  - Cardiff (flag).
  - Calypso.
  - Ceres.
  - Caledon.
  - Curlew.

Destroyer Force

Coventry (Commodore)

- First Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Montrose (D. L.).
    - 8 D. D.
- Third Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Keppel (D. L.).
    - 8 D. D.

Submarine force

- First Submarine Flotilla:
  - Douglas (D. L.).
    - 6 S. S.
- Second Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Stuart (D. L.).
    - 8 D. D.
- Fourth Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Broke (D. L.).
    - 8 D. D.

Also a fleet target service, attached auxiliaries, and drifters.

CHINA STATION

Fifth Cruiser Squadron

- Hawkins (flag, commander in chief).
- Berwick.
- Carlisle.
- Cumberland.
- Cornwall.
- Suffolk.
- Castor.
- Gunboats:
  - 18 (different types).
- Fourth Submarine Flotilla:
  - Titania.
    - 6 S. S.
- Aircraft carrier:
  - Hermes.
- Third Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Keppel (D. L.).
    - 8 D. D. (temporarily detached, Mediterranean Fleet).
- Eighth Destroyer Flotilla:
  - Bruce (D. L.).
    - 8 D. D.
  - Sloops, 4.

Also drifters, auxiliaries, repair ships, etc.

EAST INDIES STATION

Fourth Cruiser Squadron

Effingham (flag, commander in chief).
Emerald.
Enterprice.
Sloops, 3.

AFRICA STATION

Sixth Cruiser Squadron

Birmingham (flag, commander in chief).
Lowestoft.
Sloops, 4.

AMERICA AND WEST INDIES STATION

Eighth Cruiser Squadron

Despatch (flag, commander in chief).
Capetown.
Colombo.
Dauntless.
Durban.
Sloops, 2.

NEW ZEALAND

Dunedin.
Diomede.
Philomel.
Sloops, 2.

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

Cruiser squadron:
  Sidney.
  Adelaide.
  Australia (flag).

Destroyer flotilla:
  Anzac (D. L.).
  2 D. D.
Sloop, 1.
Submarines, 2.

ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY

Destroyers, 2.
Mine sweepers, 4.

AT PORTSMOUTH

(Submarine training)

Fifth Submarine Flotilla

Dolphin (flag).

Training half flotilla:
  6 S. S.
Reserve half flotilla:
  6 S. S.

Experimental half flotilla:
  5 S. S.

In addition to the above there are numerous ships used for training purposes and auxiliary uses, and the older type vessels are in reserve.

French.

The French naval forces afloat, not including coast defense vessels and units, are divided into two main fleets, the Channel or Northern Fleet and the Mediterranean Fleet.

MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

First Squadron

First Division:
  Provence (flag).
  Lorraine.
  Bretagne.

Second Division:
  Jean Bart (flag).
  Coubert.
  Paris.

First Light Squadron

Third Light Division:
  Lamotte-Picquet.
  Duguay-Trouin.
  Primauguet.

Fifth Light Division:
  Panthere.
  Tigre.
  Chacal.

Aircraft Carrier

Bearn

Torpedo Flotilla

Jaguar (D. L.) (flag).

First Torpedo Flotilla

1 (D. L.)

First Squadron:
  4 D. D.

Third Squadron:
  4 D. D.

Third Torpedo Flotilla—Suocco (D. D.)

Fifth Squadron:
  3 D. D.

Seventh Squadron:
  4 D. D.

Fourth Torpedo Flotilla

Eighth Squadron:
  4 D. D.

Tenth Squadron:
  4 D. D.

Third Submarine Squadron

9 S. S.

Third Squadron

Third Division:
  Condorcet (squadron flag).
  Voltaire (flag).
  Diderot.

Thirteenth Torpedo Squadron:
  3 D. D.

In addition there are several engineering and gunnery school ships besides auxiliaries, repair ships, etc.

CHANNEL OR NORTHERN FLEET

Second Squadron

Second Light Squadron

Second Light Division:
  Strasbourg (flag).
  Mulhouse.
  Metz.

Fourth Light Division:
  Leopard (D. L.).
  Lynx (D. L.).

Second Torpedo Flotilla

Lestin

Second Squadron: 4 D. D. Sixth Squadron: 4 D. D.	Fourth Squadron: 3 D. D.

Fourth Submarine Squadron

7 S. S.

Together with train, auxiliaries, repair ships, etc.

CHINA STATION

Jules Michelet (flag)

Three gunboats and three sloops

On the Yantse Patrol there are two river gunboats, two Eagle boats, and one mine sweeper.

In the Levant there are four yachts used as patrol vessels.

In Morocco there is one patrol vessel, and in French Indo-China there are four gunboats used for patrol duty.

WHY DID ADMIRAL HAUS FAIL TO SUPPORT THE GERMAN MEDITERRANEAN DIVISION?

By Lieut. Commander R. Theodor Braun (Vienna)

To the general reader it may seem idle to reopen a question which has been treated a number of times by eminent authorities in the Imperial German Navy. In these publications, however, the judgment which has been passed on the decision of Admiral Haus in this connection is rather unfavorable, on the whole, for self-evident reasons. This has aroused a certain amount of dissatisfaction among the former officers of the Austro-Hungarian Navy. The recently published official account from the German naval archives, "Der Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern" (vol. 1, Mediterranean Division), does to a certain extent justify the motives of the allied commander, but it was not the purpose of that work to clarify the situation from the Austrian standpoint. For the Austrian naval corps it is therefore a matter of pride that this question should be completely cleared up.

The editor of the Marine Rundschau received the following note in this connection from the German naval archives:

The German naval archives, in treating the question as to whether the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Navy was in a position to render aid to the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau*, have stated the position of Admiral Haus only in so far as was necessary to clear up the situation for the German leaders. Since, after the receipt of the order to break through the Turkish

> waters, Admiral Souchon was acting independently, and, further, since his receipt of a telegram from the German naval attaché at Vienna at 2.30 p. m., August 6, he was aware that he could not count on Austrian assistance, it did not appear necessary in this German publication to go into the details and the underlying reasons which influenced the Austrian naval commander in his decision. There is no doubt, however, that the commander in chief of the Austrian Navy was placed in a very difficult situation; restricted by the politics of his own country and not suspecting that the French fleet would be held back in the manner it was. Under the circumstances this technical analysis of the Austro-Hungarian relations at the time can only be welcomed by the German naval archives. (*Signed V. Mantey.*)

Before going to the root of the problem, it is necessary to present some clear idea of the strategic situation in the Mediterranean during those critical days. The naval convention concluded between Great Britain and France on 10–2–1913 specified separate spheres of activity for the fleets of each nation, in which each navy, under the orders of a single commander, was to engage the enemy forces in question—an arrangement which was admirably suited to cope with the widely dispersed naval forces of the Triple Alliance. Great Britain was assigned the operations area in the North Sea against Germany. In view of the inferiority of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean as opposed to the combined squadrons of Austria and Italy, England engaged to maintain a permanent force in the Mediterranean of adequate strength to combat the Austrian fleet, to protect the eastern Mediterranean and to block the concentration of the Austrian forces with the Italian forces; while France undertook to fight the Italian naval forces and to protect the western Mediterranean.

This was the original plan. The mission undertaken by England in the North Sea, therefore, permitted France to concentrate her entire battle fleet in the south, and thereby, thanks to the rapid construction work of the French dockyards, enabled her to augment the naval forces in that locality to such an extent that she was capable of effectively engaging both of her probable opponents in the Mediterranean; thus making unnecessary some of the force tentatively assigned to this operations area by Great Britain. This particular point was covered in the naval convention by the following clause:

> In the event that the number of English ships assigned to the Mediterranean are insufficient to engage the Austro-Hungarian fleet alone, they are to concentrate with the French fleet, and, in the event of war, to operate under the orders of the admiral commanding the French forces.

The following was the actual situation from the close of the year 1913: Great Britain maintained in the Mediterranean 3 battle cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 3 protected cruisers, and 10 torpedo-boat destroyers. Thus the spirit of the Anglo-French naval convention was strictly adhered to. In the North Sea was the English fleet reinforced by a few of the older French armored cruisers for coast protection, aligned against Germany under English command. In the Mediterranean was the entire French fleet supported by the British Mediterranean forces, all under the command of the French Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère. In accordance with his memorandum in connection with the summer maneuvers, the latter conceived his mission as follows: In the event of war to engage and destroy the Italian fleet and then to engage the Austrian fleet. At the moment of the threatened outbreak of war the French forces were held in readiness in Toulon, watching the movements of their probable enemy at sea—the Italian forces. Meanwhile the Italian fleet made no effort to concentrate. Although on July 30, 1914, the Italian Second Squadron appeared to concentrate off Gaeta and the First Squadron at Tarent, the First Division continued to lie off Brindisi, while the fleet destroyers lay at Tarent.

Lapeyrère's decision therefore to proceed to the southern point of Italy, in spite of the apparent inactivity of the Italian fleet, in order to avoid a possible surprise attack, was not carried out since Italy declared her neutrality on August 3, 1914. Therefore, he was only opposed by the Austrian fleet and the two German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau.*

Under the circumstances it would have been an easy matter for the French to patrol the exits of the Adriatic to prevent the breaking through of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, whose presence in Brindisi on August 1 had been reported to the commander in chief by the French ministry of marine. They would then have been in a position to prevent their escape and could have annihilated them with an overwhelmingly superior force.

Now, however, a series of misunderstandings followed which were to have far-reaching consequences in their immediate effect on the *Goeben* and *Breslau* and on the whole course of the war. At 6.53 p. m. on August 2 the French commander received a telegram from Bizerta to the effect that the two German cruisers had appeared in French territorial waters. (It is known that at this time both German ships were in Brindisi.) At 8 p. m. the admiral dispatched telegraphic orders to Bizerta and Algiers to detain the troop transports which were then in readiness to sail for France with the Nineteenth Corps until the arrival of a convoying squadron—an understandable precaution in view of the danger but very inopportune in view of the impatience of the French populace over the arrival of this anxiously awaited army corps. The navy department in Paris, being better informed, dispatched the following countermanding order:

> *Goeben* et *Breslau* sont arrivés à Brindisi dans la nuit du 31 julliet au 1 août. Appareillez, et si on vous signale hostilities commencées, arretez-les. Conseil des ministres a encore decidé que transport special des troupes se fait par navires isolés, department guerre en acceptant tous les risques.

On August 4 at midnight the admiral answered these definite instructions with the report that he had dispatched the "escadre de protection" to Algiers and that he proposed to leave Toulon that night with the entire fleet to seek the enemy off the coast of Algiers in compliance with the instructions from the counsel of ministers. He considered the formation of a convoy indispensable and would act accordingly. Thus it was possible for the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to carry out their daring raid on Bone and Philippeville on the morning of August 4, unmolested by the enemy.

Admiral Milne, the commander of the British Mediterranean squadron, had already offered his cooperation to the French admiral, although at the time England was not in a state of war with Germany, and had taken over the supervision of the movements of the German ships. Boué de Layaprère, however, was not thinking of cooperation with the English forces, but requested Admiral Milne simply to observe the movements of the Austrian and Italian forces as well as the German cruisers in the Adriatic. He himself left Toulon on the *Courbet* with the First and Second Battle Squadrons, the First and Second Light Divisions, *Foudre*, *Bombe*, and 27 torpedo boats, as well as the Eleventh Submarine Flotilla, under the escort of the *Jurien de la Graviere*, with the intention of capturing the *Goeben* and *Breslau* off Algiers, after the receipt of the report of their activities off Bone and Philippeville. He was naturally unable to find them, since these vessels had meanwhile laid course for Messina at 10.30 a. m., followed by the British ships. The latter, of course, reported the results of their observations to the French commander. However, the French admiral considered the formation of the convoy for the troop transports of the Nineteenth Army Corps of greater importance than an engagement with the German cruisers, although no enemy threatened the French line of communications in the western Mediterranean. This circumstance is all the more astounding since at the conference of ministers, where the instructions for the operations of the admiral were worked out, Boué de Layeprère himself had opposed the employment of an escorting squadron for the troop transports.

This was the strategic situation as it actually developed. Before answering the question which is given at the head of this paper, it is necessary to clear up another preliminary question in connection with this situation. Was the Austrian admiral justified in assuming such a strategic error on the part of the enemy? Was it not reasonable to suppose that on the receipt of the report of the German ships being bottled up off Messina, the entire French fleet, or at least the battleships acting in concert with the British, should hasten from Algiers to blockade the exits of the channel? If such should be the case, could he afford to risk the practically certain annihilation of the two most modern divisions under his command, with the possibility of leaving the Austrian coast unprotected against enemy attacks for the remainder of the war? In this connection it should not be forgotten that Italy, although still remaining neutral, would certainly array herself with the enemy in short order if the coast were left unprotected.

It was, however, not the above considerations which restrained Admiral Haus and prevented him from going to the assistance of the hard-pressed German ships. The basic reason must be sought in the Austrian diplomacy of that time, which sought to avoid any act which might in any manner be construed as hostile toward England. At that time the diplomats of the Danube monarchy still clung to the hope of maintaining peace with England. It was evident, however, that with the German ships being pursued by the British an engagement with the Austrian fleet would certainly result, as it was inconceivable that the English ships would cease firing on the *Goeben* and *Breslau* as soon as these vessels came under the protection of the Austrian forces. Under such conditions war with Great Britain would have been inevitable—it would have begun, in fact, with the opening shot fired by Austrian ships.

To what extent these hopes of the Austrian diplomats might be considered justified may be seen from the following telegram, dispatched on August 4 by Count Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador at the Court of St. James. This read:

> Have just seen Sir Edward Grey. The British Government has delivered an ultimatum to Germany on account of Belgium and expects a reply by midnight to-night. Grey, deeply moved, said to me that he saw no reason for the present for dispatching any memorandum to the Austro-Hungarian Government, and no reason for us coming into conflict with them as long as we were not in a state of war with France. In any event he hoped that we would not commence hostilities without a previous formal declaration of war. He would not recall De Bunsen. In the event of our going to war with France it would be difficult for England as her ally to cooperate with her in the Atlantic and not in the Mediterranean. His conversation was in the most friendly tone throughout, and I believe he is actuated by a sincere desire to avoid any conflict with us. Tyrrell told me in answer to my question, in confidence, that in any event the French Mediterranean fleet was not headed for the Adriatic at the moment. I presume that force is engaged in protecting the transports carrying troops from Africa.

The Austrian navy department then wired in this sense to the fleet commander on August 5 at the instigation of the foreign office:

> For the present avoid any hostile act toward English ships or goods under all circumstances.

Immediately thereafter the following dispatch was received by the navy department, addressed to the chief of the Austrian general staff:

> The German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* are being pursued by a British force in the vicinity of Messina. Chief of the German naval staff requests

immediate support by the Austrian fleet. The general staff adds: Act entirely in accordance with the views of the fleet command.—(*Fleishmann.*)

The above telegram was immediately transmitted to the fleet commander with a simultaneous request to the general staff for definite instructions with particular regard to the expressed wish of the foreign office to avoid any conflict with England. To this the general staff replied:

> Since the foreign office hopes to avoid war with England and since any operations directed against British ships would certainly lead to war, it would appear that support of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* should only be given in the event that these ships repair to the Adriatic to seek protection with our fleet or in our territorial waters.

The very logical reply which Admiral Haus gave to the above-mentioned telegram of the German naval attaché, Commander v. Freyberg, through the chief of the naval section of the war ministry read as follows:

> If the *Goeben* and *Breslau* are simply pursued by the British ships they will certainly be able to escape with their superior speed, but in no case could the slower Austrian fleet, over 580 miles away, reach them in time to render aid. *Goeben* can only be blockaded in Messina. Before the six Austrian battleships could reach Messina the French fleet off Bizerta, some 300 miles nearer Messina, could have effected a concentration with the British forces. To steam to their assistance under these circumstances would only involve the needless sacrifice of two of our strongest divisions. Support is therefore impossible.

In the archives of the Austrian navy department no record can be found of the radio which Admiral Haus dispatched direct to Admiral Souchon at 2.20 p. m. on August 5 in answer to the latter's direct appeal for assistance. In any event the telegram reported in Admiral Souchon's book, *Zur See unbesiegt*, volume 1, page 211, can not be correct. This is given as: "Second mobilization discouraging. Can not come."

The message given in this manner makes no sense and must be considered as garbled in transmission; aside from which no copy of same can be found in official reports.

On the morning of August 7, the war ministry, naval section, dispatched the following telegram to Admiral Haus:

> *Goeben* put to sea from Messina yesterday evening at 5.30 on southerly course. *Breslau* followed at 6 p. m. German general staff again requests advance of Austrian fleet, at least as far as Brindisi.

At 9.15 a. m. the news of the Austrian fleet standing out reached the Austrian navy department:

> *Goeben* has stood out from Messina, pursued by British ships, and is steering for the Adriatic. Am standing out with First Squadron, First Cruiser Flotilla, to meet them.

As a matter of fact the following force stood out from Pola to the southward at 9 a. m., August 7: The battleships of the *Viribus-*

Unitis, class (3), and the *Erzherzog*, class (3), the cruisers of the *Sankt Georg* and *Admiral Spaun*, six destroyers and 13 torpedo boats. On receipt of the news that the *Goeben* had passed Cape Matapan, the Austrian forces turned back at 7 p. m. in the latitude of Cape Planka and stood into their base.

As shown by the above, it is clearly evident that Admiral Haus was primarily influenced, in his admittedly difficult decision not to support his allies, by political reasons and not by the military situation. The fact that these underlying reasons were not cited in the letter given below to the chief of the German naval staff is due to the oath of secrecy which bound the Austrian commander in chief and prevented him from stating the true reasons for his decision.

This letter, dated August 8, read as follows:

> YOUR EXCELLENCY: I feel impelled to lay before your excellency the reasons which influenced my indescribably bitter decision to leave unfulfilled the request for aid and support directed to me by Admiral Souchon, in order to justify the Imperial Austrian Navy and to clear them of any reproach for having left our brave beloved brothers in arms in the lurch in a highly critical situation without the most urgent reasons.
>
> On the 10th of last month Admiral Souchon stated to me upon his arrival in Pola that the boilers of S. M. S. *Goeben* were in such bad condition that forcing them was out of the question, but that owing to the arrival of German workmen the boilers would be completely reconditioned by the end of July, and that then the ship would, in all probability, be able to develop her maximum speed of 29 knots. She would thus be capable of carrying out her mission. At the same time he informed me of his intention to order his future movements in such a manner that he could carry out the spirit of the naval convention of the Triple Alliance. In the event of war he would then be able to conduct a raid on the western Mediterranean to attack the overseas transports.
>
> I fully agreed with his plans and informed him that in these independent operations he would need no further authorization from me. However, at the time, neither he nor I thought that Italy would remain neutral.
>
> The last and only message which reached me from the *Goeben* after her departure from Austrian waters was the news of her joining the *Breslau* at Brindisi on the 1st of this month.
>
> On 2–8 the *Tribuna* reported the departure of the *Goeben* for Tarent.
>
> On 5–8 at 3 p. m. the following dispatch in cipher was received from the *Goeben* in Messina: "Urgently request you come at once to Messina to the relief of *Goeben* and *Breslau*. English ships off Messina. French fleet not here. When can fleet arrive Messina?—*Admiral Souchon*."
>
> Since the general mobilization of the fleet had only been ordered on the day previous, the following force only was available and ready for action: Three battleships of the *Tegetthoff* class, 3 of the *R–detzky* class, 2 large cruisers, and about a dozen torpedo-boat units. With this force we could risk an engagement with the British forces with some prospect of success, particularly as it might be assumed that the English forces were divided, lying off both the northern and southern Straits of Messina. We should therefore not encounter the concentrated British forces.
>
> I could not for a moment, however, entertain the assumption that the French fleet had not already been informed that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were blockaded in Messina, nor that this fleet would not immediately hasten to

Messina to assist in preventing the escape of their sole powerful enemy in the Mediterranean. By so doing they would also shatter any attempt on the part of the Austrian fleet to come to their assistance.

The essential information available with regard to the British forces was as follows: "Departed Malta at 8 p. m. on August 2; First Division to Naples, Second Division to the Adriatic." (This maneuver was regarded by us as an encircling maneuver directed against the *Goeben.*) This was followed by indefinite intelligence with regard to the English ships in the Adriatic. During the night of August 2–3 a steamer of the Austro-American Line sighted two vessels in the Straits of Otronto with screened lights; during the night of August 3–4 a steamer of the Austrian Lloyd sighted about nine darkened ships (bright moonlight night). Early on the morning of the 5th of August the Austrian station ship at Constantinople, S. M. S. *Tarus*, passed the straits homeward bound and dispatched several messages. As this ship reported sighting the Russian gunboat *Tarcz* and no other vessels in these waters, it might be assumed with reasonable certainty that the vessels patrolling the exits of the Adriatic, which could only be English (or possibly also some French vessels), had already been withdrawn, probably because they had been informed of the bottling up of the *Goeben* and their presence was more urgently required off Messina.

With regard to the French fleet, the following information was available: "Up to August 4 in Toulon; on August 4 the *Courbet* in Bizerta. French fleet departed Toulon at 3 a. m. on the 4th of this month to effect concentration with the Malta division. On the same day three ships, probably of the light division, from Corsica to the southward."

From this and other intelligence available to me at the time, I was forced to conclude that on the morning of August 5 all of the English forces were concentrated off Messina for the purpose of capturing the *Goeben* and that the various units of the French fleet had left Toulon as well as the *Courbet* (the *Courbet* would not have remained alone off Bizerta), and were en route to Messina to effect a concentration with the English forces. The ships from Toulon could arrive from 20 to 24 hours sooner than we, while the vessel from Bizerta could reach Messina even earlier.

Our relieving squadron would, therefore, probably encounter overwhelmingly superior forces off Messina, against which we should have no probability of success, so far as can be judged by human standards. The attempt to assist the *Goeben* would, therefore, result in all probability in the loss of two of our most powerful battleship divisions, the mainstay of our fleet, which in the end would only be highly detrimental to the common cause. Although the dispatches of our naval attaché in Berlin of 8 p. m., August 5, reporting the estimate of the situation by the imperial naval staff seem to indicate that our chances of a successful concentration with the *Goeben* were much more favorable, I find this estimate to be based on two assumptions, which according to information available here and my own estimate of the situation, are untenable. These are:

1. The "Malta fleet reported in the southern Adriatic." I believe I have already shown that this was correct on August 4, but that on the critical day, August 5, this was no longer true, as my information very convincingly shows.

2. "According to (Berlin) reports the French fleet has confined its operations to the protection of troop transports." Little as one may think of the French naval strategic logic, in my opinion, one certainly would not be justified in assuming that with a knowledge of the actual facts—the bottling up of the *Goeben* in Messina—the French would overlook the fact that the protec-

tion of the troop transports lay, not in the western Mediterranean, but off Messina. If the *Goeben* is in Messina disabled, then there is no further danger to the French transports, or, in any event, all danger is avoided which would make the presence of battleships in the western Mediterranean either necessary or desirable.

To summarize, in accordance with my estimate of the situation, our enemies were in complete command of the situation in the Mediterranean on August 5, to such an extent that any attempt on our part of support the *Goeben* would in all probability have been hopeless. Success in this venture could only be possible provided the enemy make errors in the employment of his available forces and the time at his disposal, which would be absolutely inconceivable on the part of a determined enemy. Possibly Admiral v. Pohl had already suspected the underlying political reasons and taken them into consideration. His answer to the Austrian fleet commander is couched in such friendly and heartfelt terms that not the slightest reproach is to be read between the lines. Had Admiral v. Pohl simply desired to return a polite answer to this letter in line of duty, a few cold and indefinite lines would have served the purpose.

The chief of the naval staff wrote:

> I wish to express my thanks to your excellency for the explanation given in your letter of August 6, which has just come to hand. I thank you for it all the more since Admiral Souchon and I both feel that our brother in arms would never have left us in the lurch in a critical situation. I shall inform Admiral Souchon of the contents of your letter. I was aware that the Austrian Navy did not start the general mobilization until August 4 and that the fleet was not clear for action, but that it could not be in condition to engage a superior force. That cry for help was a call to a friend of whom one expected that he would do all that lay within his power. We who are fully informed of the conditions have not the slightest reproach to make against our friends, as we know full well that they could not have acted otherwise than they did. An advance without sufficient preparation and with inadequate forces would not have served our cause and might well have resulted in greater damage to the common weal in the end.
>
> From the explanations offered by your excellency it is very clear that the strategic situation was such that support of the hard-pressed ships was quite impossible. The fact that even after your letter your excellency did put to sea with the fleet under your command in answer to these repeated cries for help, to risk battle under the most unfavorable conditions, will remain unforgotten by the German Navy.
>
> The *Goeben* and *Breslau* have reached the Dardanelles undamaged * * *.

There is still another matter which is closely connected with the above question, that is the request of the German naval staff that the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Navy be sent to Turkey. It is evident that the presence of the Austrian Fleet in Constantinople, or of a large part of this fleet, would not only have improved conditions in Turkey to a very great extent, but would have exerted a considerable influence on the attitude of the other Balkan States. Unfortunately, this request of our German allies could not be considered, as shown by the report of the high command of the army, which contains the viewpoint of the fleet commander as well:

> The question of a transfer of the operations area of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian fleet from the Adriatic to the Black Sea is an insoluble problem in view of the means at our disposal and the conditions which obtain at present. For fleet operations a base is a conditio sine qua non. Such a base in which the ships may be safeguarded from attacks by torpedo boats and submarines, where it may obtain all essential requirements in the line of provisions, coal, fuel oil, matériel for effecting repairs to machinery, munitions, reserve matériel of all kinds, where all manner of repairs may be carried out which are beyond the capacity of the ship's force, and, finally, where the fleet may lie safely at anchor at all times, does not exist on the coasts which come into consideration, either in Turkey, Bulgaria, or Rumania.
>
> Constantinople, owing to its great distance from the theater of operations (300 miles) can not be considered, even though this city were able to supply coal, fuel oil, etc., in adequate quantities, which it certainly is not. To prepare and improvise a temporary base where the fleet might lie at anchor in favorable weather would necessitate the assembly of tremendous quantities of material—a task which would take longer than the base would last.
>
> An undertaking of this nature would encounter tremendous difficulties, if the route from the Adriatic to Constantinople were not open, but were controlled by a superior enemy force, which could interrupt this line of communications at any time, and thus cut off the base from its source of supplies. Even the first cruise of our fleet from the Adriatic to Constantinople, together with the train, would be inviting a grave risk as long as the French fleet were not opposed by any other determined enemy in the Mediterranean except ourselves. The return of our fleet would be inconceivable before peace was made. Are we then justified in leaving our whole coast defenseless before the enemy at sea to be sacrificed to the greed of Italy? Is it conceivable that Italy would resist such a temptation?

It might be objected that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were also required to provide their own base in Constantinople and that the operations area for them lay some 300 miles distant and even farther. The fact must be taken into consideration, however, that the means available in Constantinople were barely adequate for the Turkish fleet together with the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, and that even these were largely due to German foresight and efficiency in providing same. With the large additional requirements necessitated by the additional presence of the Austrian fleet, the supplies would have been entirely inadequate. The distance of the theater of operations from the base was a problem which could be more easily met by the German ships with their greater cruising radius than the ships of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Navy.

The desire of the German staff for the employment of the Austrian naval forces in the Black Sea, therefore, requires no further discussion.

⁂

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The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

"The idea that 'intelligence' consists in the collection of a mass of fact which other countries desire to keep secret is not the case. A great proportion of the intelligence required for a modern war plan is public property in the country of its origin. It only requires collecting and sifting."

—(*Imperial Defense, by S. King-Hall.*)

NOTICE

In anticipation of the proposed visit of the fleet to South America during the spring of 1929, the December issue of the MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN will be a special number covering the west coast of South America, and especially on Chile and Peru.

It is the desire of the Office of Naval Intelligence to furnish up-to-date information to the personnel of the fleet, so that the political, economic, naval, and military situations in these countries can be readily understood and intelligently discussed.

The December number will be issued prior to the departure of the fleet from the United States.

The contents of this number of the BULLETIN are based upon information received in the Office of Naval Intelligence between October 1 and November 1, inclusive.

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O. N. I. MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

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GREAT BRITAIN

NAVAL

BRITISH NAVAL POLICY, 1928

(*Note*.—The following account of the British naval policy, together with numerous tables (not published), has been submitted by the naval attaché in London, and from this a large part of the information for congressional hearings will be obtained.—ED.)

FOREIGN POLICY.

Vice Admiral Sir H. W. Richmond, the president of the Imperial Defense College, in his recent book, National Policy and Naval Strength, begins by stating the following: "We are all familiar with the idea that naval strength is essential to security of this Kingdom of ours and for the support of its external policy. To this there is a corollary which is, perhaps, less familiar; that external policy itself aims at the maintenance of our naval strength. Indeed we may go even further and say that the attitude taken up by this country in many of the great international situations and movements has been determined finally by the effect one or another course of action would have upon our strength at sea."

Lord Wester Wemyss in a speech before the House of Lords, November 10, 1927, stated in part as follows: "Naval armaments and all armaments are but the instrument of policy * * *." Again "All our interests, without any exception, are bound up with and dependent upon the sea." Again, "Nature, giving us the seas for our unchanging and unchangeable frontiers, has determined that only by the sea can an enemy reach us or we him. She has arranged that only by the routes of the sea can we trade and become prosperous. It is therefore sea force to which we must turn for defense both of our frontiers and of our interests."

These interests have required policies which would seem to aim in general at the maintenance of the political and territorial status quo in the world, the strengthening of British influence among minor powers, and in British mandates, particularly where oil has been found, the increase in the foreign trade to provide markets for home industries, and to alleviate the unemployment. This involves also the protection of the lives and property of her nationals abroad, a service performed in major part by the British Navy.

The outstanding event of the year has been the signing of the Kellogg peace pact in Paris on August 27. Lord Cushenden, however, acting as the Foreign Secretary for Great Britain, is reported to have said in an interview given the representatives of the press, immediately after the pact had been signed, the following: "No one imagines that the signing of the treaty will immediately and absolutely banish war from the world. But the signature of the treaty is a most important and significant demonstration of ardor designed to maintain peace, and it will be the greatest war memorial ever built if the expectation founded on it prove justified." (Morning Post, August 28, 1928.)

Sir Austen Chamberlain in debate in the House of Commons, on July 30, summed up his view of the treaty in part as follows: "It is, I think, a sign of the times that such a treaty should have been proposed, and it is a recognition of what is now the attitude of all great countries to war that such a proposal should be welcomed and that we should all be glad to cooperate. But I am always alarmed when too great expectations are formed lest they should be followed by too great dissensions * * * if American opinion ranges itself behind its own treaty then indeed the signature of this treaty will be an additional and most formidable deterrent of war, and it will be an additional and most valuable security for peace." In the same debate (July 30), however, the Foreign Secretary made the announcement regarding the so-called Anglo-French naval pact, in speaking of the preparatory commission on disarmament, as follows: "* * * but as has been publicly announced, conversations have been proceeding between ourselves and the French with the hope of reducing the difference between us—indeed in the hope of finding some compromise upon which we could both agree and which we might then submit to other powers and perhaps by our proposals facilitate progress in the committee. These conversations have been successful between the French and ourselves, and I am about to communicate to the other principal naval powers the compromise at which we have arrived, with the hope that it may be acceptable to them also and that thus a great obstacle to progress will have been removed and a step made in advance."

Later, articles appeared in the French press to the effect that the compromise was more than a mere preparation for the preparatory commission and was an understanding very far reaching in its character. These articles created great uneasiness in the English press, however, after adverse press comment in America had been published. Later, the British press seemed almost unanimous in disapproving both the pact itself and the way in which the whole matter had been handled. This unanimity has been so striking that it has been suggested in some quarters as not unlikely that the press attitude has been furthered by the Government after the United States opinion was known, so that those in the United States opposed to United States naval increase could point out that public opinion in Great Britain did not support the Anglo-French naval pact or the kind of diplomacy which produced it. Lord Cushenden on behalf of the Foreign Office protested, under date of August 31, that the nature of the compromise had been entirely misunderstood and stated in the press:

> The agreement is simply for the purpose of securing a simple text as between two draft conventions. There are only four or five short but very technical clauses, and the natural thing is to delay publication until the governments most concerned have had an opportunity of considering their replies. We want their observations, and I am very hopeful that when they are considered by other governments, possibly with some amendments, we may succeed in arriving at an agreed text.
>
> Speculations as to secret clauses and so forth have no foundation whatever. I see it suggested, for instance, that we were going to arrange for pooling our navy with the French. There is absolutely nothing in any such suggestion, nor is there anything at all in the shape of an agreed policy between ourselves and the French. It is not a question of policy. That has never been discussed. There are no secret clauses nor any arrangement as to an alliance or cooperation of the navies. Nothing of the sort has been suggested.

It was only after many weeks of newspaper recrimination in the United States, England, and France that the actual terms of the compromise were made known by the publication in New York, on September 21, of a French Foreign Office confidential letter. This appeared to make it clear that the basis of the compromise is that limitation discussions shall be concerned with the following four classes of naval units:

Capital ships of more than 10,000 tons or armed with guns of more than 8-inch caliber.

Aeroplane carriers of more than 10,000 tons. Surface ships of 10,000 tons or less armed with guns exceeding 6-inch caliber and not exceeding 8-inch.

Deep-water submarines of more than 600 tons.

The reply of the United States Government made public under date of September 29 declined to adopt the accord as a basis for discussion of naval limitation, but left open the way for further discussion of the subject of naval disarmament. It has been acknowledged that in order to arrive at this agreement with France, Great Britain undertook to withdraw her objection to the French thesis that reservists must not be reckoned in the country's fighting forces when considering land disarmament. The naval part of the Anglo-French understanding appears to be defunct, but the result may be an increase in the land forces to be allowed under any scheme for military disarmament.

Imperial Policy.

The furtherance of interempire trade, the building up of the national life of each part of the Empire, the participation of each in all imperial projects and loyalty of all parts to the Crown continue to be the vital features of imperial policy. In furtherance of these policies, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Colonies, the Right Hon. L. S. Amery, made a round of visits to the Dominions which had for its object "to renew at a period midway between two imperial conferences the personal contact between His Majesty's Ministers here and in the Dominions, which is not the least valuable feature of these conferences, to inform myself by personal observation and discussion as to opinion in other parts of the Empire on matters of interimperial concern, and to deal by means of personal consultation with the members of the various governments and others concerned with any outstanding matters of current business in which it appeared that such consultation might lead to a more expeditious decision than would otherwise be achieved." (*Mr. Amery*, March 12—parliamentary debates.) The work of the empire marketing board has been valuable in connection with interempire trade during the year, and the work of overseas settlement, coupled with an unemployment problem in Great Britain that is becoming more acute, has been of value in the direction of a better distribution of the population of the Empire. The Undersecretary for the Dominions and Colonies, Lord Lovatt, is now on an Empire tour, particularly in connection with the immigration problem.

The frequently asserted dependence of Great Britain for its food supply on open trade routes is considered in connection with all matters of policy and the extent to which the welfare of the Dominions likewise depends on freedom of access for trade with the mother country is constantly emphasized. In the debate on empire trade—House of Commons, June 12, 1928—the parliamentary secretary to the board of trade (Mr. H. G. Williams) emphasized that trade between Great Britain and the Empire is complementary and not competitive. Broadly speaking, Great Britain exports manufactured goods and imports from the Dominions and Colonies quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials.

British Naval Policy.

All these policies of a great trading and industrial nation render most important the maintenance and security of trade routes and the protection of British trade throughout the world, and in this the British Navy finds its chief mission. Naval policy is shaped accordingly. Of paramount importance is the route to India, etc., via the

Suez Canal, where trade must flow through narrow waters bordered by foreign states. This route, together with the situation in southern Europe, are the major naval considerations at present. Accordingly, Great Britain keeps her strong fleet in the Mediterranean, which is the focus of European naval interest. Furthermore, the forces can readily be transferred from the Mediterranean to the Far East. As new ships are completed, however, it is to be noted that the China station is being materially strengthened, and this tendency is coincident with the progress made in the development of Singapore as a naval base.

The five 10,000-ton cruisers of the *Kent* class have been assigned to the China station. The two new sloops *Sandwich* and *Bridgewater* will, it is understood, be sent to China upon completion, also the new submarine tender *Medway*. This latter vessel, it is understood, in addition to facilities for acting as a tender for 18 submarines, has very complete hospital facilities, enabling her to act as a hospital ship for the station.

There seems to be no question but that many responsible Englishmen view very seriously the trade rivalries now existing between Great Britain and the United States and that sheer force of economic circumstances may bring on a conflict of some kind between the two countries. They fear that Great Britain is being pushed slowly but surely to the wall by her trade rivals—that British industry will never be able to cope with mass production methods or low wage scales of its competitors. History demonstrates with sufficient clarity that English policy has ever been to strike at whatever nation dared to threaten England's vital interests. As foreign trade is essential to the life of this nation, the United States may be the chief obstacle in the way. Hence the view that has been held in certain quarters that the Anglo-French accord in regard to naval limitations contemplated an arrangement whereby the British and French Governments, allowing each other to build freely the surface and underseas craft that they wished, would pool their naval resources in any extraordinary circumstances such as, for instance, a war between Europe and America.

In considering British naval effort, one must never lose sight of—

(*a*) The strategical value of her naval bases and fueling stations.

Naval bases are essential factors in the power to use Britain's great navy. It is to be noted that the Admiralty announced under date of September 28 that contract had been awarded for the construction of the main works of the new naval base at Singapore. The naval part of the whole Singapore scheme is estimated to cost $38,750,000, excluding the cost of the site. This announcement of the award of the contract is practically coincident with the signing of the Kellogg peace pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and is undertaken by a country that is heavily burdened by taxation.

(*b*) The striking superiority of the British merchant marine over all nations.

The following quotations will show that while accepting equality as regards capital ships and aircraft carriers, the British Empire will endeavor to maintain a naval establishment sufficient unto all her needs. The proposed basis for the Anglo-French naval accord would apparently strengthen this view.

Mr. Amery again stated on March 30, 1924:

> Our dependence on the sea is not something accidental, but is intimately of the structure of each and every part of the Empire.
>
> The problem of Singapore is only a part, though a vital and inseparable part, of the wider problem of the protection of our whole oceanic system.
>
> The object of the naval forces of the Empire is to keep open these vital communications, and their capacity to carry out this duty in the actual event of war enables them to fulfill what is really their primary and their continuous functions—namely, to preserve our peace and to secure the safeguarding of our common interests by peaceful diplomacy.
>
> The main defense, just as the main trade, of the Empire will continue to be carried on on the surface of the sea.
>
> What should be the standard of our naval power? For us, depending as we do for our very existence upon the continuous maintenance of the freedom of the sea, it is essential that as against any power or combination of powers, whose armaments or policy might constitute a real and definite menace to our security, we should maintain a substantial margin of superiority.
>
> In view of all we stand to lose by even a temporary loss of sea control, we can never afford to go below the standard of at least equality with any other nation. We can not afford to be obviously and clearly at the mercy of any foreign power, however friendly.
>
> The one-power standard, however, is a standard which refers to the strength of fighting fleets as measured in capital ships. There can be no similar rough and ready standard for cruisers and smaller craft, the requirements in respect of which—apart from the proper complement of fighting fleets—must depend on the peculiar defense problem of each power.

Mr. Baldwin, the Prime Minister, has stated:

> We can not allow, and we will not allow, any weakening at present of the defensive forces of the Empire. We stand for a one-power navy sufficiently equipped with cruisers to protect our trade routes and sufficiently equipped bases throughout the world to make our fleet mobile and capable of action wherever the call may come from.

Mr. Amery has also stated:

> * * * Our scheme is based, not on the contemplation of the menace but only in keeping in existence a navy sufficiently efficient to deal with such a menace gradually coming into existence after a period of years.

Mr. Bridgeman, the present First Lord of the Admiralty, has stated:

> Owing to the geographical position of our Empire and the insular position of this country, we have made it our first object to proceed with the construction of cruisers for the protection of our trade.
>
> Our policy has been to proceed steadily with the replacement of obsolete vessels by new vessels, built with all the knowledge which has been gained from the experience of the war and the advance of science * * *. To adopt the words of the leader of the opposition—very picturesque words, which I always remember—we are no more prepared than he to "allow the British Navy to rot away from the bottom."

Just prior to the three-power Geneva naval conference Mr. Bridgeman stated, referring to the then forthcoming conference:

> We welcome it, provided that we go into that conference asking other nations to consider our special difficulties in the same way that we shall undoubtedly respect and consider theirs. There are special circumstances with regard to our navy which are totally different from those of any other country. Our obligation is to maintain a fleet equal in naval strength to that of any other power and provide reasonable security for safeguarding trade and communications. That is the sacred duty, as I regard it, placed upon the fleet, and one which we at the Admiralty are proud to endeavor to carry out.

At this same time the parliamentary secretary to the Admiralty stated in Parliament on March 14, 1927:

> There is no doubt that to us our trade routes are everything. We have to protect them, and that is all that the Admiralty seeks to do so long as the Admiralty is responsible for the feeding of this country and for bringing to this country the raw materials essential to our industries; it is futile to suggest that any government can neglect the protection of those trade routes.
>
> It seems to me that it is futile to make the criticism that you are going to have another conference to discuss with other sea powers whether or not it is necessary to have so many ships or what size of ships they are to be. The point is that this country has got to have a fleet so long as it is an island. It seems to me that the wit of man is not going to make England not an island. You may talk about airships and aeroplanes, and say that the time may come when they will revolutionize war, but you will not alter the fact that the great bulk of the trade and of the food supplies of this country must be seaborne, and if they are sea-borne we must have a fleet to protect our ships and our trade.

Cooperation With the Dominions and India.

Cooperation in a naval sense between the various units of the Empire has been the preoccupation of numerous British statesmen and naval officers ever since the World War, when the need for it was so apparent. Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe, almost immediately afterwards, started in February, 1919, on a tour of India and all the Dominions (except South Africa) for the express purpose of advising their governments in this matter and of arousing interest in Dominion support of a contribution to the naval forces of the Empire. His conclusions are well expressed in a chapter of Brassey's Annual for 1926, entitled "Naval Policy of the Empire—the Need for Cooperation."

This need for cooperation was the keynote of the naval discussions at the imperial conference held in London in the autumn of 1926. The statesmen of Great Britain, India, and all the Dominions were unanimous in accepting the principles involved, even where financial reasons prevented definite promises of practical assistance. It seemed that greater recognition was created, at least in principle, of the responsibilities of the other portions of the Empire in assisting Great Britain more generously than in the past in the support of a Navy adequate for all Empire needs.

The principle of Dominion navies has been established, and the necessity of a doctrine among them similar to that of the British Navy is accepted. Along these lines, India has taken an initial step toward the establishment of a Royal Indian Navy as a combatant force. The regular system for the periodic interchange of British and Australian crusiers, though not actually in operation at present, is intended to be resumed, the plan now contemplating such an interchange for a period of one year every three years. When practicable, personnel from Dominion navies are given training aboard ship or at courses ashore in England, and officers of the British Navy are assigned in limited numbers to assist the Dominion services, particularly New Zealand.

The committee of imperial defense, which is composed of the Prime Minister and his cabinet and heads of the army, navy, and air force, with many working subcommittees, an advisory and consultative body, has been invited to assist the governments both of India and the Dominions—in addition to advising the home government. The committee is apparently always ready to examine any question submitted to it for advice, and has been active during the last Parliament, as indicated by the number of its meetings.

The Hon. Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, is quoted from his statement accompanying the naval estimates for 1928–29 as follows:

> No exchange of Royal Australian Navy and imperial cruisers has been arranged for 1928, as the *Melbourne* is due in this country shortly to turn over her crew to the new Austral an cruiser *Australia*. The system of exchanges will be resumed in subsequent years.
>
> Two destroyers—the *Torbay* and the *Toreador*—have been lent to the Canadian Government, and have been renamed *Vancouver* and *Champlain*. They will replace H. M. C. S. *Patriot* and H. M. C. S. *Patrician*.

In a financial sense cooperation is progressing slightly, although the opinion is held in many quarters that certain of the Dominions should bear a greater share of the cost of Empire naval defense. This is brought out indirectly by statements in Parliament such as the following: The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Colonies, on April 17, 1928, stated that the contributions of the dominions to naval defense took the form of maintenance of their own naval forces and establishments by His Majesty's Governments in Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. The amounts provided in the estimates for the year 1927–28 were said to be as follows:

Great Britain	$290, 000, 000
Canada	1, 725, 000
Commonwealth of Australia	28, 680, 000
New Zealand (including $575,000, the first installment of the contribution to the Singapore base)	3, 336, 000
Union of South Africa	575, 000

The proportion of expenditure on naval defense to the total import and export trade of these parts of the Empire was as follows:

Great Britain (1926), 2.87 per cent; (1927), 2.83 per cent.

Canada (1926), 0.07 per cent; (1927), 0.08 per cent.

Commonwealth of Australia (1926), 1.63 per cent; (1927), 1.91 per cent.

New Zealand (1926), 0.60 per cent; (1927), 0.70 per cent.

Union of South Africa (1926), 0.09 per cent; (1927), 0.07 per cent.

The Royal Australian Navy has been augmented by the 10,000-ton cruisers *Australia* and *Canberra* and the submarines *Oxley* and *Otway*. The latter two vessels have been carried in reserve at Malta pending corrections of certain engine defects; the *Canberra* has been lately assigned to the Atlantic Fleet for training and as a continuation of the policy of exchange of vessels between the Dominion and the Royal Navy. The aircraft tender *Albatross*, building in Australia, is understood to be nearing completion. Two later destroyers, the *Champlain* (ex-*Toreador*), and the *Vancouver* (ex-*Torbay*) have been loaned to the Canadian Government in lieu of the older destroyers H. M. C. S. *Patriot* and H. M. C. S. *Patrician*, which it is understood will be scrapped. Tenders have been received for two new destroyers for the Canadian Government to British design, but no award of contract has yet been announced. Canada apparently is not inclined to increase her contribution to empire naval defense to any great extent.

Contributions toward naval expenditure of His Majesty's Navy are noted (1) by India, its annual contribution of $500,000, (2) by the Federated Malay States, $1,440,000, and (3) by New Zealand, $450,000, the latter amounts being installments toward the Singapore naval base.

British Naval Estimates.

The British naval estimates for 1928–29 provide for an effective (active) personnel of 101,800 officers and men, inclusive of Royal Marines and 450 Royal Marine police. This is a reduction of 475 over 1927–28. The net amount appropriated to defray the expenses of wages, allowances, etc., of the above and, in addition, civilians employed in lieu of naval officers and men on fleet services, is $72,228,000 (vote 1), a decrease of $1,348,000 over the previous year. It is noted in connection with the above that the personnel assigned to the fleet has been decreased by 433, the personnel of the Royal Marines increased by 13, the personnel under training decreased by 17, and the personnel for miscellaneous establishments decreased by 38.

Comparison with 1927 estimates to include colonial estimates and contributions

	1928–29	1927–28	Increase (+) or decrease (−)
Net estimates	$286,000,000	$290,000,000	−$4,000,000
Appropriations in aid	20,053,000	26,095,000	−6,042,000
Gross estimates	306,053,000	316,095,000	−10,042,000
Appropriations by other departments	3,970,000	4,100,000	−130,000
Total expenditure	310,023,000	320,195,000	−10,172,000

Economics.

General.—Economy in its internal and external affairs is an announced policy of the British Government, though vital interests are not allowed to be interfered with by the process.

The Admiralty is striving for economy, and its initiative in this direction is understood to be furthered by pressure from the Treasury. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in his statement accompanying the naval estimates, 1928–29, opens with the following:

> The net total of navy estimates for 1928 is $286,000,000. This is $4,000,000 less than the original estimate of $290,000,000 for the current year and $5,750,000 less than the figure as amended by the supplementary estimate now found to be necessary.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> In the preparation of these estimates, the continued placidity of the general naval situation has been constantly in our minds, and many important services have either been deferred entirely or are being provided at a leisurely rate which the expectation of a prolonged period of peace alone warrants.
>
> It is natural that the considerable reductions in maintenance charges which have been effected in the past three years should make it increasingly difficult to effect further additional savings on a large scale. But the fact that I am able to ask for a smaller vote A than in 1927 and for $2,690,000 less for the maintenance of the fleet is proof that there is no relaxation in our efforts to secure the most rigorous economy.

The destroyer base at Fort Edgar and the royal naval hospital at South Queensberry are to be closed during the current year and placed in an inoperative status.

Building program.—The First Lord of the Admiralty in his statement accompanying the estimates for 1928–29 is quoted as follows regarding funds for new construction of vessels:

> The provision included on account of the new construction program is $48,149,000 as against $49,917,000 in 1927 and $45,418,000 in 1926. Had the full program been proceeded with, the provision required in 1928 would have been at least $53,500,000. This considerable reduction is due to the fact that His Majesty's Government has reduced the program by two cruisers in 1927 and by one cruiser in 1928.
>
> On the other hand, the provisions for the fleet air arm is increased by $990,000, chiefly because two new flights of aircraft must be formed in 1928 for training purposes in anticipation of the completion of the reconstruction of the *Glorious* as an aircraft carrier.

The First Lord also stated in debate on the naval estimates 1928–29, March 15, 1928, the following:

> So far, we have not any idea of altering next year's program. That will come to be considered when whoever stands here next year has to present the navy estimates. I would remind the House that this being a program of replacements it would be a very risky thing to go further than we have done in postponing replacements, because in future years we shall have a more rapid obsolescence in cruisers and therefore more necessity to spend money in replacements, and that will come at the same time as the possible necessity for replacing battleships, at the expiration of the period of the Washington convention. We have not dropped the three cruisers because we are not satisfied that this country has done her full part in naval disarmament. This country has done far more in the direction of disarmament in fact than any other country, and it is not because we think that we have not done our full share that I am making this proposal.

Also in reply to a question as to whether the cruisers that have been omitted have been dropped or deferred, the First Lord of the Admiralty replied as follows:

> It is not intended to build them this year. I can not pledge myself for the future, but it means that out of this program, spread over so many years, we have cut one year's building out.

The naval estimates 1928–29 make provision for commencing the construction of the following new ships: 2 cruisers, 1 submarine depot ship, 1 flotilla leader, 8 destroyers, 6 submarines, 1 river gunboat, 4 sloops. Of the above, one of the new cruisers has been awarded the Royal Dockyard, Portsmouth, and the other the Royal Dockyard, Devonport. One submarine has been, and the submarine depot ship will be, awarded the Royal Dockyard, Chatham. One cruiser has been dropped from the approved program; this, it is believed, will prove to be the 10,000-ton cruiser. The sloops are additional to the approved program. The balance of the program will, it is understood, be built by contract, awards to be made toward the end of the financial year.

The status of the new construction program will be published in detail in a subsequent issue.

Personnel.

The efficiency and morale of the British Navy is maintained at a high standard. Attempts on the part of socialists to corrupt the enlisted force have apparently met with no success whatever. The fine traditions of the service are kept constantly before both officers and men, great attention being given to stimulating pride in them. Athletics and education are highly developed, and their incidental value to morale is fully recognized. Greater attention is being given to the comfort, food, and general welfare of the personnel, which also improves morale.

The fact that naval officers are still denied the marriage allowance that officers of the army and air force enjoy is a source of discontent to many officers of the navy.

The First Lord of the Admiralty in his statement accompanying the 1928–29 naval estimates comments as follows:

> Owing to the reduction in the building program and other economies it has been found possible to reduce the personnel of the fleet, and the final figure for the year 1928 will be 100,986—i. e., a reduction of 1,289 compared with vote A for 1927, which was 102,275.
>
> As this reduction can only be effected gradually during the year, the vote A for 1928—i. e., the maximum number to be borne on any one day—is 101,800, which is the number estimated to be borne on April 1, 1928.
>
> The flag list, by the absorption of a final vacancy, has now been reduced to its fixed numbers.
>
> The Royal Marine Corps has, as a measure of economy, been reduced in establishment by three lieutenant colonels.
>
> The special voluntary retirement scheme for lieutenant commanders referred to in the statement of 1927 closed in June, 1927. The number of officers retiring under the scheme was 66.
>
> Under the arrangements for the periodical review of rates of pay due to changes in the cost of living the rates of pay of officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines came under review on July 1, 1927, in common with those of officers of other fighting services, the rates as a result being fixed at approximately 6 per cent below the 1919 rates, as compared with the 5½ per cent for the three years preceding.

Naval Bases and Fuel Oil Stations.

In regard to naval bases abroad, Singapore continues to be of paramount importance. Under the 1928–29 naval estimates $1,080,000 is voted for construction work at Singapore and $1,546,000 for the new floating dock, making the total for the Singapore project $2,626,000. Announcement was made by the Admiralty under date of September 28 that contract for the principle works in connection with the naval base had been awarded Sir John Jackson (Ltd.). The contract is understood to be of considerable magnitude, but of course must be only a proportion of the present revised estimate for the total of the naval work at the new base—i. e., $38,750,000. It is also understood that the contract awarded specifies completion within seven years.

Of the above amount, $2,626,000, the Federated Malay States contributed $1,440,000 and New Zealand $450,000. The total contributions of the Federated Malay States and New Zealand toward the cost of the construction of the Singapore naval base are $10,000,000 and $5,000,000, respectively. These contributions will be spread over a number of years. To quote in part from the statement of the first lord, accompanying the naval estimates, 1928–29:

> As intimated last year, the Government has proceeded with the work in the reduced scheme ($38,750,000 in lieu of $55,000,000 and exclusive of the cost of the new floating dock), and full particulars have been prepared for letting a contract. Certain contractors have been invited to tender for what may be called the heavier or main portion of the work. The tenders are due at the end of March.

It is understood that the preliminary dredging operations to provide a berth for the floating dock have now been completed, as the dock has arrived at Singapore. It is understood the berth dredged is some 70 feet deep, 1,200 feet long, and 300 feet wide. The work at Singapore contemplated a graving dock capable of taking two of the largest battleships, an aerodrome, a power plant, a high-power wireless station, an oil-fuel depot, workshops, ammunition depot, piers, cranes, railways, and roads. It is understood that it is expected to have the base in practical operation not later than 1933.

The parliamentary secretary to the Admiralty (Lieutenant Colonel Headlam) in debate on March 15 on the naval estimates, 1928–29, stated the following:

> With regard to Singapore, it is no use discussing the matter of policy, because this is a matter upon which there will always be two opinions, but we are proceeding steadily with our policy and the graving dock is to be proceeded with later on.

A very spirited protest has been made in the Straits Settlements as to the growing military contribution that will have to be made locally owing to the added expense incident to the Singapore base development. Under an arrangement of some 30 years' standing the government of the Straits Settlements pays annually the full cost of the military garrison up to a maximum of 20 per cent of the revenue. Until 1913–14 the cost of the garrison was greater than 20 per cent of the revenue. Since 1913–14 the expense of the garrison has in an increasing degree fallen short of the 20 per cent of the revenue. In 1925, the latest year for which revenue figures are available, the contribution worked out at about 13 per cent of the revenue.

Recently, owing to the commencement of the expenditure on the defences of the naval base, the ratio of the cost of the garrison, as estimated by the War Office, to revenue has again begun to rise. The 1927 estimated figure has been reported at 15 per cent, and for some years the figure might be expected to be well above 20 per cent. The Colony protests the inclusion in the cost of the garrison recoverable from colonial funds, items connected with the new base, on the ground that the base is required not for defense of the Colony as such but as a part of a scheme of Empire defense. The home government has come to the conclusion that fair arrangement would be as follows:

(1) That all military expenditures (lands, works, armaments, etc.) on the initial formation of the Singapore base should be borne finally by army votes—i. e., should be excluded from the cost of garrison.

(2) That for all other military expenditure the existing arrangements should stand—i. e., the Colony should pay the full, ordinary cost of the garrison (subject to a maximum limit of 20 per cent of the assessable revenue), including any military personnel added to the garrison as the new defenses are gradually manned and including the cost of defenses old and new. Very strong protests against the attitude of His Majesty's Government and its decision, as above outlined, have been made by the Straits Settlements in the local press, and the subject will undoubtedly be debated with some acrimony in Parliament after its opening, as will also, in all probability, the awarding of the huge naval base contract at this particular time.

In regard to fuel-oil stations and the progress made in the existing program of providing a chain of fuel-oil stations abroad, estimated to involve a total expenditure of $22,500,000, it is noted that the 1928–29 naval estimates provide for continuing the installations at Ceylon, Malta, and Singapore. At home, funds are provided for new installations at Pembroke and the Clyde (Scotland). In all, $801,000 has been provided for stations abroad and $454,000 for stations at home.

Out of the total world production in 1926 of 1,092,989,384 barrels of petroleum, approximately 18,340,000 barrels were produced in the British Empire. This quantity represented 1.68 per cent of the total, being divided by countries according to the following table:

British Empire	Output (barrels)	Per cent of world total
India	8,728,000	0.80
Trinidad	4,971,000	.46
Sarawak	4,300,000	.39
Canada	339,000	.03
England	2,000	----------
Total	18,340,000	1.68

British oil resources are, however, principally outside of the British Empire itself, and in other countries there is probably a minimum of 158,570,000 barrels of oil production (based on 1926 statistics) under British control. Probably the most important source under direct British control is Persia, which in 1926 produced some 35,000,000 barrels, representing 3.3 per cent of the world total. The largest single source of oil produced by British interests is in the United States, but in this case the control is more indirect, being produced largely by the Royal Dutch Shell group of companies, which theoretically is controlled 60 per cent Dutch and 40 per cent British. This group appears to have produced some 60,000,000 barrels, or 5.5 per cent of the world total, within the territory of the United States in 1926. A significant move toward the merging of the Royal Dutch Shell group and the Anglo-Persian-Burmah Oil Co. group has been made within the last few weeks by the acquisition of a block of 1,000,000 shares of Shell Transport & Trading Co. stock by the Burmah Oil Co. Estimates of production under British control in various countries outside the British Empire are as follows:

Other countries	Output (barrels)	Per cent of world total
United States of America	60, 000, 000	[1] 5. 5
Persia	35, 460, 000	3. 3
Venezuela	18, 000, 000	1. 6
Mexico	20, 000, 000	1. 8
Dutch East Indies	22, 200, 000	2. 03
Rumania	8, 000, 000	. 73
Peru and Ecuador	1, 750, 000	. 16
Egypt	1, 160, 000	. 11
Other countries	2, 000, 000	. 18
Total	168, 570, 000	15. 41

[1] 6.5 per cent of United States of America total.

The figures given for individual countries are estimates, and any error there may be in these estimates is probably an under rather than an over statement; in such countries as Venezuela, Mexico, and Rumania, for example, the production under British control may be larger than that shown.

The relative position of British-controlled oil production in 1927 and 1928 has probably not altered materially from that in 1926.

The construction of fuel-oil storage stations for the future use of the navy and merchant marine throughout the British Empire appears to be a vital British policy that has been energetically prosecuted by the British Admiralty and British commercial concerns for many years. Immense naval fuel-oil storage stations exist in the United Kingdom, and in addition naval storage stations exist at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Trincomalee and Colombo (in Ceylon), Port Said, Suez, Port Sudan (on the Red Sea), Singapore, Rangoon (in Burma), Hong Kong, Sydney (in Australia), Auckland (in New

Zealand), Simonstown (in South Africa), Sierra Leone (in British West Africa), Falkland Islands, Bermuda, Kingston (in Jamaica), and Esquimalt (on Vancouver Island, British Columbia).

The capacity of the fuel-oil storage stations is not now known and may be expected to vary with the importance of each station. It is believed that Singapore, with 5,460,000 barrels, is the greatest single station outside of the British Isles, and other stations follow in order: Rangoon, Burma; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Gibraltar; Malta; Colombo, Ceylon; Hong Kong; Aden.

Merchant Marine.

Great Britain continues to maintain her great and well-known preponderance in a seagoing merchant marine, a prime factor in her sea power. Much was heard early in the past year of the revival of the shipbuilding industry in Great Britain, of the high tonnage launched in 1927, and of the good outlook generally. It is not believed, judging from later developments, that the earlier optimism has been justified. Tonnage launched in 1927 in Great Britain and Ireland has been announced as 1,225,873 tons, the highest recorded since 1921, when the figure of 1,538,052 tons recorded was not far short of the pre-war average. It should be noted, however, that the launchings of 1927 followed a year of acute industrial unrest, during which the tonnage launched was the lowest recorded in Great Britain and Ireland with the exception of the year 1916. The British figure of 1,225,873 tons was reported as 53 per cent of the world's total of 2,285,679 tons launched. Foreign countries which used to be customers of this country are now building more in their home yards. Among these countries are Denmark and Italy.

Statistics issued by Lloyds Register of Shipping regarding vessels under construction at the end of the September quarter, 1927, showed a total of 1,536,416 tons under construction in Great Britain and Ireland. The total tonnage under construction in the world for the year ending September 30, 1927, was said to be 3,074,057 tons, of which 49.9 per cent was building in Great Britain and Ireland and 51.1 per cent abroad. Corresponding figures for the year ending September 30, 1928, are as follows: In Great Britain and Ireland, 1,089,760 tons, or 40.3 per cent of the world's total, which amounted to 2,521;342. Corresponding figures for the year before the war gave Great Britain and Ireland 57.2 per cent and 42.8 per cent abroad.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH NAVAL AGREEMENT.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

On September 28 in identic notes delivered to the foreign offices in Paris and London, the Anglo-French accord on naval limitation was rejected by the Government of the United States. In no way vindictive or acrimonious in tone, the note explains once again the stand already taken by our Government in regard to the basis of limitation of naval armaments and still leaves the door open for the future cooperation of the United States in disarmament discussions.

The Anglo-French naval agreement was drawn up ostensibly to serve as a basis for discussion at the next session of the league preparatory commission for the disarmament conference which has been deadlocked for many months. The chief points at issue in the commission, exclusive of naval problems, have been the question of the inclusion of "trained reserves" in computing the land forces of a country and the distinction between civil and military aircraft. In dealing with naval limitation, the commission has been faced with the problems on which no agreement could be reached at the three-power naval conference in Geneva in 1927, namely, the British insistence upon limitation of large (10,000-ton) cruisers and refusal to limit smaller cruisers to a point regarded by the United States as real limitation. France has consistently taken the stand that naval limitation must be effected by global tonnage; that is, that each country should be allowed to build, within a fixed total, whatever type of ship it desires. This would have made possible unlimited construction of submarines by France within the total global tonnage. Great Britain and the United States have as consistently argued for naval limitation by categories of ships.

As far as Great Britain and France are concerned, these differences in regard to naval limitation, at least, were settled by the terms of the agreement which was first thrust into the light of international publicity by a brief statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on July 30 and which was quoted verbatim in the issue of September 14 of this Intelligence Summary. As a great naval power and as a nation which has taken part in all the discussions of the preparatory commission for the disarmament conference, the opinion of the United States on the Anglo-French agreement was of the utmost importance. The note of September 28, in which this opinion is set forth, is a great state document and one which deserves to be carefully studied by every American interested in the relations of his Government with foreign powers. Combining strength with diplomatic suavity, without a touch of asperity or belligerency, yet amounting to a decided rejection of the plans proposed, the note has been applauded by the very countries whose suggestions the United States would not accept.

The most important points may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Anglo-French proposal applies only to the limitation of cruisers "of below 10,000 tons, armed with guns of more than 6-inch and up to 8-inch caliber, and submarines of over 600 tons." Thus it is proposed to impose restrictions only on those types of vessels

"peculiarly suited to the needs of the United States." Furthermore, such restrictions "would add enormously to the comparative offensive power of a nation possessing a large merchant tonnage on which preparation may be made in times of peace for mounting 6-inch guns."

(2) The proposal is incompatible with the American position at the Geneva three-power conference and "even more unacceptable than the proposal put forward by the British delegation at that confrence, not only because it puts the United States at a decided disadvantage but also because it discards altogether the principle of limitation as applied to important combatant types of vessels."

(3) In regard to submarines, the "American Government can not accept as a distinct class of submarines those of over 600 tons," leaving all others unlimited. "The United States would gladly, in conjunction with all the nations of the world, abolish the submarine altogether." If this is impossible, our Government believes that submarines "should be limited to a reasonable tonnage or number."

(4) "The Government of the United States remains willing to use its best efforts to obtain a basis of further naval limitation satisfactory to all the naval powers." Furthermore, it is willing to take into consideration the "special needs of France, Italy, or any other naval power for the particular class of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defense * * *. It expects on the part of others, however, similar consideration for its own needs."

The American note makes no mention of an important part of the agreement which Great Britain is believed to have made with France: that is, the withdrawal of British opposition to the French position on land armament. In all the discussions on disarmament France has consistently maintained that "trained reserves" should not be limited. Except for the countries disarmed by the peace treaties, the States of continental Europe have supported the French position in opposition to the stand taken by Great Britain and the United States. The reported volte face of Great Britain in return for French support of unlimited small cruisers for Great Britain would, it is conceded by even liberal British opinion, be a grave blow to the cause of land disarmament. Since by its very terms the agreement between the French and British foreign offices was not to go into effect unless it secured the adhesion of the United States, it is regarded by a large section of public opinion in this country as already dead.

In the meantime, despite prolonged debates in the third (disarmament) commission of the assembly of the League of Nations and on the floor of the assembly itself, the ninth ordinary session of the league assembly adjourned on September 26 without being able to register any effective steps toward the calling of the proposed disarmament conference. After a protracted debate the assembly left to M. Louden, the president of the League of Nations preparatory commission for the disarmament conference, the task of convening the next session of the commission " some time early in 1929."

There has been much discussion in the United States ever since Sir Austen Chamberlain made his announcement regarding the Anglo-French naval agreement in the House of Commons as to the attitude of the British public toward the agreement. Perhaps as just and liberal a reflection of British opinion in general as could be found is that given by Philip Kerr in the leading editorial of the London Sunday Observer of September 23:

> Public opinion in Great Britain, so far as it has followed it at all, has been considerably mystified by the outcry which the announcement of the so called Anglo-French naval agreement has aroused both in Europe and in the United States. While the quiet of the meetings of the ninth assembly of the League of Nations lends color to the view that Europe is "settling down," and the signature of the peace pact has heartened the lovers of peace in all lands, some acute observers have become quite pessimistic about the prospects of European peace.
>
> The foundation of the political structure of Europe to-day is not the League of Nations but the complete military preponderance of France and her associates. For they have the military predominance to enable them to decide whether the treaty of Versailles is to be "integrally fulfilled" and whether and when it is to be altered. The attitude of Great Britain to this system of preponderance is a matter of first-class importance to Europe, and the announcement that a new agreement has been reached between France and Great Britain about naval and military affairs naturally causes tongues to wag furiously * * *.
>
> France has since the war sought to solve her own problem of security by keeping alive the war-time Anglo-French entente in some form of military alliance with Great Britain. That is entirely natural. If it had been obtained, her security would have been assured, at any rate for the time being. The project, however, has always failed. The main factor in rejecting it has been British public opinion, which does not wholly forget the consequences of the military "conversations" of 1906 and 1907, which has been convinced that the peace of Europe depends not upon a new system of alliances, but upon making effective the ideas implicit in the covenant of the League of Nations, and which has been determined to limit its "commitment" in Europe to what was compatible with its obligations to the Empire and with good relations with the United States.
>
> Sir Austen Chamberlain has loyally attempted to follow the somewhat narrow and difficult road thus prescribed by British public opinion. With M. Briand and Herr Stresemann he has made the League of Nations the central agency for the discussion of European problems. He has been friendly and just to Germany. But he has also been convinced that the condition of European stability and progress toward peace was a close and ultimate understanding with France. And in this attitude he has doubtless been influenced by the technical consideration that if France and Great Britain were to drift apart they are in a position to do one another almost unlimited damage. London can be destroyed even more easily by air from France than Paris can

be destroyed from England, and the effect which French submarines or British cruisers could have on one another needs only a glance at a map of western Europe to reveal.

The reason for the excitement about the Anglo-French agreement is clear. Coming as it did on top of the military maneuvers in the Rhineland, the stiffness of the French attitude about evacuation, and other minor symptoms, it was taken as evidence that Great Britain had decided to go back to the old pre-war policy of the Anglo-French entente. France and Britain were to control the Mediterranean together. They were to make it plain to the United States that, however large her navy, she could not intervene in European waters. They were to agree that France need not include her reservists in the computation of her military strength, thereby assuring her of a permanent military supremacy over Germany, even under any general limitation of armaments, because France, with her system of conscription, would always have multitudes of reservists, while Germany, with her voluntary army, would soon have very few.

If the Anglo-French "compromise" really implied all these things, it was obviously an event of first-class international importance, and Berlin, Rome, Washington, and other national capitals were justified in taking it extremely seriously. Its consequences would manifestly be catastrophic. The most obvious would be that Germany would abandon the Stresemann policy of reconciliation and turn away to look for allies who could guarantee her against coercion from the west and when she had done so would denounce the clauses of the treaty of Versailles which enforced her disarmament without equivalent disarmament by others. Italy might also see fit to help to create a new balance in the Mediterranean by seeking new friends. Russia would certainly rejoice. The United States would fall back upon building a navy at least as big as Great Britain's and France's combined. The league would become once more a shadow, because military alliances would have nullified the covenant, and the peace pact would become, in fact, the phantom which cynics now try to make it out to be.

Fortunately there does not seem to be any ground whatever for this mountain of suspicions and inferences which grew up about the so-called "compromise." Its text has not yet been made public, and the reasons which led to its conclusion have not yet been made plain. Parliament will presumably extract the full story when it meets. Whatever the full story of the negotiations may be, it is quite certain that there has been no change whatever in the general attitude of the people of Great Britain to France, Germany, the United States, or the league. Britain stands exactly where she has stood for the last few years—mainly anxious to secure the appeasement and peace of Europe through the League of Nations and now through the peace pact, and not through ententes or alliances or military or naval agreements of any sort or kind, save those which provide for an all-round limitation of armaments. The real moral of the storm is the importance of thinking out clearly the policy which Great Britain ought to pursue in the new phase of European diplomacy, which is bound to open as the present system of stabilizing Europe breaks down.

There are only three ways of stabilizing Europe short of a political federation. The first is through the preponderance of one power or group of powers. The second is through a balance of power. The third is through the method set out in the League of Nations and the peace pact. All history proves that the first method invariably ends in war, because it is incompatible with liberty and the sentiment of nationality; that the second method invariably ends in war, because political change can only be effected by war; and that the one and only hope for peace, freedom, and progress for Europe is through the practical realization of the ideas implicit in the league and the peace pact.

To-day Europe is politically stabilized on the basis of the preponderance of France and her military associates, with Great Britain standing rather uncomfortably in the background with the Locarno treaties in her hand. That this system can not and ought not to last is obvious. It is only a question of time for Russia, Italy, or Germany herself, to say nothing of Great Britain and the United States, to upset it. As and when it goes, what is to be put in its place—a new balance or a real league system? That is the central problem of European politics for to-day and to-morrow.

Europe will drift back to the balance of power unless there is a real limitation of armaments. If Germany can not get equality through the reduction of her neighbor's armaments to her own level, she will wait until she is strong enough or has sufficiently strong associates, and then announce that she is going to exercise her inherent "natural right" to bring her armaments up to the level of her neighbors, knowing that these neighbors will not dare to start a war to prevent her reaching equality. If that happens, if a new balance of power is reached through a grading of armaments upward and through the formation of another system of military alliances equivalent to those between France and her associates, Europe will be headed for a new war. For the inevitable revision of certain elements in the treaty of Versailles and the carrying through of those changes in the political structure of Europe, which time and economics and science will certainly render necessary, will then become a question, not of reason but of power, of macht, of which side can threaten or coerce the other into yielding to its own point of view. Competition in armaments will set in—as in 1906—and the end will be in sight for all with vision to foresee.

There remains, therefore, the road of the league. That road is not so easy as many of its advocates believe, for it involves a complete break with all European history for 1,000 years. It means the abandonment of the use of war as the main solvent of European problems and of reliance on huge armies and navies as the main support for national security. It means acceptance of an alternative process which will in practice solve interstate problems reasonably and quickly by pacific means. And it means the reduction of armaments to a police level, coupled with collective guarantees that such disarmament will not lead to defencelessness against lawless aggression. How far has Europe got toward this ideal?

It has got a long way so far as the renunciation of war by treaty goes. It would be difficult to find a more complete prohibition of war than is made by the covenant, the Locarno treaties, and the peace pact taken together, and Russia is a party to the last. It has got a long way also in the organization of pacific modes of settlement. The organization of arbitration, conciliation, and mediation under the covenant and the Locarno treaties is singularly complete—though Russia is still outside them. But when it comes to armaments—the test of whether nations really have confidence in treaties renouncing war and in the alternative pacific procedure—little or no progress has been made.

Europe is still divided between two schools. On the one side there is the school which sees security only in the piling up of immense armaments and water-tight treaties of guarantee behind the whole settlement made at Paris in 1919, to be invoked against any State which seeks to alter the status quo. On the other side there is the school which is convinced that the only real road to peace is to accept the necessary corollary to the renunciation of war and allow the peace machinery which has been created to deal freely with any and all of Europe's problems, to abandon all alliances and to reduce all armaments to the level at which any sudden and successful attack on a neighbor becomes practically impossible and the validity of international guarantees against aggression therefore becomes effective.

If the first school prevails, it means a new balance of power and alliances, followed by another European war a decade or so ahead. If the second school prevails it means the moral unity of Europe and a fresh breath of civilization for mankind.

AERONAUTICAL

ANNUAL AIR MANEUVERS—COMMAND EXERCISES, AIR DEFENSE OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1928

Each year at the end of the annual training program that portion of the Royal Air Force included in the air defense of Great Britain engages in a series of exercises usually referred to as the annual air force maneuvers. This year, however, the exercises were officially referred to as "command exercises of the air defense of Great Britain."

The air defense of Great Britain.—The air defense of Great Britain (hereinafter referred to as the A. D. G. B.) is an area command and is, as its name implies, charged with the defense of Great Britain against attack by hostile aircraft. For strategic as well as economic reasons, the A. D. G. B. is centered around London, with headquarters at Uxbridge, about 10 miles northwest from London. While primarily an air force command (it is commanded by an air marshal—i. e., a lieutenant general), it includes all ground organizations and agencies directly concerned with the air defense of Great Britain. All antiaircraft units are organized, equipped, and trained by the army. Certain of these are assigned to the A. D. G. B. and while so assigned are under the tactical control of the air officer commanding.

All fighting and bombing squadrons of the regular, reserve, and auxiliary air force stationed in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland (with the exception of two regular bombing squadrons at the airplane and armament experimental establishment, Martlesham Heath) are assigned to the A. D. G. B. These units are organized into three subordinate commands, viz:

(*a*) The fighting area—headquarters, Uxbridge—comprises 9 airdromes and 12 fighter squadrons of the regular air force.

(*b*) The Wessex bombing area—headquarters, Andover—comprises 8 airdromes and 11 bombing squadrons of the regular air force.

(*c*) No. 1 air defense group: This is purely an administrative command (headquarters in London) for the administration of cadre squadrons and of squadrons of the auxiliary air force. Cadre squadrons, or special reserve squadrons, as they are sometimes called, are composed partially of regular and partially of special reserve personnel. Special reserve personnel have greater liabilities as to service than do ordinary reservists. All cadre and auxiliary squadrons are bombing squadrons and when called out for active service in Great Britain are assigned to the Wessex bombing area.

The fighting area and the Wessex bombing area are not geographically distinct but are superimposed one upon the other. Each comprises an irregular circle of airdromes with London as the approximate center.

Cadre and auxiliary squadrons are located in or near various cities in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The number is at present limited—viz, three cadre squadrons and five auxiliary squadrons.

Outline of air defense system.—The A. D. G. B. headquarters at Uxbridge, near London, is the nerve center and the controlling agency for London's air defense system. The headquarters of the fighting area is also at Uxbridge, immediately adjacent to that of A. D. G. B.

Headquarters, Wessex bombing area, is at Andover, about 65 miles slightly south of west from London. As the bombing force is offensive, it need not be considered in this outline.

The area surrounding London is divided by radial lines into sectors. Each sector includes one or two fighting-plane airdromes, searchlight, and antiaircraft artillery arranged in depth, observation telephone centers, and finally a great number of observation posts. The sectors are not tactical commands. All units are controlled directly from A. D. G. B., Uxbridge.

The observation centers, the airdromes and the A. D. G. B. headquarters, have all direct telephone communication with each other.

At each airdrome is an operations office equipped with a telephone switchboard and a large-scale map of the sector in which located. A similar but larger installation is provided at A. D. G. B. headquarters, where the map covers the entire defense area. The maps are mounted on tables and markers are used to indicate all necessary information.

The map board at A. D. G. B. is supposed to give the air officer commanding a complete picture of the situation throughout the defense area at all times. It shows briefly—

(1) The number, location, etc., of both hostile and friendly aircraft in the air.

(2) The number of airplanes on the alert, in reserve, out of commission, etc., at each airdrome in A. D. G. B.

(3) The weather conditions throughout the area.

The map boards at the several airdromes show the same information for the sector in which located.

Whenever a hostile bombing formation is picked up by an observer, it is reported immediately to A. D. G. B., the course is estimated, the fighting airdrome nearest its predicted path is notified and ordered to send up planes to the attack. Even after the fighting planes have left the ground the path of the bombing formation, as reported by observers, is followed continuously, and if any material changes are noted the fighting planes are notified by radio or, if more appropriate, another formation is sent up from another airdrome.

1928 EXERCISES

Dates and hours of exercises.—The 1928 exercises took place during the period August 13 to 16. Exercises commenced each evening at 6 p. m. and, except in the case of the last night, terminated at 9 a. m. the following morning. On August 16 the exercises terminated at 11 p. m.

The reason for confining the exercises to the hours between 6 p. m. and 9 a. m. was to insure adequate communication facilities. The air defense of Great Britain relies to a great extent on telephone communication between its headquarters, its operating stations, and the numerous observation posts surrounding London. When the air defense program is completed, this communication will be accomplished over direct lines owned and controlled by the Air Ministry. At the present time, however, the A. D. G. B. is almost wholly dependent upon the public telephone system operated by the post office and it is only during the slack hours of evening, night, and early morning that sufficient lines and adequate service can be placed by that organization at the disposal of the air force.

The exercise covered, therefore, three periods of 15 hours each and one period of 5 hours. For London on August 16 the sun rises at 5.52 (daylight saving) and sets at 8.16 (daylight saving). As it is light for about an hour before sunrise and for an hour after sunset, each of the 15-hour periods comprised approximately 3¼ hours daylight in the evening; 7½ hours darkness at night; 4¼ hours daylight in the morning; 15 hours total.

The final period of 5 hours on August 16 included about 3¼ hours daylight and about 1¾ hours darkness.

The total period of 50 hours was therefore about equally divided between daylight and darkness.

Purpose of exercise.—As stated by the Air Ministry, the primary object of this year's exercises was to test the operational efficiency of individual units rather than of the air defense of Great Britain as a whole.

Some of the details toward which was directed especial attention may be listed as follows:

(*a*) The coordination of air and ground defenses.
(*b*) Communication problems.
(*c*) Spotting hostile aircraft.
(*d*) Issuance of orders.
(*e*) Climbing in formation of pursuit planes to high altitudes.
(*f*) Air tactics.
(*g*) Ground signals.
(*h*) Organization of operation rooms.
(*i*) Airdrome discipline.

These and the individual performance of command and staff duties were the main points to be observed and studied during the exercises.

Assumed situations.—The assumed situation was the opening phase of a war between England and a strong power in northern Europe. England is referred to as Westland and the European country as Eastland.

Special conditions.—The exercises were of a purely defensive nature in so far as Westland was concerned and purely offensive from the Eastland point of view.

The theater of operations comprised the southeast section of England, as indicated on the attached map, plus a strip of water 5 miles wide along the coast of that section.

As will be noted from the map the limit for night operations was slightly more restricted than for daylight operations.

A balloon barrage about 10 miles wide and 20 miles in depth was assumed to be in existence across the Thames, as shown on the attached map. Planes were not allowed to operate over the area covered by this barrage.

The reason for placing the balloon barrage in the position indicated is of course that the Thames River, even at nighttime, offers an infallible guide to the heart of London. Another reason was that, deprived to a large extent of this prominent landmark, the aircraft of both forces were required to exercise greater skill in navigation than would otherwise have been necessary.

No planes were allowed to operate at an altitude of less than 2,000 nor more than 20,000 feet.

During the hours of hostilities (i. e., between 6 p. m. and 9 a. m.) all bombers had to enter and leave the theater of operations at some point on the coast line. In the case of bombers operating from airdromes within the theater of operations (there were three such airdromes, all very close to the coast line) the planes on leaving the airdrome, took the shortest possible route to the coast line and then flew over water to the point from which they were to start their raid. However, before 6 o'clock in the evening and after 9 in the morning bombing planes were allowed to fly across the theater of operations in going to their rendezvous points or in returning to their home stations.

Forces engaged in exercises.

(*a*) Air units:

All squadrons of the A. D. G. B., with the exception of—

(1) Two regular bombing squadrons, newly organized and not yet ready to take part.

(2) Two cadre bombing squadrons, one not yet fully organized; one located in Ireland.

(3) Two auxiliary bombing squadrons, both located in Scotland.

The air forces engaged therefore included 12 fighter squadrons, regular air force; 9 bombing squadrons, regular air force; 1 bombing squadron, cadre; 3 bombing squadrons, auxiliary air force.

This is the first time that cadre or auxiliary squadrons have been allowed to participate in extensive exercises, and the fact is hailed as an indication of considerable progress in the air defense program.

(*b*) Antiaircraft units:

One Antiaircraft searchlight battalion, Regular Army, and all Antiaircraft searchlight units of the territorial army.

No Antiaircraft artillery units took part in the exercises. Those normally located in or near London were, during the exercises, undergoing summer training at military camps.

(*c*) Observers corps:

For information in the approach of hostile aircraft the A. D. G. B. relies primarily on observation posts along the south and east coasts and scattered in great numbers throughout a radius of 30 miles from London. Each group of posts is connected by telephone with a local observation center, and these centers are in turn in direct telephone communication with A. D. G. B. headquarters, Uxbridge. Each post is manned by an observer trained to report the number, type, direction of flight, and altitude of any aircraft he may see.

These observers are known collectively as the Observer Corps. At the present time, the Observer Corps is composed entirely of volunteers. These men undertake the necessary training and perform their duties without compensation.

During the recent exercises about 100 observation posts were in operation from 6 p. m. until 11 p. m. every evening.

Assignment of forces.—All fighting planes and all ground antiaircraft units and agencies were assigned to Westland—i. e., to England. All bombing planes were assigned to Eastland and, presumably, operated from the Continent. A detailed list of units is given below. The location of all stations concerned is shown in the attached map.

WESTLAND

(*a*) Air force units:

Squadron No.	Types of planes	Airdrome from which operated during exercises	Squadron No.	Types of planes	Airdrome from which operated during exercises
1	Siskin	Northolt.	32	Siskin	Kenley.
3	Woodcock	Biggin Hill.	41	do	Northolt.
17	do	Do.	43	do	Tangmore
19	Siskin	Hornchurch.	56	do	North Weald.
23	Gamecock	Kenley.			
25	Siskin	Hawkinge.	111	do	Hornchurch
29	do	North Weald.			

All of the above are single-seat fighter squadrons of the regular air force.

(*b*) Antiaircraft units:

Organizations	Areas in which located during exercises
First antiaircraft searchlight battalion, Royal Engineers	Redhill.
Twenty-sixth antiaircraft searchlight battalion	Edenbridge.
Twenty-seventh antiaircraft searchlight battalion	Orpington.
Essex antiaircraft searchlight group, consisting of Three hundred and ninth, Three hundred and tenth, and Three hundred and eleventh Companies	Hornchurch.
Kent and Middlesex antiaircraft searchlight group, consisting of Three hundred and thirteenth, Three hundred and fourteenth, and Three hundred and seventeenth Companies	Biggin Hill.
Surrey antiaircraft searchlight group, consisting of Three hundred and fifteenth, Three hundred and sixteenth, and Three hundred and eighteenth Companies	Kenley.

The First antiaircraft searchlight battalion is a Regular Army unit; all others are territorials.

(*c*) *Observers corps.*—About 100 observation posts throughout the theater of operations were manned during the exercises.

EASTLAND

The only units assigned to Eastland were bombing squadrons, viz:

Squadron number	Type of plane	Regular, cadre, or auxiliary squadron	Station from which operated
Day bombers:			
11	Horsley	Regular	Netheravon.
12	Fox	do	Andover.
39	DH-9A	do	Bircham Newton.
100	Horsley	do	Bicester.
207	Fairey IIIF	do	Eastchurch.
503	Avro and Fawn.	Cadre	Waddington.
600	DH-9A	Auxiliary	Lympne.
601	do	do	Do.
605	do	do	Manston.
Night bombers:			
7	Virginia	Regular	Worthy Down.
9	do	do	Manston.
58	do	do	Worthy Down.
99	Hyderabad	do	Upper Heyford.

General conduct of exercises:

(*a*) *Command.*—The air officer commanding the fighting area, A. D. G. B., was given command of all Westland forces and acted, therefore, in so far as all defensive operations were concerned, as air officer commanding, A. D. G. B. The actual A. O. C., A. D. G. B., took no part in the exercises, but acted as chief umpire. Eastland forces were commanded by the air officer commanding the Wessex bombing area. The Eastland and Westland commanders were given a free hand in the conduct of the exercises and in the employment of the forces placed at their disposal.

(*b*) *Umpires.*—The assignment of umpires contemplates one with each bombing formation (or single bomber), one at each single-seat fighter airdrome, and one at each of the prearranged bombing objectives.

It was the duty of the umpires—

(1) To see that the various units conformed to rules of the exercises.

(2) To assess casualties resulting from aerial combat or from antiaircraft artillery fire.

(3) To estimate the accuracy and effect of bombing raids.

In assessing casualties resulting from aerial combat, umpires were guided largely by individual judgment, coupled with the general rule that the weaker formation should lose a number of planes equal to one-half the difference in strength between the opposing formations. The strength of a formation was the number of engines therein.. Assessment of casualties resulting from antiaircraft artillery fire depended entirely on the judgment of the umpire.

The reports of all umpires were transmitted to the air officer commanding A. D. G. B. who, assisted by his staff, made the final assessment of casualties and prepared the running accounts of the exercises for release to the press.

(*c*) *Bombing objectives.*—The following points, all of which are indicated on the attached map, were designated as objectives for the bombers:

Daylight raids: Petrol dump, Beckton; R. A. F. stores depot, Kidbrooke; north tower of Crystal Palace, London; Duke of York's headquarters, London; R. A. F. airdrome, North Weald; R. A. F. airdrome, Hornchurch; Air Ministry, London; point in Wormwood Scrubs (a park on outskirts of London).

Night raids: R. A. F. stores depot, Kidbrooke; civil airdrome, Croydon; point in Richmond Park, near London.

The day objectives were numerous and somewhat widely scattered in order to minimize the possibility of collision during cloudy weather. In order to avoid unnecessary disturbance of the inhabitants of London, the night objectives were all located beyond the city limits.

Each objective was provided with camera obscura and was presumed to be protected by antiaircraft artillery. The objective umpire estimated the accuracy of bombing and the losses to the bombers due to antiaircraft fire. In addition to normal camera obscura procedure, day bombers released a red Very light at the instant of bombing. A night bomber showed a steady white light while in the immediate vicinity of objective and flashed its call signal on the downward recognition lights at the moment of releasing its bomb.

(*d*) Safety precautions:

(1) Within 5 miles of Charing Cross (about the center of Greater London) the minimum altitude for all aircraft was 5,000 feet.

(2) For planes not equipped with oxygen apparatus, the maximum permissible altitude was 16,000 feet.

(3) All aircraft operating at night were required to maintain constant wireless communication with headquarters. Should the wireless equipment cease to function, the plane was to land at the first opportunity. This was to avoid having planes attempt to return to airdromes which had become covered with fog.

NOTE.—Under the defense system, A. D. G. B. headquarters is constantly informed as to the weather condition at and surrounding all airdromes.

(4) At night the bombing planes were required to show navigation lights at all times except when on the way in toward their objective, and even then if at an altitude of less than 5,000 feet. Fighting planes were required to show lights at all times after dark. If bombing planes moving without lights sighted one or more fighting planes and if there appeared to be any possibility of collision, the bombers were required to switch on their navigation lights.

(5) During night operations fighter planes were not allowed to approach within 200 yards of bombers. In each bomber the rear gunner was provided with an electric torch, which he was to flash in the direction of any fighting plane which appeared to be coming too close.

(6) Bombing planes were required to avoid flying in or near cloud formations while in the immediate vicinity of London or when outside the theater of operations.

(7) A number of emergency landing fields in the vicinity of London had been previously designated and were illuminated with landing flares at all times during night flying.

(8) Position reporting. Except between 6 p. m. and 11 p. m. (during which period the observers corps was on duty), all bombing formations in the theater of operations were required to transmit the following information to headquarters A. D. G. B. every 10 minutes:

(1) Number of planes in formation within 33 per cent.

(2) Position within 3 miles.

(3) Altitude within 2,000 feet.

(4) Course within 20°.

This information was given to the Westland commander and took the place of that which would have been furnished under normal conditions by the observer posts.

Summary of exercises.—The exercises consisted in a series of day and night bombing raids directed by the Eastland commander toward the prearranged objectives in and around London and in the efforts of the Westland forces (i. e., the A. D. G. B.) to prevent the successful accomplishment of these raids.

Day bombers were used exclusively for daylight raids and night bombers exclusively for night raids.

Daylight attacks took place every evening and early every morning. On each occasion, the Westland commander directed simultaneous raids by all of his day bombing squadrons (i. e. 81 day bombing planes). In some cases the squadrons operated as units—i. e., in formations of nine planes; in other cases they were broken up into flights of three planes each. Each formation followed a different route in approaching London, but all were timed so as to reach their objectives at as nearly as possible the same instant. During daylight hours the weather conditions were generally good. A southwest wind varying from 15 to 40 miles per hour, prevailed throughout the exercises, and large formations of cumulous clouds, sometimes broken, sometimes in layers, were generally evident.

Counting each formation as one raid, the total number of day raids was 57. The number of occasions on which bombing raids were intercepted before reaching their objectives was 39. As some formations were attacked two or three times, it may be assumed that approximately 50 per cent of the bombing raids reached their objectives unmolested. About the same figures apply to the interception of bomber formations on returning from London to the coast line, the number of such occasions being 37. Only nine raids (or about 16 per cent) succeeded in evading the fighters both ways.

Casualties assessed during the 57 day raids were as follows: 151 bombers shot down by fighters; 20 bombers shot down by antiaircraft artillery; 139 fighters shot down by bombers.

Inasmuch as casualties were not assessed immediately as they occurred, these figures are of only relative interest. For example, a bombing formation of nine planes might have been attacked twice or three times en route to London. Theoretically these encounters might have resulted in the loss of, say, three bombers. Nevertheless, the formation continued its flight with normal strength of nine planes. Accordingly, in any subsequent combats the strength of the formation was greater than would have been the case under war conditions. The same applies to fighting planes.

As is the accepted practice in the Royal Air Force, night raids were invariably made by single planes, never in formation. Each night bomber goes by itself. All follow different routes and attack their objectives independently. The prevalence of clouds in the vicinity of London required the bombers to fly at comparatively low altitudes, usually around 4,000 feet. At this height they were as a rule picked up by searchlights almost immediately on entering the searchlight zone, and the great majority were attacked by fighters before reaching their objectives.

From 25 to 30 individual night-bomber raids were undertaken each night.

On several occasions night bombers approached London just above a thin layer of clouds. Even though these planes could not be seen from the ground, the searchlights were directed toward them. This caused a light patch in the cloud layer, against which the bombers were silhouetted and made clearly discernible to fighting planes patrolling above.

During the exercises a total of approximately 250,000 miles were flown by the airplanes engaged. Only one minor accident occurred. A single-seat fighter turned over in landing and the pilot suffered slight bruises about the face.

Conclusions.—As has been previously stated, the purpose of the exercises was to test the efficiency of individuals and units rather than of the defensive system as a whole. For this reason, and in view of the fact that the Air Ministry press releases included very little of comments or criticisms, it is possible to draw only the most general conclusions. These are as follows:

(1) It is impossible by any means to prevent a very considerable percentage of bombing planes from arriving over their objectives and releasing their bombs.

(2) While wind and clouds are usually of advantage to bombers during daylight hours, at nighttime they tend to force the bombers down to within the effective range of searchlights, balloon barrages, and antiaircraft artillery.

(3) In the vicinity of London (because of the prevailing weather conditions), and perhaps in any organized defense area such as the A. D. G. B., fast day bombing planes have a much better chance of success than do slow, heavy night bombers.

(4) As has been the case for several years, the single-seat fighting planes now in service in the Royal Air Force are too slow to cope with the latest and fastest types of day bombers. This deficiency has the attention of the air ministry, and, as previously reported, strenuous efforts are being made to develop satisfactory types of fighting planes.

(5) It is the first mission of the defense forces to intercept and attack hostile bombers before they reach London. However, since this mission can never be fully accomplished, it is regarded as of only secondary importance that the defending fighters should relentlessly pursue hostile bombers and inflict upon them, even as they withdraw, as heavy as possible casualties. In other words, since bombing raids can never be entirely prevented, one of the best defensive theories lies in the destruction, whenever and wherever located, of enemy bomber aircraft.

(6) The detection, reporting, tracking, and interception of attacking bombers (in other words, the work of the air defense system as a whole) has shown a decided improvement since last year. This may be attributed to—

(*a*) The increased perfection of ground installations—viz, operations rooms, telephone communications, etc.

(*b*) The results of continued training.

(*c*) The fact that the area of operations was more restricted this year than last.

(7) The auxiliary and cadre squadrons played an important and creditable part in the first exercises in which they have been permitted to participate.

This fact is not only of direct importance to the air defense of Great Britain, but should prove a stimulus to the organization of more such squadrons.

(8) The volunteer observer corps and the searchlight units of the territorial army performed their tasks seriously and well.

(9) A high degree of efficiency was shown in staff work and by individual units. It is believed that the Royal Air Force, as a whole, is far better prepared for immediate and effective combat than is our own Air Corps. This is attributable to—

(*a*) The fact that sufficient number of staff posts are provided in tables of organization, and that all such posts are kept filled at all times, and that the officers so assigned are not burdened with a variety of additional miscellaneous duties.

(*b*) The fact that all units are maintained at full strength both as to personnel and equipment at all times.

(*c*) The annual training system under which every individual in the air force repeats every year a course of training in every duty called for by his post or assignment.

It is of interest to note that no invitations were issued to any foreign attachés to witness any phases of these exercises, and informal inquiries at the air ministry indicate that a request for permission to attend would be denied. Because of the large number of scattered units engaged and the wide area covered, it is doubtful if an observer could have gained any more than is set forth in the above report and as derived from air ministry daily communiques to the press, unless the air ministry had so specially desired. In informal discussion with the foreign liaison officer of the air ministry, it has been intimated that after the final reports on the maneuvers have been prepared, the air ministry will consider letting us have the benefit of its conclusions on the important points, so that further information of value in connection with the above may be expected in time.

FRANCE

POLITICAL

REVIVAL OF GERMAN ANIMOSITY TOWARD FRANCE.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

The reaction produced in Paris by this recrudescence of hostility is considerable. Its importance lies in the influence it will have upon the negotiations arranged for at Geneva for reviewing the Dawes plan and settling the evacuation question. However, it is noticeable that the violence of the German press has not induced an unreflecting abuse of Germany by way of retort. The French press has nevertheless printed and replied to many of the articles and speeches reported from across the Rhine. The general effect would seem to be to strengthen the stand taken by the French Government at Geneva as expounded in Mr. Briand's speech. German intemperance has enlarged the volume of French approval of that stand and weakened the effect of socialist criticism of it.

As seen from Paris, the Germans are seeking to enlist American sympathy as against the Franco-British combination. Their method of doing this seems to strengthen the sympathy existing between these two countries, and if they fail in their efforts they will have excited suspicion and irritation in one quarter without gaining a corresponding advantage in the other.

Von Bernstorff at Geneva and the German press in general have been seeking to stir up world opinion against the proposed Franco-British naval arrangements, using the revelations of the Hearst papers as a proof that France and England are obstacles to disarmament, while Germany is pictured as a victim of their selfish combinations. Germany, they say, has disarmed, and yet others refuse to diminish their warlike preparations. Is it fair? Is it in accordance with the terms of the treaty, let alone the spirit of Locarno? All the efforts toward a rapprochement, all the painful sacrifices made by the German people in the hope of good understanding, have been trampled upon by French imperialism and the Frenchman's malignant desire to wound German feelings and keep Germany in vassalage.

The French papers in many instances point out to the Germans that if their country has disarmed it is in no way due to her love of peace or desire to set an example. The long efforts at obstruction are recalled, the detailed reports of the allied central commission showing this obstruction are reviewed, and the fact is pointed out that 10 years of vigilant and persistent effort have been required to force Germany to execute her engagements in the matter of disarmament.

Is anybody taken in by these German protestations, it is asked. Do even the French socialists believe in them, or are they, as usual, seizing this as an opportunity to attack the Poincare Government? The German politicians know the truth, and the big writers in their press also; but the German people are gullible, and this occasion gives a chance for cleverly infecting them with a new obsession—namely, that the German Government has voluntarily disarmed their country in accordance with a mutual agreement that all Europe shall disarm and that, now she is prostrate, the others refuse to live up to their word.

One thing the French press has omitted to comment upon, and that is the likelihood of the United States feeling any gratitude for Germany's taking their side in discussions which have gone on in Geneva over the limitation of armaments or in Washington, London, and

Paris over the naval-limitation plan. We are quite able to take care of our own interests in these two matters without help from Germany or advice from Count Von Bernstorff, but the German news-papers can not be expected to see this point. In the easy task they have set themselves of convincing their own readers of Germany's innocence and her self-sacrificing efforts for peace they do not realize that we are likely to scrutinize their real intentions with as much care as we are bestowing upon the cause and effect underlying the Franco-British naval compromise.

A SEPARATE AIR MINISTRY FOR FRANCE.

Since the time of Richelieu, Frenchmen have been in the habit of turning to the Government for direction and impulse in many matters which the American prefers to see attended to by private initiative. This tendency has grown, rather than diminished, with each succeeding régime and asserts itself quite independently of the efficiency of the prevailing Government or any popular confidence in it.

Whenever anything goes wrong, the Government is expected to intervene and set it right, and it is kept fairly busy responding to such appeals, with the result that it would often seem to be more occupied with repair work than with new construction. When the matter was very grave the old-fashioned method was revolution or an effort in that direction; since the advent of the third Republic the system employed is to upset the existing cabinet, turn out some minister in whose department the trouble arose, or else make a violent scene in Parliament. The cabinet, or some of the ministers, having been charged in response to this clamor, most frequently things go on just as before, public fury be satisfied with the sacrifice offered up to it.

It seems entirely likely that the air ministry just created would not have been decided upon, at least at this time, had not Mr. Bokanowski, the Minister of Commerce charged with civil aviation matters, been recently killed with all on board in an aviation accident. There have been advocates and opponents of an air ministry in France just as in America; there have been critics of France's aviation and admirers of its record; their arguments for and against the actual system have been reported to you by this office during several years.

Mr. Bokanowski was known to be ardently interested in advancing aviation, and he was able and energetic. Had he lived, things would probably have gone on as they were. His death raised a national outcry, and the old, old system of meeting it was resorted to. The Government responded (Parliament not being in session and its usual action thus prevented) by deciding to create an air ministry modeled on the British system, and, criticism thus being met, its members can go about their business, having washed for the time being this messed-up child.

The only people who feel they have reason to complain are the war and navy departments, and in France, as in America, both branches of the service are accustomed to sacrifices and to its acceptance in silence.

Mr. Leygues and Mr. Painleve protested. It is even said they both offered their resignation but were prevailed upon by their colleagues to remain. I believe their gesture was one of official dignity intended to satisfy their subordinates in the army and navy and they are glad to-day to find themselves still in the cabinet. Mr. Eynac obtains all he demanded for his new department, according to the formal announcement given out at the end of the cabinet meeting.

Colonel Armangaud, Marshal Foch's staff officer for aviation during the World War, who lately commanded the aviation brigade in Morocco during the insurrection there, said that as a soldier interested in the efficiency of the army, he would regret the creation of a separate air ministry such as existed in England; as an individual desiring rapid promotion he would accept the change with that resignation an officer always feels when confronted with the chance of higher rank and wider authority.

A year ago Mr. Lasaro-Weiller, an aviator five times wounded and now a constructor of airplanes, told me that all the makers were in favor of an air minister who would concentrate all orders for construction, as it would make contracts easier to get than at present when four ministries had to be consulted. Whether the contracts would thereby be better for the services using the machines, he was far from sure. Political and commercial influences could better be exerted upon one minister than upon four, and each maker had to get at the ministries with all the means in his power if he wanted an order.

These two statements are repeated merely as side lights and not as a full picture of the situation. French aviation has in recent years been somewhat sick; but most everything in France which depends upon the Government has been in the same state. Money has been scarce and politics prevalent. Nobody can say whether a separate air ministry, had it existed during the last five years, would have been more efficient than any other department of the Government. To quote a prominent deputy: "Things can hardly be worse than they have been. Eynac is an able man and knows the aviation business thoroughly. Let us hope he will succeed in improving it."

It is under these circumstances that an experiment gravely affecting the army and navy has been begun. They are not of a nature to inspire enthusiasm, but there is also no fair reason for prejudging the results.

One prediction can be made regarding the immediate future. Mr. Eynac proposes to concentrate money and energy upon technical research and improved construction and to withdraw, as far as possible, from competitive and spectacular experiments such as transoceanic flights.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBINED AIR FORCE.

On October 2 the presidential decree outlining the functions of the newly designated Minister for Air and the composition of the new French air force was issued. A study of this decree indicates that the organization is very similar to the British Royal Air Force.

The new Minister for Air was added to the Supreme War Council of National Defense. The Minister for Air assumes charge of all French aviation—military, naval, and commercial, including the meteorological, experimentation, and research activities.

The following paragraphs are quoted as indicating the effect of the new decree on naval aviation. The matériel pertaining to naval aviation is turned over to the Air Ministry.

> However, the personnel of naval aeronautics aboard ship remains under the direct orders of the Ministry of Marine. Since naval aeronautics do not constitute a separate branch of the navy, each individual pertaining thereto will, within a period of three months after the promulgation of the law fixing the status of the air force, be permitted to choose whether he desires assignment to the navy or to the air force.
>
> The personnel of the general naval service on detached naval aeronautical duty will be supplied and administered by the navy until its replacement by personnel of the Air Ministry under conditions which will be satisfactorily arranged with the Minister of Marine.
>
> All buildings, land, schools, etc., belonging to the navy which are used for aviation purposes will be assigned to the Air Ministry, except those included within navy yards.
>
> The budgets pertaining to all aeronautical services will be prepared by the Air Minister after consultation with the ministers concerned as to their needs.
>
> Orders for material of every nature and the contracts relative thereto will be the responsibility of the Air Minister.
>
> The number and type of naval air squadrons and their assignment in time of peace will be made after agreement with the Minister of Marine and in accordance with defense plan.

There followed certain provisional regulations covering the above transfers of authority.

Further decrees and necessary legislation will clear up uncertain points, such as the promotion list for air force officers, commissioned grades, decorations, etc.

French Press Comment and Opinions on the New Ministry.

Favorable:

General reception of the decree is reported as favorable, particularly so in aviation journals and those newspapers interested more in civil aviation and airplane construction companies.

Le Caulois summarizes as follows:

> M. Laurent Eynac having full powers will have full responsibility. The new Minister of Air will have against him all hidden influences, political intrigues, and the coalition of small self-centered interests against which he will have to struggle with all his energy.

The Excelsior, in an interview with M. Eynac, states that he feels that the present allocation of funds for aviation is badly advised. He would increase the amounts destined for research and new material and develop postal and commercial aviation liaison between Paris, the capitals of Europe, and the French colonies.

Unfavorable:

The military attaché (Paris) draws attention to the " rough-shod " and " strong-arm " methods employed by M. Laurent Eynac, the new Air Minister, in wresting from the army and navy ministries complete control of aviation. He states that his tactics, fully premeditated and planned beforehand, enabled him to take advantage of a temporary weak cabinet situation and avail himself of a strong public enthusiasm for the development of civil aviation to entrench himself firmly in military control of the air.

An article appearing in Le Figaro of October 4, 1928, points out certain dangers in the new decree as follows:

> We did not think it was worth while taking seriously the project for the new Air Ministry before it was published * * * the text of the decree shows how wrong we were.
>
> It is impossible to understand how the cabinet could have accepted such an organization, but it does explain why it did not think it desirable to consult the national defense council before deciding. This council would never have admitted that any such attack could be made upon the unity of command, without which it is not possible to carry on a modern war.
>
> In the minds of aviation fanatics their arm will henceforward be the first of all * * *.

As to the navy:

> This all means that we are going to commence the experience which England has had, the defects of which it did not take long to reveal. The aviator who is not a sailor is entirely useless in a naval war, because * * * etc. During the recent war the navy borrowed aviators from the army. In spite of their best intentions, they were of no use, except to report our sailing sloops were enemy cruisers and floating logs were submarines.
>
> A few years ago the newly created Air Ministry in Great Britain desired to add their units to the navy. That did not last long. The Admiralty saw

that this personnel lacked a professional education of a naval character which can not be acquired in a few months, but must be learned as a sailor on board ship."

In England the principle of the Air Ministry having independent charge of seaplanes has not yet been overthrown, but they act there as if it never existed.

The Air Minister had an urgent task to fulfill at once—that of improving commercial aviation and of rebuilding the technical service * * *. But that was not enough for him; he wants besides to take over the direction of a weapon which could not be easily separated from the tactical use of other arms * * * any more than torpedoes could be separated from cruisers.

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Due to the recent creation of an Air Ministry, the council of ministers, on October 2, 1928, approved the addition of the Air Minister to the Supreme War Council of National Defense.

The following presidential decree was issued on the same date:

> Article 3 of the decree of November 17, 1921, stating the organization of the Supreme War Council of National Defense, is modified as follows:
>
> The following will compose the council: The president of the council, President; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Minister of the Interior; the Minister of Finance; the Minister of War; the Minister of Marine; the Minister of Air; the Minister of Public Works; the Minister of the Colonies.

NAVAL

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY.

French foreign policy may be summed up briefly as follows:

(*a*) A complete colonial policy, political, defensive, and economic.

(*b*) Accord with England in her continental policies. France is fully aware of the deciding rôle of England in any European conflict, especially in the Mediterranean; hence her desire for complete harmony with this power.

(*c*) Strengthening of French influence among minor powers and in French mandates.

(*d*) Maintaining a secure position on the continent by means of defensive alliances with friendly powers.

(*e*) In general, maintenance of her political and territorial status quo in the world.

French Naval Policy.

French naval policy evolved to support the above may be summed up as follows:

Whatever may be the evolution and necessities of the foreign policy of France, in the future the size of her navy must always be determined by the double necessity of guaranteeing the liberty of her essential communications by sea, particularly with north Africa, and of insuring the protection of the home and colonial frontiers.

in conjunction with the units specially charged with their permanent defense.

The French colonial army comprises approximately 33 per cent of the present army strength. These troops must be assembled at those points of the globe where their presence is necessary. To insure the transport of these troops at sea, the sea routes must be kept open—principally, the Marseilles-Algiers-Dakar and Bordeaux routes.

This necessity requires the maintenance in the Mediterranean of a force at least equal to the strongest Mediterranean power and in the Atlantic a squadron equal if not superior to the German fleet. Whatever may be the course of events, France will always be forced to maintain squadrons in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and it would be vain to hope that these forces could be united, without danger, due to the position of Gibraltar.

French opinion leans strongly to the hypothesis that the next war will spread from country to country until many of the leading powers are involved, that it will be above all a war of movement and of concentration of forces, and that the sea routes will be the natural tracks for transporting troops and materials which have to be assembled at limited points.

France fully recognizes the important rôle of her colonial empire in a war of the future. Her colonial empire is not by any means limited to her north African provinces. She is well situated on the road to the Far East at Casablanca, Dakar, Diego-Suarez, Saigon, and Camerang, as well as having bases in the West Indies and in the Pacific, the utilization of which would enable her to play an important part in any world conflict.

Her sea routes are officially stated to be as follows: Lines of communications, 36,000 miles (second largest in the world); coast line, including colonies, 10,000 miles (third largest in the world).

The French view the army and navy as inseparable when it comes to the question of defense of the country. This is based on the fact that the strength of the army in times of war would depend on the reinforcements which could be brought from Africa and that the arrival of these reinforcements would depend on the navy fulfilling its task.

The time-honored policy of France in the Mediterranean consists in maintaining a margin of naval superiority over other nations bordering on the Mediterranean.

The naval power against which France naturally measures herself is Italy, and the French would resent any move tending to the supremacy of Italy in the Mediterranean. Should Italy undertake a large building program, it would undoubtedly mean a competition in armaments between herself and France. France just as much dislikes being forced to build a big navy (for financial reasons), as she is determined not to reduce her existing program without guarantees for her security.

The present program is regarded by the French as the minimum they require for their purpose, and they intend to stick to it at all costs. Any limitation on the construction of light craft and submarines would be bitterly contended by the advocates of security.

The following are a few of the quotations from the Minister of Marine who, in France, is the spokesman on the naval policy of the country:

> The sea is the key to the world.
>
> International policy has ceased to be continental and has become oceanic.
>
> The importance of the reconstruction of our fleet can only be measured by our maritime routes, which are next in importance after those of England. The importance of our colonial possessions assigns us a rôle which we can not shirk without compromising the international naval equilibrium to which is linked the maintenance of the world peace.
>
> The navy recognizes the importance and difficulties of its rôle. It assures our security, guarantees the freedom of our ocean routes, unites the colonies with the mother country, strengthens the ties of friendship which bind us to other people. It affirms our presence and cooperation in the maintenance of peace and order as well as international equilibrium.

To sum up the French case, it may be stated that the basis of the present French naval policy is to maintain a navy sufficient to assure in any eventuality the protection of the maritime frontiers of France and her colonies: to assure to the country against an aggression the security of her maritime communications.

In keeping with this policy the French fleet is now concentrated in the Mediterranean. Now that the German menace is removed in the North Sea the Mediterranean is deemed to be the theater of probable maritime operations.

Cooperation With Colonies.

Cooperation with the French colonies in maintaining the navy as is known in England does not exist in France. The French colonies prior to the war were considered in too precarious a financial condition to ask them to contribute to the support of the navy. However, conditions have somewhat changed for the better, and the question is now being considered by the Government to ask the colonies to defray expenses in constructing oil reserves, coast-defense works, and a proportionate share of expenses in maintaining ships of the navy (mostly gunboats and yard craft) in the respective colonies. Small craft stationed in the colonies are manned by native crews. Further than this, it can not be said that the French colonies contribute to the support of the navy.

Building Program.

Developments in connection with proposed Franco-British naval agreement, as well as general disarmament discussions, will no doubt have a bearing on future building programs.

To date the French seem to lean toward a continuance of light-craft construction, which they consider absolutely essential. It is very probable that the question of building capital ships will not be given serious consideration until after the expiration of the Washington agreement.

Personnel, French Navy.

General efficiency.—The general efficiency of the personnel of the French Navy may be considered excellent when allowance is made for the disadvantages incurred due to short terms of compulsory enlistment, varying from 5 years to 18 months. About 10,000 to 12,000 men are drafted annually from the "army contingent" to serve their military service in the navy. This is considered too short a period in which to train efficient personnel.

Morale.—The morale of the navy, from all appearances and from statements made by the Minister of Marine, may be considered excellent. At intervals agitators with communist ideas arise and try to make capital out of items which are in reality incident to life on board ship and exist more or less in all navies. Due to compulsory military service, a certain number of men with communist ideas must necessarily find their way into the navy. Every effort is made to select men coming from centers free of communist activities.

Training and instruction.—Training of personnel in the French Navy is somewhat similar to methods employed in other navies. Men are encouraged to attend the numerous schools existing at the various centers. Special classes exist for men eligible to take examination for entrance to the "Ecole Navale," and every facility is afforded these men. Practically all enlisted men do a short period of their military service in one of the many schools existing at the naval centers. Regardless of rating, the men are encouraged to take these courses.

Athletics form a part of the routine training, and teams from the fleet compete in all important fêtes throughout the country.

Groups of enlisted men are on duty in every plant doing work for the navy—gun factory, chain shop, proving grounds, optical works, ship-construction yards—and in many bureaus forming part of the navy department.

In training men the French keep expansion upon mobilization in view and give men diversified training during their military service, even if the navy does not get any immediate benefit due to the short term of enlistment.

Naval Bases.

France has naval bases in importance as follows: (1) Toulon, (2) Brest, (3) Bizerte, (4) Cherbourg, (5) Lorient, (6) Rochefort.

Toulon and Brest may be considered as first-class yards; Bizerte, Cherbourg, and Lorient as secondary yards; Rochefort as an auxiliary base.

Toulon is the principal French naval base and is capable of looking after the entire French fleet in case of emergency. The principal war stocks, ammunition, fuel, provisions, etc., are centered in Toulon.

Brest is second in importance and is also capable of looking after the entire French fleet in case of emergency. All types of ships are constructed at Brest.

In view of the commanding position of Bizerte in the Mediterranean, special attention is being given to its development. Bizerte may be considered an excellent submarine and aviation base as well as a first-class repair base.

Cherbourg, a secondary base, is principally used for fitting out submarines and other small craft.

Lorient, a secondary base, is now practically a ship-construction yard.

Rochefort is practically out of commission, but is retained as an auxiliary yard in case of emergency.

MODERNIZATION OF SHIPS.

Modernization of the Six Capital Ships, "Bretagne," "Lorraine," "Provence," "Paris," "Jean-Bart," and "Courbet."

1. Installation of tripod masts.
2. Grouping of smokestacks of *Jean-Bart*, *Paris*, and *Courbet*.
3. Increase in angle of elevation of main turret guns (12-inch and 13.4-inch).
4. Various modifications and installations against fire and flooding.
5. Improvement of trim by removing a short length of armor forward.
6. Installation of director fire.
7. Installation of defense against aircraft.
8. Installation of partial oil-burning system.
9. Installation of organizations of lookouts and searchlights against destroyer and submarine attack.
10. Reorganization of communication systems—radio, pneumatic, and telephone.

Cost of above modernization: Ordnance, $200,000 per ship; construction and engineering, $360,000 per ship.

Modernization on Other Ships.

None; all work performed on other ships since 1922 was nothing more than repairs and general upkeep. Various installations and modifications against flooding were made on the 18,000-ton battleships.

Projected Modernization in View.

None; after completion of modernization to *Jean-Bart* in 1929, all battleships will then have the modernization as originally outlined completed. No other program of modernization is contemplated.

WINTER CRUISE OF CADET SHIP "EDGAR-QUINET."

The proposed itinerary of the cadet training ship *Edgar-Quinet* for the winter cruise of 1928 is as follows:

Leave Brest	Oct. 15.
Casablanca	Oct. 18 to Oct. 25.
St. Vincent	Oct. 30 to Nov. 3
Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 13 to Nov. 23.
Bahia	Nov. 26 to Nov. 29.
Trinidad	Dec. 9 to Dec. 14.
Curacao	Dec. 16 to Dec. 18.
Colon	Dec. 20 to Jan. 2.
Kingston	Jan. 5 to Jan. 8.
Vera Cruz	Jan. 12 to Jan. 18.
Havana	Jan. 21 to Jan. 31.
St. Thomas	Feb. 2 to Feb. 6.
Antilles (French)	Feb. 7 to Mar. 18.
Dakar	Mar. 28 to Apr. 6.
Cadiz	Apr. 12 to Apr. 17.
Alger	Apr. 19 to Apr. 26.
Toulon	Apr. 28.

The *Edgar-Quinet* will have on board 150 cadets and will be commanded by Capt. J. L. X. F. Darlan, French Navy.

SINKING OF THE FRENCH SUBMARINE "ONDINE" BY THE GREEK STEAMSHIP "EKATIRINA M. GOUKANDRIS."

The Greek steamship *Ekatirina M. Goukandris* arrived in the Rotterdam New Waterway on October 12, 1928, to discharge cargo and then proceed to the yard of the New Waterway Shipbuilding Co. at Schiedam, near Rotterdam, for repairs.

This vessel, which measures 2,670 tons and is owned by the Greek steamship company, Kirtasas Bros., had departed for Holland from Lisbon, Portugal, on October 3, 1928, with cargo destined for the Monton Transport Gesellschaft, Rotterdam. On the same evening of that day, about 11 o'clock, while near Vigo, Spain, the vessel collided with what was at first thought to have been a floating wreck, but is now determined to have been the French submarine *Ondine*, which was sunk as a result of the collision. The entire crew of the submarine was lost, including 43 officers and men. Efforts to communicate by wireless with the submarine were unsuccessful. Messages were sent out to all near-by vessels by the master of the Greek ship reporting the striking and sinking of an unknown submarine. After cruising about for 14 hours near the point where the vessel disappeared to render any possible assistance the Greek vessel continued its voyage to Holland. Upon its arrival at Poortershaven, near Rotterdam, Captain Fannet, of the general naval staff, came to Rotterdam to investigate and report upon the matter. The Greek Government instructed its naval attaché at London to proceed to this port to conduct a similar investigation.

Each officer and member of the crew have been closely interrogated. The master is reported to have made the following statement:

> On October 3, 1928, at 11 o'clock in the evening, I was asleep in my cabin, when I was suddenly awakened by a heavy shock. I immediately went up to the bridge—which was in charge of an officer—where I observed a submarine on starboard side. Neither myself nor any of the crew could make out the nationality of the quickly disappearing vessel. My ship had collided with its port-side stem against the starboard-side stem of the submarine. I gave order to cruise about in the direction where the vessel disappeared and reported by wireless to all vessels in the neighborhood that while passing a point approximaterly figured as 22° north latitude and 9° 36′ west longitude we collided with an unknown submarine. We continued our search until 1 o'clock in the morning of October 4, when the vessel departed for Holland.

Reports are current that the *Ondine* was sailing without lights. There has also been unfavorable comment concerning the delay of the master of the Greek vessel in withholding this vital information until two days after his arrival in Holland, seven days after the accident had occurred. Both the French and the Greek officials, it is rumored, have decided to put the matter in the hands of a neutral expert—i. e., Mr. Fock, chief inspector of Dutch shipping, The Hague, who will render report upon the sinking of the submarine.

It is understood that the present investigation relates only to civil damages and that at this time there is no question of attempting to fix the criminal responsibility for the disaster upon the Greek captain or members of the crew.

The Greek representative at Rotterdam has declared that in his opinion the collision is attributable to an unfortunate combination of unavoidable circumstances and that no blame can be attached to either party.

RECRUITING NAVAL OFFICERS.

To increase the number of graduates of the naval academy, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Georges Leygues, has taken steps to facilitate the preparation of candidates for the academy and to extend the sources of supply of candidates for that school.

During the year preceding the first examination that candidates may take, they will be given instruction on ships on which they will be carried as extra numbers. This instruction will be given on ships in reserve commission as the various commanders in chief feel that their instruction does not progress rapidly enough on ships in the active fleet. Any candidate who fails, without good reason, to take the examination for which he prepared, or any candidate who fails twice to pass the tests, will be dropped from the list of available candidates.

Many warrant officer candidates with a fair education, who possess the required mental, moral, and professional qualifications, are, after passing the required entrance examinations, dropped from the naval academy for the reason that they can not meet the relatively high standard of scholarship required at that institution.

To open to this worthy class of officers the opportunity of becoming commissioned officers of the line, the secretary has decided to create for them a special course of preparation. This course is open to officers who have served a certain number of years and who possess the required characteristics. It will be given once each year on a ship of the training squadron.

ITALY

POLITICAL

FASCIST LAW FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE FASCIST GRAND COUNCIL.

One of the items on the party program for the next legislature is the constitutionalization of the grand council of the Fascist Party. This is spoken of in the press as the "completion of the revolution."

A summary of the law is given herewith:

Article 1. What the Council Is.

The Grand Council of Fascism is the supreme organ which coordinates all the activities of the régime (Fascist) born of the revolution of October, 1922. It has deliberative functions in cases established by the law and has cognizance over every other question—political, economic, or social—of national interest which may be referred to it by the Government of the King.

Article 2. The Head of the Council.

The chief of government, Prime Minister, is the president of the grand council. He convokes it as he regards necessary and arranges the order of business.

Article 3. Who Constitutes the Council.

The chief of government (one): the president of the Senate (one): the president of the Chamber of deputies (one): the ministers, secretaries of state (seven): the quadrumvirate of the march on Rome (four): the undersecretaries of state to foreign affairs, internal affairs, and corporations (of which the chief of government is now minister) (three): the commanding general or chief of staff of the Volunteer Militia for National Safety (one); the secretary, vice secretaries, the administrative secretary, and the directors of the Fascist Party (nine): the ministers of state who have left office since 1922 who have had at least five years of office: the secretaries of the Fascist Party who have left office since 1922 (three); the president of the National Fascist Institute of Culture (one); the president of the General Confederation of the Autonomous Corporations (one); the president of the General Confederation of Fascist Syndicates of Workmen and Tradesmen (one); the President of the National Confederation of Farmers (one); the president of the National Confederation of Industrials (one); the president of the National Association for Cooperation (one); the president of the "Balilla" (one); the president of the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State (one).

Article 4. Additional Persons Called to Work With the Council.

The chief of government can call to participate in the work of the council for a determined time men who have been meritorious in the cause of the nation and Fascism, or else, for special reasons, persons particularly competent in questions being examined by the grand council.

Article 5. Status of Members.

Same as that of senators and deputies.

Article 6. Freedom from Arrest; Immunity.

Members can not be arrested or subjected to penal proceedings nor subjected to the custody of the police without deliberation of the council. No disciplinary measure against a member of the council as pertaining to the Fascist Party can be adopted without deliberation of the grand council.

Article 7. What the Council Deliberates Upon.

(1) The list of deputies designated in accordance with the electoral law of March 17, 1928.

(2) The statutes and ordinances and the directive policies of the Fascist Party.

(3) The nomination and recall (resignation) of the secretary, vice secretary, and board of directors of the party.

The council must be consulted on questions having constitutional character.

As having constitutional character shall always be considered—

(*a*) **Proposed laws concerning succession to the throne.**

(*b*) **The powers of the King and his prerogatives.**

(*c*) The composition and functioning of the grand council, the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies.

(*d*) The attributions and prerogatives of the chief of government, Prime Minister.

(*e*) The power of the executive to issue judicial regulations.

(*f*) Ordinances for syndicates and corporations.

(*g*) Relations between the State and the Catholic Church.

(*h*) International treaties which involve changes in the territory of the State and the colonies, or renounce the acquisition of territory.

Article 8. Nomination of Chief of Government.

The council forms and maintains a list of names to present to the Crown, in case of vacancy, for the nomination of the chief of government, Prime Minister. A similar list of suitable persons shall be kept for filling other Government vacancies.

Article 9. Sessions of Council—Secretary.

The secretary of the Fascist Party is the secretary of the council. He will convoke and preside over the council if there is a lack of a president, or it is impossible for the president to act.

The sessions of the grand council are secret. They are valid whatever number is present.

Internal rules, established by itself, will govern the other functionings of the council.

Article 10. Payment of Members—Expenses.

Members receive no pay.

No request shall be made on the national treasury for the expenses of the council.

Article 11. Nomination of Certain Members.

The secretary, vice secretaries, the administrative secretary, and the directors of the Fascist Party are nominated and removed from office by decree of the chief of government, Prime Minister, and Secretary of State after previous deliberation by the grand council. Their term of office is for three years and they may be reappointed.

When ordered by royal decree, upon the proposal of the chief of government, the secretary of the Fascist Party may participate in meetings of the council of ministers.

General Remarks.

As previously stated, this law will be approved by the Chamber of Deputies at its next session, November–December, 1928.

It will be noted that the navy, army, and aeronautics are represented only by their ministers, or, at present, only by Mussolini. All other Government departments have a representative aside from Mussolini, even though he be minister of three of them.

General Balbo, Undersecretary for Aeronautics, would at present be on the council as one of the quadrumvirate of the march on Rome.

At present there are no ex-ministers eligible for the council, which would to-day consist of 38 members.

THE APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION OF GENERAL ITALO BALBO, M. V. S. N., AND UNDERSECRETARY FOR AIR.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

Upon the recommendation of the chief of the government, Premier Mussolini, the King has signed a decree by which Gen. Italo Balbo, a general officer of the Fascista Militia (M. V. S. N.) and also the Undersecretary for Air, is transferred from the status of a reserve officer of the infantry arm of the Royal Army to the general staff of the Regia Aeronautica, with the rank of general of air fleet, reserve status.

The press states "that this honor having been placed on a faithful member of Fascism, it should not pass unobserved. After six years it is evident that the great personality of Balbo has made it a natural fact that he should be promoted to the highest grade as a contribution to a clever man of tremendous understanding."

The Official Bulletin of August 11, 1928, is as follows:

> Italo Balbo, major general of the M. V. S. N. (Fascista Militia) and captain of the infantry reserve, is transferred as a reserve officer of the general staff of the Regia Aeronautica, with the rank of general of air fleet.

He was called to active service by an order of later date.

Comment.

Without doubt this promotion is for the best interests of the Regia Aeronautica and Italian aviation, and may be cited as an example of how the present chief of the government places in command men whose service has been an undivided and unselfish sacrifice for the party. This promotion is unique in that it has never been done before and was ordered in the face of many apparent obstacles.

The young officers of the Regia Aeronautica are enthusiastic over it, as it places at the head of the Regia Aeronautica a young man, a pilot, and a cabinet officer who can recommend direct to Mussolini the necessary legislation for the efficient development of the Regia

Aeronautica, and, as Mussolini is for aviation, his full support is assured.

The older officers of the Regia Aeronautica, especially those of general-officer grade, are greatly surprised and more or less swept off their feet by the suddenness of the promotion of a cabinet officer. They naturally feel that the highest regular grade in the Regia Aeronautica should be filled by an officer of the regular establishment. However, the excitement has subsided to the degree that nothing more is heard outside of aviation circles.

General Balbo is well fitted for his position, being a young man with magnetic personality and dynamic energy. As soon as he was appointed to the post of Undersecretary for Air he at once learned to fly, and now continues to pilot his own planes. He stands well with the Government, is keenly interested in everything new in aviation, and has built up the Regia Aeronautica, both in morale and in equipment. He has introduced a new line of thought in aviation, in that he believes in sending flights on long trips and allowing the best pilots to see what other countries are doing in aviation. This was clearly shown in the Mediterranean flight last May and the flight of 12 planes to London, England, in July. In each case the pilots were carefully selected with a view of assigning personnel which could get the most out of the trips.

General Balbo has been personally responsible for the recent records made by Italian pilots and planes. He has taken trips to Germany, France, Spain, and England to study their methods of training. He has introduced into the Regia Aeronautica every phase of this training consistent with the funds available.

It is thought that under the guidance of General Balbo the Regia Aeronautica and Italian aviation in general will enjoy a period of intense development and will attain a high standard of efficiency. Money alone is the only obstacle now, and with his personality and good standing with the Government officials he will succeed in obtaining a large share of the funds allotted for the defense of the nation.

GERMANY

POLITICAL

DEFINITE MOVE FOR TOTAL REPARATIONS SETTLEMENT.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

For the first time since the World War ended 10 years ago a complete and definite settlement of the vexed question of German reparations seems now in sight as the result of a conference in Paris last week between S. Parker Gilbert, agent general for reparation payments; Premier Poincare, of France; and Winston Churchill, British Chancellor of the Exchequer. At this conference it was decided to turn over to an international committee of financial experts within the next month or two the task of revising the Dawes plan and fixing the total of Germany's reparations debt.

It was S. Parker Gilbert's annual report last year on the working of the Dawes plan that started talk of its inevitable revision. In closing his report he said:

> And as time goes on and practical experience accumulates, it becomes always clearer that neither the reparations problem nor the other problems depending upon it will be finally solved until Germany has been given a definite task to perform on her own responsibility, without foreign supervision and without transfer protection.
>
> This, I believe, is the principal lesson to be drawn from the past three years, and it should be constantly in the minds of all concerned as the execution of the plan continues to unfold.

These remarks furnished the press with a controversial subject claiming international attention for many months, afterwards, as it reopened the whole question of German reparations and led also to a discussion of the willingness of the allied nations to cut Germany's debts to them if and when America is willing to cut the allied debts to her.

While in this report Mr. Gilbert recorded the punctual payment of the Dawes plan annuities during the previous three years and Germany's ability to meet those for the fourth year, he warned that the success of the plan in the fifth—first standard annuity—year beginning September 1, 1928, when the payments would increase from 1,750,000,000 gold marks to 2,500,000,000 gold marks, or $625,000,000, as well as in succeeding years, could not be taken for granted. His warning was based chiefly upon the fact that up to that time full payments had been made possible only through external loans, chiefly from the United States, and also upon the fact that the Dawes plan had made no provision as to how long these payments were to continue. The total sum of money borrowed by Germany abroad since the Dawes plan went into effect equaled, at that time, about 10,000,000,000 gold marks, or approximately $2,500,000,000, which means that in addition to the billions of gold marks which Germany must pay for reparations she must also pay out about 750,000,000 gold marks, or nearly $200,000,000 per year for interest and amortization of this debt.

In his interim report on the execution of the plan during the first nine months of the fourth annuity year, Mr. Gilbert again stressed in the following words the need for revision of the plan at a suitable moment:

> Fundamentally what the plan has done is to reestablish confidence and to permit Germany's reconstruction as a going concern. In so doing it has marked the turning point in the reconstruction of Europe, and it has also achieved its primary object by securing from the very beginning the expected reparation payments and transfers to the creditor powers. But the success of the plan should not obscure its true nature. The experts themselves did not recommend the plan as an end in itself but rather as the means to meet an urgent problem and to accomplish practical results. They aimed primarily to provide for the recovery of Germany's reparation debt to the Allies, and more broadly to provide for the reconstruction of Germany, not merely as the means of securing the payment of reparations but also as "part of the larger problem of the reconstruction of Europe." I believe, as indicated in the conclusions to my last report, that from both standpoints the fundamental problem which remains is the final determination of Germany's reparation liabilities, and that it will be in the best interest of the creditor powers and of Germany alike to reach a final settlement by mutual agreement "as soon," to use the concluding words of the experts, "as circumstances make this possible."

Even this reopening of the question in print might not have led to any direct action in the near future had it not been for Germany's renewal at Geneva in September of her plea for evacuation of the Rhineland and France's abandonment of the security plea and insistence instead upon making evacuation contingent upon a more definite settlement of the reparations question, preferably with a large and immediate cash payment.

Following subsequent conferences between representatives of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and Japan, a communique was issued announcing agreement by the six Governments on the following points:

1. The opening of official negotiations relating to the request put forward by the German Chancellor regarding the early evacuation of the Rhineland.

2. The necessity for a complete and definite settlement of the reparations problem and for the constitution for this purpose of a committee of financial experts to be nominated by the six Governments * * *.

That agreement was open to the criticism that its terms might indicate merely a conference of delegates directly representing the several Governments, instead of a body selected independently like the Dawes committee, until S. Parker Gilbert made a quiet visit to London last week, culminating in the conference in Paris, for the purpose of making definite arrangements for the latter type of committee.

Though the interested nations have agreed that in the coming meetings of the committee the question of French and other European debts owed to the United States shall not be discussed, the amount of those debts will largely regulate the amount Germany will have to pay. The attitude of France, as the principal outside power concerned, is the key to developments. She has clearly set forth the thesis that an acceptable settlement of reparations must include the certainty for France of receiving not only the total sum to be paid her creditors, but an additional amount for reconstruction of her devastated areas. Great Britain has stated several times that she would expect from continental Europe no more in reparations than is required to meet her debt to the United States. In discussing the recent conference Mr. Churchill reiterated this stand and added:

> Surely nobody can expect us to do more than that for Europe. I hope they will not expect us to do more, for we have taken our stand irrevocably upon that principle. This year we shall receive very nearly as much from Europe as we require to pay the United States. We are, in fact, on the point of achieving the position aimed at when Balfour enunciated our war-debt principle, and we shall do our utmost to maintain that position in the future.

Aside from that, British opinion is distinctly cautious, for there has always been a feeling in the financial district that unless the United States agreed to a revision of the allied debts to America any reduction of German reparations would fall most heavily on England.

The total, therefore, that Germany is likely to be called upon to pay is the total received by the United States each year, plus the additional sum to France for war damage and that for cost of transfer of the funds. Present war-debt receipts of the United States run a little above $200,000,000 a year, and the highest called for is around $400,000,000. Thus the figure being most frequently mentioned as a possible total is $10,000,000,000, which is about $1,000,000,000 more than the present value of the war debts owing to America. Obviously, however, the naming of any precise sum in advance of the committee's deliberations must be premature. During the heat of passion just after the war $133,000,000,000 was talked about; Germany in 1921 offered $12,500,000,000, which was turned down as ridiculously low, the Allies figuring on about $33,000,000,000 as a minimum. The sequel to that situation is well known. The reparations committee itself did not venture to require immediate annual interest payments on that sum. Germany failed to make even the payment prescribed on the so-called "active reparations debt"; in 1922 she asked for a moratorium and the French and British Governments disagreed entirely as to the action to be taken: France entered the Ruhr, and Germany plunged into public bankruptcy. The events of that unhappy period taught their own lesson, as none of the European Governments emerged unscathed.

When the Dawes program was drafted in 1924 as one of the greatest business experiments of all time, the full amount to be paid was not fixed, nor was the time limit, since the information on which to base a valid conclusion did not exist; nor, if it had existed, would the prejudice and friction of the day have permitted a wise decision on those points and the probable outcome of any effort to fix a total would have been the rejection of the whole program by some of the signatories, thus closing the door to an adjustment that has brought obvious benefits to all concerned.

Since Mr. Gilbert's first suggestion of revision M. Poincare has insisted that the Germans must pay as long as the Allies pay, which is about 62 years, unless Germany can mobilize her indebtedness in a shorter time in sufficient amounts to guarantee allied payments to America, plus the reconstruction amount. He intimated that this might be accomplished by permitting her to sell, in the open market, about $4,000,000,000 of German railway and industrial securities created by the Dawes plan. A plan much discussed in this connection provides for the marketing in the near future of perhaps one-fourth of these bonds for the purpose of discounting the last 25 years' allied payments to America and thus bringing the period over which Germany would pay to the same length as the period during which the Allies must pay, as the German railway and industrial bonds would run 37 years, the term originally assumed for operation of the Dawes plan.

It is apparent that these calculations depend primarily upon American cooperation since Europe's inability to absorb the flotation of German securities is well recognized, and the money market of the United States is the only one capable of taking them up. There is much speculation as to whether the State Department, when asked by bankers as to the advisability of such a flotation, would find objection to it. It is thought, however, that if these bonds were guaranteed by France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium, as well as Germany, there might be no objection, since this would be similar to the transaction wherein a debtor to whom money is owed passes over promissory notes with his own indorsement and thus increases the guarantee by two signatures instead of one. The belief has also prevailed that unless France should ratify the Mellon-Berenger agreement on the French debt to the United States, American aid would be refused in floating the bonds. It is understood, however, that this matter was discussed in the conference in Paris and that Premier Poincare will request Parliament to ratify the agreement made between the United States and France in 1926 which fixed the funded debt at $4,025,000,000. Since France is now meeting war-debt payments with perfect regularity according to this agreement, ratification seems only a logical step.

Whether or not the German bonds could be absorbed by the American market is a question upon which there is much disagreement, but the possibilities have not yet been fully explored. One contention is that if no other foreign bonds were taken by American investors, probably $2,000,000,000 of the German securities could be absorbed in a single year.

This phase of the question can not be worked out until the foreign nations have made a final settlement of the reparations problem among themselves. The date of the conference has not yet been fixed, but it is expected that the constitution of the committee will be completed early in November and that Germany, after conferring with the other countries, will then fix the date of the meeting for the latter part of November or early days of December.

It is far too early to speculate upon what provisions the experts may suggest. The important fact is that a start has been made and made in an atmosphere of mutual conciliation, for France has recognized Germany's right to the early withdrawal of the alien troops in her territory, long assumed as inevitable, but it is none the less a concession from the French point of view; Germany has at least tacitly admitted that this question is not altogether unrelated to her war payments, which is a German concession; and all the powers are agreed that only by fixing Germany's total indebtedness can the economic development of Europe proceed on an orderly basis.

(NOTE.—*In connection with the above article the following is quoted from the speech made by President Coolidge on November 11, 1928. It clearly states the position of the United States with regard to the reparations settlement.*)

Our Duty to Europe.

We have heard an impressive amount of discussion concerning our duty to Europe. Our own people have supplied considerable quantities of it. Europe itself has expressed very definite ideas on this subject. We do have such duties. We have acknowledged them and tried to meet them.

They are not all on one side, however. They are mutual. We have sometimes been reproached for lecturing Europe, but probably ours are not the only people who sometimes engage in gratuitous criticism and advice. We have also been charged with pursuing a policy of isolation. We are not the only people, either, who desire to give their attention to their own affairs. It is quite evident that both of these claims can not be true. I think no informed person at home or abroad would blame us for not intervening in affairs which are peculiarly the concern of others to adjust, or when we are asked for help for stating clearly the terms on which we are willing to respond.

Immediately following the war we went to the rescue of friend and foe alike in Europe on the grounds of humanity. Later our experts joined with their experts in making a temporary adjustment of German reparations and securing the evacuation of the Ruhr. Our people lent $110,000,000 to Germany to put that plan into immediate effect.

Since 1924 Germany has paid on reparations above $1,300,000,000, and our people have lent to national, state, and municipal governments and to corporations in Germany a little over $1,100,000,000.

It could not be claimed that this money is the entire source from which reparations have been directly paid, but it must have been a large factor in rendering Germany able to pay. We also lent large sums to the governments and corporations of other countries to aid in their financial rehabilitation.

I have several times stated that such ought to be our policy. But there is little reason for sending capital abroad while rates for money in London and Paris are at 4 or 5 per cent, while ours are much higher. England is placing very considerable loans abroad; France has had large credits abroad, some of which have been called home. Both are making very large outlays for military purposes.

Europe, on the whole, has arrived at a state of financial stability and prosperity where it can not be said we are called on to help or act much beyond a strict business basis. The needs of our own people require that any further advances by us must have most careful consideration.

NAVAL

THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMIRAL RAEDER TO SUCCEED ADMIRAL ZENKER AS CHIEF OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

As reported, Admiral Zenker, chief of the German Navy Department, retired on October 1. His relief is Vice Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, former commandant of the Baltic naval station. Vice Admiral Raeder entered the navy in 1894 and during the war served as chief of staff of the commander in chief of the scouting forces, Admiral Hipper, and took part in the Battle of Jutland.

CHINA

POLITICAL

CURRENT PHASES OF THE NATIONALIST RÉGIME.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

Four months of peace of a sort have now prevailed in China since the victorious entry of the Nationalist armies into Peking. This statement does not take into consideration the recent successful operations by Nationalist forces against remnants of the former northern armies south of the Great Wall, nor the minor skirmishes between rival military chieftains in distant Szechwan Province, nor the frequent forays against so-called communists and bandits in various parts of the country. True peace China probably will not know for many years, but with the cessation of actual civil war came, the Nationalists aver, the end of the period of the revolution and the beginning of the period of reconstruction and political tutelage, both periods having been outlined by Dr. Sun Yat-sen as necessary preliminaries to the building of a new state on the basis of his "three people's principles"—nationalism, democracy, and socialism, or the people's livelihood.

During these four months it is notable that the Nationalist military commanders have maintained the operating unity which made the northern victory possible and have even gathered in political conference with civilian leaders of the Government. The small amount of actual accomplishment, however, when there is so much to be done, is particularly incomprehensible to the occidental mind accustomed to orderly and efficacious governmental procedure. In considering current phases of China's development, therefore, it is encouraging to read the following excerpt from an article in a leading newspaper of Shanghai, the British-owned North China Daily News, which has been one of the frankest critics of the Nationalist movement:

> It is only in recent years that a section of the Chinese people conveniently called Nationalists * * * has really begun to think politically. And when we consider how short the time they have been doing so and how barren their background, we should rather admire the real headway that has been made than only deplore the chaos temporarily inseparable from it * * * many other peoples have had to tread the way along which they are now struggling, and * * * how great a similarity exists between China's misfortunes and their own earlier chapters.

From this standpoint the current attempts of the Nationalists to lay the foundations of the new state are not altogether failures

The chief interest among these attempts is the fifth plenary session of the central executive committee, the highest authority of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, which took place in August with a degree of harmony that was doubly surprising to the many observers who had even doubted that a quorum of the 36 members could be secured for the meeting. There were serious differences of opinion, it is true, and perhaps permanent withdrawals of some of the members, but the important fact is that the moderates retained control of the party and government. What success was achieved was due in no small part to the mediation efforts of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, the ostensible commander in chief of the Nationalist armies, who appears now to be aspiring to civilian honors.

It has been said that if the resolutions adopted by the plenary session could be effectuated within a reasonable period, China would eventually take her place among the world's important powers. In the spectacle of the enlightened few trying to lift the great bulk of the Chinese Nation out of the age-old habits of feudalism, with its attendant selfishness, ignorance, and ineptitude, we have, perhaps, the key to the current situation in China. To execute the reconstruction proposals adopted by the committee there would be required, first of all, a well-developed public opinion—and Chinese public opinion is just now in the making—a not surprising fact when it is remembered that from the standpoint of literacy alone China is about where Europe was at the time of the Renaissance. The world should be prepared, therefore, for the inevitable stumblings of the infant régime.

Foremost among the more tangible results of the plenary session is the plan for reorganization of the Government, which is now being put into effect. The present supreme authority, it would appear, is the central executive committee and next below it is the Nationalist Government council which supposedly will function in the intervals between plenary sessions. In the third step down there are administrative, legislative, and judicial departments (called boards), to which the Nationalists wisely have added the typically Chinese institutions of examining and supervisory boards. The first of these latter is analogous to the civil service of the west, and the second functions in a monitory or censorial capacity. Under the administrative board will be arranged special bureaus and the usual portfolios of a modern government. Complicated though the new system is, according to western ideas, still it is simpler than the committee system adopted under Russian tutelage; hence is being hailed as a definite step away from Soviet methods.

Criticism is being directed toward the apparently self-perpetuating power of the central executive committee. The majority of its members were originally elected for one year by the second national congress of the Kuomintang Party in January, 1926, in accordance with the former system. Other members have since been expelled or elected as circumstances required. The committee has justified its present extralegal position on the ground of emergency conditions; but it is not yet clear whether it will voluntarily submit itself to rejection or confirmation by the third national congress which is scheduled for January next. Significantly, the congress at present appears to have no authority to convene except at the call of the committee; but it may be that the draft of the new constitution, which was authorized by the plenary session for presentation to the January congress, may provide for some check on the present supreme powers of the central executive committee in governmental affairs.

The plenary session also approved the disbandment proposals of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, which included unification of military administration, adoption of conscription, and reduction of existing armies to a point where the total military expenses would not exceed 50 per cent of the Government's income. The ultimate success of the Nationalist régime will depend upon the execution of this plan; but the issues involved are not alone technical, but moral, psychologic, political, and economic. Despite the lip service rendered to the principle of disbandment immediately after the capture of Peking by the four commanding generals cooperating in the northern campaign, there has been little or no disposition to put it into practice. It is reliably reported, on the contrary, that recruiting has been going on almost uninterruptedly in some armies. The differences manifested at the plenary session, moreover, made it clear that the several military leaders, as in times past, will not permit an early submission to a central authority where armies are concerned.

One important obstacle to disbandment is the prevailing uncertainty as to the future moves of Feng Yu-hsiang, the one-time "Christian General," whose forces are credited with being the best trained and best disciplined among Chinese armies. Feng himself, however, despite his personal honesty, vigor, and simplicity, is distrusted by his fellow militarists because of his opportunistic tactics of other years, which he has explained as having been for China's good at the time, as he saw it. At present he is extending his influence in north China by means of military occupation and political appointment to such a degree that the unaggressive Yen Hsi-shan, "model governor" of Shansi Province, is withdrawing his troops from the Peking-Tientsin area originally assigned him for garrison purposes. There are those, however, who believe that Feng's rugged virtues and efficiency would have a salutary effect on the present chaos and corruption if the Chinese were disposed to accept a dictatorship.

While the Nationalists are struggling to solve their colossal domestic problems, they are not hesitating to attack the many vexing issues in the realm of foreign affairs, and here the outlook is not entirely discouraging. No solution has been reached of the deadlock with Japan on the question of the Chinese abrogation of the Sino-Japanese commercial treaty of 1896; yet Nanking appears to have found a basis for relations with Manchuria, in spite of Tokyo's interdiction against unification of the latter area with Nationalist China proper. All the foreign nations involved in the Nanking incident of March, 1927, except Japan have reached a settlement with the Nationalist Government on that question. The tariff treaty signed with the United States has been widely heralded, and now a similar treaty has been signed with Germany, which has, in addition, lately dispatched a permanent envoy to Nanking. Further, as an instance of the moderation now prevailing in the Nationalist Government, the latter has just reappointed the present officiating inspector general of the Chinese maritime customs, an Englishman, in accordance with the practice always followed. A less far-sighted government might have appointed a Chinese inspector general to carry out the present Nationalist tariff autonomy program, thus creating untold confusion in the service, to say nothing of complications with foreign governments.

Despite the successes of the Nationalist Government—not inconsiderable in the face of the difficulties involved—doubt is expressed in many quarters as to the future of the present régime in view of reliable reports that Nanking's authority does not extend far beyond the capital city. Most local, civil, or military authorities in the various Provinces appear to administer affairs with only slight regard for the central government. This follows along the path which the Chinese have trod for centuries and foreshadows the long period of political tutelage necessary for the attainment of the modern nation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's ideals. The present situation is logical under the circumstances, and perhaps not without benefit to the Kuomintang Party, which is too much occupied with the more pressing domestic and foreign problems to undertake the task of enforcing upon the Chinese masses a centralized authority they have never known.

REPORT OF TOUR OF CHINA FROM JUNE TO SEPTEMBER, 1928, BY LIEUT. CLARENCE MARTIN, U. S. NAVAL RESERVE (I–V–S).

First impressions of Shanghai are that business has not been greatly depressed by reason of the almost constant civil warfare in China, and inquiry tends to support this view; building is progressing at an astonishing rate and water-borne commerce has increased steadily during the past four years, which have been the most trying. Under this surface of activity, however, there is a very decided feeling of uncertainty as to the attitude of the various governments toward the demands of the Nationalist Chinese for the abrogation of the extraterritorial and customs treaties.

The course the Chinese would pursue if given a free hand in regulating foreign business and property rights is naturally the big and disturbing question in the minds of all foreign business men in China. Practically all of the foreign problems in China are concentrated in the Shanghai district, which with its tremendous commerce and foreign investment presents a difficult problem for settlement, and an intelligent discussion of this problem would take more time than the few days I spent in that vicinity.

In explanation of the following I will say that I have been doing business with a German firm in Shantung Province, where the members of the firm have made their homes for from 15 to 20 years.

The head of this organization, Mr. A. Boerter, has an intimate knowledge of North China, has many friends among the Chinese, and the nature of his business has given him an opportunity for observation of Chinese affairs that is seldom equaled.

I spent several days in Tsingtao and proceeded by train to Tsinanfu in company with Mr. Boerter. The occupation of Tsinanfu last May by Japanese troops brought a crisis between China and Japan that has not yet been settled, and which exceeded any previous difficulty between the two nations in the intensity of hatred which it engendered. The actual motives for the move on Tsinanfu are, of course, known only to the Japanese Government, but it is interesting to hear the discussions and explanations, some of them given out by representatives of the Japanese in China. The most common, and, of course, the most plausible is that the action was necessary to protect the lives and property of the Japanese nationals.

Under this there is a very strong undercurrent of the theory that the Japanese did not want the southern Chinese armies to advance within striking distance of the three northern Provinces—Manchuria—where they have so much at stake.

At the same time there was being circulated a very persistent rumor—more of a charge than a rumor—that the Japanese had engineered the death of Chang Tso Lin in Mukden because he had shown a tendency to treat with the southern forces and might have accomplished an alliance with them.

It is certain that the occupation of Tsinanfu, with the resulting deaths of so many of the Chinese natives of the city, roused a storm of hatred against the Japanese, which has made itself evident even to the smallest Japanese merchant, and the feeling has not been confined by any means to the Chinese.

In this connection it is interesting to hear the comment of Major Stockwell, editor of the Tsingtao Times, which is typical of the English and American expression:

> The Japanese have finally awakened to the fact that the whole world mistrusts and despises them and now, with the Tsinanfu incident, where they were entirely justified in what they did, they find themselves universally hated on their past record. But now they realize what their position is, and every move they make now is designed to gain the confidence and respect of the nations of the world. And they are particularly careful here at the heart of things.
>
> I have very frequent visits from the Japanese intelligence officers, who give me reports on what their Government is doing, and I know that every newspaper in the China ports receives similar visits. They are doing everything they can to place their Government in a favorable light in the eyes of the other nations. They give frequent social functions, and always include the leading men of other nationalities.

My own observation of the situation in Tsinanfu is that it is a very difficult one for the Japanese. Practically all of the foreign residents are genuinely gratified that the Japanese came in when they did and gave protection to foreign property and lives. The town marks the nominal division between the control of the southern forces and that of the northern troops. At the time of my visit there the Japanese were still enforcing martial law, had sentries posted at important street corners, and required all traffic on the streets to cease at 9 p. m. With all of their precautions, it was more or less of a common thing to be awakened in the early hours of the morning with shooting and after dawn to learn that some sentry had been shot from the shadow of a building. My host remarked that the southern sympathizers thought the best form of sport in town was to creep up on a Japanese sentry in the dark, empty an automatic pistol at him, and "then run like hell!"

Significance of Tsinanfu.

The situation in Tsinanfu, while it is tense and troublesome, is one that holds more for the future peace of China than any other spot in the nation. First, it is apparently the buffer that Japan has set up against the movement against Mukden, where her influence in Manchuria might be jeopardized. It is the terminus of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, which Japan controls, and, what is most important of all, it is the seat of a great deal of the traffic which passes through Shantung Province. In the recent readjustment of territory given to the various Chinese generals, Fung Yu Shen (the so-called Christian general), was given Shantung Province. Normally this would have been a rich prize with the enormous revenue possible from the taxes which could be collected on the traffic, but with the Japanese in control of not only the only seaport—Tsingtao—the railway and the terminus of Tsinanfu, as well, it only leaves Fung a hollow shell, and his possibilities of revenue are limited to the interior only. The opinion of those men in Shantung Province who are acquainted with the local conditions is that Fung will demand a reapportionment of territory with at least one seaport and, failing in this, will start a counter-revolution to get what he wants.

Unfortunately for the peace of the country, he commands sufficient troops to upset the nation in severe action, if not to enforce his demands, and in the event these are granted, it will mean territory taken away from other of the victorious generals and it will lead to the same vicious circle of more fighting. During September Fung was concentrating his troops and making polite demands at the Nanking conference for his wishes.

Tsinanfu is in the center of one of the most fertile regions in China; its produce of cotton, kafir corn, millet, beef, wool, hides, etc., make it of great importance to foreign commerce, as well as a prize to the Chinese general strong enough to seize and hold it.

Tientsin.

In company with Mr. Boerter I made a trip to Tientsin via the Yenchen-Tientsin Railway. The bridge over the Yellow River at Yenchang had been partially destroyed by the retreating northern troops and the whole system was in a deplorable state of disrepair. The normal trip of about 6 hours took about 14 and with the most wretched equipment I have ever seen.

The territory was overrun with southern troops stationed at each little town and the trains crowded with men returning to their homes or rejoining their regiments.

On this trip we passed three very large troop trains, and inquiries made of the men in each were answered to the effect that they were to concentrate in the vicinity of Tientsin and wait for a movement on Mukden, the movement which was interrupted by the Japanese occupation of Tsinanfu.

How much truth there was in this statement it would be impossible to say, for it might have been pure "bunk" given to the troops to hold their morale.

Troops.

The striking feature of the troops seen on this trip was their extreme youth. We saw hundreds of boys hardly large enough to carry their equipment, yet decked out in uniforms and expected to take their part in the next skirmish. Mr. Boerter talked with a number of the men and found that the propaganda work of the Nationalists has been carried to a very high degree in their army. They feel that they are fighting for a united China, to free their country from the oppression of the foreigner—in short, they have something that has been hardly known before, and that is patriotism. We found, also, men in the troops from almost all classes—distinct from the old Chinese idea that a soldier was a grade lower than a coolie. With each body of troops there are several civilian workers who would take the place of our own intelligence men, but whose duty it is to spread the doctrines of the Nationalist Party.

Information.

There are doubtless many other men like Mr. Boerter similarly situated in other parts of China who could give first-hand authentic information on Chinese affairs. It was my observation that the American consuls who would normally be expected to gather information are interested only in the commercial affairs until the military situations become really serious.

The decided isolation of the country makes it difficult to obtain clear information of a district a few hundred miles distant. In the first place, there is no well-organized news service for public information, and the lack of communication facilities has made it extremely difficult for correct information to reach the seaports. There is an opportunity, however, through the several commercial houses to gather the loose ends together.

SPAIN

POLITICAL

THE "NEW SPAIN" IN THE MAKING.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

In order to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the coup d'état of September 13, 1923, a demonstration of public homage and gratitude to Gen. Primo de Rivera for his services to the country and of confidence in the Government took place in Madrid on September 13. The demonstration, arranged by the Union Patriotica, the political organization created by the director to assist him in the discharge of public affairs, consisted of groups of representatives from every Province and every social condition throughout Spain, many arrayed in typical local costumes, with bands and banners, all of which provided a brilliant background for the general's picture of "national unity."

In Spain, as in Italy, the man is the main element in politics, and if this be true in ordinary times it applies with particular force to a virtual "dictatorship." No account can be rendered of the present political state of Spain without a close examination of the man at the helm.

When on September 13, 1923, Gen. Primo de Rivera started on his career as a dictator he announced that he would stay at most 90 days. He is still in office, and his latest pronouncement postpones his retirement for at least two years more and as much longer as he considers it necessary in order to perfect the work of the dictatorship. Yet he was wholly sincere in 1923—sincerity, perhaps, is the outstanding virtue of the Spanish dictator. He is a truly representative man, resembling the mass enough for the people to recognize themselves in him, yet rising above them sufficiently to carry the burden of representation. His personal traits of character have made him very popular throughout Spain. Above the traits which stamp him as one of the many there are qualities which make him one above the mass; first, his courage, both physical and moral, his spirit of sacrifice for the country, and his straightforward and honest policy; then his generosity, for he bears no grudge either against those who wrong him or against those he has wronged. He is a man of much feeling, who although in possession of uncommon energy is loath to resort to the violent suppression of political enemies. It is chiefly for these reasons that his continuance in power is desired by the majority of the nation, notwithstanding the indifference and lack of political interest which distinguish the Spanish masses.

Scion of an old Spanish family, Primo de Rivera began his career under favorable circumstances. His early military activities were so successful that he became a great favorite with the army, and as a result of his successful campaigning King Alfonso rewarded him with the governorship of Madrid. A great friendship grew up between the King and the general, which inflamed the jealousy and aroused the ire of the older Spanish generals over whom he had been promoted. They formed a cabal to oust him from power, finally forcing the King to dismiss him from Madrid. To compensate him he was made captain general of the rebellious Province of Catalonia, which he administered from 1919 to 1923. Here he finally succeeded in suppressing to a certain extent syndicalist and autonomist movements. Camped in this outpost in Barcelona, he was able to view his country in a certain perspective. He regarded with alarm the corruption in politics, the inefficiency in government, and the failure of justice. He saw Spain's position in world affairs again weakening. It was upon such a scene of disorder and demoralization that he set out on September 13, 1923, with the cheers of the Catalonians ringing in his ears and the army at his back to make his official entrance into Madrid, calling on his Sovereign, the army and the navy, and all Spaniards loyal to the interests of their country to rally to his support and overthrow the professional politicians who were "menacing Spain with a speedy, tragic, and dishonorable end." Within three days after he issued his manifesto the former cabinet resigned, the King dissolved the Cortes (Parliament), and Gen. Primo de Rivera was the government.

Gen. Primo de Rivera believes himself to be Spain's savior and the leader of a new Spanish order, but he is representative not of the "old régime"—i. e., of the restoration—but the "very old régime"—i. e., the era of pronunciamientos, which covers practically the middle third of the nineteenth century. He belongs to the dynasty which gave Spain Riego, Espartero, O'Donnell, Narvaez, Prim, Pavia, Martinez Campos. No doubt he is a man of his century in many ways, but he descends from that line, just as King Alfonso, also a man of his century, descends from that line which gave Spain Ferdinand VII and Isabel II. With his usual insight and courage he has absorbed twentieth century elements from the atmosphere of his day. His originality lies in that he can not be easily classed either as a liberal or as a reactionary leader. He is seen as a liberal in municipal affairs, rather a socialist in labor matters, a conservative in constitutional ideas, a reactionary in education, an opportunist in military administration, and a truly spiritual leader in the Moroccan affair. He works by instinct and inspiration. His system is wish the best, work for the best, hope for the best. His motto is "Country, religion, monarchy."

The history of the Spanish dictatorship falls naturally into two periods. From September, 1923, until December, 1925, it was governed by a military directorate of nine generals and one admiral; from December, 1925, onward it was constituted as a cabinet under the monarchy—as a council of ministers. In actual fact the difference amounted to very little, since most of the undersecretaries who managed the departments under the directorate became ministers in the council.

The Moroccan question took most of the time and energy of the dictator during the first period. He went to Morocco, waged a successful campaign against the Moors, and came back, popular as ever and still strongly intrenched. His record in Morocco must stand as his indisputable right to the gratitude of his country. From that time onward he was free to devote himself to home affairs.

In internal reforms his efforts fall under two categories—day-to-day government and measures for the constitution of a new political system. As to the first, the dictatorship can not be judged as a unit, for it has no unity, and its work depends very much on the particular merits of the minister in charge of each department. The positive results of the work of the director are found in the Departments of Public Works, Finance, and Labor, while the negative side comes mainly from the Departments of Justice and Education. The new régime has failed to lessen the dependence of justice on politics, which was one of the glaring defects of the old. As for education, history repeats itself with unfailing monotony, and the dictatorship has gradually given over the department to the most reactionary tendencies.

The censoring of the press, too, and the doing away with gambling have not met with universal favor; but despite these facts there is comparatively little open opposition to a dictatorship that has restored the nation's finances to a sound condition, replaced terrorism in certain localities by order, and given a new breadth to Spain's industry and commerce.

The situation in which Spain finds herself to-day, politically speaking, approaches a dilemma. Gen. Primo de Rivera has been promising for the past five years a return to some form of representative government. The postponement of this action has been accounted for by the need of regulating the country's finances and of setting Spain's house in order after many long years of dilatory and corrupt political procedure on the part of the old-time line politicians. Some of the elements of difficulty associated with the transition from a dictatorial régime to something resembling parliamentary conditions are the provisions of the constitution of 1876 which have been abrogated by the dictatorship, the delicate position occupied by the King vis-à-vis the present directorate, and his even more trying position in the transition back to a more popular form of government.

Last year, on the eve of the anniversary of De Rivera's coup d'etat, King Alfonso signed, in Sebastian, the long-awaited decree convoking a national assembly, marking the second stage of the dictatorship. This consultative assembly is a body of some 400 men and women appointed by the municipal bodies, provincial deputations, and representatives in the field of commerce, agriculture, industry, literature, arts, and science, all of whom are members of the Union Patriotica and all personally selected by Primo de Rivera. This assembly does not enjoy legislative powers nor does it participate in the sovereignty of the nation, as did the Cortes; its powers are strictly consultative. It is an endeavor on the part of the existing régime to pass to a more constitutional administration by peaceful evolution. Its principal function is to study present economic conditions with a view to framing a new constitution in keeping with the progress and future development of Spain. The politicians who were excluded from any part in the assembly and the enemies of De Rivera pronounced this announced purpose of the assembly to be a mere pretext for abolishing the old constitution, under which they claim the entire rule of Primo de Rivera is unconstitutional, and for regularizing under the monarchy the constitutional status of the dictatorial régime.

The rather sudden decision taken by the general in July to remain in power indefinitely and to put off until 1930 any return to constitutionalism has increased rather than diminished the political unrest. But the dictatorship lasts for a number of reasons. It is representative of a certain type of simple political mind; its leader has solved the Moroccan problem; its labor policy is on the whole acceptable to the working classes; it has military strength behind it; it prevents all political life by suppressing news and views which might be injurious to its life, thus blocking the way to any possible alternatives to the present system; finally, the grave problems implied by the situation are put to a nation which has been tried by more than a century of political strife and which has learned to look before it leaps—to revolution. The greatest weakness of the Spanish dictatorship lies not in any doubt of its ability to maintain itself, but in the fact that it does not constitute, as Fascism does in Italy, a constructive political system or, for that matter, pretend to be a political system at all.

There is no question but that the dictatorship has raised the tone of Spanish national life. It was hailed as a hopeful sign by public-spirited men unconnected with the old parliamentary system. There is a vigor, an ambition, in Gen. Primo de Rivera to make Spain a great nation, and he rules all parts of the land with an iron hand and commands the obedience of all Spaniards. Pride and dignity, which are the leading characteristics of the Spanish character, do not harmonize with dictation and repression. In principle the ideals of the Spanish people can not accept a dictatorial government; nevertheless, they must accept it, because even the most politically passive of peoples tire some day of being led nowhere. Even the most complacent of governments can not mark time forever.

NAVAL

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPANISH NAVY.

(*Article by the Secretary of the Spanish Navy*)

The Directory has occupied itself with the navy from the time that it took over the Government, understanding itself and making the people understand that, if the back of Spain is turned on the sea in contempt, if they do not realize the large, rich things offered to them on the horizon of this said sea, then they should deserve to disappear from the nations of the earth, victim of their own insensibility.

With the ardent patriotism of the premier as an incentive, the Government, which was installed in December, 1925, has constantly nursed the idea of naval increase. Other things have now been cleared away, and the idea is being put into practice, with the hope and promise that the marine of Spain will not again become stagnant.

I am not going to enumerate, or even speak of, the advance that has taken place during the time that the Directory and the present Government has been in control, this having been done many times and especially on the occasion of the anniversary of the twenty-fifth year of rule of our present august monarch. These are some of the most important things that have taken place: A commencement at Ferrol, of two units, which form a part of the program of 1926—modified in May of this year—together with a direct policy laid out by the Directory for the carrying out of this same program in other yards.

Another thing which has been an incentive is the voyages that have been and are being made by the vessels of our navy. The *Sebastian Elcano*, training ship for midshipmen and cadets, is on her way to South America on the solemn mission to deliver ensigns for the two destroyers, built in our dockyards, which are now to become a part of the navy of a glorious sister nation. By her presence on that occasion this beautiful Spanish vessel, the product of our nation's industry, will tend to contribute to and maintain the sacred fire of friendship which ties us to Argentina.

Our personnel also continues the good work in specializing in all branches, not only land but at sea, where specialization is very necessary to make perfect the present modern naval vessels. The technical personnel has been augmented and is being improved constantly, so that every day the number of experts and officers which we have been supporting from foreign countries is being reduced. In other words, we are advancing every day toward a complete nationalization of our naval industry.

Our merchant marine deserves and is also receiving attention from the Government and advances are being made in the number and condition of the ships and the morale of the personnel attached thereto.

In other words, the Spanish marine is getting ready to take its place among the nations of the world as required by our national necessities; and when this is attained, it is only just to confess that Spain will owe it, not only to the vigilance and perseverance of the Government but also to our august sovereign, Don Alfonso XIII, who since the first hours of his reign has endeavored to keep before the Spanish Nation the necessity for a love of the sea and a respect and admiration for the loyal and patriotic men of our navy, whose faith in the service has enabled us, against tremendous disadvantages, to retain our position as a leading nation. And it is this same Don Alfonso who has kept up the spirit of the personnel and made them realize the high mission which has been placed in their hands.

THE MARITIME POLICY.

(The consensus of opinion in Madrid is that this article was inspired or written by Primo de Rivera.)

Spain will occupy the sixth place amongst the great naval powers.

"Money spent on ships is money lost. It is money thrown into the sea." A wrong idea has been bolstered up by this prejudice in the minds of the common people. And it is certain that during the time that all these international conferences are being held and pacifist laws passed naval dockyards continue to work at their full capacity. In order to confirm this it is only necessary to emphasize what is taking place in Europe. Great Britain has just added the *Nelson* and the *Rodney* to her fleet, being the largest warships in the world, and in her Parliament houses new naval programs are always under discussion; only just recently France held a naval review at Brest, in which more than 20 units of a new order of construction took part—cruisers, flotilla leaders, squadron torpedo boats, and submarines; Italy has just held a review of her aero, naval forces, and the dockyards at Leghorn, Castellamare, and Spezzia are kept hard at it in order to carry out the plan of new ships worked out by the Fascist Government; and even Germany, in spite of the restrictions imposed at Versailles, is constructing new ships to replace old units.

It is therefore not astonishing that our country should be preoccupied with its navy, and that it continues in this manner a history that has only been interrupted for short intervals. It was Maura and Ferrandez who in 1908 undertook the difficult enterprise of reconstructing our navy. This patriotic object was thwarted by the great war and the insufficiency of our naval industry, which to-day possesses all the best conditions for production. The present Government has strengthened the naval policy by giving it a single enlightened control, so that the ships will be constructed along uniform technical lines and the fleet have a degree of instruction that is both possible and necessary. The credit of 600,000,000 pesetas that has been voted will permit our navy to possess excellent elements. In an American periodical—without attributing an official value to the figures, but simply that of a "press" value—we observe a plan of construction which comprises, according to the article in question, 2 battleships of 25,000 tons, being of a reduced *Nelson* type, 3 *Washington*, 6 large flotilla leaders, and 12 submarines. If this plan or one similar is carried out, by taking into account the latest statistics, Spain will occupy the sixth place amongst the world's navies.

With regard to the degree of instruction, money voted, and dockyards, we are on a level with the first naval powers. Two concrete instances may be cited: The admirable voyage of the destroyer *Alsedo* following that of the *Plus Ultra*, and the repairing in a few days of the *Le Velasco* when she put in at Alhucemas. The national naval industry has made such progress that it is now capable of carrying out in a few months' work that, previously, required five years of labor.

Spain is thus following, along the road, in the track of the greatest European powers. And only this summer, on the occasion of the visit of his majesty the King and the Minister of Marine to some of the warships and submarine squadron, the value of our war units was remarked upon, the sums voted merited all the congratulations that were offered.

This is a fact which confirms the flourishing condition of our fleet and the tendency toward a greater development, which is the characteristic of an essentially maritime country like ours.

And the president of the ministerial council, during the recent visit to Ferrol, publicly announced that "the immediate construction of two large warships" was being proceeded with, which "with other units under consideration will give to our navy the desired value and necessary weight (tonnage) in the world concert." Such official statements exclude all comment.

It is necessary, at times, by putting to one side less important political themes, to deal in the press with these great national questions. Our time will not have been lost if we are thus able to draw the attention of a great number of readers to realities of this kind. which have—we would repeat—in spite of persistent generous efforts, and unquestionable and well-known importance.

TURKEY

NAVAL

TURKISH NAVAL PROGRAM.

A copy of a communication has been obtained through unofficial sources from the minister of national defense, in which he submits specifications for tenders for new Turkish naval construction.

The Turkish Government has recently informed certain concerns and Government contractors of its desire to enter into contracts with foreign shipbuilding concerns for the construction of certain naval equipment, namely: 4 torpedo-boat destroyers, 5 submarines, 1 mine-carrying submarine, 6 submarine chasers.

In the communication from the ministry of national defense announcing the intention of the Government to place orders for the above naval craft it was stated that deliveries were to be made as quickly as possible and that favorable consideration would be given to the firms offering the most advantageous credit terms.

As a rule the announcement of adjudications is made in the Official Gazette or in the various daily newspapers. In this case, however, no public announcement was made by the Government of its intention to place this order nor was it announced that the Government would receive bids for such craft.

SPECIFICATIONS.

Two torpedo-boat destroyers:
- Speed in knots, 36; 40.
- Radius of action at 15 knots, 4.000 miles.
- Armament—
  - Guns—
    - Four 4.6-inch.
    - Two 1.5-inch.
    - Two 30–30 caliber (machine guns).
- Torpedo tubes: Six 21-inch (triple).
- To carry at least 40 mines and 10 depth charges, with necessary laying arrangements.
- To install wireless telegraphy, underwater sounding signal (transmitter and receiver), underwater noise listening apparatus and artificial fog apparatus; all in latest practice and system.

Three submarines:
  Speed in knots, 14.5 surface; 9.5 submerged.
  Radius of action—
    Surface radius at 10 knots, not less than 4,000 nautical miles.
    Submerged radius at 5 knots, not less than 100 nautical miles.
  Armament—
    Torpedo tubes—bow, 4; stern, 2; dimensions, 21 inches.
    Guns—
      One 4-inch.
      One 1-pounder.

To install wireless telegraphy, underwater sounding signal (transmitter and receiver), underwater noise listening apparatus, and artificial fog apparatus, all in latest practice and system.

One submarine:
  Speed in knots: 14.5 surface; 9.5 submerged.
  Radius of action—
    Surface radius at 10 knots, not less than 4,000 nautical miles.
    Submerged radius at 5 knots, not less than 100 nautical miles.
  Armament—
    Torpedo tubes: Two in No. 21-inch.
    Guns:
      One 4-inch.
      One 1-pounder.

To install wireless telegraphy, underwater sounding signal (transmitter and receiver), underwater noise listening apparatus, all in latest practice and system. This boat will carry 40 mines.

Six submarine chasers:
  Type I—
    Speed, 30 knots.
    Armament—
      Gun: One 1-pounder.
      Depth charges: 20 (10 included in design displacement). Depth charges so arranged that in case of necessity one of the two 18-inch torpedo-tube arrangements can be replaced.
  Type II—
    Speed, 32 knots.
    Armament—
      Guns—
        One 3-inch.
        One machine gun.
      Torpedo tubes: Two 18-inch.
      Depth charges: 6 to 10.

To install wireless telegraphy, underwater listening apparatus, and artificial fog apparatus, all in latest practice and system.

NOTE.—Torpedo-boat destroyers, submarines, and submarine chasers are to be least possible tonnage.

RUSSIA

NAVAL

REPORT OF COMMISSION FOR IMPROVING BALTIC FLEET.

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

The special commission which was appointed "to discover special means for raising the battle efficiency of the Baltic Fleet" has submitted the following report:

Report by the president of the extraordinary commission for increasing preparedness for war of naval forces of Baltic Sea attached to Directorate of Naval Forces RKKF

To the PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR MILITARY AND NAVAL AFFAIRS:

The inspection of vessels has shown that the Baltic Fleet, as at present composed, is not sufficiently capable of conducting fighting operations. This will, in the event of war, enable our presumed enemies to make use of all means at their disposal with very small possibility of failure.

In view of the absence of new construction the state of the fleet is deteriorating in quality, to say nothing of the fact that it can not compare with the annually increasing naval forces of foreign powers.

The commission considers it essential to reexamine that portion of the budget of the Directorate of Naval Forces RKKF for 1928–29 which deals with construction and repair of vessels, and the manufacture and repair of gun and torpedo material. The sums assigned do not in any degree correspond with the program laid down for the naval defense of the Union.

Bearing in mind that the construction of battleships would, judging by the state of shipbuilding works, appear to be impossible of realization, at any rate in the next few years, the commission brings to your attention the following scheme for an altered program which can be realized in the course of five years:

1. The construction of four battle cruisers.
2. The construction of not less than two light cruisers.
3. The construction of six destroyers and four submarines.

With this end in view, the commission requests that the sum of $225,000,000, which will be the cost of carrying out this program, be assigned in the following manner:

$100,000,000 to be assigned immediately and to be expended on the construction of:

1. Four battle cruisers. Preliminary estimate, $80,000,000.
2. Gun and torpedo portions of the four battle cruisers enumerated in paragraph 1. Preliminary estimate, $20,000,000.

$125,000,000 to be assigned during the coming five years after the battle cruisers have been laid down.

In so far as concerns the establishment of an operations base, the commission considers it essential to appoint a special commission to examine in all its phases the reconditioning and enlargement of the Kronstadt and Leningrad Harbors.

With reference to Kronstadt, the commission's tasks would include the following items:

1. Conclusions on the possibility of completing the armament of vessels.
2. Conclusions on the possibility of carrying out repairs to all parts of vessels.
3. Examination of existing stores of inviolable reserves, and also of fuel, lubricating oils, and other kinds of fleet stores.
4. A draft of their conclusions on the subject of construction of buildings in addition to those indicated in paragraph 3.
5. Thorough inspection of the artillery armament of Kronstadt.

With reference to Leningrad Harbor:

1. Inspection of existing workshops with a view to their repair and necessary expansion.
2. Construction of new depots for articles necessary for naval warfare.
3. Inspection of stores of fuel and decision as to the necessity of their repair or enlargement.
4. Draft of their conclusions as to an increase in harbor craft and means of loading.

In the opinion of the commission the suggested measures are very important and can no longer suffer postponement, in view of which I request that the present views be submitted to the budget commission of the TSIK SSSR for examination immediately.

MUKLEVITCH,
Chief of Naval Forces RKKF.

SPECIAL ARTICLE

IS IT PERMISSIBLE UNDER WASHINGTON TREATY TO POSTPONE LAYING DOWN REPLACEMENT BATTLESHIPS BEYOND YEAR SCHEDULED IN THE TREATY?

The British Government has interpreted the provisions of the treaty relative to the laying down of replacement capital ships to mean that replacement capital ships must be laid down during the exact year scheduled in the treaty or they must be abandoned, i. e., that the treaty prohibits any postponement in the scheduled laying-down date. This interpretation is of interest to the United States in considering the question of the laying down of two replacement battleships in 1931. If our interpretation of the treaty is the same, the doubt as to whether or not Congress will appropriate funds for these replacement ships is removed, as no Congress will refuse to appropriate, if such refusal results in entirely abandoning such replacement ships.

DATA FOR STATEMENT REGARDING BRITISH ATTITUDE.

In 1922 when the laying down of the *Nelson* and *Rodney* was under consideration, the point was made that if the laying down of these ships was delayed better ships could be obtained because of the advance in engineering and ship design, etc. Lord Lee, of

Fareham, one of the delegates to the Washington conference, speaking in the House of Lords December 6, 1922, said in this connection:

> I do not want to say anything on this occasion with regard to the technical implications of the treaty and its schedules, but it is perfectly plain to me as one of those who signed the treaty, and it was perfectly plain to the board of admiralty when I was associated with it, that it is not open to us under the terms of the treaty to postpone the building of these ships. We have either to abandon them altogether, and to tell the world and the Empire that we can not afford to keep up the 1-power standard and must be content to fall to the third rank of naval powers, or we must build these ships. Of course, it is open to this country to say that we can not afford to keep up the 1-power standard, if it is so desired, but we are not able to postpone the building of these ships.
>
> The schedule which was drawn up, and which formed the subject of prolonged negotiations and consideration at Washington, was based upon actual dates, and for this reason, unless the dates on which various powers might lay down ships were fixed, it might be open to any power to postpone, and to take advantage of that postponement in order to introduce even greater development of naval science, and to produce ships which would not in fact bear any relation in strength to the ships of other powers of which they were supposed to be the equivalent. If once you start upon a system of trying to postpone, in order to get better ships later on, you will be not only breaking the treaty but arousing the suspicion of every admiralty in the world, and, I think, giving ground, and good ground, for suspecting the good faith of the British Government and the British Admiralty in this matter.

PART OF TREATY PERTINENT.

The parts of the Washington treaty bearing on the question are quoted below:

> (a) "The replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers shall take place according to the rules in Section I and the tables in Section II of this part." (Ch. II, pt. 3.)
>
> (b) "Capital ships and aircraft carriers 20 years after the date of their completion may, except as otherwise provided * * * in the tables of Section II of this part, be replaced by new construction * * *. The keels of such new construction may, except as otherwise provided * * * in the tables of Section II of this part, be laid down not earlier than 17 years from the date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced * * *." (Sec. I, pt. 3, par. (a).)
>
> (c) Tables in Section II, part 3, are not quoted because of their length, but these tables specify the year of laying down and the year of completion of replacement ships and the year of scrapping ships replaced.
>
> (d) "In the case of vessels to be scrapped the work of rendering the vessels incapable of further warlike service * * * shall be commenced not later than the date of completion of its successor * * *. If, however, the completion of the new vessel be delayed, then the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of further warlike service shall be commenced within four years from the laying of the keel of the new vessel." (Pt. 2, Art. IV, par. (b).)

COMMENT.

The question as to how the treaty is to be interpreted resolves itself into whether or not the tables of Section II are hard and fast schedules as to dates of laying down, completion, and scrapping of capital ships. The section quoted in (d) above provides for the contingency of a delay in date of completion and alters the scrapping schedule accordingly, but there is no provision for a delay in the date of laying down.

Another interesting question which arises as a corollary of the question regarding postponement in laying down is, If the replacement ships are not laid down, must the ships scheduled for scrapping in the tables of Section II be scrapped notwithstanding?

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
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FOR CONVENIENCE IN ROUTING

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Executive Officer			
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First Lieutenant			
Engineer Officer			
Asst. F. C. Officer			
Communication Officer			
Medical Officer			
Supply Officer			
First Division Officer			
Second Division Officer			
Third Division Officer			
Fourth Division Officer			
Fifth Division Officer			
Sixth Division Officer			
Marine Officer			
"V" Division Officer			
"A" Division Officer			
"B" Division Officer			
"E" Division Officer			
"M" Division Officer			
"N" Division Officer			
"R" Division Officer			
Radio Officer			

The material for the BULLETIN is largely derived from service sources and its interest and value are correspondingly dependent upon the number and character of the reports received by the Office of Naval Intelligence from our own officers. In this connection the observations of officers afloat are of great value, particularly if the reports rendered are drawn up in accordance with existing intelligence instructions.

While political and economic information is undoubtedly of much use, the collection of naval information should come first in the intelligence work of cruising ships.

" The idea that 'intelligence' consists in the collection of a mass of fact which other countries desire to keep secret is not the case. A great proportion of the intelligence required for a modern war plan is public property in the country of its origin. It only requires collecting and sifting."

—(*Imperial Defense, by S. King-Hall.*)

NOTICE

In anticipation of the proposed visit of the fleet to South America during the spring of 1929, this issue of the MONTHLY INFORMATION BULLETIN is a special number covering Chile and Peru.

It is the desire of the Office of Naval Intelligence to furnish up-to-date information to the personnel of the fleet, so that the political, economic, naval, and military situations in these countries can be readily understood and intelligently discussed.

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CHILE



M.I.D., G.S., U.S.A., 1926. MAP NO. 122-B

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CHILE

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The name "Chile" is probably derived from the Quichua word "Chiri," meaning cold, or from "Tchile," a word of the same language, meaning snow.

Chile is located along the western South American coast and extends for a distance of about 2,700 miles from the Sama River, the northern boundary in approximately 18° south latitude, to Cape Horn, about 55° south latitude. Transporting her coast line to the Northern Hemisphere it would extend from Seward, Alaska, to the southern end of Lower California. The width of the country varies from 65 to nearly 250 miles. The coast line of the Republic is 23 times greater than its average breadth. It has an area of approximately 292,500 square miles and is situated along a narrow stretch of land between the Andes and the Pacific Ocean.

The climate of the country is modified by the influence of the Humboldt Current sweeping northward from the Strait of Magellan.

The Republic may be divided geographically into four distinct divisions as follows:

The northern or desert zone, extending from 17° 15′ to 27° south latitude. This zone is virtually rainless and barren of vegetation. For a distance of 600 miles southward no river enters the sea. This desert country has an altitude of from 5,000 to 7,000 feet. Within this region are located the nitrate belt, the greatest natural wealth of the Republic, and very extensive deposits of copper, especially those found at the mines of the Chile Copper Co. at Chuquicamata.

The second, or mineral zone, extends southward from the first zone for a distance of 700 miles. The country is generally arid, although there is a fair amount of cultivation in the central valley. Minerals of all descriptions are found in this district.

The south-central, or agricultural zone, extends from 33° to 42° south latitude, and in this area is included the rich and fertile central valley, crossed by several important rivers. The climate here is temperate, rain abundant, and the soil is so fertile that this region has been called the "Garden of Chile." Ample coal for Chile's need, besides vast timber areas, are located in this zone.

The southern, or island zone, extends from latitude 42° South to Cape Horn. This district, which includes part of the island of Tierra del Fuego and the Territory of Magallanes, is the cattle and sheep raising area of the Republic as well as the location of immense forests reserves. This zone is thinly populated.

The Republic of Chile is divided into the following provinces, departments and territories:

Province of Tacna: Capital, Tacna; departments, Tacna and Arica.

Province of Tarapaca: Capital, Iquique; departments, Pisagua and Iquique.

Province of Antofagasta: Capital, Antofagasta; departments, Tocopilla, Loa, Antofagasta, and Taltal.

Province of Atacama: Capital, Copiapó; departments, Charanal, Copiapó, and Huasco; capital, Vallenar.

Province of Coquimbo: Capital, Serena; departments, Serena, Elqui, Ovalle, and Illapel.

Province of Aconcagua: Capital, Valparaiso; departments, Petorca, San Felipe, Andes, Quillota, and Valparaiso.

Province of Santiago: Capital, Santiago; departments, Santiago, Melipilla, and Maipo.

Province of Colchagua: Capital, Rancagua; departments, Rancagua, Cochapoal, Caupolican, San Fernando, and Santa Cruz.

Province of Talca: Capital, Talca; departments, Curicó, Lontús, Talca, and Mataquito; capital, Curepto.

Province of Maule: Capital, Linares; departments, Loncómilla, Linares, Parral, Constitucion, and Cauquenes.

Province of Nuble: Capital, Chillan; departments, San Carlos, Chillan, Yungay, Bulnes, and Itata.

Province of Concepcion: Capital, Concepcion; departments, Tomé, Concepcion, Yumbel (Rere), Coronel and Arauco; capital, Lebu.

Province of Bio-Bio: Capital Los Angeles; departments, Laja, Mulchen, and Angol.

Province of Cautin: Capital, Temuco; departments, Traiguen, Victoria, Lautaro, Temuco, Imperial, and Villarrica.

Province of Valdivia: Capital, Valdivia; departments, Valdivia, La Union, and Osorno.

Province of Chiloe: Capital, Puerto Montt; departments, Llanquihue, Ancud, and Castro.

Territory of Aysen: Capital, Port Aysen.

Territory of Magallanes: Capital, Magallanes (Punta Arenas); departments, Natales, Magallanes, and Tierra del Fuego.

POPULATION, GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE, AND LANGUAGE

The population of Chile is estimated to be about 4,000,000.

The following approximation of other nationalities residing in Chile:

Spaniards	30,000	French	8,000
Italians	15,000	British	8,000
Germans	15,000	Argentines	7,500
Bolivians	15,000	Turks	7,000
Peruvians	12,000	Americans	2,000

There are very few Chinese and Japanese, and practically no African population; 47 per cent of the population is urban and 53 per cent rural.

The Chilean is the distinct race formed of the union of the native Indian and whites. In the beginning the white element was pure Spanish descendants of the early explorers, who founded Valdivia in 1540. Other nationalities eventually came from the northern countries of Europe and, more recently, from the United States. These immigrants have intermarried, but the fundamental elements remain predominantly Indian and Spanish.

The general national characteristics of the Chileans may be summarized as follows: Great tendency to be visionary; spend much time in talking and are slow in getting down to business; are somewhat less excitable than other Latin American races; in general, the people are improvident; are great gamblers; promises held lightly and dishonesty general; much drinking done among all classes.

The upper class includes the landed proprietors and professional men. This class is educated and celebrated for their politeness and hospitality. The middle class is made up mainly of the foreign population, which controls a large part of the mercantile business. The Chilean peons comprise the largest element of the population, forming the greater part of the working class. They are hardy, vigorous and excellent workmen, with great patience and endurance. Their greatest fault is that they drink to excess when they can, and are hot-headed and quarrelsome.

Spanish is the national language of Chile. In diplomatic circles after Spanish, French is the language most commonly used. It is noticeable among the Chileans that while many of them know English and speak it fairly well, they are reluctant to use it unless it is impossible to use Spanish. They will use French more readily. English is spoken in many shops both in Santiago and Valparaiso, and in general in the large cities on the coast.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE

Diplomatic Representatives.

The United States in 1811 sent Joel Poinsett as our diplomatic representative to Chile in the capacity of consul, although he was not officially received as such until 1812. About the same time Don Manuel de Aguirre was sent from Chile to the United States as confidential agent to purchase arms and supplies and to promote the progress of Chile's cause of independence from the mother country.

Poinsett was succeeded in 1818 by Bland, who was sent there for the purpose of obtaining all available information pertaining to Chile as a help to the United States in formulating its future foreign policy.

Our first minister to Chile was sent there in 1824, in the person of Mr. Heman Allen. Chile was unable to reciprocate with a minister until August 10, 1827, when Don Joaquin Campino was appointed to the post.

Mr. Allen, on setting out upon his mission, was instructed by President Adams to seek an adjustment of American claims pending against Chile. The *Macedonian* case was considered the most important. He likewise was given the power to conclude a commercial treaty. In 1827 Minister Allen was granted a recall to the United States at his own request. He failed to accomplish the main object of his mission in settling claims. He did, however, create more friendly relations in political circles, and the recognition of the rights of American citizens in that country.

A treaty of peace, amity, commerce and navigation between the two countries was signed on May 16, 1832, and approved by our Senate on December 19, 1833.

Mr. Richard Pollard, an American chargé, was on duty in Chile from March, 1835, to June, 1842. His mission may be considered the most successful one up to that date, its chief result being the settlement of the most important of our international claims against Chile after a negotiation of 20 years.

External Influences.

The outcome of the Mexican War with the cession of California to the United States had an important influence on the international relations with Chile at that time. The discovery of gold in 1849 and the rapid development of California as a State stimulated Chilean commerce with the United States by creating a market for Chilean wheat and other agricultural products.

The "*Macedonian*" affair, a question of 40 years standing, was disposed of May, 1863.

The period from 1844 to 1860 was one in which many irritating instances arose and resulted in a period of strained relations between the two countries.

The period immediately following 1860 shows a distinct change for the better in our relations with Chile. The facts contributing to this change were the Civil War and the imperialism of Napoleon III of France.

The next effort of importance in our relations with Chile was war between Spain and an alliance composed of Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Spain attempted to secure control of the valuable guano deposits of the Cincha Islands off the coast of Peru, which precipitated hostilities. Mr. Thomas H. Nelson, our minister to Chile, exerted his best efforts to avoid a conflict and continued to use the good offers of this country in restoring peace, and for his services the Chilean Government was very grateful.

United States Policy.

The foreign policy of the United States during the Chilean-Peruvian war was a consistent observer of the rights of the belligerents and neutrals. At the time of the occupation of Arica in southern Peru by Chile, efforts at mediation were made by the United States. The prospect of European intervention, if affairs became too serious on the Pacific, was not welcome to our traditional policy. A conference of Chilean, Peruvian, Bolivian, and United States delegates was held on board the U. S. S. *Lackawanna* off the port of Arica on October 22, 1880, but resulted in a distinct failure due to the clash of attitudes taken by the participants. Several attempts were made by this country to settle the dispute, all of which ended in failure, and as a result of our diplomatic efforts the United States was discredited in the eyes of Latin America. In partial extenuation of our failures it may be recalled that the untimely deaths of President Garfield and of Generals Kilpatrick and Hurlbut, diplomatic representatives to Chile and Peru respectively, unavoidably complicated the situation, which still remains a problem for solution.

In 1891, during President Balmaceda's struggle with Congress and which resulted in a short civil war, the American minister at Santiago gave protection to certain followers of Balmaceda. The steamer *Itata*, carrying arms for the Congressionalists, was seized in San Diego Harbor, and after escaping was forced to return with its cargo. These two incidents with various subsidiary ones caused the Congressionalists, the victors in the civil war, to feel resentment toward the United States.

The "Baltimore" Affair.

Shortly after the close of the Chilean civil war of 1891 the U. S. S. *Baltimore* was in the port of Valparaiso. On the afternoon of October

16, 120 men were granted liberty ashore. No trouble occurred until the latter part of the afternoon. The trouble apparently arose about 5 p. m. in a saloon called "The True Blue," when a dispute arose between a Chilean sailor and two American bluejackets. A Chilean spat in the face of an apprentice seaman by the name of Talbot: the latter knocked the Chilean down. A grand mêlée arose and as a result 2 American sailors died and 16 were wounded. Chilean authorities also arrested 36 of our men, treating many of them with brutality. An investigation disclosed that the attack was probably premeditated, and the police and local authorieties failed to take the necessary steps to protect our sailors and to apprehend the attackers, as they would naturally be expected under the circumstances. A series of diplomatic notes were exchanged in regard to this affair. The Chilean foreign office was at first dilatory and later imputed untruth and insincerity to our President and to the Secretary of the Navy in their official communications to the Congress of the United States. Our Government immediately demanded that the insulting remarks be retracted and a suitable apology offered, otherwise diplomatic relations would be promptly terminated. The Chilean President recognized that his Government had committed a serious blunder and made the necessary amends to restore harmony. The American minister to Chile notified our Secretary of State on July 11, 1892, that Chile had offered $75,000 in gold as indemnity, requesting it be distributed among the families of the deceased and those who had suffered personal injuries in the *Baltimore* incident. This offer was accepted by the United States as a full settlement of the affair. This incident still rankles, and whenever occasion presents itself it is pointed out as an example of American overbearing arbitrariness. Be this as it may, it is certain that more disastrous results would have followed weaker action on the part of our Government. The popular and even the official attitude in Chile continued hostile some time after the *Baltimore* incident. After the departure of the U. S. S. *Baltimore* from Chile, the U. S. S. *Yorktown* under Commander R. D. Evans was left to care for the United States interests. The next two incidents occurred during his stay in those waters, which introduced the decisive character of the late Admiral Evans. In one case a boat from the *Yorktown* going ashore for supplies was stoned by some of the rowdy element. Commander Evans, therefore, notified the commander of the Chilean war vessels in that port that on the repetition of such an act he would arm his boats and shoot anyone insulting him, his men, or his flag. No further trouble of that sort occurred. At a later date Chilean torpedo boats in their movements in the harbor persisted in passing close aboard to the *Yorktown* as nearly to collide, thus indicating a contemptuous indifference to the ship and her commander in the presence of war vessels of other countries in the harbor. Commander Evans protested against this nuisance, but received a sneering reply to the effect that Chilean ships could go where they chose in Chilean waters, to which Commander Evans promptly rejoined that, granting this, the *Yorktown* was the property of his Government, and if a Chilean war vessel even scratched the paint of his ship he would " blow her bottom out." The annoyance ceased from that time.

It may be incidentally recalled that some of the anti-American feeling at the time was possibly fostered by the German residents there by their loose talk about the helplessness and insignificance of the United States. Apparently high officials were led to believe that, in case of war between the United States and Chile, Germany would come to the assistance of Chile.

Our action in backing Venezuela in the boundary dispute against Great Britain in 1895 was looked upon favorably and helped to smooth over the *Baltimore* incident.

The latest and most far-reaching relations between the two countries is that growing out of the Tacna-Arica affair, which remains unsettled. The sincere efforts of the mediator has been a thankless task; and the earnest efforts and good intentions of our Government to solve this question amicably will never be fully appreciated by either country involved in the controversy.

The diplomatic relations between Chile and the United States during the past few months have apparently taken a turn for the better, and there has not been for some time such cordial relations as exist to-day.

POLITICAL ESTIMATE

Chile has a republican form of Government and is a representative democracy. The basic laws of the nation are contained in a written constitution, promulgated May 25, 1833, but since replaced by a new constitution, which became effective October 18, 1925.

The sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, which delegated its exercise to the authorities established by the constitution. The supreme powers of government are vested in three distinct branches—legislative, executive, and judicial.

The President of the Republic must be native born, not less than 30 years of age, and is elected by direct vote of citizens enjoying the right of suffrage. His term of office is for six years, and can not serve two consecutive terms. The President is not authorized to leave the country without the consent of Congress. There is no vice president. In the event of the death or disability of the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate acts in the capacity temporarily as vice president.

The President is assisted in the administration of the Government by a cabinet of 10 ministers, whose entire confidence he possesses, since he is free to appoint and remove them at will. The present membership of the Cabinet is as follows:

Minister of the Interior	Guillermo E. Matte.
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Conrado R. Gallardo.
Minister of Education	Eduardo Barrios.
Minister of Justice	Osvaldo Koch.
Minister of War	Gen. Bartolomé Blanche.
Minister of Marine	Comdr. Carlos Frodden.
Minister of Fomento	Luis Schmidt.
Minister of Social Welfare	Luis Carvajal.
Postmaster General	Enrique Castillo.

The national Congress is composed of the Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Senators must be at least 35 years of age, and are elected by direct vote as representatives of groups of provinces, for a term of eight years. There are nine groups and each group is entitled to five Senators. One-half of the Senate is renewed every four years. The qualifications for deputies are the same as those for senators. The term of deputy is for four years. The Chamber of Deputies is renewed totally every four years. Deputies are elected by direct vote as representatives of departments or groups of adjacent departments within a province. There is one deputy for every 30,000 inhabitants or fractions of that number.

The judicial administration comprises a supreme court of justice, courts of appeal, courts of first instance, courts of justice and of peace, and courts of alcaldes and higher police officers. The supreme court of justice, of 11 members, sits in Santiago. The eight courts of appeal sit in Santiago, Iquikui, Valparaiso, La Serena, Talca, Concepcion, Valdivia, and Temuco. The courts of first instance sit in the capitals of the Departments. The executive is represented in each Department by a public prosecutor, who initiates criminal and civil prosecutions and is an officer under the direction of the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior.

In general, the exclusive powers of Congress are to approve or disapprove the annual public budget, authorize the President to absent himself from the country, pass upon the resignation or disability of the President, ratify or reject treaties presented by the President, determine the land and sea forces to be maintained in peace and war, declare war upon the recommendation of the President, etc.

In the executive repose the responsibilities and powers incident to the authentication and promulgation of all laws and the issuance of regulations, orders, or instructions necessary for their execution; the power to adjourn the ordinary sessions of Congress and call it to special session; appoint cabinet ministers, diplomatic representatives, intendentes and governors, magistrates of the higher courts, and judges; dispose of the land and naval forces; declare war when so authorized by a law. Provisions are made by which the President submits a budget which has to be accepted, rejected, or modified by Congress within four months of its presentation.

The new Chilean Constitution provides for a change from the parliamentary to a presidential form of government, following more closely that of the United States, with such variations as are considered necessary to meet different conditions in Chile as well as the temperament of the Chileans.

In general, the Government of Chile is very highly centralized at the capital. Provinces and Departments have comparatively little independence in government. The Provinces are administered by intendentes and the departments by gobernadores, both appointees of the national executive. The subdelegacies are governed by subdelegados appointed by the governors and the districts by inspectors appointed by the subdelegates.

Chile has probably a clearer record as regards revolts and revolutions than any other Latin American country. The first real clash between the parliamentary and the presidential systems came in 1891, in the administration of President Balmaceda, that resulted in civil war in which the parliamentarians came out victorious. From that time on the system became more impracticable, and the masses demanded and gained greater participation in the Government.

President Alessandri felt the need of more executive power and continually advocated a change in the constitution to this effect. The Congress became so absorbed in party politics and so opposed to the executive that the military coup d'êtats and bloodless revolutions of September, 1924, and January, 1925, took place, and a new constitution, which included the presidential system and the principle of decentralization, was adopted September 18, 1925.

For a short period after President Figueroa's inauguration the affairs of the nation appeared to be tranquil, then it became evident that governmental and political conditions were drifting back to the old system.

The executive became hopelessly deadlocked with Congress and cabinet. The military authorities stepped into the breach and forced the resignation of the cabinet. Eventually Colonel Ibañez was appointed premier and became a dictator in name only. He initiated a reform campaign of far-reaching consequences. A chain of circumstances caused the President to resign and left the Government in the hands of Colonel Ibañez as Vice President. In the election held on May 22, 1927, he was unanimously elected President of the Republic.

It is generally conceded that President Ibañez is the best available man for the position, and the only one who can maintain order and bring about confidence and the establishment of an honest and efficient government.

The policies of the Ibañez administration center around political reform and economic stability, besides the firm purpose of governing the country according to the constitution. In his annual message to Congress in 1927 he stressed his avowed purpose of purifying Chilean politics—a plan he has pursued for some months past. The new administration set its face firmly against the spread of radicalism in Chile.

The economic situation has been quite serious, money has been tight, with Government expenses exceeding revenues. The crisis in the nitrate industry has caused a serious loss in revenues, besides throwing thousands of laborers out of employment. As a result of some of the reform measures carried out, material savings have been made in governmental expenses. Legislation pertaining to the following projects have been accomplished: Nitrate, petroleum, taxes on real estate; reform of law of municipalities and judicial action on treaties; and agrarian bank. Several other projects of law are still pending before Congress.

Originally there were two political parties in Chile, the Liberals and Conservatives, being separated by religious questions only. Since 1861 the more advanced Liberals gradually separated from their party and began calling themselves Radicals, advocating the most advanced reforms, namely, the separation of church and state. The Liberals remained in power for over 20 years, until 1891 when the party split, some of the Liberals and Radicals remaining loyal to the President, who was the recognized head of the Liberal party; a large number, however, formed a coalition with the Conservatives against Balmaceda. Since that date there have been created the following Liberal groups: Liberal Doctrinaires; Liberal Democrats; Liberal Democrats of the Union; Liberal Democrats of the Alliance; Nationals.

Due to these subdivisions and lack of well-defined differences it can not be said at present that any party has any great power or importance. President Ibañez has announced "that my Government is of no political party; it is neither Conservative, Liberal, Radical, Democrat, nor Communist, but this Government is inspired by new modern economico-social concepts."

Chile's attitude on specific American and international combinations and doctrines may be briefly stated as follows:

Pan Americanism.—Not a strong supporter; in fact, does not think much of it. Is suspicious of the motives of the United States in promoting Pan Americanism.

Monroe Doctrine.—Thinks less of this than Pan Americanism. Resents the assumed authority of the United States in imposing this doctrine, and is suspicious of it objects.

League of Nations.—Is losing interest in this institution. Can see nothing in it for Chile—all for Europe. Not specially flattered by being given a nonpermanent seat.

Pan Latinism.—Government not interested. Support not gaining.

Pan Iberianism.—Stronger than Pan Latinism.

The General pact for the renunciation of war.—Chile has not yet signified her intentions in regards to this treaty. She at present is temporarily immersed in the Tacna-Arica dispute, but our Government has no reason to believe that Chile will not eventually adhere to the treaty.

The delay in adherence by the A B C powers may possibly be explained by the method in which our Senate disposes of the matter. and whether that body makes any interpretation in reference to the Monroe Doctrine.

For many years Chile's foreign affairs have revolved mainly around her relations with Peru-Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil.

In general, Chilean-Argentina relationships are at present, while cordial enough on the surface, controlled by mutual distrust and suspicion.

It is believed for economic reasons, Chile is desirous of cultivating more friendly relations with Peru. The recent opening of the Tacna frontier under advantageous conditions for mutual commercial intercourse; the cordial relations of the Chilean and Peruvian delegates at Sixth Pan American Conference held at Cuba in January, 1928; and finally, at the suggestion of Secretary Kellogg, the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries which was severed 18 years ago. At least it indicates a more conciliatory attitude toward both Peru and our own country.

Chilean-Bolivian relations have long centered around Bolivia's contention for a Pacific port and the revision of her treaty of 1904 with Chile. On May 13, 1928, Chile delivered to Bolivia the latter's section of the Arica-La Paz Railway, fulfilling the last pending clause of the 1904 treaty.

The Chilean-Brazilian relations have for many years been close. The two countries have had acute boundary disputes with Argentina, and although these disputes have been settled for some time, there still exists a common policy between Chile and Brazil of opposition toward and watchful waiting as regards Argentina.

ECONOMIC ESTIMATE

Chile's chief economic importance is as a producer of raw materials, notably minerals and mineral substances. The country is practically self-sustaining as to food and is rapidly becoming self-sustaining as regards the essential manufactured and fabricated products.

Chile is self-sustaining as regards the essential foodstuffs. Sugar may be said to be the only essential food that Chile is at present under the necessity of importing. Rice is at present imported in large quantities, but is not essential food, especially in a country that has a large potato production. Beef, in the form of live animals, is at present imported in considerable quantities from Argentina and Bolivia, but this is a question of accessibility and of comparative prices rather than of necessity. The Republic can always draw on her tremendous reserve of mutton. Chile at present has a surplus of foodstuffs for export, notably in wheat, barley, and beans, besides the large surplus of mutton.

The chief source of Chilean wealth is mining. This includes almost every variety of mineral, but certain kinds are of outstanding importance.

Chile possesses the world's greatest and practically the only extensive deposit of nitrate (saltpeter)—an essential constituent in all military explosives. The deposits contain sufficient reserves to satisfy the world's need for more than two centuries.

Chile is a nation rich in developed and undeveloped copper ore. She stands second in the world's copper production.

Iron ore is found in several of the Provinces of Chile.

The production of wool is the principal industry in the Territory of Magallanes and also reaches considerable importance in the central region.

Chile is one of the few South American countries possessing coal. The output in recent years has been a little over 1,000,000 tons, which hardly meets the country's demands.

Petroleum has not yet been found in Chile in commercial quantities.

Due to the absence of an iron and steel industry Chile at present is not so self-sustaining as regards manufactured and fabricated articles. There are a number of important woolen mills, cotton mills, and tanneries which do a considerable business. Explosives are manufactured on a large scale at Calama for the service of the mining industry. The Compania Electrico-Siderurgica e Industrial de Valdivia has been organized for the purpose of manufacturing pig iron and steel from native raw materials.

The prosperity and well-being of Chilean commerce fluctuates with the condition of a single industry, the production of nitrate of soda. Chile's commerce is conducted mostly with the following countries: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy. The trade of the United States with Chile for the 12 months ending June 30, 1927, and 1928, was as follows:

	1927	1928	
Imports from Chile	$63, 854, 359	$68, 605, 651	(an increase of 7.44 per cent)
Exports from United States to Chile	41, 669, 713	37, 994, 190	(a decrease of 8.82 per cent)

The trade balance of Chile for the year 1927 was $75,000,000 in her favor.

The highways, completed and under construction, extend some 30,000 miles and are especially good in the central valley from Santiago to Temuco, where they serve in conjunction with the Longitudinal Railroad. The road and bridge system is being extended southwards to Puerto Montt and in the nitrate fields.

Chile is well provided with railways, having better rail facilities than any other South American country. The Longitudinal Railway extends from Pisagua south to Puerto Montt, and has a number of transverse lines, branching therefrom to the principal seaports, and others to mining settlements in the mountains. The Republic contains the termini of three international lines, two extended into Bolivia and one into Argentina. The line from Valparaiso to Los Andes, via Santiago, has recently been electrified.

Regular ocean steamship lines connect Chile with the east coast of South America via the Strait of Magellan, and northerly through the Panama Canal. The ports are enumerated in the following order according to records of the greatest tonnage: Valparaiso, Iquique, Antofagasta, Talcahuano, San Antonio, Arica, Pisagua, Tocopilla, Taltal, Caldera, Huasco, Coquimbo, Coronel, Valdivia, Ancud, Puerto Montt, and Punta Arenas (the latter name recently changed to Magallanes).

As a result of the successful stabilization of the finances, the Government was able to end the year 1927 with a small surplus, after a long succession of annual deficits. The budget estimates for 1928 and 1929 show a surplus of $2,420,000 and $4,235,000, respectively.

The currency since January 11, 1926, has been upon a gold basis. The par value of the peso is 40 to the pound sterling and 8.129 to the United States dollar. The 10-pesos unit is called a condor. Gold coins are in the denominations of 20, 50, and 100 pesos (2, 5, and 10 condors, respectively). The expressions "condor" and "peso" are both used. Silver coins are legal tender in settlement of private obligations in amounts up to 50 pesos in one payment. Silver coins are in the denominations of one-half peso (50 centavos), 1 peso, 2 pesos, and 5 pesos. Nickel coins are in the denominations of 5, 10, and 20 centavos. The Banco Central of Chile has issued paper notes in the value of 1,000, 500, 100, 50, 10, and 5 pesos.

The major portion of the Government's income is derived from export duty on nitrate and its customs duties. The estimates of the expenditures and receipts for the budget of 1928 are as follows:

Revenues	$117,987,400
Expenditures	115,966,130

Chile, like most new countries, early realized the need of foreign capital, and the assistance of business and professional men of other countries. To obtain these, attractive profits and treatment were accorded foreign capital and enterprises up to a few years ago. Since that date many new laws have been passed subjecting foreign and national business enterprises to most stringent regulations. The present debt of Chile is about $356,000,000 gold. The public wealth of Chile has been estimated by an authoritative party at $5,000,000,000. The total foreign investments in Chile are estimated at $1,192,085,000 and are held by the following countries:

Countries:	
United States	$526,085,000
British	351,000,000
German	100,000,000
Spanish	80,000,000
Italian	60,000,000
French	45,000,000
All others	30,000,000
Total	1,192,085,000

Although Chile owes her present economic importance largely to foreign capital and energy, and is practically dependent upon foreign capital to increase her economic capacity, she maintains an independent foreign policy which is based strictly upon expediency. At the present time Chilean policies are guided more by British influence than any other power.

The financial barometer of the country is the nitrate industry, on which the Government depends for a large part of its revenues. For Chile to maintain her standing there should exist a fair certainty that the nitrate trade remains normal and Chile's monopoly of this product be permanently maintained.

COMMERCIAL AVIATION

The aeronautical situation in Chile has suffered greatly from political interference and the efforts of the navy to divorce itself from the army in connection with aviation. Commercial aviation is therefore in an early stage, no commercial air routes being in operation at the present time.

Early in April of this year the Minister of Industry brought up with the Ministers of War and of the Navy a proposition to establish an aerial line between Iquique, Antofagasta, and Valparaiso, using naval and military pilots, to keep down the cost of service and postage on mail. The Minister of the Navy detailed two naval aviation officers to cooperate with an engineer detailed by the Minister of Industry to work out a project of aero commercial navigation between these points, but nothing further has been heard of it. In a commercial sense, this is the only concrete case of Government initiative, and there is nothing to date to indicate that Chilean commercial interests have taken any action toward the development of industrial aviation.

Two contracts, however, have recently been signed by the Chilean Government with the Societe Latecoere, one for carrying the mail by air between Chile and Argentina, and the other for carrying Chilean mail by air from Argentina to Uruguay, Brazil, Africa, and France, thus completing the company's trans-Atlantic service from Europe to the west coast. These contracts are very liberal ones for the French company and do not indicate much chance for competition in case all stipulations are complied with.

BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY FORCES

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

Compulsory service in the army has been in effect for 17 years and it is strictly and impartially enforced.

The strength of the regular army is composed of 1.204 officers and 26,000 enlisted men.

The division is the largest unit maintained in the army. There are 5 infantry divisions, each composed of headquarters and 2 reinforced brigades. A reinforced brigade is composed of brigade headquarters, 3 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of artillery, 1 battalion of sappers, and 1 train company.

The present organization of the combat arms is as follows:

Infantry.—Sixteen regiments and three mounted battalions.

Cavalry.—Eight regiments. The existing regiments of cavalry are grouped into 3 brigades consisting of (2 or 3 regiments each, and 1 or 2 regiments), 1 group of horse artillery (2 batteries), and 1 section of mounted sappers. The 3 brigades are grouped into a cavalry division.

Field artillery.—Five regiments; 3 mounted artillery groups and 3 horse artillery groups.

Air service.—One regiment. There are 24 rated pilots. The only equipped army flying field is at El Bosque, about 7 miles south of

Santiago. Hangars will house about 40 planes. The plan is to have eventually 3 such fields, 1 at Concepcion, 1 at Santiago, and 1 at Antofagasta, with advanced landing fields at Iquique and Calama in the north, and certain advance fields in the south of Concepcion. The army aviation has about 75 planes of various makes.

Engineers.—Four battalions.

Combat and auxiliary services.—One railroad regiment, 1 battalion communication troops, 5 train battalions, quartermaster corps, ordnance department, and medical corps.

The Carabineros of Chile consists of 768 officers and 19,232 enlisted men, making a total of 20,000. This force consists of Carabineros, fiscal police, and municipal police, they having recently been combined into one force under the above-mentioned name. They are recruited from selected personnel which has been furloughed to the reserve of the army, and are organized into squadrons, groups, and regiments. The Carabineros of Chile are under the direct control of the Minister of the Interior, the senior member of the cabinet, and form a strong and efficient force for the maintainence of internal order or for immediate use in case of any emergency, national or political.

It is estimated that the number of trained reserves is 177,000.

The individual equipment consists of the .30-caliber Mauser rifle and carbine and Stayer pistol.

The organization equipment consists of the Colt .30-caliber automatic rifles, Hotchkiss .30-caliber machine guns; also Colt-Browning machine guns. The artillery consists of 2.7-inch, 3-inch, and 4.5-inch Krupp guns and howitzers; 3-inch Schneider mountain guns; also 4.5-inch and 6-inch Schneider howitzers.

Chile is divided into six military zones; each territorial command functions under the direct control of the Minister of War. The headquarters of these zones are located at the following places:

First	Iquique.	Fourth	Concepcion.
Second	Valparaiso.	Fifth	Valdivia.
Third	Santiago.	Sixth	Magallanes (Punta Arenas).

Efficiency and morale.—Discipline suffered somewhat during the last two revolutions. Although energetic steps were taken to improve the discipline, so far enlisted men have shown few signs of infractions of discipline. The permanent troops are hardened soldiers and the conscripts look upon service in the army as a privilege. Officers are well educated and in general capable. Their relations with enlisted men follow the German system. Morale of troops is good and the Chilean is good fighting material. Training is excellent.

NAVAL ESTIMATE

DIAGRAM OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION OF CHILE



I. NAVY

Organization.

COORDINATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

The President is the commander in chief of the armed forces of Chile. The Chilean law provides for a council of national defense which ordinarily will meet twice a year, or in extraordinary sessions, at such times as may be designated by the Executive of the Republic. It is composed of civil and military personnel.

The council of national defense is composed of the President, all members of his cabinet, inspector generals of the army and navy, and chiefs of the general staff of the army and navy. Other high ranking officers of the army and navy are assigned as technical advisers.

The matters which will be especially considered by the council are divided into the following general subjects: (*a*) The general plan of military and naval policy, in accordance with the international policy of the country; (*b*) general organization of the nation in the event of war; (*c*) supply and transportation; (*d*) manufactures of all kinds; (*e*) aeronautics; (*f*) hygiene and social welfare; and (*g*) communications in general. Each of the general headings heretofore mentioned are further subdivided into their various phases and are investigated and reported upon to the council by special committees.

The council of national defense will be dissolved when mobilization is ordered.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

The navy department is under the Minister of Marine, who ordinarily is a civilian. In the reorganization of the navy department in May, 1927, the President appointed a commander of the Chilean Navy as Minister of Marine, who while assuming that position in the cabinet, holds flag rank. In the presidential decree the Minister of Marine was directed to assume the duties and functions which at present pertain to the director general of the navy and naval council. The advisory board, naval missions abroad, and naval stations come directly under the Minister of Marine.

The subsecretariat, which is under the control of a civilian, performs the duty of secretariat general of the navy. The legal department of the navy forms an integral part of this office. It is required by law to keep the Minister of Marine advised on legal and judicial matters which relate to the naval service. The subsecretariat will be secretary of the advisory board.

The Minister of Marine controls the administration of the navy department through the following directorates, departments, and sections. The directors will be chosen from not below the rank of captain ("capitan de navio"); chiefs of departments from not below the rank of commander ("capitan de fragata"):

Directorate of naval operations corresponds in a measure with our Chief of Naval Operations and is divided into the following departments:

1. General staff of the navy.
2. Department of navigation and hydrography.

Directorate of material and supplies combines the functions of our Bureaus of Engineering, Construction and Repair, Ordnance, and Yards and Docks. It is divided into the following departments:

1. Department of armaments (ordnance).
2. Department of naval engineering.
3. Section of contracts and specifications.
4. Section of hydraulic works and architecture.

Directorate of personnel corresponds to our Bureau of Navigation, and is divided into the following principal departments:

1. Section of mobilization, recruiting, assignment, and promotion.
2. Section of schools and instruction.
3. Department of naval sanitation.
4. Department of judge advocate general of the navy.

Directorate of maritime territory has no counterpart in our service, and is divided into the following principal sections:

1. Section of merchant marine.
2. Section of maritime territory, lights, and buoys.
3. Section of radiotelegraphy (land stations).
4. Meteorological service.

Office of fiscal control is in charge of an accounting officer of a rank not below that of captain. This office corresponds more or less with our Navy budget office.

Commissariat general of the navy is in charge of a civil officer appointed by the President, who has the title of "Director of Commissariat." He is charged with the accountability, auditing, and legality of naval disbursements.

Commissariat of material is in charge of an officer. He will function in correspondence with the commissariat general of the navy, but distributes only such material as may be directed by the Minister of Marine, through the intermedium of the naval base at Valparaiso.

Inspector general of the navy, who is a flag officer, supervises the instruction and inspection of the navy afloat, on land, and in the air. In time of peace the inspector general is the director general of naval maneuvers when large forces are concerned. In time of war he becomes chief of the naval forces and will have as chief of staff the assistant chief of the general staff of the navy. The office of the inspector general of the navy is divided into the following divisions:

Secretariat.
Inspectorates of naval and coast artillery and target practice.
Torpedoes and submarine arms.
Communications.
Navigation and hydrography.
Aviation.
Electricity.
Naval engineering, construction, and repair.
Maritime territories, lights, and buoys.

The following divisions of the navy are located at Santiago, Chile:

Inspector general of the navy.
Directorate of naval operations.
Directorate of material and supplies.
Directorate of personnel.
" Controlaria " of the navy.

There is also a " junta consultiva " (advisory board) to advise the Government on naval matters, which will be composed of the inspector general, the directors, chiefs of departments, commandants of naval stations, commandants of squadrons or divisions, and those admirals present in Santiago.

FLEET

The Chilean Navy was reorganized on April 28, 1927, as follows:

(1) Cruiser Division (1BB, 3–OCA).
(2) Destroyer Division (1–OCA, 3DL, 2DD).

This force is based at Talcahuano.

NAVAL DISTRICTS

The seacoast of Chile is divided into five naval districts, each of which embraces the following littoral maritime divisions:

Arica.—Arica, Tarapaca, and Antofagasta.

Valparaiso.—Atacama, Coquimbo, and Valparaiso.

Talcahuano.—Maule, Concepcion, and Valdivia, from the mouth of the Mataquito River on the north.

Puerto Montt.—Llanquihue and Chiloe.

Magallanes.—Magallanes.

The commander in chief of the naval base of Valparaiso will be the director of maritime territories. He will be responsible for the administration, discipline, defense, communication, enrollment, and mobilization within his jurisdiction.

The commanders of naval stations will have charge of arsenals, hospitals, schools, naval aviation, ships out of commission undergoing repairs, coast artillery, and fortifications located within the territory under their jurisdiction.

Matériel.

BUDGET

The amount of the naval budget authorized for 1928 amounts to $12,530,040.20, United States currency, which is approximately 10.9 per cent of the entire appropriation. Of the amount allotted to the navy, $227,356.60 is set aside for aviation. The authorized naval expenditure in 1927 amounted to $11,811,445.78.

It is understood that an "extraordinary budget" was prepared early in the year, but no information is available as to the amount set aside for naval construction.

BATTLESHIPS (BUILT)—BB

Name	Date of laying down	Date of completion	(a) Displacement (tons); (b) designed horsepower; (c) designed speed (knots)	(a) Type of machinery; (b) type of fuel	Armament
Almirante Latorre	1911	1915	(a) 28,000 (b) 37,000 (c) 22.75	(a) R (b) C and O	10 14-inch; 14 6-inch; (AA) 2 3-inch; 4 smaller; T. T. 4 21-inch B. W.
Building and projected, none.					

COAST DEFENSE BATTLESHIPS (BUILT)—OCA

Capitan Prat	1888	1890	(a) 6,902 (b) 12,000 (c) 18	(a) R (b) C	4 9.4-inch; 8 4.7-inch; 10 smaller; T. T. 2 18-inch A. W.
Building and projected, none.					

ARMORED CRUISERS (BUILT)—OCA

Esmeralda	1895	1896	(a) 7,050 (b) 18,000 (c) 22.25	(a) R (b) C	2 8-inch; 12 6-inch; 12 smaller; T. T. 2 18-inch A. W.
General O'Higgins	1897		(a) 8,500 (b) 10,000 (c) 19	(a) R (b) C	4 8-inch; 10 6-inch; 12 smaller; T. T. 2 18-inch B. W.
Building and projected, none.					

PROTECTED CRUISERS (BUILT)—OCL

Chacabuco	1897	1902	(a) 4,500 (b) 15,500 (c) 24.0	(a) R (b) C	2 6-inch; 10 4.7-inch; 6 smaller.
Ministro Zenteno	1896		(a) 3,420 (b) 7,500 (c) 20.0	(a) R (b) C	8 6-inch; 1 smaller.
Blanco Encalado	1892	1894	(a) 4,420 (b) 14,500 F. D. (c) 22.75	(a) R (b) C	2 8-inch; 10 6-inch; 6 smaller.
Building and projected, none.					

DESTROYERS (BUILT)—DL AND DD

Name	Date of laying down	Date of completion	(a) Displacement (tons), (b) designed horsepower, (c) designed speed (knots)	(a) Type of machinery, (b) Type of fuel	Armament
Almirante Riveros class (2)	1911	1915	(a) 1,7[illegible] (b) 30,000 (c) [illegible] surface	(a) R (b) C and O	6 4-inch, 2 [illegible], 2 smaller; T. T. 4 18-inch, mounted in pairs on one side, singly on other [illegible].
Almirante Lynch class (2)	1911	1914	(a) 1,430 (b) [illegible] (c) [illegible]	(a) T (b) C and O	6 4-inch; T. T. 3 18-inch.
Building and projected 6 of Thornycroft type.	1927	[1]	(a) 1,090 (b) 28,000 (c) [illegible]	(a) G. T. (b) O	3 4.7-inch, 1 A. A. 1 [illegible]; T. T. 6 21-inch, triple tube mounts.

SUBMARINES (BUILT)—SS AND SF

Name	Date of laying down	Date of completion	(a) Displacement (tons), (b) designed horsepower, (c) designed speed (knots)	(a) Type of machinery, (b) Type of fuel	Armament
6 Holland type (H-1, H-2, H-3, H-4, H-5, H-6)	1915	1917	(a) $\frac{364}{4[illegible]}$ (b) $\frac{480}{320}$ (c) $\frac{12.75}{10.5}$	(a) I. C. (b) O	T. T. 4 18-inch bow.
Building and projected 3 [illegible] type	1927		(a) $\frac{1,540}{1,8[illegible]}$ (b) $\frac{2,[illegible]}{1,3[illegible]}$ (c) $\frac{15.5}{9}$	(a) E (b) O	1 [illegible]-cm, 8 torpedo tubes, [illegible]-cm

TRAINING SHIPS (BUILT)

Name	Date of laying down	Date of completion	(a) Displacement (tons), (b) designed horsepower, (c) designed speed (knots)	(a) Type of machinery, (b) Type of fuel	Armament
General Baquedano Building and projected, none.	1898		(a) 2,500 (b) 1,500 (c) 13.75	(a) Sail and steam (b) C	4 4.7-inch, 4 smaller

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[1] Launched.

COASTGUARD VESSELS (BUILT)

7 vessels varying in tonnage from 250 to 800 tons, normally employed as surveying ships and lighthouse tenders, but in event of war they would be used as mine layers and patrol vessels.

Building and projected, none.

SHIPS IN COMMISSION, IN RESERVE, AND OUT OF COMMISSION

The following ships in commission:
- One battleship.
- Four cruisers.
- Five destroyers.

The following vessels in inactive status:
- One old battleship.
- One cruiser.
- Six submarines.

Naval Bases.

The principal naval base in Chile is located at Talcahuano. The harbor is the best in Chile and is large, with deep water. In form it resembles very much Manila Bay, except that it is smaller in area.

It is strongly fortified and has excellent railroad connections with the interior of the country which is entirely self-supporting. The base is provided with two dry docks of sufficient size to dock any ship of the Chilean Navy. The summer anchorage for the fleet is located at Quintero. There is also a small base at Coquimbo and an arsenal located at Valparaiso.

COAST DEFENSE SYSTEM

The coast artillery is a part of the navy. The following Chilean ports are defended by permanent fortifications:

Antofagasta.—One battery of 4 6-inch Canet guns.

Arica.—Two batteries of 4 6-inch Canet guns; one battery of 2 4.5-inch Canet guns; two searchlights.

Coquimbo.—One battery of 6 6-inch Canet guns.

Iquique.—One battery of 4 6-inch Canet guns.

Talcahuano.—Three batteries of 2 10-inch B. S. Co. guns; one battery of 2 8-inch Armstrong guns; one battery of 4 6-inch Armstrong guns; seven batteries of 2 6-inch Armstrong guns; one battery of 2 4.5-inch guns; two dismounted batteries.

Valparaiso.—Three batteries of 2 11-inch Krupp guns; two batteries of 1 11-inch Krupp guns; one battery of 4 6-inch Armstrong guns; two batteries of 2 6-inch Armstrong guns; 6 searchlights.

Building and Repair Facilities.

Naval ships.—There are no building facilities for naval vessels in Chile. The Chilean Government has two dry docks located at Talcahuano, the dimensions of which are, respectively, as follows: 614 feet by 87 feet by 30.6 feet, and 861 feet 3 inches by 135 feet by 36 feet.

All ordinary repairs to hull and machinery can be made at the navy yard. Castings and forgings up to 10 tons can be handled. Shafts up to 28 inches radius and 100 feet in length can be made, and pipes up to 12 inches in diameter can be brazed.

Commercial ships.—There are no building facilities for commercial vessels in Chile, except for vessels of less than 1,000 tons.

There is a floating dry dock located at Valparaiso, which is the property of Soc. Astilleros "Las Habas." This dock is 365 feet long by 64 feet in breadth and 21½ feet depth on sill at high-water mark, and has a lifting capacity of 4,500 tons.

Aircraft.—There are no plants or facilities for the manufacture of aircraft in Chile. There are no assembling plants for the army and naval aviation.

Fueling Stations.

Naval.—Coal for naval use is supplied from domestic sources, principally from Concepcion. The navy has a fuel-oil depot located at

Concepcion Bay, but there is no information on file as to the amount available or method of distribution.

Commercial.—In 1923 the net production of domestic coal available for sale was 1,018,390 tons, and of this amount 181,640 tons was sold to foreign vessels. Antofagasta, Arica, Coronel, Lota, and Valparaiso are the principal ports where domestic coal is available for sale.

Fuel oil available at following ports in quantities indicated below:

Name of port	Amount usually available (barrels)	Method of delivery and maximum draft for loading	Remarks
Antofagasta	220,000	Floating pipe line and lighter, 42 feet.	Diesel oil and gasoline, about 27,000 barrels and 110,000 gallons, respectively.
Arica	25,000	Lighter	Diesel oil available, 25,000 barrels. Gasoline, 20,000 gallons. Rate of bunkering fuel oil, 600 barrels per hour.
Cruz Grande	28,000	Pipe line to dock, 28 feet	Diesel oil available.
Iquique	260,000	Floating pipe line from tank to vessels in stream.	Rate of delivery when using two pipe lines, 200 tons per hour; 31,000 barrels of Diesel oil and 8,000 cases of gasoline available.
Mejillones	15,000	Submarine pipe line, 48 to 60 feet.	Rate of delivery, 100 tons per hour.
Taltal	Not known.	Pipe lines	Rate of fueling, 2,000 barrels per hour.
Tocopilla	Not known.		
Valparaiso	98,400	Lighters and pipe line, 48 feet.	Loading point at Salinas about 3 miles from city. Williamson & Co., rate of delivery, 700 barrels per hour; Anglo-Mexican, rate of delivery, 1,400 barrels per hour; 50,000 barrels of Diesel oil and about 15,000 tons of gasoline available.

COMMUNICATIONS

Cable.—Cable service within Chile and between Chile and foreign points is furnished by the following lines: All America Cables (Inc.), three cables from Valparaiso, north to Iquique, thence along west coast to South America via Canal Zone to New York City, N. Y.; three land lines from Valparaiso to Buenos Aires, Argentina. West Coast of America Telegraph Co. (British), one line from Antofagasta to Iquique via La Serena; one line from Valparaiso to Talcahuano. This company also controls land lines from Arica and Concepcion into the interior. Communication with Punta Arenas, Chile, is maintained by means of wireless between that place and Puerto Montt, Chile, thence by connecting lines to Santiago, Chile.

Radio.—There are 22 Government radio stations located in various parts of the Republic for internal communication. There is only one purely commercial radio station in Chile, and it is for international communications only. It is owned and operated by the Transradio Chilena, which is a combination of British, French, German, and United States companies. The station is located at Quilicura, in the vicinity of Santiago, will use a short wave and will receive and transmit. There are legal provisions against its being employed for the transmission of messages within the country; it, therefore, will be confined to international work. There are 18 broadcasting stations located in Chile.

AVIATION

Aircraft.—The present director of naval aviation has the rank of commander, who has direct supervision of matériel and personnel, but this section is under the charge of the inspector general of the navy.

The naval aviation equipment consists of 15 to 20 serviceable planes of the *Fairey*, *Dornier Wahl*, and *Avro* types.

Air stations and landing fields.—The Chilean naval air service has its headquarters at Quinteros, about 20 miles north of Valparaiso. There are runways, landing field, hangars, quarters, and certain machine-shop facilities.

Personnel.

METHOD OF RECRUITMENT

By voluntary enlistment and conscription. Military or naval service is required of every Chilean as provided by law, from the age of 20, except those who are absolutely disqualified or excused for good or specific reasons. In the active navy, two years from the age of 20. In the first reserve of the navy, from date of furlough from the active navy to 32 years of age, inclusive. In the second reserve of the navy, from 33 years of age to 45, inclusive. In the naval territorial guard, from 46 years of age to 50, inclusive. Service is by classes. A class includes those born between the 1st of January and the 31st of December of each year.

The recruiting of the navy devolves upon the Ministry of Marine. The recruiting zones for this branch of the service are by maritime zones, governments, and subdelegations.

The President of the Republic may furlough up to 50 per cent of the conscripts of the army or navy who have served an instruction period of one year in the ranks.

STRENGTH (TOTAL AND BY GRADES)

Officers

	Line	Coast artillery	Engineers	Supply corps	Medical corps	Dental corps	Pilots	Total
Vice admiral	1							1
Rear admirals	5		1		1			7
Captains	17	1	2	2	1			23
Commanders	37	2	6	5	3			53
Lieutenant commanders	60	4	15	8	6	2	1	96
Lieutenants	135	12	59	30	16	6	16	274
Ensigns	45	8	24					77
Midshipmen	52	1	26					79
Grand total								610

The above figures are of March 3, 1927.

Each year, six months in advance, the direccion will fix the number of midshipmen and "aspirantes" for the other branches, according to the necessities of the service.

Enlisted.—The number of enlisted men authorized for 1927 was 10,665.

Reserves.—Not known.

DISTRIBUTION

At sea.—The approximate number of officers at sea is 250 and number of enlisted men is 4,875.

Shore stations.—The approximate number of officers employed on shore stations is 360 and number of enlisted men is 5,790.

AVIATION

There are 35 officers detailed for aviation, among whom are 10 expert pilots for all ships, 12 that are classified as elementary pilots, and 8 in training as observers. There are no noncommissioned officers or men who are pilots or observers and none are in training. There are 30 chief petty officers detailed as machinists, riggers, etc., and between 150 and 200 men, conscripts, for general duties.

TRAINING

INDIVIDUAL

Officers.—The outline of individual training for officers is as follows:

LINE OFFICERS

Naval school.—The training for commissions in the Chilean Navy involves six years' training. During the first five years the midshipmen go through a course at the Chilean Naval Academy at Valparaiso. After this training they must pass a year on the training ship *General Baquedano*, at the end of which they are commissioned as ensigns.

Formerly all engineering officers of the Chilean Navy were supplied from the naval engineering school located at Talcahuano. Under the new President this system has been changed and there has been the fusion of the engineering school at Talcahuano with the naval school at Valparaiso, forming one school at that place for the education of naval cadets. With the formation of this school all vacancies existing in the line, engineers, and paymasters are filled by graduates from the naval school.

Officers also receive individual training at the following schools: Torpedo, artillery, radiotelegraphy, coast artillery, and aviation.

Officers in the higher ranks are assigned to the naval war college located at Valparaiso. The course is no doubt modeled after the

British system. Since its inception, in 1912, a British naval mission has been on duty in Chile. At the present time this mission consists of eight British officers, who are specialists in general staff work, gunnery, torpedoes, electricity, submarines, aviation, and radiotelegraphy.

Enlisted men.—The conscripts are assembled for their entrance into the service and for preliminary instruction at the various naval districts. The scheme of instruction for enlisted men closely resemble the British, whose naval standards the Chileans have endeavored to attain and whom they consider the best sailors in the world.

There is a school located at Valparaiso which has for its object the preparation of selected enlisted men in the duties of mechanics and machinists.

A nautical school for pilots is located at Castro, on the east coast of the island of Chiloe, where there is an excellent harbor. There is a school ship located there for the purpose of instructing selected men of the navy and civilians in the duties of pilots and navigation.

Enlisted men are also given instruction in torpedoes, artillery, radiotelegraphy, coast artillery, and aviation.

Morale.—The officers are energetic, cultivated, keenly interested in their profession, and thoroughly in touch with the latest developments in the naval service.

In a maritime country such as Chile seamanship is popular, and the navy never has difficulty in filling its ranks with young men who are developed rapidly into smart and well-disciplined sailors. Training and discipline follow the British system.

Naval strategy and policy.

There is no country in South America which has been more susceptible to the influence of sea power on its history than Chile. This geographical fact was recognized when she was struggling for her independence, and for that reason the Chilean Navy has a history which dates back as far as 1818. Throughout the intervening years the navy retained its traditions and showed the results when it was reorganized and placed on a firm footing by Lord Cochrane, probably the greatest sea captain of his era next to Lord Nelson. Almost continually from that time the Chilean Navy has been trained on English lines. Although small in comparison with those of other large naval powers, it is efficient and the personnel excellent.

The geographical situation of Chile, giving her a coast line of 2,700 miles or more in length, renders her acutely interested in the future of the Pacific. Command of the Strait of Magellan and her possession of a small but efficient naval force are guaranties of her ability to protect this interest against any other South American naval force.

With the exception of the Tacna-Arica problem, Chile has no outstanding question with any foreign power.

The boundary troubles with Argentina long constituted a source of friction. These were finally settled by arbitration, and this was followed by a treaty between the two countries for the limitation of naval armament and tonnage. During the World War a common pro-Germanism and indifferent neutrality of the two countries served to draw them somewhat closer together, but the war ended, and, the naval limitations treaty having lapsed some years before, Chile aroused Argentina's suspicions by very considerable increase in her naval forces.

Chile's main foreign policy is to promote a friendly understanding with Great Britain and the United States.

It is probable that the influence of Great Britain is more strongly felt in Chile than that of any other European power. This is due to the fact that in the early days of the Republic some of the leading military and naval men were British subjects.

The influence that the United States has in Chile must be credited to the wealth and power of our country and not to any bonds of friendship or traditions such as exist between Great Britain and Chile.

The Chileans are rather jealous of exploitation of their country by any foreigners except the British, which is due to the long acquaintance and friendly relations with that country. They have experienced several disagreements with our country and they view the Monroe doctrine with suspicion. For a long time there has been a prevalent belief in that country that the United States was more friendly to Peru than to Chile. Until this erroneous belief is eradicated there will always exist a feeling of coolness toward the United States.

II. MERCHANT MARINE

Organization.

RELATIONS TO GOVERNMENT (SUBSIDIES, CONTROL, POLICY)

Chile has enacted a law reserving the coasting trade to ships under the Chilean flag and registry, and from this law a considerable increase in Chilean merchant shipping is anticipated.

The Chilean Government has for a number of years extended direct financial aid to both Chilean and foreign shipping. Subsidies or bounties have been paid for the maintenance of regular steamship communications, including the free carriage of the Chilean mail.

The principal beneficiary of the subsidy policy of Chile has been the Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, a Chilean steamship company.

The Government has passed a law relating to measures of protection in behalf of the national mercantile marine and more especially the vessels that for two years or more have traversed the Panama Canal.

According to the new law, the President of the Republic is authorized to expend $240,000 per annum in the form of subventions to companies that have maintained a regular service of vessels via the Panama Canal for two years. The subsidy will be proportionate to the cargo carried.

The State becomes a partner in the shipping companies which benefit by this law, receiving a proportion of the profits. The President of the Republic is authorized, also, to contract loans for the purchase of vessels for the coastwise or foreign services of the national mercantile marine.

OWNERSHIP (OWNING OR OPERATING COMPANIES)

There is one important steamship line and several smaller ones flying the Chilean flag. The most important company is the Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores.

OPERATION (TRADE ROUTES)

All of the Chilean steamship lines are engaged in coastwise traffic along the coast of Chile. The Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores run at least two steamers to New York via the Panama Canal, stopping at Peruvian and Ecudorian ports en route and return.

Matériel.

NUMBERS, TONNAGE, AND SPEED OF SHIPS

According to the latest information, Chile has in her merchant marine 53 vessels of 1,000 tons gross and above with a tonnage of 123,309 gross tonnage classified as follows:

Tonnage	Number	Total tonnage
1,000 to 2,000	16	24, 928
2,000 to 4,000	32	66, 916
4,000 to 6,000	2	10, 647
6,000 to 8,000	3	20, 808
	53	123, 309

Classified as to speed

Speed	Number	Tonnage
12 knots	6	17,056
13 to 14 knots	8	25,796
15 to 17 knots	3	20,559
	17	63,411

The speed of the balance of the merchant marine is rated at less than 12 knots.

CLASSIFICATION AS TO PRESENT AND POSSIBLE WAR USES

1. Present uses (liners, cargo and passenger, cargo, tanker, etc).
2. War uses (transports, cruisers, cargo, tankers, etc.).

Commercial ships which might be utilized for war uses

Name	Date built	Gross tonnage	Class	Speed in knots	Estimated troop capacity
Aconcagua	1922	7,309	Passenger and cargo	17	1,400
Alfonso	1928	3,076	Cargo		615
[illegible]	[1] 1919	1,876	do	11	375
Aysen	1906	3,814	Passenger and cargo	12	760
Cachapoal	1881	2,370	do	12	475
Huasco	1906	3,798	do	12	760
Imperial	1889	2,729	do	12	750
Maipo	1901	4,687	Naval transport	11	940
Mapocho	1882	2,652	Passenger and cargo	11	530
Palena	1886	2,640	do	12	725
Rancagua	1898	6,210	Naval transport	10	1,250
Renaico	1898	5,981	Cargo	15	1,200
Santiago	1901	3,909	do	14	800
Teno	1922	7,310	Passenger and cargo	17	1,460
Valparaiso	1900	3,944	Cargo	14	800
Building and projected, none.					

TANKER

Allipen	1923	1,378	Private tanker	Remarks: There is no further information on this tanker.
Building and projected, none.				

[1] Rebuilt.

Personnel.

NUMBERS

There are no exact figures available as to the number of officers and seamen who comprise the Chilean mercantile marine. It is estimated there are about 200 officers and 3,000 seamen in the Chilean mercantile marine.

CHARACTER (NATIONALITY, RELATIONS WITH NAVY)

In 1922 about 50 per cent of the officers holding masters' certificates were of Chilean nationality. By the law of cabotage, promulgated in that year, directed that all officers who were not citizens or naturalized citizens must become so within six months or else forfeit their licenses.

There are no special schools for training either officers or seamen for the mercantile marine.

The branch of pilots which exists in the Chilean Navy has no exact equivalent branch in our service. They are designated as staff officers in the Navy Register, and it possibly corresponds in a measure to our warrant officers. These officers are variously employed on transports, tugs, station ships, navy yards, and arsenals. None are employed on men-of-war proper. The school of pilots also instructs young men for the mercantile service.

Under the above-mentioned law, promulgated in 1922, Chilean mercantile ships automatically, in time of war, revert to the Chilean Navy. This law, when passed, contemplated that some sort of a navy reserve should be formed out of the officers and personnel of the Chilean mercantile marine.



M.I.D.G.S., U.S.A. 1926. MAP NO. 118-B

24344—28. (Face p. 33.)

PERU

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The Republic of Peru is one of the three countries of South America fronting on the Pacific Ocean, being bounded on the north by Ecuador and on the south by Chile. On the east and northeast its limits extend to Brazil and Colombia, respectively, and on the southeast to Bolivia. The country lies entirely within the Tropics, stretching from approximately 2° to 18° south latitude, and from 69° 10′ to 81° 10′ longitude west from Greenwich (these figures are approximate only on account of the unsettled boundary questions at the north and south).

The coast line of Peru, length of about 1,400 miles, has a marked trend from northwest to southeast. A fact often overlooked is that the southward extension of the Atlantic coast of the United States would roughly coincide with the west coast of South America. Callao, the chief seaport of Peru and almost equidistant from the southern and northern boundaries, is due south of New York.

The unsettled boundary questions with Ecuador and Chile prevent definite figures being given regarding the area of Peru. In an official publication of the Peruvian Government the area is stated as approximately 553,280 square miles. This figure includes the territory still under litigation with Ecuador and Chile. Accepting the foregoing figure as the most accurate obtainable, Peru is more than twice the size of Texas, three and one-half times that of California, and larger than France, Italy, and Germany combined.

The overshadowing topographical factor in Peru is furnished by the Great Andes Mountain system, which traverses the interior of the Republic throughout its entire length in a series of parallel chains, giving rise to three natural zones:

The narrow coastal belt with an average width of 25 to 40 miles;

The lofty Andean region, properly known as the sierra; and

The tropical territory occupying the eastern slopes of the Andes and extending to the low basins of the Amazon River and its tributary systems generally termed the "montana."

The coast line of Peru has few deep indentations, and good harbors are generally lacking with two or three exceptions. In most cases ships anchor in open roadsteads some distance from the shore and handle cargo by means of lighters.

The Republic is divided into 19 Departments and 2 littoral Provinces, which are practically equivalent to Departments. Each department is subdivided into Provinces, and these in turn into districts. The following is a list of the Departments:

Amazonas.
Ancachs.
Apurimac.
Arequipa.
Ayacucho.
Cajamarca.
Callao (Constitutional Province).
Cuzco.
Huancavelica.
Huanuco.
Ica.
Junin.
Lambayeque.
Libertad.
Lima.
Loreto.
Madre de Dios.
Moquega (Littoral Province).
Piura.
Puno.
San Martin.
Tumbes (Littoral Province).

POPULATION, GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE, AND LANGUAGE

The present population of Peru is estimated to be 5,500,000. The Bureau of Statistics estimates that 53 per cent of the total population are Indians of pure blood, 27 per cent are mestizos, or Indians of mixed blood, and 20 per cent are descendents of North Americans, Europeans, and Asiatics. The mestizos are chiefly a mixture of the Indian with the Spaniard or the Italian, in varying degrees. The Negro and Mongolian are also present. The density of population per square mile is 8.66.

The bulk of the population, consisting largely of Indians of unmixed blood, resides in the elevated Andean region. Most of the whites are found in the towns and valleys of the coastal section. The majority of the mestizos live on the coast and in the more developed districts of the Andes. The population of the eastern lowlands, including the various tribes of wild and semicivilized Indians, will probably not exceed 400,000.

The dominant class in Peru until a comparatively recent time was composed of the whites of pure Spanish descent, who by reason of superior education, wealth, and traditional prestige were far above the heterogeneous elements of the population. They were augmented by those individuals with such a small amount of Indian blood that are classed as whites, and by a few foreigners (chiefly Italian and British) who have intermarried among the old families and have become thoroughly identified with the country. This group is exclusive, proud of their social rank, and admit very few outsiders to their circle. They are well educated, travel extensively, and are at home in the most distinguished society of

European capitals. The upper class Peruvian has inherited the leading traits of his Spanish ancestors. He is loath to perform any kind of manual labor and seldom engages in trade. He turns to the professions or to politics for a vocation, or if a property owner, lives by preference in the capital from the revenues of his estate, leaving the actual management to a mayordomo.

The most important class in Peru to-day is the middle class. This is a class President Leguia is working to develop, and with whom he has largely surrounded himself in the Government. They comprise the clerks, shopkeepers, teachers, professors, and a large percentage of the practicing professional men. The officers of the army and navy are now drawn from this class and no longer from the aristocracy. The middle class is politically powerful and now furnishes the majority of the national leaders in all Government branches and comprises the more intelligent voting population.

The lowest class are the " cholos," with only a small trace of white blood, who comprise the vast majority of inhabitants of every urban center and form the unskilled laboring class in general. The majority of them are illiterate, improvident, devoid of ambition, and maintain a low standard of living. The average " cholo " is fond of amusement and often addicted to drunkenness. Petty thieving is a common trait and medacity is quite prevalent.

The Indians of the lofty Andean plateau are chiefly of the Quechua stock. They retain their ancient customs and language with little change. They shun the society of the whites and mestizos as much as possible. Long exploitation by the upper classes has made them taciturn and suspicious. Their bleak environment has dwarfed their mentality, and the excessive use of native alcohol and of the leaves of the cocoa plant has further debased and stupefied large numbers, making them little more intelligent than animals.

The Peruvian has had little to do with industry up until the present time and even to-day is taking a surprisingly small part in the industrial development of the country. 'The industries in Peru are practically all foreign-owned and directed. With the exception of a very few who have made their money in mining, the wealthy Peruvians have all made their money from their sugar and cotton haciendas, or from stock or sheep, or vineyards, or some agricultural product.

The national language of Peru is Spanish.

RELATIONS BETWEEN PERU AND THE UNITED STATES

The tradition of friendship and good will between Peru and the United States has been one of long standing. In the various diplomatic and other controversies in which Peru from time to time has found herself involved with her neighbors, the belief was generally held that she could command at least the moral support of our Government. The offers of mediation made by the United States during the War of the Pacific were generally regarded by Peru as dictated by a desire to aid her in safeguarding her territorial integrity menaced by the aims of Chile.

Peru has long been one of the most ardent advocates of the cause of American solidarity and its wider development of Pan Americanism. It was due largely to her initiative that conferences of the South American States were held in Lima in 1847, 1864, and 1874. Later, when the first of the series of Pan American Congresses was launched, chiefly at the instance of Secretary of State Blaine, Peru offered her enthusiastic adhesion. At all these gatherings the Peruvian delegates invariably championed all measures looking toward a closer entente among the republics of the New World.

The attitude of the Peruvians toward the issues of the Great War was even more sharply defined after the United States became a belligerent.

Peru in joining the League of Nations had high hopes of removing those causes of friction and ill-feeling growing out of the War of the Pacific with Chile.

Peru, on November 1, 1920, requested of the league the application of Article XIX of the covenant, to the said treaty, to the treaty of Ancon, with a view to a settlement of the Tacna-Arica controversy with Chile. The reply of the league was not to the satisfaction of Peru, and while she has retained her membership in the league, she has attended none of the league's session nor taken any part in league affairs since 1920.

On July 1, 1927, the President of Peru issued two "Supreme decrees"—one declaring the 4th of July a holiday that year, and the other paying a glowing tribute to President Monroe and directing that his picture be placed in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

President Leguia evidently believes the time has come to call attention to the debt of gratitude the South American nations owe the United States for having stood sponsor for their independence at a time when the need was great.

BRIEF POLITICAL ESTIMATE OF PERU

Form of government.

The form of government of Peru is a highly centralized republic. The basic law is a written constitution. The present one was adopted in January, 1920, replacing the old one of 1860. Suffrage is limited to male citizens over 21 years of age who can read and write, and are inscribed in the military register, except those that exercise political authority, either military or of the police, soldiers in active service, etc.

Since the declaration of its independence (1821), up to the present time, there have been 40 Presidents. Practically all of them, including the present incumbent, secured their office through revolution.

President Leguia's administration has quelled several incipient revolutionary movements. The last of any considerable moment were in 1923 and 1924. The factors making for stability and strength of the present administration are: Length of tenure of office; the combating of any disloyalty in the army, navy, police, and secret service; the President's personal honesty and interest in the progress of his country; and the generally capable and personally honest members of the cabinet.

The factors which make for the insecurity of the administration are: The Government is too highly centralized; it is a one-man government; every governmental position is directly or indirectly by appointment of the President. There is a further fact—that the President is not in the best of health, and there is no one to whom he can delegate his responsibility who enjoys in any degree the complete confidence of the people.

The actual difference between the theory and practice of government in Peru may be briefly summarized as follows: Whereas the constitution attempts to create three equally powerful branches of government, the tendency is for these branches to encroach upon each other's territory, and, from the resulting struggle, the Executive has come forth with his power and jurisdiction considerably increased at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches. And so long as the present Executive has the support to enforce his will, the formal law will be set aside in favor of the measures which the Executive considers necessary for his own protection, and which he considers for the greatest good to the nation.

Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, which delegates its exercise to the authorities established by the constitution; namely, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

The President of the Republic, who must be a native Peruvian of not less than 35 years of age, and 10 years' residence in the Republic, is chief of the executive branch. He is elected by direct vote of the whole electorate for a period of five years, and may be reelected immediately for a single additional term. There is no Vice President. In the event of the President's death or resignation Congress shall elect within 30 days the citizen who shall complete the presidential term, the cabinet governing during the interim.

The President is assisted in the administration of the Government by a cabinet of seven ministers whose entire confidence he possesses, since he is free to appoint and remove them at will. There is also a council of state composed of seven members, appointed for five years by the cabinet, with the approval of the Senate. The council, when requested must give oral or written opinions to the President on questions concerning matters of state.

With the Executive reposes the responsibilities and powers incident to the authentication and promulgation of all laws and the issuance of regulations, orders, or instructions necessary for their execution; to call general and special elections; to call general and special sessions of Congress; to give the necessary orders for the collection and disbursement of public revenues; to organize the land and naval forces, and to assign and dispose of them in the service of the nation; to direct diplomatic negotiations and enter into treaties which must be ratified by Congress; to appoint and remove cabinet ministers and diplomatic agents; to exercise the ecclesiastical patronage, etc.

The legislative power rests in the National Congress composed of a Senate consisting of 35 senators, and a Chamber of Deputies, consisting of 110 deputies. Senators and deputies, both national and regional, are elected by direct popular vote of those citizens who have the right of suffrage.

The qualifications for senators and deputies are as follows: For senators: Must be a Peruvian citizen by birth and at least 35 years of age. For deputy: Must be a Peruvian citizen by birth, at least 25 years of age, be born in the department in which elected or have had two years' residence therein.

Members of both houses are elected by direct, popular vote, for a period of five years, the renewal of the legislative power being complete and coinciding with that of the Executive authority.

Powers of Congress.

The principal powers of Congress are to pass and repeal laws; to fix responsibility for violation of the constitution; to impose and repeal taxes; to authorize the Executive to negotiate loans; to create or abolish public offices; to proclaim the election of the President of the Republic, and to elect a President in certain cases; to approve or disapprove nominations for colonels in the army, captains in the navy, or higher grades; to declare war; to ratify or disapprove treaties or other agreements with foreign governments; establish the internal territorial political divisions; and to decide what land and naval forces must be maintained by the State.

The ordinary session of Congress opens on the 12th day of October of each year for not less than 90 days, nor more than 120 days

The Chief Executive may if he deems it necessary call an extraordinary session of Congress, which shall not sit for more than 45 working days. In order that Congress may be organized, it is necessary that 60 per cent of the members of each chamber be present.

The judicial administration comprises a supreme court of justice, superior courts, courts of first instance, and courts of justice and peace. The supreme court of justice, with 11 members, sits in Lima. The 12 superior courts sit in Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Cerro de Pasco, Chiclayo, Cuzco, Huaraz, Iquitos, Lima, Piura, Puno, and Trujillo. The superior courts take cognizance of cases appealed from the courts of first instance, which are established in the capitals of Provinces. Justices of the peace are authorized in each town.

Laws may originate in either chamber upon the motion of any member, or by a message from the President. All laws must pass first in the originating body, after which they must pass in the second body, be approved by the President, and be promulgated by Executive decree before they have the force of law. The President has a veto and the right to return a bill to the originating body within 10 days with his observations and recommendations. Failure to return a bill within 10 days is equivalent to approval.

Internal Administration.

For purposes of internal administration the Republic is divided into Departments and littoral Provinces. The Departments are divided into Provinces, and these into districts. The Departments and littoral Provinces are governed by prefects, the Provinces by subprefects, the districts by governors, and lieutenant governors where necessary. The prefects are immediately subordinate to the Executive; the subprefects to the prefects; the governors to the subprefects; and the lieutenant governors to the governors. The prefects and subprefects are appointed by the Executive; the governors by the prefects, and the lieutenant governors by the subprefects. The powers and the term of office of these officers are determined by law.

Three regional congresses are established by the constitution of 1920—corresponding to the north, center, and south of the Republic, which assemble annually for a period of 30 days for the purpose of resolving regional questions. The representatives to these congresses are selected at the same time as national representatives. In case any action taken by these congresses is deemed incompatible by the Government, such action is vetoed and sent to the National Congress for final decision.

Political issues in Peru, as in most Latin American countries, are essentially questions of "personality."

Education, means of communication, development of latent resources are the tasks here confronting the Executive.

Political Organization.

The political parties in Peru are, for the most part, unstable groups, formed at the suggestion of a strong directing personality. With the passing of the directing force, the party often dies.

The only real political organization in Peru at present is the Democratic Reform Party, which was founded July 7, 1923, by President Leguia. The vast majority of voters are with and behind the administration, and are all Leguista, regardless of nominal party affiliation.

The Constitutional Party was founded by Marshal Andres A. Caceres, a former President of Peru, and helped elect Leguia to the office of the presidency prior to his coup d'état of July 4, 1919. The party had a large military and naval adherence, but since the death of Caceres and Admiral Villavicencio it is thought that the younger military and naval officers will more likely affiliate with the Democratic Reform Party. All the older officers, survivors of the War of the Pacific, joined the ranks of the Constitutional Party after the war, because of the stand which Caceres took to resist the harsh terms of peace offered by the Chileans. The third party, which indorsed Leguia in 1924 was the Democratic Party. This party was originally the child of Nicolas de Pierola, born, like the Constitutional Party, in that difficult period of reconstruction which followed the War of the Pacific.

The Liberal Party was founded in 1900, and was an offshoot of the Democratic Party. The Liberal Party ceased to exist since the death of its founder, Augusto Durand, formerly the owner of the powerful "La Prensa."

The Civilista (Civil) Party was one of the first real political organizations in Peru, and was founded in 1870. Its old adherents have either been long since apprehended in revolutionary schemes, and deported, or they have become Leguista, and drifted into the ranks of the Democratic Reform Party.

The present Executive, Señor Don Augusto B. Leguia, began his second term as President of the Republic in 1919, and has served continuously to date in that capacity. His third term of office expires in 1929. On the eve of the approaching presidential campaign all indications point that President Leguia will be the only candidate in the elections to be held in May, 1929.

President Leguia's platform will be to develop the country's industries and agriculture; to irrigate lands and distribute it in small tracts among the landless Indians; to attract immigration to Peru; and to improve communications by air, rail and motor roads.

The Cabinet.

Personnel of the cabinet (1928):

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Dr. Pedro Jose Rada y Gamio.
Minister of Government and police: Jesus M. Salazar.
Minister of justice, worship, and instruction: Pedro Oliveira.
Minister of War: Emilio S. Palacios.
Minister of Finance and Commerce: Manuel G. Masias.
Minister of Fomento and Public Works: Enrique A. Martinelli.
Minister of Marine: J. Arturo Nunez Chavez.
National Attorney: Dr. Piacido Jiminez.

The conduct of the affairs and public administration is intrusted to the ministers of state, whose number are determined by law. The personal qualifications for minister of state are the same as for deputies.

Each minister presents at the time of the convening of Congress in regular session a report setting forth the conditions of the various matters under his charge, and at all times furnishes such information as may be demanded of him. The Minister of Finance furthermore presents the general accounts of the Republic for the preceding year and the budget for the following year with the approval of the cabinet.

The ministers, with the approval of the President of the Republic, may present to the Congress at any time proposals for laws which they deem desirable; they may assist at the debates in the chambers, but must retire before the vote.

Foreign Relations.

Peru's main external problem is the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute, which is now the subject of direct negotiations between the two countries involved. At present it is understood that the conversations have taken the form of the discussion of another plan to divide the territories in a manner satisfactory to both parties.

The boundary between Ecuador and Peru has never been agreed upon. Most of the territory in dispute has never been adequately mapped, is inhabited by wild or semicivilized tribes, and has been, up to the present, of but slight economic importance. It is believed that eventually means will be found for an amicable settlement of the problem.

Summary.

In brief it may be said Peru's relations with other South American countries are as follows:

Argentina.—This country has no conflicting question with Peru, and their relations are excellent.

Bolivia.—Recent events in Bolivia indicate that nation more in sympathy with Peru than she has been for years.

Brazil.—This country has no boundary dispute with Peru, and the two countries are very friendly.

Colombia.—This country is even closer in friendship to Peru than before the Tacna-Arica dispute. The Saloman-Lozano protocol fixing the international boundary between Peru and Colombia, which was signed on March 24, 1922, was ratified the latter part of December, 1927, by Peru. This protocol had previously been ratified by Colombia.

Ecuador.—This country still maintains diplomatic relations with Peru, although it is supposed Ecuador is under Chilean influence, and rather displeased about the Saloman-Lozano treaty. As previously stated, a boundary question between Ecuador and Peru still remains to be settled.

Venezuela.—This country is friendly disposed toward Peru. The latter country has gained much in world respect and sympathy as a result of the conduct of her share of the arbitration and recent plebiscitary proceedings which came to naught with Chile.

In conclusion it may be stated that so long as the present executive remains in power the country can look for a gradual improvement in the economic condition, the development of the natural resources, communications, and social rehabilitation of the country, but in the event President Leguia should be removed from power by death or accident, the general sentiment in Peru among Peruvians and foreigners is, "God help Peru if anything happens to Leguia."

ECONOMIC ESTIMATE

Contrary to the general impression, agriculture, and not mining, is the chief source of economic wealth in Peru. The production of food crops in Peru is barely sufficient for local consumption; in fact, some of the chief staples must be supplemented by importation. There are three chief producing regions: The narrow coastal belt, with an average width of 25 to 40 miles; the lofty region, popularly known as the "sierra"; and the tropical territory, occupying the eastern slopes of the Andes and extending to the low basins of the Amazon River and its tributary systems, generally termed the "montana."

Irrigation is the normal rather than the exceptional method of growing crops in Peru. The coast of Peru is a typical desert except where the short streams flowing down from the mountains have formed isolated oases at varying distances. The foremost irrigation authority in Peru has estimated that there are approximately 1,000,000 acres of land under cultivation in the coastal zone, of which amount some 750,000 acres are in the river valleys, within a distance of 40 miles from the coast.

Cotton and sugar are the two most important agricultural products, accounting ordinarily for nearly half of the total exports. Cotton, the principal product, is grown over a wide area. The bulk of the sugar is produced on approximately 60 large plantations, which are mostly controlled by Peruvians.

Wheat is grown almost entirely in the highlands and under conditions which are extremely variable. Very little of the wheat grown in the Andean sections is shipped to the coast because of the prohibitive expense of transportation. Over 2,000,000 bushels of wheat required by Peru annually is obtained from foreign countries. Corn is not the most valuable, but it is probably the most important grain crop grown in Peru. Practically the entire crop is consumed locally. Although over 90,000,000 pounds of rice is raised annually in Peru, over 20,000,000 pounds is imported from foreign countries to supply the more prosperous inhabitants of the coast sections. Peas, beans, potatoes, and mandioca, which are staple articles of diet in the various regions of Peru, are grown quite extensively and sufficient for the ordinary need. Peru produces practically all of the coffee consumed in the Republic.

Peru has not been known as a livestock country. It has been and still is one of those regions that neither produced livestock in any numbers for export nor brought in any quantity from other countries.

The three minor exports are wool, rubber, hides, and skins.

Peruvian agriculturists are fortunate in having close at hand a perennial source of one of the best fertilizers known to the world in the valuable aid of guano. Since 1909 these deposits have been under the control of a semiofficial monopoly known as the Compañia Administradora del Guano, with headquarters at Lima.

All guano extracted is utilized exclusively for national requirements, with the exception of the quantities remaining to the Peruvian Corporation, which under its contracts of 1890 and 1907 has the sole right of exportation until its total allotment of 2,000,000 tons is covered. Guano is now extracted from about 40 different places along the coast, including most of the islands and certain portions of the mainland. The Chincha Islands are the most famous. Each year the Peruvian Government designates the islands that may be worked.

The waters of Peru are literally teaming with fish on account of the exceptionally favorable conditions for marine life. The lack of refrigation facilities prevents the extension of the market to interior points except for products in the form of dried salt fish.

The principal mineral products of Peru, in order of importance, are petroleum, copper, silver, gold, vanadium, coal, tungsten, lead, and mercury. Molybdenum, antimony, bismuth, nickel, zinc, and borax are also mined in small quantities.

Petroleum is now the most important of Peruvian mineral products, having easily displaced copper from first rank since 1922.

The present producing area, with the exception of the small Pirin field, comprises a narrow strip of land, generally less than 20 miles in width, which borders the Pacific Ocean from the vicinity of Paita to the Ecuadorean boundary. There are only two refineries in Peru, that of the International Petroleum Co. at Talara, and a small one at Zorritos. The refinery at Talara is the largest in Peru; in fact, the largest on the west coast of South America. The storage tanks for crude oil at Talara and the adjacent fields have a capacity of about 1,000,000 barrels.

The production of crude oil in Peru has practically doubled within the last five years, as indicated by the following figures:

Year	Number of barrels	Year	Number of barrels
1922	5,315,271	1925	9,138,042
1923	5,698,510	1926	10,519,000
1924	7,924,700	1927	10,135,000

It is unlikely that the production will show any greater increase in the near future than it has in the last five years. So far as the coastal area is concerned—the area from which all the present production is obtained—it is unlikely that the production will ever exceed 15,000,000 barrels annually.

The International Petroleum Co. (subsidiary of the Standard Oil of New Jersey) accounts for more than 70 per cent of the total production of petroleum in Peru.

Approximately nine-tenths of the present copper production in Peru comes from the famous Cerro de Pasco, Morococha, and Casapalca mines, situated inland from Lima on the Central & Cerro de Pasco Railway and now controlled for the most part by an American company, the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation, and its subsidiary, the Backus & Johnston Mining Co. The copper section of next importance is near Quiruvilca, in the Department of La Libertad, some 60 miles east of Trujillo. The northern Peru Mining & Smelting Co., a subsidiary of the Guggenheim interests, has acquired an option on the properties of the former Quiruvilca Mining Co.

The best-known iron deposits in Peru are those near Tambo Grande Department of Piura. Other deposits are located in the Departments of Ancachs and Ica.

Peru possesses extensive coal deposits, including anthracite, bituminous, and lignites, but most of the fields are so inaccessible that their exploitation has not yet been feasible. Present production is derived almost entirely from the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation and is utilized by that company for smelting purposes.

Peru is still in the raw-commodity stage of economic evolution and is largely dependent on foreign markets for its manufactured products; however, considerable progress has been made in certain lines of manufacturing. The manufacture of cotton and woolen textiles is the most important manufacturing industry of the Republic. Other industries of lesser importance are tanning, flour milling, shoe and chocolate manufacturing.

Peru is fortunate in having a variety of raw products for the world's markets and in not being dependent on the demand for a single commodity to the extent that is true of many other Latin American countries.

The following table shows the total value of exports and the value to the United States. Likewise the total value of imports, value, percentage, and favorable trade balance from the years 1920 to 1926, inclusive:

[All export and import values in United States dollars, in thousands; 000 omitted]

Year	Exports		Imports						Favorable trade balance
			Value		Percentages from—				
	Total value	Value to United States	Total	From United States	United States	United Kingdom	Germany	France	
	Dollars	*Dollars*	*Dollars*	*Dollars*					*Dollars*
1920	162, 046	74, 657	84, 264	46, 675	55. 4	14. 7	1. 7	3. 0	77, 782
1921	59, 978	23, 539	60, 009	29, 687	49. 5	13. 7	4. 4	3. 8	31
1922	72, 154	25, 409	40, 887	16, 262	39. 8	19. 1	10. 8	3. 1	31, 267
1923	98, 439	39, 120	58, 084	23, 538	38. 9	19. 6	10. 0	2. 4	40, 355
1924	101, 713	34, 012	73, 019	28, 541	29. 1	18. 7	10. 3	4. 0	28, 694
1925	87, 437	30, 438	73, 457	28, 394	38. 6	18. 7	10. 1	3. 6	13, 980
1926	89, 190	30, 720	72, 761	33, 618	46. 2	15. 6	9. 9	3. 7	16, 429

Although Peru was the pioneer country of South America in railway construction, its first line having been opened to traffic in 1851, it is now fifth with a mileage of about 2,180 miles. The longest and most important railways are the Central and Southern systems, with lengths of 257 and 534 miles, respectively, and these are the only ones which extend from the coast into the elevated Andean region.

The Tambo del Sol Railway, under construction for several years past, is Peru's first line to penetrate from the Pacific coast into the undeveloped country of the Amazon Basin. Linked by the Central and Cerro de Pasco railways with the port of Callao, the Tambo del Sol Railway has already been completed for a distance of about

50 miles over the eastern Cordillera of the Andes. The route planned for the line is to terminate at Pucallpa on the Rio Ucayali, a distance of 300 miles from starting point.

Peru has only very recently begun to manifest serious interest in the development of a system of national highways. Probably in no country in the world are the problems of road building more difficult than in Peru, due to the varied conditions of topography and climate. On account of its generally level nature, the coastal plain possesses the greatest extent of roads passable for automobiles, although most of them are in their natural state and often comprise difficult stretches. Great impulse was given to road construction during the year 1926, especially in the Department of Cajamarca. In 1926 it was estimated Peru had about 12,500 miles of roads of varied assortment. In the latter part of 1927 it was estimated Peru had between 500 and 550 miles of excellent automobile roads.

While the trade balance is still favorable to Peru, there is a steady flow of money to foreign countries, due to the large percentage of foreigners engaged in business in that country, which keeps the Peruvian pound below par. Rather large loans negotiated by Peru for the past five years has necessitated mortgaging her revenues to the limit.

The totaly debt of the Republic as of June 30, 1928, was approximately $128,521,695, of which $97,274,562 was external funded debt and $31,247,133 internal debt.

The United States interests in Peru is invested chiefly in copper mines and oil. The Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation controls 730 mineral claims comprising 5,900 acres. It owns the largest copper-producing mine in Peru. The Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey is represented in Peru by the International Petroleum Co., whose properties cover 1,000,000 acres. This company controls 70 per cent of the Peruvian output of petroleum, while British capital controls 27 per cent, and Italian capital the remaining 3 per cent. The total amount of foreign investments in Peru is estimated at $343,000,000.

Name of country:	Per cent of aggregate total
United States	40
Great Britain	34
Italy	14
Germany	7
France	2
Various	3
Total	100

CIVIL AVIATION

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

In several respects Peru is ideally adapted for commercial flying; there being neither railroads nor motor roads running north and south, transportation must be carried on either by sea or airplane. While there are very few specially prepared airports or landing fields, the level coastal littoral where the great bulk of the inhabitants live is entirely feasible for flying and a skilled pilot finds little difficulty in landing or taking off at almost any point along the Peruvian coast.

President Leguia is particularly alive to the opportunities of commercial aviation and is anxious for all possible outside assistance in the development of his country. It has been his continuing policy, therefore, to advance the branches of domestic administration by means of foreign missions and methods. In regard to the very recent contracts signed with both United States and German aviation interests, the Peruvian Government has not been willing to lend any financial aid, but by rivalry among the competing groups has been able to establish more favorable terms for its own purposes. An American, formerly a United States naval officer, has recently been made inspector general of aviation with unified control over naval, military, and commercial aviation in the Republic. This enlargement of his previous authority as head of the naval air service, effected in March of this year by presidential decree, is of considerable significance in the interests of the United States in that it resulted in the transference of one inspectorate general of aviation in Peru to a former member of the American naval mission instead of to a member of the German military mission at present on duty with the Peruvian Army.

The first aerial service for mail and passengers organized by United States naval mission on behalf of the Government was inaugurated in 1927 between Lima and Iquitos, Peru's fluvial port on the Amazon 2,000 miles inland from the Atlantic. The air route from Callao, Peru, to Iquitos, Peru, on the Amazon River is as follows: By rail from Callao to La Oroya, a distance of approximately 117 miles; thence by auto to La Merced about 58 miles, where land planes are taken; thence in a northeasterly direction along a branch of the River Bajo Ucayali to Masisea, a distance of approximately 182 miles, where the personnel shifts to hydroplanes. Thence generally along the River Bajo Ucayali to Iquitos. The total distance is approximately 770 miles. The importance of the Lima-Iquitos line is strategic as well as commercial, enabling the Government to keep in touch with any situation of a serious character which might arise in the eastern departments. Three important contracts have just been granted by the Peruvian Government under conditions which make competitive development inevitable and which envisage the extension of these services to other Latin-American countries and to Europe. They are as follows:

1. One contract to the Elmer Faucett Co., American, now supported by local capital, to establish a regular service along the coast and coastal valleys of Peru.

2. A second contract to the Huff Daland Dusters (Inc.), a subsidiary of the Keystone Aircraft Corporation of America, to establish an air-mail, cargo, and passenger service between Peru and the United States, via Panama. President Leguia also approved a contract between this concern and the Peruvian postal authorities to carry mail on the entire coastwise section of Peru for five years, renewable for the same period with the preferential privilege of establishing other routes on the same conditions as may be offered by any other company.

3. The National Commercial Aviation Co., representing Dornier and Hansa interests (German), was also granted a contract to establish air services in Peru which may connect with "services of other nations of America and Europe." German representatives are already reported in Ecuador and Chile for the purpose of seeking further permits for service on the west coast.

It is quite obvious that the object of German aeronautical interests in seeking these new concessions is to link up new lines with their present ones operating in Bolivia and Colombia; possibly as a part, eventually, of a system dominated by European air companies extending from Panama or northern Colombia down the west coast to Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, across from Valparaiso and Santiago to Buenos Aires, Argentina, north from Buenos Aires to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and across the south Atlantic to Africa, Spain, France, Germany, and England.

BRIEF MILITARY ESTIMATE

(Source: M. I. D.)

The strength of the regular army is 1,006 officers and 6,416 enlisted men.

The strength of the national police is 420 officers and 6,380 enlisted men. The national police furnishes detachments for duty in the various cities throughout the Republic.

There are no municipal police nor other armed forces.

It is estimated that about one-half of the strength of the national police would be available in event of emergency to serve as a body, the remainder could not well be taken off duty, such as traffic direction and city-street control.

THE REGULAR ARMY

The general staff is organized as follows:

First section.—First bureau (personnel); second bureau (matériel).

Second section.—First bureau (army organization); second bureau (war plans and concentration).

Third section (statistical).—First bureau (foreign); second bureau (domestic).

Fourth section.—First bureau (inspection); second bureau (training); third bureau (conscription).

A total of 76 officers are now on general-staff duty (including the military attachés).

COMBAT ARMS

The regular army is organized into four skeleton divisions and a garrison for the Montana.

Each division has: 2 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry, and 1 regiment of field artillery.

Peace strength of the division, 107 officers, 1,203 enlisted men.

AIR SERVICE

The air service consists of the Aviation School, at Las Palmas, a suburb of Lima. Strength, including students, 30 officers, 55 enlisted men; 70 civilian employees (mostly laborers). Officers are detailed from other arms, as there are only three air-service officers permanently commissioned.

EQUIPMENT

The individual equipment consists of the .30-caliber Mauser (rifle and carbine), revolver, saber, and machete.

Small arms in use and store

Rifles, Mauser, 30-30 caliber	58,500
Carbines, Mauser, 30-30 caliber	1,500
Mannlicher (old), mostly 30 caliber	15,000

Condition, generally poor. Limited work now going on fitting new barrels, reconditioning, etc.

ORGANIZATION

Artillery.—The organization equipment consists of the Schneider-Canet 3-inch, field and pack, about 60 pieces in use and store.

Machine guns.—About 100 Schneider-Canet 30-30 caliber guns in use and store.

Aviation equipment.—Six Avro (Gnome engine) training planes. Three observation planes.

Purchase of new equipment this year is indicated if the training of the 15 student aviators now at school is to be completed.

Engineer equipment.—None. Engineers are equipped as labor battalions.

The elements of the national police have the same equipment as have the corresponding units of the regular army.

MOBILIZATION

Each of the four skeleton divisions, in time of war, would furnish the framework on which the forces are to be organized. Present plans indicate a total war strength of about 10,000 men to a division.

Lack of reserves of clothing and equipment would limit the number. Forty thousand men would probably represent the maximum attainable, with no prospect for even that until the lapse of considerable time.

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES

For administration and mobilization the Republic is divided into five areas. Four of these are called divisional regions, the fifth is called the Region of the Montana.

The divisional regions are as follows:

First. The Departments of Lambayeque, Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas, San Martin, and La Libertad; and the Province of Tumbez.

Second. The Departments of Lima, Ancash, Huanuco, Junin, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Ica; and the Province of Callao.

Third. The Departments of Arequipa and Tacna (the latter now held by Chile) and the Province of Moquegua.

Fourth. The Departments of Cuzco, Apurimac, Puno, and Madre de Dios.

Region of the Montana.—The Department of Loreto.

EFFICIENCY AND MORALE

Training.—The Military School has an annual output of about 30 cadets graduated each year. The army is handicapped in that the best families do not consider the academy nor an army career suited to their sons. The curriculum compares favorably with that of the local colleges. In the army itself training is poor; it is confined almost exclusively to a small amount of close-order drill and guard duty. Combined exercises and maneuvers are held most infrequently. Target practice is neglected.

The national police are better trained, but for police purposes only.

Efficiency.—The combat efficiency of the army is low. Poor equipment, meager clothing and food militate against efficiency in the rank and file. Due to the system of promotion by selection, officers are frank to state that "playing politics" is much more advantageous than attention to military duties.

Discipline.—Discipline is fair throughout the service.

Morale.—Morale in the army is low. The soldier is a conscript either a full or mixed blood Indian (the better classes finding some means to avoid service). He is poorly fed, poorly paid, inadequately clothed and housed. He is uneducated upon entry into service, and the completion of his enlistment period shows but little change in this respect.

In certain of the elements of the national police the morale is distinctly better. They have better pay, quarters, clothing, and equipment than the soldier. The ranks of these forces are kept up by soldiers reenlisting voluntarily, a most remarkable tribute to the work of the Spanish mission.

Present fighting value.—The army is adequate to its primary mission of the maintenance of internal order. It is in no sense trained or equipped for combat operations against trained forces.

I. NAVY

Organization.

(a) COORDINATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

The President is the commander in chief of the armed forces of Peru.

The national defense of Peru is coordinated in a measure by the Superior Council of War, which will be composed of the following personnel: Minister of War, president; the inspector general of the army, vice president; the chief of staff of the army; the chief of staff of the navy; the administrator general of the army; and three general officers on an active status who have commanded a division or performed the functions of chief of staff and who will serve with the council during a period of not less than two years.

The duties of the council are of a permanent character. It meets regularly once a month and has extraordinary sessions when called by the President. It may also appoint subcommittees.

Projects of law presented by the Superior Council of War are sent by the minister to the President of the Republic for his consideration, and he in turn transmits them to Congress when it is thought necessary.

(b) NAVY DEPARTMENT

The administration of the army and navy under one cabinet member, the Minister of War and Marine, was in effect until 1919. The

NAVAL ESTIMATE

DIAGRAM OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION



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[1] The chief of hydroaviation is also inspector general of aviation in Peru, which includes army and commercial aviation.

separate Ministry of Marine was created in 1919, effective in the calendar year 1920.

The navy department is under the Minister of Marine, who is a civilian, and is titular head of the navy, and authenticates all documents requiring his signature; is at the call of Congress to reply to any interrogatories relating to his department, and personally appears before that body to discuss the budget or other important matters under discussion concerning the navy.

The Minister of Marine controls the administration of the navy department through the following channels as indicated by the chart of the naval organization:

Chief of the naval general staff.—This post is held at present by the head of the United States naval mission, who has the rank of rear admiral in the Peruvian Navy, and who is the executive head of the navy, subject to the orders of the President of the Republic and the Minister of Marine; immediate adviser of the minister on all matters relating to the naval establishment; charged with the formulation of all policies and regulations affecting the navy; charged with the operation of the fleet and its preparation and readiness for war; exercises full control over the three administrative bureaus, and settles all difficulties between them; and is in actual command of the navy, except that (in accordance with contract) he is not required to take part in any war or internal revolution.

General staff.—In addition to its chief, consists of four active and two reserve officers of the United States Navy and one Army officer of the United States Army, also one Peruvian officer. The personnel of the present United States naval mission, with their respective duties, are as follows:

A. G. Howe, Captain, U. S. Navy, head of naval mission and chief of naval general staff.

C. G. Davy, Commander, U. S. N. R., subchief; director of naval academy and director of naval communications.

J. S. Abbott, Captain, U. S. Navy, commander of squadron.

This position is normally occupied by an officer of the Supply Corps, U. S. Navy: Line officer, acting temporarily, director of administration.

H. P. Burnett, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy, aide for submarines on staff of squadron commander.

H. B. Grow, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. V., chief of the service of hydroaviation.

B. H. Wyatt, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy, chief of hydroaviation school at Ancon.

R. C. Moore, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army, Technical adviser attached to the office of the chief of the naval general staff.

The members composing the mission will be subordinate to the President of the Republic, the Minister of Marine, and officers of a rank higher than that of the mission, each member enjoying the honors and privileges of his grade. A Peruvian naval officer, a member of the general staff, is in charge of naval intelligence work.

The director of the naval academy at the present time is Commander C. G. Davy, U. S. N. R., who has the rank and wears the uniform of Captain (Capitan de Navio) in the Peruvian Navy. He also performs the following additional duties: Head of Naval Communications; responsible for the procuring of tidal observations at Callao; in charge of receiving and sending of official time from the Naval Academy. Acts as the representative of the Head of Mission during his absence.

The commandante general of the squadron is an officer of the mission, ordinarily of the rank of captain, United States Navy, who has a commander of the Peruvian Navy as his chief of staff, and three aides. The squadron at present consists of 2 cruisers, 1 gunboat, 1 destroyer, and 4 submarines. The squadron commander has all the duties of a division commander in the United States Navy. The present squadron commander is Capt. J. S. Abbott, United States Navy.

The director of administration: This post is ordinarily held by an officer of the Supply Corps, United States Navy, of the rank of commander. This officer has the rank and wears the uniform of a captain (capitan de navio) of the Peruvian Navy. To all intents and purposes he is the chief of the bureau of supplies and accounts and the paymaster general of the Peruvian Navy. He has a commander as sub-director, and two other officer assistants.

The aide for submarines for the commandante general acts also in the capacity of aide for torpedoes, torpedo tubes, and mining studies. The officer charged with this duty at present is Lieut. Commander H. P. Burnett, United States Navy, who has the rank and wears the uniform of a commander (capitan de fragata) in the Peruvian Navy.

The chief of the service of hydroaviation has charge of all the naval air activities of the country. He is by (supreme resolution) the inspector general of aviation of Peru, which includes the army and commercial aviation. This officer is also assigned to duty as governor of the military-naval zone of Ancon. He is a member of the naval mission, and is, therefore, subject to the orders and jurisdiction of the head of the mission. The head of this service at the present time is Lieut. Commander H. P. Grow, U. S. N. V., with the rank of capitan de navio.

The chief of the hydroaviation school at Ancon is charged with all the activities of the school for the training of the regular navy and the reserve naval aviators. The school at present is commanded by Lieut. B. H. Wyatt, United States Navy, who has the rank and wears the uniform of a commander (capitan de fragata) of the Peruvian Navy.

The Technical Adviser to the Head of the Mission: This is a post that has recently been established in connection with certain engineering problems at Callao, Peru, and vicinity, and is in the process of development. This post at present is occupied by Lieut. Col. Richard C. Moore, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, who holds the rank of colonel.

Director of personnel: The director of personnel is a captain of the Peruvian Navy, having a commander as subdirector and four other officer assistants. This bureau corresponds to our Bureau of Navigation, to which the health department of the navy is also added.

Director of Matériel: The director of matériel is a captain of the Peruvian Navy, having a commander as subdirector and four other officer assistants. This bureau combines the functions of our Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and Hydrographic Office; also the (Bureau of Navigation) Commerce Department. It also has indirect supervision over the lighthouse service and buoyage system, though the direct supervision is in the hands of a private company (semigovernment) which has charge of the guano deposits along the coast. This company can do nothing, however, without the ministry's authorization.

The duties in the Peruvian Navy include activities not so distributed as in the United States. In the principal ports and in many of the secondary ports there are naval officers assigned as captains of the ports. They are the marine representatives of the supreme Government. The navy is also charged with the supervision of the lighthouse establishment and the fishing industry of the coast.

(c) FLEET

The naval force of Peru is divided into the following units:

(1) Squadron (2–OCL, 1 PG, 1–ODD, and 4 SS).

(1) Loreta Flotilla (Amazon River district) 4 AG.

(d) NAVAL DISTRICTS

There are no naval districts as the term is generally understood in the United States Navy. The seacoast, lake, and river districts, however, are divided into "capitanias," under the direction of naval officers, who have jurisdiction over all maritime industries and merchant-marine activities in the ports to which assigned and to the islands, keys, seacoast in the vicinity, bays, coves, and roadsteads.

Matériel.

BUDGET

The sum of approximately $1,873,762 was appropriated for the upkeep of the navy for the year 1927, which was 4.73 per cent of the entire appropriation. In the 1928 budget the sum of approximately $2,204,393 is appropriated for the upkeep of the navy, which is 5.08 per cent of the entire appropriation.

A building program covering a period of five years was proposed by the naval mission in 1923, which was approved by the Minister of Marine and the President of the Republic, which is as follows:

Six destroyers (U. S. S. "Chandler" Class).

Six submarines (improved "R" type, U. S. Navy).

Twenty-five seaplanes (training, combat, and bombing).

Submarine and destroyer base and repair station.

Supply of torpedoes, mines, and depth bombs.

Purchase of new ammunition for above units, and replacement of old ammunition now in stock.

The present policy of the mission and of the ministry is to confine its efforts to the above program.

In January, 1924, the Peruvian National Congress, passed an act creating a "national defense fund" (to be supported by certain additional taxes to be levied), the proceeds of which are to be used in new acquisitions for the army and navy.

The Government made an effort to float a loan to carry out half of the navy program noted above, in which they nearly succeeded, but complications arose among the bankers and the deal fell through.

Subsequently, in April, 1924, a contract was entered into with the Electric Boat Co. for 2 submarines, 24 Bliss-Leavitt torpedoes, and a complete submarine station (including electric plant, repair shop, and marine railway capable of lifting a boat of 1,500 tons). The submarine base was completed and turned over to the Peruvian authorities in December, 1926.

Two additional submarines, sister ships to *R–1* and *R–2*, as previously mentioned, were contracted for in 1927 and completed late this fall. They arrived in Callao, Peru, on November 5, 1928.

SHIPS

Tables showing numbers and characteristics of ships authorized, building and built

Name	Date of laying down	Date of completion	(a) Displacement (tons); (b) designed horsepower; (c) designed speed (knots)	(a) Type of machinery; (b) type of fuel	Armament
CRUISERS (BUILT)—OCL					
Almirante Grau	1905	1906	(a) 3,200 (b) 14,000 (c) 24	(a) R (b) O	2 6-inch; 8 14-pounder; 8 1-pounder; 2 T. T. 18-inch.
Coronel Bolognesi	1905	1906	(a) 3,200 (b) 14,000 (c) 24	(a) R (b) O	2 6-inch; 8 14-pounder; 8 1-pounder; 2 T. T. 18-inch.
Building and projected, none.					
GUNBOATS (BUILT)—PG					
Lima		1880	(a) 1,790 (b) 2,000 (c) 14	(a) R (b) C	4 4-inch; 4 3-pounder.
Building and projected, none.					
DESTROYER (BUILT)—ODD					
Eniente Rodriguez		1909	(a) 490 (b) 8,600 (c) 25	(a) R (b) C	6 9-pounder; 3 T. T. 18-inch.
Building and projected, none.					
SUBMARINES (BUILT)—SS					
R-1 and R-2	1925	1926	(a) 576/682 (b) 880 (c) 14.5/9.5	(a) D. E (b) O	1 3-inch; 4 T. T. 21-inch.
R-3 and R-4	1927	1928	(a) 576/682 (b) 880 (c) 14.5/9.5	(a) D. E (b) O	1 3-inch; 4 T. T. 21-inch.
Projected, 30					

RIVER GUNBOATS—AG

Four river gunboats employed on upper Amazon River, varying in size from 22 to 240 tons. Building and projected, none.

Ships in commission, in reserve, and out of commission

In commission:
- 2 Cruisers (OCL).
- 1 Gunboat (PG).
- 1 Destroyer (ODD).
- 4 Submarines (SS).
- 4 River gunboats (AG).

NAVAL BASE

The only naval base in Peru is located at San Lorenzo Island (4 miles from Callao). This base was built primarily for the accommodations of submarines. Its equipment, however, is sufficient to attend to the ordinary and varied wants of the present squadron, with regard to general overhaul and minor repairs.

San Lorenzo is the strategic key to Callao Harbor. A line of hills averaging 1,000 feet in height, and extending the entire length of the island of about 5 miles. The topography affords many suitable sites for the emplacement of heavy artillery for both sea and harbor defense.

COAST DEFENSE SYSTEM

The coast defense of Peru has always been controlled by the army. Late in 1927 the inspector general of the army recommended to the head of the mission that the navy take over the coast defense. This matter was submitted to the President and so far as this office is aware no supreme resolution has been issued effecting a change, but it appears likely this change will be made. Callao is the only port defended by permanent fortifications, and even this is antiquated and very inefficiently organized. It comprises one battery of four 9.5-inch Schneider-Canet and one battery of four 6-inch Armstrong guns.

BUILDING AND REPAIR FACILITIES

Naval ships.—No facilities available in Peru for building naval vessels.

Commercial ships.—There are no shipyards in Peru of any size. Shipbuilding is not an industry. Callao is the only port in Peru where repair facilities can be made. The Compania Peruana de Vapores y Dique del Callao has a steel floating dry dock; length, 385 feet; width of entrance, 70 feet; draft taken, 22 feet; capacity, 7,000 tons, and makes any kind of repairs to hulls, and machinery; 50-ton crane available.

FUELING STATIONS

Naval.—The floating fuel base *Duenas*, moored off the naval base, has capacity of 1,500 tons of coal for local use. There is no other coal supply in or near Callao harbor, except for small quantities on hand for sale by the various local dealers. Fuel-oil tanks located at the naval base with capacity of 1,200 tons, for the use of the two cruisers. The International Petroleum Co. has its wells at Talara, about 520 miles north-northwest of Callao, where it can deliver 1,000 tons per hour to its tankers.

Commercial.—Large quantities of coal exist in the interior of Peru, but very little has been mined up to date on account of its inaccessibility, consequently all fuel of this nature is imported from the United States, England and Australia.

Oil facilities

Name of port	Amount usually available	Method of delivery and maximum draft for loading	Remarks
Callao	105,000 barrels	International Petroleum Co., dock or lighter, 23 feet.	24 hours' notice required. Reported that this oil not suitable for ships. About 15,000 cases gasoline available.
Mollendo	21,000 to 28,000 barrels	Pipe line	
Patia	Very small	West Coast Oil Fuel Co., pipe line at anchorage, 42 feet.	Diesel oil available.
Talara	84,000 barrels	International Petroleum Co., pipe line at anchorage, 42 feet.	Rate of fueling, 4,500 barrels per hour. Diesel oil available.

COMMUNICATIONS

Cable.—Cable service within Peru and between Peru and foreign points is furnished by the following companies: All America Cables (Inc.), 3 cables from Callao to Iquique, Chile; 2 cables direct from Callao to Santa Elena, Ecuador; 1 cable from Callao to Santa Elena with T-piece connections with Trujillo and Paita, Peru. West Coast of America Telegraph Co. (British), one line from Callao to Arica, Chile, via Mollendo, Peru.

Radio.—In April, 1926, the Peruvian Government awarded a contract to the Marconi Co. for a period of 20 years the administration of the postal, telegraph, and radiograph services of that country. There are 22 Government radio stations located in various parts of the Republic for internal communications.

There is one official broadcasting station located at Lima.

AVIATION

The inspector general of military, naval, and commercial aviation in Peru is Harold Grow, a former lieutenant commander in the United States Navy. The present director of the naval aviation school at Ancon is Lieut. Ben Wyatt, United States Navy.

The naval aviation equipment consists of about 25 serviceable planes.

In addition to the regular instruction of students, numerous formation flights have been made during the year. Instruction in radio from machines in the air has been recently undertaken. Several air maps were made by the photographic department. The discipline in the naval air service is fair and condition of material excellent. In March, 1928, six naval aviators were awarded pilot licenses.

AIR STATIONS AND LANDING FIELDS

The main naval air station in Peru is located at Ancon, about 22 miles north of Callao. It is new, and absolutely up to date in its equipment and buildings, being the successful product of the initiative and energy of the aviation member of the naval mission.

To reduce the time in transit and to furnish mail and passenger service from Lima to Iquitos, the latter place the headquarters of the Loreta Flotilla (Amazon River District), the Government of Peru in September, 1926, issued a decree providing for the inauguration of a hydroaviation service, the operation of the air line to be under the direct control of the air service of the navy.

Through the energy and initiative of Harold B. Grow, formerly a lieutenant commander, United States Navy, this service was inaugurated the latter part of 1927, thereby reducing a former travel schedule of 15 to 18 days to one of about 2½ days. Present schedule is as follows:

Lima to Oraya by train, one day.
Oraya to La Merced by auto, one day.
La Merced to Puerto Bermudez by landplane, one hour.
Puerto Bermudez to Iquitos by seaplane, seven hours.

The facilities in this route are as follows:

La Merced.—Field, shops, hangars, quarters, gas deposit (main base for land planes).

Puerto Bermudez.—Field only (no facilities).

Masisea.—Small hangar and runway; limited shop facilities, quarters.

Iquitos.—Large hangar and runway, shops, quarters. Main base for seaplanes.

Personnel.

METHOD OF RECRUITMENT

By voluntary enlistment or conscription for two years. According to Peruvian laws, all males between the ages of 18 and 21 must be enrolled, and are subject to military or naval service for a period of two years. The maximum age for volunteer service being 21 years, though anyone in service may reenlist up to 60 years.

Conscripts are called annually to the number of about 400 and are assembled at Callao on April 1. The head of mission reported under date of October 2, 1928, that the number of reenlistments for the past 12 months was 261, this being an increase of 112 over the preceding year.

Strength (total and by grades).—Officer, estimated number, 225; enlisted, estimated number, 1,450; reserves, none.

DISTRIBUTION

At sea.—The approximate number of officers on duty with squadron is 60 and enlisted men 750.

Shore stations.—Estimated number of officers on shore duty, exclusive of aviation, is 135 officers, and enlisted men about 600.

Aviation.—About 30 officers and 150 men.

TRAINING

Individual.

Officers.—All officers belonging to the "line" of the navy must be graduates of the Peruvian Naval Academy. This institution is conducted on the same general high standard of efficiency as the United States Naval Academy, so far as conditions and funds permit. The course of study covers a period of six years, upon the conclusion of which graduates are able to perform either "line" or engineering duty. "Amalgamation" was effected in 1923, but only for those graduating since that date.

All naval cadets are sent on an annual summer training cruise for a period of three months from January 1 to March 31. Instruction in aviation for cadets was begun in 1925. Peru has no naval war college at the present time.

Enlisted men.—Conscripts are assembled at the naval academy and given one month's intensive training in elementary seamanship, boat drill, physical exercises, hygiene, and general instruction for recruits prior to being distributed to the service. There is an apprentice school located at the naval academy, which has accommodations for 50 men. The purpose of this school is for the development of likely candidates for petty officers. A torpedo school has recently been established at the naval academy. Likewise there is a diving school at the naval base at San Lorenzo.

Collective.—Practice cruises, target practice, and maneuvers.

Morale.—The discipline of the Peruvian Navy may be considered to be below our own service. The officers and men appear to be ready and willing to obey orders, so long as some one is present to direct and guide them, otherwise they lack the sense of responsibility.

Naval Strategy and Policy.

The coast line of Peru is approximately 1,400 miles long. The coast is generally straight and precipitous. During the winter months the coast is beaten by heavy southwest swells. The majority of the ports are open roadsteads. Callao is the only port of major importance, and it is situated about equidistant along the 1,400 miles of coast line.

Between the Pacific and the West Cordillera there exists a narrow strip averaging about 80 miles in width and extending along the entire coast line, in which very little vegetation grows, sand and rocks predominating. There are a few small streams which flow across this narrow strip and empty into the Pacific.

It will be noted in this area the absolute lack of railway, or even road communications along the coast. Should any point be threatened along the coast, it would be impossible to transfer troops to that area except with the protection and aid of war ships.

In the Peruvian-Chilean war (1879–1883) Peru was defeated because she was weak on the sea. At that time the Peruvians were fully cognizant of this weakness, but apparently took no action to remedy the defect. A naval policy was formulated shortly after the establishment of the United States naval mission to that country in 1922.

Peru is not a self-sustaining nation, and the economic life of the country is dependent on foreign trade, by the highway of the sea. Due to her geographical location, coast line, terrain, and lack of interior communications, her major strategy is essentially naval. Her primary defense, therefore, should be on the sea.

The formulation of a naval policy was given careful consideration by the mission and its recommendations were approved by the Government. It was considered that the international relations and the financial conditions of the country did not warrant an offensive naval force. Keeping in mind the trend of events in the Great War, it was decided that an offensive-defensive force, consisting of 6 destroyers, 6 submarines, and 25 (scouting, fighting, and bombing) planes of the most efficient proved types was considered ample for the present needs of Peru.

All that is desired is a force of sufficient strength and of such composition to prevent an invasion of Peru and permit her trade to continue uninterruptedly, while at the same time permitting her to strike an effective blow at the maritime communications of her potential enemy.

Peru, prior to the acquisition of two submarines, was absolutely defenseless on the sea. Any of the A, B, C countries of South America could within a reasonably short time win a war against her without firing a shot by means of an economic blockade, which would result in the gradual strangulation of Peru.

Conclusions.

Peru does not desire war with Chile; in fact, she would exert all energies to prevent another such war. The Peruvians have not forgotten the results of the conflict in 1879–1883.

II. MERCHANT MARINE

Organization.

RELATIONS TO GOVERNMENT

Subsidies, control, policy.

The only ship subsidy paid by the Peruvian Government is to the Peruvian Steamship & Drydock Co. (La Compania Peruana de

Vapores y Dique del Callao). This subsidy, which amounts to about $14,600 per year, is based on article 5 of the law governing merchant marine, which reads as follows:

> Steamships flying the national flag shall receive as a subsidy from the Government 1 centavo ($0.004865) per registered ton for each 100 miles traveled on round voyage.

In order to enjoy the subsidy it is necessary that the minimum speed of ship shall be 10 knots. The company also receives a drawback of customs duties paid on ships' stores and equipment purchased abroad, as well as an exemption from the payment of various shipping dues. In return for state aid a steamship company agrees to carry mail free of charge and turn over its steamers to the Government for use as auxiliary cruisers in time of war.

In the latter part of 1926 the Peruvian coastwise shipping law passed the House and Senate of that country, the latter body slightly modifying it before approval. The text of the bill provides the creation of a nation council of navigation to reserve coastwise shipping to ships having the right to use the national flag, and which are to be, in addition, owned by native or naturalized Peruvians or by foreigners who have resided in the country for over 10 years, and with two-thirds of their crew of Peruvian nationality and commanded by Peruvians. If the vessels belong to a company, it is necessary that 60 per cent of the capital stock be owned by Peruvian citizens in order for the organization to be considered national.

Ownership: Owing or operating companies.

The majority portion of the shipping under the Peruvian flag is controlled by the Compania Peruana de Vapores y Dique del Callao.

Operation: Trade routes.

The shipping company mentioned in the previous paragraph is engaged only in coastal trade along the South American coast.

2. *Matériel.*

Numbers, tonnage, and speed of ships

Tonnage	Number of vessels	Total gross tonnage	Tonnage	Number of vessels	Total gross tonnage
1,000 to 2,000 tons	4	6,593	6,000 to 8,000 tons	1	6,163
2,000 to 4,000 tons	10	31,624	Total	19	65,011
4,000 to 6,000 tons	4	20,631			

Speed	Number of vessels	Total gross tonnage	Speed	Number of vessels	Total gross tonnage
18 knots	1	3,305	12–14 knots	3	16,209
16 knots	1	4,403	Total	5	23,917

The speed of the balance of the merchant marine is rated at less than 12 knots.

Classification as to present and possible war uses.—Present uses (liners, cargo and passenger, cargo, tanker, etc.). War uses (transports, cruisers, cargo, tankers, etc.).

Commercial ships which might be utilized for war uses

Name	Date built	Gross tonnage	Class	Speed in knots	Estimated troop capacity
Amazonas	1894	3, 264	Cargo		650
Apurimac	1898	4, 763	do		950
Huallaga	1911	4, 403	do	16	880
Jose	1900	3, 445	do		685
Mantaro	1910	4, 617	do	13. 5	925
Mari	1907	3, 835	do		770
Rimac	1907	6, 848	do	12	1, 370
Strombus	1900	6, 163	do		1, 230
Ucayali	1909	3, 305	do	18	660
Urubamba	1910	4, 744	do	13. 5	950

Building and projected, none.

3. *Personnel.*

Numbers: Not known.

Character (nationality, relations with navy): The law authorizes the Government to use all personnel (officers and men) of the Peruvian merchant marine as reserve force in time of war or national emergency.

THE CHILEAN-PERUVIAN WAR

1879 to 1883

Historical.

During the Spanish colonial period, from the sixteenth century until the beginning of the nineteenth, Chile formed part of the vice royalty of Peru as a captaincy general, leading a somewhat autonomous political existence. Bolivia, the ally of Peru in the War of the Pacific, belonged to the vice royalty of La Plata, the present Argentina. All Spanish America was the personal possession of the absolute Spanish sovereign, and exact geographic boundaries and various political divisions of the American domains were not fixed. This uncertainty regarding boundary lines caused many disputes among the new nations when they became free from Spain.

Causes of the War.

The Province of Atacama, or properly the desert of Atacama, had remained without a definite owner for many years. At one time claimed by Bolivia, at another by Chile, but never considered of sufficient importance to warrant the establishment of a boundary line until the discovery of the guano nitrates and other mineral wealth which it contained. In 1866, the Republics being allied in war against their common enemy, Spain, a treaty was made between Bolivia and Chile establishing the boundary at the twenty-fourth parallel of south latitude, and further stipulating that Chilean citizens already landowners between the parallels of 23° and 24° south should be allowed to mine and export the valuable products without tax or hindrance from the Government of Bolivia. To facilitate the execution of this agreement Chile was allowed to have a representative in the customhouse at Antofagasta. The nitrate business was chiefly in the hands of one company represented by the English house of Gibbs, a Chilean named Edwards, and the Chilean Government. On the 23d of February, 1878, Bolivia levied a tax of 10 centavos per quintal on all nitrates. When remonstrated with for this alleged breach of treaty stipulations, the Bolivian Government not only refused to remit the tax but declared it retroactive, and further decreed that if the taxes were not paid before the 14th of February, 1879, the nitrates in the hands of exporters would be seized and sold at auction. Chile remonstrated against these preceedings, and sent her fleet, under Rear Admiral Revolledo Williams, to protect the property of her citizens at Antofagasta.

On the 24th of January, 1879, a Chilean force of 500 regulars was landed at Antofagasta and it then became the headquarters for further operations. At the same time Chilean war vessels occupied the ports of Cobija and Tocopilla.

Chile demanded of Peru the reason for her preparations for war, and that they should cease. Chile was not satisfied with the answer and, on the 2d of April formally declared war, at the same time asserting that she knew of a secret treaty of February 6, 1873, between Peru and Bolivia. Bolivia declared war on Chile on the 1st of March, 1879, but Peru did not declare war until April 5. This delay gave the Chileans time to occupy every port on the Bolivian coast.

The naval forces engaged

THE CHILEAN NAVY—1879

Name	Class	Date built	(a) Displacement (tons); (b) designed horsepower; (c) designed speed (knots)	(a) Type of machinery; (b) type of fuel	Armament
Almirante Cochrane.	Armored box-casemated ram.	1874	(a) 3,560 (b) 2,960 (c) 12.8	(a) T. S., 2 engines; (b) coal.	6 9-inch, 12-ton M. L. Armstrong; 1 20-pounder; 19-pounder; 1 7-pounder; 9-inch armor at water line.
Blanco Encalada	do	1874	(a) 3,560 (b) 2,960 (c) 12.8	do	6 9-inch, 12-ton M. L. Armstrong; 1 20-pounder; 19-pounder; 1 7-pounder; 9-inch armor at water line.
Chacabuco	Corvette, wooden hulls.	1867	(a) 1,670 (b) (c) 8-10	(a) S. S., simple, old type; (b) coal.	3 7-ton M. L. Armstrong rifles; 2 70-pounders; 4 40-pounders.
O'Higgins	do	1867	(a) 1,670 (b) (c) 8-10	do	Do.
Abtao	Corvette	1864	(a) 1,050 (b) 300 (c) 5-6	(a) S. S., simple engines; (b) coal.	3 150-pounder M. L. Armstrong rifles; 3 30-pounders.
Esmeralda	Sloop	1854	(a) 850 (b) 200 (c) 3.0	(a) Simple, old-type S. S.	14 40-pounder M. L. Armstrong rifles.
Magellanes	Second-class corvette.	1874	(a) 772 (b) 1,230 (c) 11.0	(a) Engines, compound T. S.	1 7-ton M. L. Armstrong rifle; 1 64-pounder; 1 20-pounder.
Covadonga	Gunboat	(1)	(a) 412 (b) 140 (c) 5.0	(a) S. S., old-style engines.	2 70-pounder M. L. Armstrong rifles.

[1] Captured from Spain in 1866.

NOTE.—Besides the above-named men-of-war, Chile had an excellent line of English-built coast steamers and a number of vessels engaged in transporting ores belonging to the Cousino estate.

The naval forces engaged—Continued

THE PERUVIAN NAVY—1879

Independencia	Ironclad ram frigate.	1864	(a) 2,004 (b) 1,500 (c) 12.0	(a) Old type; (b) coal.	2 150-pounder M. L. Armstrong rifles; 12 70-pounders. At outbreak of war following added: 1 150-pounder M. L. Vavasseur rifle; 1 150-pounder Parrott rifle; armor, 4½ inches at water line.
Huascar	Ironclad S. T. ram	1865	(a) 1,130 (b) 1,200 (c) 11.0	(a) S. S. simple engines; (b) coal.	2 10-inch 12½-ton 300-pounder M. L. Armstrong rifles; 2 40-pounder; 1 12-pounder; armor, 4½ inches abreast the turret chamber.
Atahualpa	S. T. harbor monitor.	1866	(a) 2,100 (b) 320 (c) 6.0	(a) Vibrating lever S. S.	2 C. I. smoothbore M. L. Dahlgren 15-inch guns; armored.
Manco Capac	do	1866	(a) 2,100 (b) 320 (c) 6.0	(a) Vibrating lever S. S.	Do.
Union	Wooden corvette	1864	(a) 1,150 (b) 400 (c) 12.0	(a) Simple engine S. S.	2 100-pounder M. L. Parrott guns; 2 70-pounder; 12 40-pounder.
Pilcomayo	do	1864	(a) 600 (b) 180 (c) 10–11	(a) Simple engine	2 70-pounder M. L. Armstrong rifles; 4 40-pounders.
Oroya	Armed transport	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1).

[1] No further data available.

NOTE.—The Peruvian transports Chalaco and Limena, of 1,000 and 1,163 tons displacement, respectively, armed with 2 40-pounder M. L. Armstrongs, capable of steaming 11 to 12 knots.

The Chilean Navy consisted of 208 officers and 1,500 enlisted men. The navy had been fostered by the Government and was fully alive to its vital importance in the national defense. Many of the younger officers had gained experience in foreign services.

The Peruvian naval force was divided into three divisions. The first, under Captain Grau, consisted of the *Huascar*, *Independencia*, and *Oroya;* the second, under Captain Carillo, consisted of the *Manco Capac*, *Atahualpa*, and *Chalaco;* the third or light division, under Captain Garcia y Garcia, consisted of the *Union*, *Pilcomayo*, and *Limena.*

The active navy of Peru was commanded by Rear Admiral de la Haza. The senior Peruvian naval officer afloat was Captain Miguel Grau. Born in the city of Puira in 1834, Captain Grau was educated at the nautical school where he graduated with distinction and was then sent to sea in a merchantman. Later he became a coast pilot and in 1856 entered the navy as a sublieutenant. In 1868 he reached the grade of commander and was ordered to command the *Huascar.* Grau was a good seaman, an intelligent officer, a brave and honorable gentleman, beloved and respected by every one who came in contact with him.

The discipline of the Peruvian Navy was very lax, and drills were almost unknown. The enlisted personnel was composed of the offscouring of foreign merchant and naval service, the best among them being Chileans. This material supplied the petty officers and filled the ratings of seamen and ordinary seamen, while the landsmen were drawn from the native Cholos.

Bolivia had no navy.

The land forces engaged.

The Chilean Regular Army at the outbreak of the war was a well-disciplined and organized force, numbering 2,440. Steps were immediately taken to raise a number of regiments, each to a war strength of 1,200 men.

The standing army of Peru at that time including the gendarmerie and Lima police, is estimated at from 9,000 to 13,000 men of all arms. Decrees were issued to organize a large number of regiments, which resulted in bringing to Lima thousands of Indians from the interior. There was no organization beyond the regiment in the Peruvian Army. It had no commissariat, no artillery worthy of the name, no engineers, and no general staff.

The Bolivian Regular Army numbered 3,300 in 1879. At the outbreak of war a levy en masse was decreed. Material of the rank and file was excellent, but there were no officers capable of reducing this raw material to a trained army. The recruits were principally Indians, who showed docility, endurance, and determination worthy of all praise. For enduring long and tiresome marches these men had no superiors. To arm and equip these troops, a forced loan was decreed, but only partially raised. Several thousand Bolivian Indians, poorly armed and equipped, without commissariat, transport, or medical services, set out under General Daza to join the Peruvians at Tacna.

Operations.

While the Chileans and Bolivians were contending for the possession of the Atacama district, the Peruvians sent a force of 3,000 regulars under Col. Manuel Velarde to Iquique. Later Gen. Jose Buendia was sent to command this army of the south.

Coincident with the declaration of war on April 2, the Chileans began to collect an army at Antofagasta.

The first naval engagement of the war opened on April 12, when the Chilean (corvette) *Magellanes*, while on her way to join the Chilean squadron, met the *Union* and *Pilcomayo*, off Point Chipana, near the mouth of the river Loa. The action lasted about two hours. The *Union* suffered some damage and the *Magellanes* managed to escape.

During the night of May 16, President Prado of Peru sailed from Callao in the *Oroya*, accompanied by the *Huascar*, *Independencia*, *Limena*, and *Chalaco*, proceeding well out to sea and eventually arriving at Arica where the troops were landed from the two transports. President Prado then assumed the office of supreme director of the war, it having been arranged between the allies that the command should rest with the commander in chief of the army belonging to the country in which they were operating. In the interim, General Daza had arrived at Tacna with a force of about 4,000 Bolivians.

The "Huascar" and the "Esmeralda."

After seeing the troops safely disembarked from the transports, the *Huascar* and *Independencia* sailed, on the evening of May 20, to the southward.

Captain Grau had received information of the movement of the Chilean squadron to the north, and consequently was aware of the unprotected state of the coast and weakness of the blockade at Iquique.

In the meantime the Chilean admiral, having information of the proposed movement of the Peruvian fleet from Callao, sailed north on May 16 with the *Cochrane*, *Blanco*, *O'Higgins*, *Chacabuco*, *Magellanes*, and *Abtao*, keeping close in shore in hopes of bringing about a general engagement. This force arrived off Callao during the night of May 21–22, when it was discovered that the Peruvian forces had evaded them. The *Esmeralda* and *Covadonga*, on account of the bad condition of their engines, had been left to enforce the blockade of Iquique.

During the night of May 20–21, the Peruvian iron-turreted ship *Huascar*, under Captain Grau, senior officer, and an ironclad frigate *Independencia*, Capt. J. G. Moore, touched at Pisagua to make certain of the absence of the Chilean ironclads. Being reassured, Captain Grau continued on, and at daylight of the 21st appeared off Iquique.

Commander Arturo Prat, commanding the Chilean wooden sloop *Esmeralda*, as soon as he made out the enemy, signaled to Commander Carlos Condel, commanding the wooden gunboat *Covadonga*, to take position in column astern of the *Esmeralda*. The *Huascar* singled out the *Esmeralda* and the *Independencia* the *Covadonga*. After a hard fight the *Huascar* sank the *Esmeralda* by ramming. The *Covadonga* outmaneuvered the *Independencia* by leading her into shoal water. On her third attempt to ram the *Covadonga*, the Peruvian ship struck a rock and stuck fast. The lighter draft Chilean then took an advantageous position, badly damaged the *Independencia* by gunfire and forced her to surrender.

Although Commander Prat was well aware he was to meet a superior force, his attitude under the circumstances may be best expressed by the speech which he made to the officers and men before the fight: "Children the odds are against us. Our flag has never been lowered in the presence of the enemy; I hope that it will not be to-day. As long as I live that flag shall fly in its place, and if I die, my officers will know how to do their duty."

When the *Huascar* rammed the *Esmeralda*, Prat followed by four or five men managed to board the *Huascar* before the ships separated. He fell mortally wounded, near the spot on the *Huascar's* deck, where later Grau was to meet his end.

The *Huascar* was considerably damaged in this action and while proceeding to Callao for repairs she sighted two vessels, which in the haze she mistook for the *O'Higgins* and *Chacabuco*. She stood toward them, and when about 5 miles distant discovered she had to deal with the Chilean armored ship *Blanco* and the covette *Magellanes* instead. These vessels gave chase. A few shots were exchanged. After a hard run the *Huascar* managed to escape and on June 7 arrived at Callao for overhaul and refit, where she was received with great enthusiasm. Captain Grau, by a unanimous vote of Congress, was promoted to rear admiral, but at his own request he was allowed to retain his old command, as he realized that there was no one to replace him in that all-important position.

On the return of the Chilean squadron from Callao, the blockade of Iquique was restablished under Captain Simpson of the *Cochrane*.

The Chilean Government was very much dissatisfied with the manner in which Admiral Williams had conducted affairs, and shortly afterwards he was relieved and Commodore Galvarino Riveros was placed in command of the squadron.

The army of Tarapaca under General Buendia, with Colonel Granier of the Bolivian Army at Pisagua; now numbered about 10,000 men. The headquarters of the allied army was located at Arica.

The Second Cruise of the "Huascar."

After being repaired and remanned, the *Huascar* started on a second raid to the southward, touching at Arica on July 9, where the admiral communicated with the director of the war, from whom he received orders to proceed south and inflict as much damage as possible, but on no account to risk a combat with superior or even equal forces. Leaving Arica, Admiral Grau ran into the Bay of Iquique the same night, where he had an engagement with the *Magellanes*. The *Huascar* made four attempts to ram the *Magellanes*, but without success. The firing brought the Chilean ironclad *Cochrane* on the scene and caused the *Huascar*, in accordance with her instructions, to leave after a short running fight.

On July 17, the *Huascar* captured the Chilean transport *Rimac*. Among the articles captured in the transport was the official correspondence of the Government, from which it was learned that the Chileans expected two cargoes of arms from Europe by the way of the Strait of Magellan. The *Union* was dispatched to those waters to intercept the cargoes, but was unsuccessful. Two Chilean ships were sent after the *Union*, but she succeeded in evading them.

On the night of August 27 the *Huascar* appeared off Antofagasta and, approaching within 200 yards of the *Abtao* fired a "Lay" torpedo at her. The torpedo proceeded some distance on its course, making a half circle in that direction, and came back toward the firing vessel. A lieutenant of the *Huascar*, appreciating the danger, jumped overboard and caused the torpedo to deviate from its dangerous course. The next day the *Huascar* again ran in and engaged the shore batteries and the corvettes *Magellanes* and *Abtao*, severely damaging the latter vessel.

Change of Plans in Chilean Naval Campaign.

Great dissatisfaction was now expressed in Chile in regard to the conduct of the war. The blockade of Iquique was abandoned, and all vessels that could be spared from the protection of Antofagasta were ordered to Valparaiso for repairs. Captain Latorre, who was the hero of the hour, was placed in command of the *Cochrane*, and Don Rafael Sotomayor, Minister of War, was sent to Antofagasta to supervise matters.

On the 1st of October the Chilean squadron, consisting of the *Blanco*, flagship of Commodore Riveros, the *Cochrane*, *O'Higgins*, and *Covadonga*, and transports *Loa* and *Mathias Cousino* went north toward Arica.

The Chilean squadron at Mejillones, having coaled, put to sea during the night of October 7 in two divisions. The first, under Commodore Riveros, consisting of the slower vessels, *Blanco*, *Covadonga*, and *Mathias Cousino*, sailed at 10 p. m., and started down the coast toward Antofagasta; the second, under Commander Latorre, consisting of the *Cochrane*, *O'Higgins*, and *Loa*, sailed at 1 a. m. on the 8th with orders to cruise 25 miles on and off Point Angamos.

The President of Peru, General Prado, at this time issued orders for the *Huascar* to make another raid to the south. This was done against the advice of Admiral Grau, who knowing that the *Huascar's* speed was materially reduced by her exceedingly foul bottom, that she was in urgent need of a general overhaul, considered his vessel of too great value, in the present reduced state of the navy, to be needlessly risked. His advice, however, was overruled, and on September 30 the *Huascar*, in company with the *Union*, escorted the transport *Rimac* with troops to Iquique, and on October 5 appeared off the harbor of Coquimbo. They remained off this port until October 7 and then set sail for Antofagasta, where the

Huascar and her consort arrived shortly after midnight on October 8. Finding nothing of interest there, the *Huascar* joined the *Union* off Point Tetas and headed north. Shortly after 3 a. m. they made out the smoke of three vessels along the coast steering south about 6 miles distant. These were soon recognized as war vessels and the course was changed to southwest at 3.30 a. m. to avoid them.

At about 5.40 a. m. Admiral Grau finding that he was rapidly distancing his pursuers turned toward the north. At about 7.15 a. m. smoke was sighted on the horizon to the northwest, and at 7.30 a. m. the *Huascar* stood slightly to the westward to reconnoiter. The *Cochrane* and her consorts were recognized. The *Union*, which had remained on the *Huascar's* port quarter, now crossed her stern and passed to starboard of her at full speed. Admiral Grau had ordered her to make the best of her way to Arica whither she was followed until dark by the *O'Higgins* and *Loa*.

Admiral Grau saw that his only chance of escape from the superior Chilean forces lay in his speed. At 9.25 a. m. the *Cochrane* was approximately 3,000 yards distant and the *Huascar* opened fire with her turret guns. At 9.45 a. m. the conning tower of the *Huascar* was struck by a shell from the *Cochrane* and Admiral Grau was killed in the explosion which followed.

By about 10.30 a. m. the ship was almost unmanageable and on fire in several places; still the engines were kept going, and the port turret gun was fired occasionally. Lieut. Pedro Garezon, the fourth commanding officer, called a council of surviving officers and decided to open the sea valves and sink her. The engines were stopped, but before the *Huascar's* officers were able to accomplish their work, the vessel was captured by boarding parties from the *Cochrane* and *Blanco*, and eventually brought into port.

The engagement lasted 90 minutes. The *Huascar* suffered heavy casualties. Out of a crew of 200, 28 officers and men were killed and 48 wounded.

With the loss of the *Huascar*, the Peruvian Navy figuratively speaking, ceased to exist.

The remains of Admiral Grau were buried with full military honors at Santiago; deepest regret for his passing was expressed not only in Peru but in Bolivia and Chile as well. His record was a bright one, for he had endeared himself to friend and foe by his generosity and high ideals.

This was the last naval battle of the war.

Subsequent Land Operations.

The allied army at Arica and vicinity now numbered about 20,000 men. The Chileans, on the other hand, had a striking force of about 16,000 men in the vicinity of Antofagasta. A Chilean expeditionary force of about 8,000 men embarked in transports at Antofagasta and appeared off Pisagua on November 2. In the face of considerable opposition this force landed and captured Pisagua.

The allied forces fell back and concentrated at La Noria and Pena Grande, the terminus of the Iquique Railroad. On November 19 an allied force of 10,000 men attacked the Chilean positions in the vicinity of San Francisco, but were met with such heavy fire from the entrenched Chileans that a general rout took place. This was, however, not taken advantage of by the Chileans. Nearly the whole of the Bolivian division started for Bolivia immediately. The remnants of the Peruvian army retired to the town of Tarapaca. On November 22 the town of Iquique was occupied by Chileans.

The day following the engagement at San Francisco, a Chilean force of 2,000 men was sent to reconnoiter the enemy. This force, proceeding to the foothills of the town of Tarapaca, arrived in an exhausted condition. The Peruvians evacuated the town on the approach of the Chileans, but on learning the condition of the approaching force, returned and suddenly fell upon the Chilean force and routed them completely. For some unknown reason the allies failed to make use of this victory and continued to retreat leaving the Chileans in complete possession of the Tarapaca region.

On December 21 a revolution broke out which had been smouldering in Peru for some years. Senor Don N. Pierola, a colonel of one of the new regiments, executed a coup d'état and proclaimed himself supreme chief of the Republic. Following the revolution in Peru one occurred in Bolivia which placed General Campero in power.

The objectives of the Chileans in the second campaign were the forces of the allies in Tacna and Arica, and the capture of the Province of Tacna. The Chileans embarked 12,000 men in 20 transports at Pisagua and proceeded north on February 24, 1880. The next day a force of over 9,000 was landed at Pacocha, a small town about 60 miles north of Arica. At the same time a force of 3,000 was landed at Vitor, situated about 20 miles south of Pacocha. Careful preparations were made for the march inland over a desert country. By March 20, Moquegua was occupied without resistance. From the heights of Alto de la Villa, which commanded the old town of Moquegua, the Peruvians with a force of about 2,000 men could be seen occupying the strong positions of Los Angeles. After a desperate effort the superior Chilean forces turned both flanks of the Peruvian position, and the position was occupied on March 22.

Early in April, 1880, complete preparations were made by the Chileans for the advance from Moquegua to Tacna. In the meantime Chilean war vessels were engaged in a series of minor naval operations in and about the bay of Callao.

The allied army at Tacna, numbering about 14,000 of all arms, was commanded by Gereral Campero, the President of Bolivia. Admiral Montero commanded the right, composed of Peruvians, and General Camacho the left, composed of Bolivians. The Chilean Army of about equal numbers was commanded by General Baquedano. The allies occupied a strong position along a line of hills to the northwest of Tacna. Chileans opened the attack on May 26. The tide of the battle swayed back and forth between the two forces during the forenoon, but finally at 1 o'clock the whole allied line retreated and retired to the mountains.

The Chileans by June 5 had invested Arica both by land and sea. The following day a general engagement took place both by land and sea. The allied troops commanding the forts at Arica put up a stubborn defense, but finally surrendered.

As a result of the second campaign the Chileans had gained a strip of Peru (from Pisagua to Ylo), and had demonstrated that they were greatly superior to their opponents both in courage and leadership.

An expeditionary force of about 3,000 men, commanded by Patricio Lynch, a captain in the Chilean Navy, carried out successful raids at various places on the coast and inland.

The Chilean Army was reorganized during the summer, and prepared for operations against Lima. This force was under the command of General Baquedano, and consisted of 23,621 men and 63 guns, divided into three divisions. The first division of the Chilean Army landed at Pisco on November 18, 1880, and the whole army was ready to move against the defenses of Lima six weeks later.

The army of Lima was an army only in name. The regular force which numbered 26,500 men of all arms, in command of General Pierola, was divided into four divisions of about 6,000 men, each commanded by a colonel. The reserves numbering some 7,000 men could hardly be called soldiers. The whole force in the vicinity of Lima, therefore comprised about 33,500. The plan of the Peruvian commanders was to continue to act on the defensive as they had done throughout the war. For defensive purposes the position selected was magnificent. The line extended along a range of hills from Point Chorrillos (near Callao) to Monterico Chico in the form of a crescent, a distance of about 8 miles. A second line, in the immediate vicinity of Miraflores and parallel to and about 4½ miles in the rear of the first line was established and manned by reserves.

The first line of defense was attacked by General Baquedano early on the morning of January 13, 1881. Reconnaissance proved that the flanks rested secure, and the first stage of the battle was a purely frontal attack. The battle of Chorrillos ended in the complete defeat of the Peruvians; less than a quarter of the army rallied behind the Miraflores defensive. Two days later the battle of Miraflores occurred. Its result was, as before, the complete dissolution of the defending army. Lima, incapable of defense, was occupied by the invaders on the 17th and on the 18th Callao surrendered.

The resistance of the Peruvians was so far broken that shortly after the surrender of Callao, General Baquedano, with all but about 10,000 of his troops, returned to Chile. Captain Latorre with a small naval force was left in command on the Peruvian coast.

The last engagement of the war took place in July, 1883, near Huamachuco. The Peruvians were utterly routed and lost 1,800 men in killed and wounded. The allies were finally beaten and Chile signed treaties of peace with Peru on October 20 and with Bolivia on December 11, 1883.

The Treaty of Peace.

By the treaty Chile obtained from Bolivia the latter's seacoast, including the port of Cobija, 20 per cent of Bolivian port customs, privileges for constructing railroads into the interior, and other concessions.

By the terms of the treaty between Peru and Chile, the former ceded to her antogonist the territory of Tarapaca to the Camerones River, forever and unconditionally; the territories of Tacna and Arica were to remain subject to Chilean authority for a period of 10 years, at the close of which term the vote of the people of those Provinces should decide whether they should return to Peru or remain Chilean. In either case, the country to which they should afterwards be definitely annexed engaged to pay to the other an indemnity of $10,000,000.

By this treaty Chile obtained the present Province of Tarapaca and that of Antofagasta from Bolivia, and these are regarded the really valuable spoils of the war, as they contain all the rich nitrate beds and considerable mineral wealth.

TACNA-ARICA DISPUTE

There has existed considerable misapprehension as to the size and natural resources of the area in dispute. The territory in question covers an area of approximately 14,500 square miles. There are about 98,135 acres under cultivation, or less than 2 per cent of the entire area in dispute. Very little, if any, real workable nitrate deposits have been located in the Provinces, and their real value is as a sea outlet for Bolivia. Relatively speaking, it is a barren desert with practically no rainfall. The value of the property in 1917 was 68,299,544 pesos. The natural resources of Tacna and Arica were well expressed by Señor Mathieu, formerly Chilean ambassador to the United States, when he said that "Chile and Peru disputing over Tacna presented the spectacle of two bald men fighting for a toothless comb." The census of 1920 showed 38,912 people in the Province of Tacna, a population density of 2.7 persons per square mile. The number of Peruvians in this territory was difficult to estimate at that time, but there were 12,052 Peruvians in the whole of Chile in 1920, and by far the greater number was located in Tacna.

By an unhappy oversight the treaty of Ancon did not stipulate the exact conditions under which the plebiscite would be held. The most unfortunate omission was one having to do with the qualifications of those inhabitants who would be allowed to vote. This plebiscite should have been held in the year 1894, but due to the unsettled conditions existing in Chile this feature of the treaty was not carried out.

In 1910 Chile proposed that the plebiscite be arranged on the basis of the vote being given to literate Peruvian, Chilean, and foreign males over 21 years of age who had resided in the Tacna-Arica territory for six months, and that the plebiscite be supervised by a commission composed of one Chilean, one Peruvian, and a third member chosen by the consular agents in Tacna and Arica. This plan did not appeal to Peru, as her population in the disputed territory was a laboring one and as a class was illiterate. The feeling over this dispute became so bitter that Peru withdrew her legation from Santiago, Chile. The diplomatic relations then broken remained so for a period of 18 years.

In 1912 the Huneens-Billinghurst protocol was drawn up but never received effective ratification or acceptance in either country.

In December, 1921, the Chilean Government proposed to Peru that the plebiscite arranged in the agreement of 1912 be held without delay. Peru refused to accept this proposal; in fact, denied that there ever existed an agreement in 1912. She proposed to leave the whole matter to arbitration of a friendly third power, preferably the United States.

In 1922, at the suggestion of the late President Harding, the Chilean-Peruvian dispute was referred to the Washington conference which met in that city on May 15 and resulted in the reference of the dispute to President Harding as arbitrator.

The agencies of Chile and Peru presented their cases and counter-cases to the arbitrator, the President of the United States, on November 13, 1923, and April 12, 1924, respectively.

The arbitrator handed down in March, 1925, a clean-cut decision on the merits of each of the questions submitted. The first question was decided in favor of Chile's contention that the ultimate disposition of Tacna and Arica should be determined by popular vote. The second question, namely, the conditions of the plebiscite, involved the determination of some important matters such as the qualifications of the voters and the supervision of the plebiscite. Some of these matters were decided in accordance with contentions made by Chile, others in accordance with contentions made at one time or another by Peru. The question which concerned the northern and southern boundary of Tacna and Arica was decided outright in favor of Peru as far as it concerns the northern boundary. The dispute regarding the southern boundary is remitted to a special commission, consisting of one member from Chile, one from Peru, and one from the United States.

The plebiscitary commission arrived in Arica on August 4, 1925, to commence its work of preparing for the plebiscite. It was composed of General Pershing, as president, Señor Manual de Freyre Santander, of Peru, and Señor Augustin Edwards, of Chile.

The Chilean delegates resorted to obstructionist tactics and accused General Pershing of delay in fixing a date for the plebiscite. General Pershing apparently became disgusted with the situation and resigned as a member of the commission on February 27, 1926, when he was succeeded by Major General Lassiter. The latter labored on the commission until June 14, 1926, when he and the Peruvian commissioner abandoned the idea of holding a plebiscite. General Lassiter's report may be succinctly stated as follows: "It is felt that there was not a presumption of a doubt as to the lack of suitable plebiscitary conditions and that any such presumption was repelled by well-known facts which made it appear that the commission is denied the opportunity of performing its appointed task."

One final effort to adjust the differences between Chile and Peru was made by the United States. On November 30, 1926, a memorandum suggesting a settlement was sent to the Chilean and Peruvian ambassadors in Washington. The memorandum suggested that Chile and Peru voluntarily cede their rights in Tacna and Arica to Bolivia, subject to certain guarantees for the protection of the rights of all inhabitants of the Provinces. Bolivia was to provide adequate compensation for the cession of the territory and the apportionment of the compensation between Chile and Peru was to be agreed upon by the representatives of the two governments.

This proposal was accepted unconditionally by Bolivia. Chile accepted it in principle. Peru rejected the proposal. Since this last effort no further propositions have been offered by our Government for the settlement of the dispute.

Through the instrumentality of the Secretary of State, diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru were renewed in October, 1928, after a cessation of 18 years.

CHILEAN-PERUVIAN ACCORD

(*Source: M. I. D.*)

An important happening of an international character, and one which is regarded by Latin-American authorities as the greatest single peace-making event in South America during the past 50 years, is the resumption of diplomatic relations—suspended since March, 1910—between Chile and Peru. Official relations, in process of renewal through the friendly offices of the United States since July of this year, were formally established on October 3 through the exchange of diplomatic representatives of the rank of ambassador. This recent tide of Chilean-Peruvian friendship which has swept both countries for the first time in 40 years, contrasts sharply with the somewhat feverish energy which characterized the activities of the two Governments during the past few years in the acquisition of new armament. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, if Chilean and Peruvian statesmen, in the near future, lend their best efforts toward a peaceful settlement of their international dispute over Tacna-Arica, long considered the real danger spot in South America.

The news of the acceptance by Chile and Peru of Mr. Kellogg's suggestion to renew official contact has been featured in the press of the two countries concerned, the general tone being one of satisfaction and optimism as to the outcome. Two of the principals have issued statements which are not without interest. Foreign Minister Gallardo, of Chile, sent the following official announcement to the press of Bueno Aires, Argentina:

> The Chilean Government is profoundly grateful for the generous invitation of Mr. Kellogg and has replied with absolute forgetfulness of the past and without other vision than for the morrow. Chile proceeds in good faith without reservations, without zigzagging, straight ahead to seek an agreement with Peru, by new roads and in order to cement it upon bases which will make the greatness and build up the prosperity of both peoples. We have lost 40 years in fruitless discussions, in circumstances that for that period the national economy of the two countries has been sacrificed to some thousands of millions, because the commercial intercourse has been almost nil, even though in the last 10 years

> we have bought in Peru to the value of $580,000,000. The proposition of 1921 was unfortunate, the exchange of notes had no other effect than to stir up opinion in both countries. * * * To-day we wish to attempt the solution by means very much different, creating an atmosphere of cordiality, exchanging friendly ideas in private, without sonorous and empty speeches, but reposefully and quietly, thinking deeply and with seriousness. President Ibanez took charge of the Government in circumstances when in both countries there existed a great remoteness. After a year of silent and honorable work, without protestations nor circulars, counting upon a frank spirit of comprehension and good will on the part of the men of the Government and of the people of Peru, that atmosphere has changed. This new situation with the neighboring country will demonstrate to the countries of America what the true structure is of the present Government of Chile and what is the objective of its international policy. His excellency President Ibanez wishes with all the force of his soul to attain a friendly solution and to finally settle that which others have unsettled.

That Peru still relies on the final judgment of the United States in disposing of the Tacna-Arica matter is implied by the tone of the utterances of President Leguia in referring to comments that some international jurists were of the opinion that the task of the arbitrator had terminated with the decision in reference to the plebiscite. The President said:

> I do not understand how anyone can entertain such a belief. The President of the United States can do everything in his judgment that may be necessary to solve the question. * * * I do not understand how there could be two opinions upon it, because not only is the arbitration in full existence, but in addition there are the good offices, and employing these the arbitrator can do anything. Now, for example, he has asked for the renewal of relations diplomatic. We can deny nothing to the arbitrator that he may esteem necessary to renew his mission.

Interrogated as to what would be the immediate result of the renewal of diplomatic relations, he replied:

> It will give the two countries the opportunity of treating directly, which can be advantageous. In that case all that we agree upon can be accepted by the arbitrator as a base of his decision because the arbitrator would not desire to issue a decision which could not please both parties. * * * We wish the problem to be solved but correctly and with justice.

The economic note in the statement of the Chilean Foreign Minister can not be overlooked. Press comments also emphasize the fact that the renewal of relations will not only be in the interest of confraternity and union, but of commercial intercourse as well. For many reasons the commercial field between Chile and Peru offers great opportunities for both countries. Peru is a large exporter of sugar, cottonseed oil, rice, fruit, gasoline, kerosene, petroleum, and cotton. Chile, on the other hand, is a producer of articles which Peru imports, such as nitrate, sole leather, railway ties, woods of all kinds, grains, industrial textiles, and footwear. The balance of trade for the past 10 years has been about $64,000,000 all told, in favor of Peru. It is argued that if under the adverse conditions of suspension of relations there has been a very considerable trade, what a much more profitable future there would be with friendly relations, whereby the interchange of products between the two countries could be effected under exceptionally advantageous circumstances.

For the supervision of commercial affairs in their international aspect, consulates are necessary. It is of considerable interest, therefore, to learn that President Leguia has introduced in the budget items relating to the establishment of four consulates of different categories in Chile. According to the information so far available, there will be a consulate general of the first class in Valparaiso, a consulate of the second class in Antofagasta, and consulates of the third category in Iquique and Talcahuano. It is also understood that the Chilean foreign office is taking steps toward the reopening of the Chilean consulates in Peru. In general, it may be said that there is a very definite undercurrent of commercial expediency in the improved atmosphere between the two countries which, fortunately, permits them to turn their attention from international quarrels to the more profitable fields offered by the exploitation of their own large natural resources.

As regards a settlement of the Tacna-Arica controversy, it is true that while only a beginning has thus far been made, it is one full of promise. On October 10 the state department made the following announcement in regard to the suspension of the activities of the Tacna-Arica Boundary Commission:

> In view of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru and the hopeful prospect that these two countries may now be able to settle this long-standing dispute, which, if settled, will make unnecessary further work of the boundary commission, the two Governments have agreed to the suggestion of the Secretary of State to suspend the work of the boundary commission for a period of four months, in order to give time to permit negotiations between the Governments for a settlement.
>
> Both Governments have accepted such proposal. In this action the two Governments have taken a broad-minded and liberal view of the matter and have shown their earnest desire to come to a settlement.

This announcement would tend to confirm the belief that the promise of a Tacna-Arica settlement had developed into a strong possibility, and, furthermore, should go far toward convincing the Latin-American nations that the United States has not only had no sinister purpose in its connection with this affair, but that its animating motive has been to do all in its power to help establish peace and to strengthen commerce in the continent to the south. That two such important neighbors as Chile and Peru should live in full agreement is not only logical but necessary for the preservation of the peace and prosperity of South America, and it is encouraging indeed that these neighboring nations should signalize so desirable a state of affairs by arriving at their present stage of mutual understanding and helpfulness.

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